Pearl Harbor and then??

Hello rouges,​

One thing has always been bugging me.

What did the Japanese actually expect to happen after Pearl Harbour?

Hitler invaded or attacked Western Europe and was successful. He could have been successful against England in the long run. Even his estimate toward attacking the Soviets in regards to achieving victory or a kind of stalemate was still feasible IMHO.​

However Japan even upon sinking another one or two battleships or the aircraft carriers, what did they believe would or should happen after that? The US begging for peace? The US leaving the entire Pacific to them?

Were they really so naive to think that the destruction of a fleet would be enough to keep the US out of the picture?

Regards
Kruska ​

 

Several problems the Japanese military had with themselves.

An overwhelming sense of racial superiority.
Never lost a war.
Bushido.

Combined, leads to a lack of logic and understanding. The only Japanese officers with doubts about the outcome, were officers that served or were educated in the US, Yamamoto being the most well known.

 

The problem is they achieved most of their goals faster then they ever dreamed. After that, they had no idea what to do. So Yamamoto cooked up an invasion of Midway to lure out the US carriers and end the war. We all know how that turned out.

 

Just destroying some carriers - and that's it?

What about the US industrial potential - in regards to building new ones?
And not just carriers.

Did the Japanese (according to documents) have any valid viewpoint in regards to the reaction of the US after Pearl?

Regards
Kruska

 

By June of 42 the US was still very limited. No new carriers would be commissioned until December, and even then the USS Essex was not ready to enter combat until May of 43. By January 44 the US had only replaced the fleet carriers lost in action to that point. 1943 was the year US production really started to make the difference. Japans hope was to defeat the US before this could happen. Rather than crush the nations hopes, Pearl Harbor only unified us.

 

A litle known fact, at least to me, is that they were going after ice cream. The whole "bombing" thing was just a huge mistake. It seems that the Japanese were actually trying to support Great Brittain against Germany. The support would be in actual troops and materiel: the troops would be sent by bus and bicycle through Malaysia to Singapore and then on to Europe. The materiel would be planes, bombs and aeriel torpedoes that would be delivered to Pearl Harbor. In return the US and Great Brittain would share Naval ice cream making technology. Unfortunately the Naval task force delivering the supplies to Pearl Harbor ran low on fuel, waiting for the American Aircraft Carriers and the ice cream to show up, and decided that they could at least deliver the planes, bombs and aeriel torpedoes before having to turn for home. Appearantly one young Japanese pilot wasn't paying attention and instead of lowering the landing gear hit the bomb release control lever; and well, the rest is history.

 

Hello mikebatzel,

that is exactly what I do not understand or can't follow on. How does anyone - in this case the Japanese - believe that by destroying a fleet at Pearl, that this would lead to the defeat of the US???

So, did the Japanese plan to attack the US - e.g. California, by 1943 or something simmilar?
So as to say - exploit the power gap in the Pacific - before the US starts building up.
If so there would be a plan in existence to attack the US mainland?

Regards
Kruska

 

Hello FJH,

well...hm...okay...makes kinda more sense to me then attacking Pearl and as such defeating the US. Are there contracts that would have ensured the transfer of icecream making technology to the Japanese, or were the US just pulling their legs?

Regards
Kruska

 

I am under the impression that the Japanese were desperate. They had a lovely little war going on in China which America rudely interrupted by not selling Japan the steel, rubber and petrol that they needed. At that point everyone in the IJA and IJN lost their minds and decided that the only shot they had was to bomb Pearl Harbor, grab all of the Dutch, GB and American possessions in the Pacific, then wait it out. Not a very bright plan in retrospect.

 

Hello Triple C,

maybe it is just me, but I find it hard if not impossible to believe that the Japanese could only think as far as Honolulu - there must have been more on their mind - really no...further plans?

Regards
Kruska

 

Lets look at what we can prove:

American Aircraft Carriers did produce Ice cream during WW2:

Tora Tora Tora!

Everyone knows that Tigers LOVE ice Cream

Banzai:

we've all seen the archival footage of the Japanese plane launching and the crews yelling "Banzai!". They are actually yelling : "Yaaaaaay Yaaay Ice Cream"

A Third Wave was not launched:
This could have been an apologetic gesture when the Japanese realised they were having issues with their bomb release and landing gear interface.

Yamamoto:

this is accepted as a reference to the Giant Plumb Dragon of Japanese Mythology who was very protective of his ice cream.

