Split from "What if Britain was defeated in 1940" Operation Overlord was not a gamble. The operation's starting point was determined by both major participating Allies as the moment on which neither the German navy or air force could do much to interfere with the amphibious assault, as well as a moment on which Germany was so heavily engaged on other fronts that no reserves other than those already present in France could be summoned to aid in a possible counterattack. This meant that the operation's Ready Day was a date on which the Allies controlled the air and the sea and were confident that their land forces would be able to cope with the Germans in the field because of the sufficiently weak enemy position reinforced by massive Allied air and naval support. In other words, the whole fact that D-Day ever existed meant that Germany was already defeated. The British especially couldn't afford to be beaten back; the Americans probably couldn't rouse popular support for a second attempt; and so both established the starting point for the operation to be a time when success chances were very high indeed.
Despite that, the invasion still could have failed. If it had - well, you say it yourself: Had the Germans seen through the diversions, had Hitler not been asleep, and several other 'ifs' and 'maybes', then it could potentially have failed. Remember that after D-Day the Allies were considering giving up on Omaha (not sure what this proves! ). However, once we got a toehold we were there to stay. Getting the toehold was the gamble. Yes, they chose the best time, but any offensive - especially an invasion - is always a bit of a gamble.
ah, but remember that whilst overlord was the main invasion the allies were already fighting in italy and the german line was crumbling in June 44 all across the eastern fronteirs. Even if Rommel had pushed us back into the sea it would only have delayed the inevitable rather than allowed Germany to go uncontested. The Allies had a lot of material and men and if overlord failed it could have been transfered to Itlay to threaten an invasion across to sourthern france and speed up that offensive. FNG
Of course the allies chose the most advantageous moment to attack, Overlord would have been not only impossible but unthinkable without total air and naval supremacy (look at what happened to Sealion) it would also have beebn impossible had the German army not been ground down in other theaters.All that said though Overlord was a risk - it required enourmous planning and preparation, a vast logistical effort (without even mentioning two of the most dareing and crucial special operations of the war at Pegasus Bridge and thePont Du Hoc) and it could still have failed, as Ricky points out many ifs, buts and maybes that could have scuppered the whole thing.
Churchill was primarily the reason that the invasion took place in 1944. US leaders had wanted to invade in 1942 or 1943 at the latest. Churchill convinced Roosevelt that it would be better to hit at "the soft underbelly of Europe" first. Most historians agree that the invasion of Italy was a needless distraction and contributed little to the ultimate defeat of Germany though many argue that it caused Hitler to abandon Operation Citadel which ultimately resulted in the German forces going on the defensive and perhaps wasting their last best chance to win in the East.
An cross channel invasion was simply beyond the western allies capbilities in 1942 or 43 it was Italy or nowhere. Personaly I think Churchill was right and Italy drew off German troops which could have been better deployed elsewhere as well as knocking Italy out off the war which put more pressure on declining German manpower - matter of opinion though.
You may very well be correct in that assessment. I'm just pointing out that wisely or not the US leaders wanted to invade much sooner than 1944. With 20-20 hindsight I happen to agree that sooner would have invited disaster.
US leaders indeed wanted to invade in 1942 and later in 1943, but they themselves were well enough aware that this was beyond their own capacity since they simply didn't have enough manpower in Britain before January 1944 (this shows the relative size of the Italian front; the troops there were tiny compared to the force assembled for the invasion). In the end they took a more cautious course and this meant that when they eventually did start the operation they were ready, meaning the Germans were not (enough). This operation could still have failed if, as Ricky said, all the measures the Allies took to ensure that it did not fail, failed. This is a strange contradiction...
The Allies took measures to ensure that Hitler was asleep that morning, and so therefore the armour could not be moved? And you can try all the countermeasures/diversions you like, but if your enemy don't believe them... Yes, the Allies did all in their power to make sure it was a success (of course), but it was still a risk. It could still have gone wrong. They did still get lucky in places.
