Von Kluge's 8th Army Encircled and Destroyed

In late summer 1944, the Germans were basically getting their a$$es handed to themselves by the Allies and Comintern. On the Western Front, they had been pushed out of Normandy. In an attempt to try and make one final move to retake Normandy while it was still in reach, Von Kluge made a "Last Gasp" attack on the 30th Infantry Division several miles east of Avranches. Patton and his Third Army, south of the counterattack, was ordered (VERY reluctantly, mind you) to go far east and cut north and cut off Von Kluge. However, while Von Kluge's army was retreating through the Falaise Gap, Patton was ordered to hold and not to advance and cut off the Germans.

What if this hadn't happened?

What if Bradley gave Patton the go-ahead to complete the encirclement of the 8th Army and therefore Von Kluge's army? No doubt they would be captured or destroyed. It is stilll pretty obvious that Germany would've lost the war much quicker, but how quick? January 45? December? November? Plus, HOW would they fall? The Soviets? The Allies? Comments plz

 

I don't believe I remember Bradley making that call...if anyone, it was Montgomery. However, I think the Allies could definitely have closed the Falaise sooner and, with much less bloodshed. They were slow in getting around it, allowing the Germans to regroup and try to bash their way out, much to the dismay of the Polish, Canadian, and American troops trying to finish the circle. There has already much speculation on this subject, and here's the gist of it all.

The Germans screwed up bad, real bad, thanks to Hitler. But the Allies screwed up too, even if it did score an astounding victory still. Sure a 100,000 or so German troops escaped, but they left behind vital supplies, vehicles, armor, and ammunition that Germany was hard-pressed to replace. So, I believe the war would have been changed very little.

 

Bradley stated in his memoirs that it was he who ordered Patton to stop, as he was fearful that the German forces were too strong to be trapped,
stating " I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken [American] neck at Falaise"

 

Wasn´t the main excuse used the possibility of US and British troops attacking each other when the quote " solid shoulder at Argentan..." was used?? I mean you would fight the Germans anyway but this was a chance in a lifetime to destroy the whole armoured German force in the West...

 

I stand corrected. Perhaps he was just painfully aware of Patton's recklessness.

As it stands, Montgomery must have felt the same way, because he obviously didn't override the command. Seems the high command was pretty unified on this. What happened? Too cautious?

 

Bradley does mention this in his autobiography. He also describes the question coming up twice during the battle. On the first occasion he assumed the Canadian corps would be reaching its objective line on schedule or nearly so & so close the gap as planned. A second factor was the lack of enough battalions to push on. Pattons entire army was scattered across Normandy, Brittiany and adjacent provinces. He had only one corps of two divisions positioned to attack north towards Falaise. Bradley did not think this enough to stand up to the German attack east wards from the pocket. He had intellegence reports of German movement towards the gap and expected a desperate counter strike. Right or wrong that was his rationall.

The question remained however and over the next few days it became clear the 21st AG was not closing the gap, tho it was very near. When Bradley discussed it with Patton a second time Patton was cool to the idea. He had not moved significant reserves or supplies to his corps on the south edge of the gap. More important he felt the wider evelopment to the Seine river would net far more Germans. He was already completing preperatiosn for this envelopment and had taken the preliminary steps for execution. Bradley left it at that.

I've never seen a exact analysis of how many German prisoners were taken where in this campaign. The records do exist as each corps kept track of the take each day. I suspect that by picking over those numbers a usefull picture might emerge.

" ...but this was a chance in a lifetime to destroy the whole armoured German force in the West..."

The armored force inside the pocket was destroyed. Few if any tanks or other vehicals made it out. Of those that were not trapped in the pocket, about half never were inside the pocket, the bulk were lost trying to cross the Seine River before the Allies encircled that line. Crossing the Seine was a major problem for the Germans as the bridges were down, the pontoon bridges were useless in daylight as were the ferrys. Thousands of remaing vehicals were abandoned along the Seine River for lack of a crossing or fuel.

The other consideration is the immense loss by the German armored or mechanized force before the pocket was formed. Depending on how you count the tanks & assualt guns of the divisions were replaced two to three times over during the June/July battles. That is the entire armored force available in the west in June was effectively destroyed, and the reserve or replacement vehicals and current production sent destroyed as well.

It would have nice to have close the pocket completely earlier in the battle, but the German lost over 400,000 men in the battle of France in the first three months. Thats comparable to their loss at Verdun in WWI over more months.

 

I'd say the Germans would do what they would do best- Punch things. They would blitz through the relatively weak line wehre the British and Americans met and RUN. A reminder of German military power might make the Allies more cautious, more panzers get across the Seine, and it actually turns out BETTER for the germans. But that's how I think it would have happened.

 

I don't want niggling,but an 8th army in the West in 1944 ?

 

Indeed it should be the 7th Army as well as Panzer Group West/5th Panzer Army.

 

Read some descriptions of the Germans who tried to "punch out", even before the gap was closed. About every English language hsitory of the Normandy campaign has at least one of these accounts. Read just a half dozen and it is clear what sort of hell those who did escape went through. One described crawling several kilometers to avoid the rain of artillery fire. Another indication of how bad the 'gap' was is in the numbers of Germans soldiers who choose to surrender rather than try to run the gauntlet or escape in some other direction. I cant recall any descriptions of surviors escaping with vehicals after the entire gap was covered by artillery fire.

Officers who tried to keep control inside the 'cauldron' found the fuel and ammo dumps were unusable and they could not organize any attacks against the perimeter larger than a company. As thin as Pattons and Hodges defense on the south side was the Germans describe being unable to assemble a large enough attack to crash through. Every group larger than a small company was hammered by massed artillery fire and air strikes.

The time for a organized escape by the 7th Army & the armored group passed shortly after the battle of Mortain. Perhaps even earlier. Rather than attacking at Mortain a attack south and east much earlier would have actually saved some organized formations and their equipment.

Ironically many who escaped the debacle of the Falaise pocket were amoung the thousands who were corraled by the US 1st Army in the Mons pocket a couple weeks later. Others were caught before they could cross the Seine River.

 

oh,and dont forget the intense dislikeness between bradley and patton.