The Aircraft Carriers were not in port.

Nothing else makes sense. IF the Japanese had truly intended to attack Pearl Harbor they would have declared war

 

Kruska, I think I have a "sort-a, kind-a" idea of what was the objective of the Japanese. That was to deal the Americans a vicious blow, and their "mongrel nation" of isolationists and cash happy capitalists would sue for peace and allow them to let them keep the territory they conquered and set up their own system of colonies in the Pacific area. Since they came into the "colony" business late, had been rewarded with the former colonies of the Germans north of the equator post-WW1, they probably felt the other "colonial powers" would have little to complain about if they did exactly what they had done.

Prince Fumimaro Konoe who was also the Prime Minister three times was probably the instigator of the idea of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere with Japan at its head. In an attempt to found a Greater East Asia, comprising China, Korea, Manchuria, and parts of Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Philippines) lead by Japan itself the political leaders came up with this "militarist/expansionist" design to remove the "white European/America" influence in the Pacific Rim nations as well as the Asian mainland and replace them with Japanese. Konoe was one of the few who wished it to be done diplomatically rather than with "military power".

Asia for the Asians was one of the policy's position, the many smaller rebellions if the French colonies, the British, Dutch, and American controlled areas re-enforced the belief they would be seen as liberators by the indigenous peoples. Directly after WW1 he had published an essay which stated; "The peace that the Anglo-American leaders are urging on us amounts to no more than maintaining a status quo that suits their interests. … The true nature of the present conflict [WWI] is a struggle between the established powers and powers not yet established…. At an early stage, Britain and France colonized the ‘less civilized’ regions of the world, and monopolized their exploitation. As a result, Germany and all the late-coming nations also, were left with no land to acquire and no space to expand."

In spite of this position Konoe was sort of a pro-American fellow and tried to avoid provoking war with the US, but others in the Cabinet didn’t agree with him, and felt that they could "bully" America into accepting the expanded Japanese hegemony as a "fait accompli" if they struck fast enough. In addition to Konoe, there were two men who advised the Japanese HQ to not pursue this direction, one was General Kuribayashi, the Japanese Commander of Iwo Jima, and the other was Admiral Yamamoto.

Kuribayashi was from a higher ranking Samurai family than Yamamoto’s adoptive family, but below Konoe’s. Kuribayashi had been educated in Canada and toured the US. In Japan, he was one of the few soldiers ever granted an audience by Emperor Hirohito. His adamantly held position that attacking the US was a very bad idea, earned him the animosity of others in the military clique of the cabinet, and he was removed from all important duty and position. Eventually ending up as the defender of Iwo Jima as a backwater posting.

Yamamoto was a more savvy man than Kuribayashi when it came to "political infighting", and saw which way the wind was blowing so he took it upon himself to design the best plan he could to win as much as possible as fast as possible. This would allow Japan to be dealing from strength and then offer the US a "treaty" which would allow the Japanese to maintain control over their new territories. These areas would supply them with the raw materials they would need to feed their own industrial output, as well as supply the home islands with much needed food imports.

These are of course just my own opinions formed over the years, and could be both short-sighted and/or incorrect. "OpanaPointer" has a fine set of points as well. I am somewhat dubious of Brad's ("formerjughead") tongue in cheek postiion on this being hinged on a desire for ice-cream

 

Hello FJH,

you have not provided any proof for the willingness of the Americans to share icecream making technologies with the Japanese who took the stress of cycling down to Singapore.

Plese state sources - otherwise I will disregard your assumtions.

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As for Yamamoto:

Sounds dumb to me - making a statement as such - after the landinggear incident.

Well they did, the declaration just came a bit too late. Intimidation of an enemy is one thing, having a plan to defeat the enemy would be a primary requisit before attacking someone.

Destroying the US Pacific fleet = defeating the USA?
Destroying the US Pacific fleet = awakening of a sleeping giant?

How prosaic and dumb at the same time can one get?

Regards
Kruska

 

Destroying the fleet at Pearl Harbor was designed to prevent it from interfering with the Japanese aim of occupying the Philippines and Guam. The Japanese believed that by capturing those two, and in the process destroying the US Asiatic Fleet, the US would have no means of threatening the Japanese homeland and would be forced into the position of negotiating a peace which left Japan's territorial acquisitions intact.


