Was small arms and mortar logistics for the Germans strong throughout the war?

I remember stumbling upon a figure- that the average German infantry company used 3 times more rifle munitions in combat actions compared to their American counterpart.

This is due to the obvious fact that the MG42 was so numerous and relied upon.

And that something like 80% of US casualties in the bocage were caused by German explosives fire.

Since there is much discussion of German logistics problems in the last year of the war, was this more limited to larger munitions( ie. tanks, flak, artillery, fuel, etc?)

 

I do not recall finding lots of instances of German infantry running out of rifle (or MG as I believe the belts could be reloaded in the field) ammo. But I believe the real killers are the mortars, once the ammo for those is gone the firepower of an infantry unit is greatly reduced. Shortages of mortar ammo are common occurrences for the germans.

 

Thanks.

But it surely wasn't as limited as German artillery, right?

And did the allies deploy more mortar firepower in their infantry divisions than the Germans as well?

 

The Germans almost always had less artillery to use than the allies, especially towards the end of the war. What they had was first-class, especially the legendary 88 - but they never had enough of them where they were needed, which was everywhere they fought. Not only were their munitions factories and transport facilities being bombed around the clock, they also faced serious shortages of strategic materials needed to make the big guns and ammunition for them. Moreoever from 1940 onward, a huge proportion of Germany's artillery was tied up in defending the Reich against allied air attack, the Germans often having to swap their 88's from an anti aircraft role to anti-tank or bombardment, and then back again all in the same battle.

Stalin called artillery "the god of war" and he probably wasnt wrong. In both World Wars and the Korean war artillery caused the majority (more than half) of all casualties on all sides. And if you want to count mortar fire as artillery you wouldnt be too far wrong either.

Mortar fire could be even deadlier than artillery. In WW2 most artillery was fired from several miles away, so the shell usually struck the ground at a much more shallow angle than a mortar shell hitting the same spot. Thus alot of the blast and shrapnel of the shell was dissipated up into the air or into the ground. When a mortar round hit the ground it was usually closer to vertical, and more of the shrapnel exploded at ground level where the people were more likely to be.

Towards the end of the war both sides developed "air burst" artillery. These shells were designed to explode before they hit, spraying shrapnel on a wider area and pity the poor fellow hiding in his fox hole!
Modern US, and presumably those of other nations, have mortar shells that have an adjustable dial on them that the crew sets before dropping the shell in the tube. The crew can choose when the round will detonate just by changing the dial. They can choose impact detonation, air burst, or delay (the mortar round will bury itself in the ground before exploding.)

 

I find the 80% US casualties by German mortars statistic to be rather extreme. If mortars are so effective, why didn't the US deploy them in even greater numbers (and size) ?

 

anyone know?

 

Because mortars are a "poor man's" artillery. They are a cheap substitute for actual artillery. The US used quite a few 60mm mortars in their units; these were roughly about 60% as effective as an 81mm mortar and had the same range as the German short (stummel) 81mm of about 1000 yards.
But, since the US had very effective communications and no real shortage of artillery (there are documented cases of up to 100 batteries using TOT fire being called on a high priority target) they had no reason to burden their infantry with alot of mortars like the Germans did.

 

It would seem that..when in close contact with German targets, having overwhelming mortar support to directly barrage the specific elements at close range (rather than far away, as it is with artillery) would augment their assault power.

But this is just an assumption.

 

US forward observers could easily place a barrage within a couple hundred yards of their own troops safely. And, given the artillery's longer range counterbatterying mortars is far easier. In fact, both the US and British in late 1944 started employing vehicle mounted mortar tracking radars that allowed them to back track and target mortar batteries in minutes.

 

I recal reading about one particularly bitter action in the Ardennes in which one FO called down artillery fire 200 yards in front of his own position. I do not remember if he survived but the Germans were pushed out of the position. What was the minimum safe distance from an artillery barage at the time? 300 meters?

 

thanks

How widespread were these vehicles? I haven't heard of them.

Is there a significant destructive effective between a 88mm shell or a 105mm shell?

 

Yes.

This is from a rather complex program I wrote as part of a miniature wargame design some years ago. The results have tracked very closely with the few official published numbers on this: (note, this is somewhat involved and the number below does not fully indicate the effect of an HE round as there are more variables involved but, it is a baseline comparison).

German 105mm HE effect 28 (due to a poor quality shell and filler)
US 105mm HE effect 37
German 88mm HE effect 26
British 25 pdr HE effect 33

So, the 88 is about 20% less effective than the standard Allied field artillery pieces and about as effective as the standard German field artillery piece.


A note on the program. It accounts for the shell weight, metallurgy, % filler, type of filler, and fuze location among other variables. Also there are modifiers for mortar and rocket artillery rounds included.

 

First, it should be recognized that for the bulk of the significant warfare, the Germans were on the defensive. Mortars and machine guns are more effective in a defensive mode. Mortars are effective in that they can be dropped on enemy troops without any way for those troops to locate where they are being launched from. As portable as mortars are, it makes them even more effective, but the Germans lacked the ability to minimize the number of rounds it took to move and fire on target efficiently.

As radar became more compact, it was only a matter of time before they could modify it to pinpoint artillery rounds. The procedure is simple and easy to implement. Today mortar crews are very mobile. Larger mortars are vehicle carried. Fire control units give them a high first hit probability, and they can have everything loaded and be moving before the rounds hit. Smaller mortars are harder to detect due to the short flight time. A two man team can set up and fire 2-3 rounds, and then move on with little risk from retaliation.

 

Yes, it is way off. US Army studies of battlefield wounds indicate that 70%+ were casued by fragments. Either from the casing of a projectile, or rocks and masonry or wood thrown about by a explosion or impact. The remainder were bullet wounds, burns, or concussions

As T A implied the mortars were a substitute for for missing howitzers and guns. German production policys reaching far back into the 1930s created the shortage of artillery ammunition, and a shortage of effective heavy cannons. To make up for this the cheaper mortars, mostly the 120mm models were built. The down side is the mortars lacked the range to compete with the howitzers. Perhaps Gardner would favor us with a larger list of effectivness comparisons from his game, including the mortars?

Blackburn in his book 'Guns of Victory' mentions one in use in 1945. Its not clear if that was the only one in the Canadian Army area or in the entire 21st Army Group. Neither is it clear if he is refering to just one machine or one unit operating several radar sets. In the 1980s we had one counter battery radar platoon in each divsions artillery (USMC), each with several transcievers and computer vans. Somewhere on my shelf is a artical in the Field Artillery Journal describing the use of the machines in the 1990s is Kosovo to locate snipers firing from high rise apartment buildings.

It was a matter of opinion. While they tried to train the soldiers to accept artillery projectiles landing a hundred meters away not everyone bought off on that. If you were entrenched, with good overhead cover The projectiles could land just five meters away. In the open maybe fifty to 100 meters. The effective casualty radius for a 105mm projectile was around 25 meters and over 40 for a 155mm howitzer projectile. However the distribution of projectles around a 'mean point of impact' will create a danger zone considerablly larger than 25 or 50 meters. Back in the 1980s we had a Marine killed in a training accident by a fragment over 400 meters from the detonation. Cant recall the exact distance.

 

I've seen this figure as well. What were the figures for the German or Russian side? The Germans had much less "frag" oriented firepower so losses to artillery and bombs must have been higher.

So I assume that this piece of mortar radar equipment was not standard issue?

 

iirc,the german 120mm morter was a copy of the ussr 120mm,and presumably the jerries had large amounts of captured morters and ammunition during their lightning advance through russia.cheers.