Midway, alternate outcomes

Simple question: What, if anything, could the Japanese done differently at Midway from approxmately 0800 4 June 42 when the Tone 's Scout Plane #4 reported having sighted the US carriers and their location?
Could the Japanese have altered their operations after that point and defeated the US or, at least, avoided the destruction of their own carriers?

 

Spent most of today and last night thinking about this and the only thing that I feel Nagumo could have done to have had a fighting chance at this point would have been to launch the second wave attack against Midway rather than begin a rearming process. This serves to possibly end the use of Midway as an active airfield and it keeps the Japanese carriers free of what would be the careless storage of bombs on their ships that contributed to the rapid destruction of 3 of their 4 fleet carriers. If just one of those carriers could have remained operational along with the Hiryu later in the day, the Japanese could have had a fighting chance against the US fleet and possibly sunk have sunk either the Hornet or Enterprise along with the Yorktown. My feeling is that the Japanese propensity for using seperate forces and diversionary attacks is what ultimately cost them a victory at Midway. If Yamamoto had kept the two small carriers Ryujo and Junyo (sent with Hosogaya for the attack on the Aleutians) with Nagumo's force and disregarded the whole Aluetians operation he could have added almost 90 more planes to his force. Even if these were use as fighter platforms for fleet defense purposes it could have made all the difference between keeping his carriers afloat and losing 3 within minutes of each other.

 

I don't think there was much Nagumo could do to change the outcome myself. The best possible alternative changes things only a little. In this alternate Nagumo, on receiving the scout plane's report of American carriers, immediately begins spotting and launches a large CAP which is completely airborne by 0830. Since the Zero has a good aloft time, the CAP doesn't need replinishment for a bit.
At 0835 or so the first Midway strike returns, lands and, is struck down to the hangers. While the CAP is being launched and the first strike is landing, the second strike is readied to take on the US carriers. This gives Nagumo almost an hour to ready the second strike.
By 0900 the first strike is down and in the hangers. The second strike is now moved to the flight deck and spotted. While this is going on, the US makes several futile attacks on the carriers from Midway and, from the carrier torpedo groups. Many of the CAP Zeros are now low or out of cannon ammunition but the attacks have been repulsed without damage. The second strike completes spotting by about 0950 and begins to launch. This is right after the torpedo strikes have failed but just before the dive bombers arrive (1025). The CAP now needs replinishment as described as well.
By 1010 the strike is off. Nagumo brings up the Zeros that escorted the first strike having almost an hour to rearm and refuel them. These launch following the strike launch at about 1020. Simultaneously, some of the aloft CAP return to land. The dive bombers show up at 1025 and meet some but, not overwhelming, resistance from the just launched fighters that have managed to just climb to altitude.
How much this changes the Japanese losses can be debated; maybe not at all to one or more of the carriers survives with heavy damage. However, the Japanese have launched a large strike of nearly 100 aircraft against the US carriers which deliver a serious blow to one or more of them in return. So, now Midway is a draw rather than an outright victory.
Guadalcanal is delayed and the Japanese are able to entrench in the southern Solomons prolonging the Pacific war by six or more months.

 

Don't forget that the Japanese could only warm up engines on the flight deck, unlike the Americans who could use their hangar decks for this purpose. Engines needed to be warmed for about 15 minutes prior to launch. So they had to bring up aircraft from the hangar deck and not just spot them, but warm them up as well.

 

The deck warm-up time was included in my time line which was derived from Isom's "The Battle of Midway: Why the Japanese Lost (Naval War College Review, Summer 2000) and Parshall, Dickson and Tully's "Doctrine Matters" in Naval War College Review, Summer 2001. While these authors concentrate on the historical time line, they provide enough data to construct alternates that were possible within Japanese doctrine.
Originally, the second strike was kept in the hangers and continious CAP flight operations were run to protect the carriers from attack. It was in large part the small ammunition supply of the Zero's cannon that required frequent replinishment of the CAP. Had the CAP been large enough from the start or had it been kept airborne without the frequent landing and launch cycles that originally occured it was possible to spot and launch the second strike before the US hit the Japanese at 1025. As it was, Nagumo chose the conservative alternate to continue CAP operations in the face of repeated, but ineffective, attacks.

 

Even with the actual losses sufferd by the IJN, surely their Surface based Navy was strong enough to continue to Midway and land the troops which would have then made Midway a Japanese base.

Its the only way in which the losses suffered would have been worth it.

I dont believe the USN could have stood up to the Japanese Naval Forces in a surface battle and though the USN chased the retreating Japanese after Midway, they didnt cause enough damage to have disrupted a surface fleet.

 

Not necessarily, after the sinking of the Hiryu, the Japanese force is left only with the light carrier Hosho with the Main Body and the light carrier Zuiho with the Invasion Force. The Hosho carried only 8 dive bombers and the Zuiho carried 12 fighters and 12 torpedo planes. The US still had the carriers Enterprise and Hornet which still had a majority of their bombers available along almost half of there fighters. The airstrip on Midway was also operational and still had a formidable force of SBD's and Army B-26 and B-17's available to it. As the the US carriers were still putting up forces of 50 and 60 planes on July 6 in search of the remaining Japanese forces and additional B-17's had been flown in from Hawaii, the Japanese retreat was a no-brainer for them. An often overlooked element of the US forces at Midway was the 12 submarines located in the area that any invasion force also would have had to contend with.