"If Manila falls, there will be no alternative for the United States Asiatic Fleet but to surrender; and in the case of surrender it is thought steps will probably be taken by the Fleet to scuttle itself; but if it is America's method not to allow scuttling, it will have to face the calamity of being captured by the Japanese Fleet. Also, it is not difficult to imagine the United States Asiatic Fleet making an attempt to escape from Manila Bay so that it may devote itself to its task of destroying the trade of Japan. If several cruisers and submarines make a successful escape from Manila Bay, they will cause serious havoc. Therefore, as the first task of its blockade, the Japanese Navy should exercise every precaution to prevent the escape of the United States Asiatic Fleet.
If Japan occupies Guam and the Philippines, she will undoubtedly have a convenient situation for her military operations. As Bywater has pointed out, if Guam and the Philippines fall into the enemy's hands, the United States will be confronted with a serious problem, the solution of which will be almost impossible. The loss of Guam and the Philippines means that the United States will not have even a single base of operations in the West Pacific. Without such bases she will never be able to strike at the heart of Japan from Pearl Harbour.
On the other hand, the morale of the Japanese nation will be greatly heightened by the occupation of Guam and the Philippines; at the same time if the brave Japanese submarines will haunt the long Pacific coasts of the United States, attacking United States commercial ships and threatening to destroy the supply routes between the United States mainland and Pearl Harbor, the American people, proud though they are, will be extremely worried about the situation."

Kinaoki Matsuo, Japanese Naval Intelligence

 

Actually I'm not sure they ever did. The infamous 13point paper wasn't really a declaration of war. I'm sure others can point you to the text so you can see for yourself if interested.

 

I have stated sources they are the blue wrinting in ( parenthesis' )

My thesis is no more silly than half of the stuff that comes to light during the discussions regarding attitudes, motivations and consequences of Pearl Harbor, I just chose to get mine out first.

That would be the rational approach obviously things would have been different if the American Carriers were in port at the time of attack. IT is widely accepted that Carrier Airpower was a decisive factor in the Pacific Theatre.

Slowing it down maybe but not defeating it

That is a quote directly attibuted to Yamamoto after hearing that the Carriers were not at Pearl Harbor during the attack. AS it turns out it was actually quite accurate in gauging the American response to the attack.

Is that a rhetorical question or did we just meet? Because regular posters will notice that the pendulum can go equal distance in both directions.

 

I think you have to look at the actual goal of the Pearl Harbor attack compared to the results.

The Japanese wanted to destroy the US Fleet, especially its Carriers. Doing so would cripple the American Pacific Fleet and render them incapable of taking action in the Pacific as the Japanese Island-Hopped to places that had some of those resources they needed. I think the goal, since it'd take nearly a year (if not more) for the US to rebuild their lost carriers, would have been to secure the Pacific from the US and - due to the threat of invasion - force them to surrender or make Peace with concessions.

 

Too true, the mulitpart part message to the D.C. negotiators contained no declaration of war, and didn’t even formally break off diplomatic relations between the two nations. That, breaking off diplomatic relations is the "first step" toward a declaration of war usually.

However a portion from the ibiblio site shows that the war itself was a fait accompli in early December.

ON THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN MEETING OF PRIVY COUNCIL DEC. 8, 1941

Written by Matsumoto-Head of Treaty Bureau In the 11th item of Article of the Internal Orders decided upon at the time the Reorganization of the Privy Council in December 1938, was included a section on "The Declaration of War." It was unclear whether this gave the Privy Council the right to advise the decision to engage in war, or just the authority for advising the formal declaration of war. However, when war was declared against the United States and Great Britain, the decision to engage in war had already been made at the previous conference of Dec. 1, 1941, so the Privy Council was only to consider an address to the throne stating "We declare war against the United States and Great Britain." A draft of an Imperial Rescript declaring war was attached to the Address to the Throne for advisement. (The address to the Throne and the draft of the Imperial Rescript were drawn up by the Cabinet.) Meeting of Committee of Advisement Dec. 8-7:40 A. M. (12:40 P. M., 7 Dec., Pearl Harbor time.) In the Imperial Palace. (emphasis mine)
　
See:

JAPANESE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN

The Japanese did deliver a two-line note to Ambassador Joseph Grew on the afternoon of the Dec. 8th, Tokyo Time. This echoed the Imperial Radio Rescript telling the Japanese people they were at war was heard in the U.S. at 4 pm, Dec. 7th, D.C. Time.