"The Allies took measures to ensure that Hitler was asleep that morning" What they do? Slip a benny in his ovaltine? Besides, it didn't matter if he was awake or asleep. He was convinced that the Normandy landings were a faint with the main invasion being agains Calais. By the time he got his act together all the bridgeheads were secure. FNG
I was just pointing out one part-reason of the success that was far beyond Allied control. He may have believed it was a feint, but he may also have decided to crush the feint using at least local reserves of armour. Who can say what would have ahappened if Hitler had been in control that morning...
There would have been little the Germans could do even then, since they were no longer in control of the air (interdiction strikes depleted and delayed all German troop movements during Overlord) and resistance movements as well as bombers had done their best to disable communications and railroads. The whole area of Normandy was almost impossible to travel through for massive German troop columns. Again, the Allies had prepared this operation so extensively that it could barely fail.
Um, on June 6th, only 2 German aircraft attempted to disrupt the invasion, and they got all the way to the ships of the invasion fleet. If the Luftwaffe had made a concerted, all-out effort to smash the invasion attempt, what would have happened? To quote Robert Burns... "The best-laid schemes o' mice an' men Gang aft agley" (which means you can plan & prepare as much as possible, but it can still go horribly wrong...)
As I understand it consideration was given to withdrawing from Omaha and relanding at a less well defended location farther down the coast. Even if that idea would have prevailed, it would have only meant a delay and coming ashore on a different beach, not abandoning the invasion.
Yes, but when I posted that I was thinking that it proved that, despite all the Allies did, the landings at Omaha nearly did not succeed. had the other landings not done so well as they did, Omaha would, IMHO, have been called off. In fact, if all the landings had proved as tough, it is possible that the whole darn caboodle would be in serious trouble...
It's an interesting point because it's not clear that you can call off an amphibious invasion without abandoning the troops already landed. There are very few examples of failed ampibious assaults of any size. There was Dieppe however it was relatively small compared to either Pacific amphibious operations or to the Normandy landings and the men on the beach were pretty much all killed or captured AFAIK.
You can't compare a local landing with the intention of capturing a port and withdrawing later, to an ampihbious operation involving nine divisions of assault troops and the largest fleet ever assembled with the objective of dealing the final blow to the enemy. However, the appearance of the word "final blow" in the previous sentence again indicates that the Allies got to Normandy to end it; they were confident that they could. What Ricky brings forward could indeed have obstructed the invasion but the Americans, the British and their allies were more ready than ever in late May 1944 and with public opinion an ever threatening variable they decided, controlling the air and the sea, that the time was now. Meanwhile they did everything within their power to stop the Germans from throwing the invasion back into the sea; all these measures may have failed, but most didn't, and this was not because of luck but thorough planning, spying and estimations of the situation. The point about the aircraft is debatable. First, a fleet of Luftwaffe planes is more easily detected and concentrated against than just two fighters. Second, no one expected the two German planes to actually obstruct the invasion forces, since there was little they could do with just the machine guns and cannon in two Fw190s against a force of 176,000 men and 5,000 ships. And third, the German planes dared make only one raid over one of the assault beaches of the invasion before withdrawing, obviously not expecting the element of surprise to last any longer in their favour.
Ok, let's debate! How many aircraft (fighters, fighter-bombers & bombers) could the Luftwaffe have thrown at the Invasion forces on 6th June 1944? My guess is quite a lot. Enough would have got through the protective fighters to do damage to the invasion fleet. Not crippling damage, sure, but still damage. Which could have had knock-on effects to the invasion itself - the lack of crucial supplies at a crucial time, ground-support aircraft diverted or withdrawn due to enemy air activity, or just a dis-organisation of ships to and from the beaches. Had I been the Germans, the Luftwaffe gets thrown in. I know it would gut them, but it could also give me the advantage...
What do people think of Max Hastings' 'Overlord' and Carlo D'Este's 'Decision in Normandy' account of the battle and its history?