A Bridge Too Far

Why did Arnhem fail? It was too late, there had been numerous plans proposed to get the airborn divisions into action in Europe, mostly involving airborn troops dropping ahead of the advance and preparing the way for the foot sloggers and tanks. Most of the plans were canceled as the ground troops reached the target of the attacks before the airborn troops could get off the ground. The last canceled plan was COMET, which would have used the 1st British Airborn division to attack the main bridges in Holland. Comet may have succeeded if it had used a larger force but as it was it is a good job it was canceled before it was launched. The attack was supposed to take advantage of the apparent rout of German troops from Belgium. It was reasonable to assume that the ground forces could push up the road though originally it was intended for the infantry to continue along a normal front. There was no reason to suppose they couldent do this as the German front was already crumbling all over the place. When Market Garden was proposed it simply meant enlarging comet. Unfortunatly there were not enough aircraft to get the 3 and a bit divisions out in one drop so they would go over in 3 drops. The next problem was that the pilots had not had enough experience for pre dawn or post dusk flights and so ony one drop per day was authorised. Next problem, the corps command HQ was to be airlifted to the battle. It was decided to remove the 38 aircraft needed to take it to the battle were to be removed from those taking the British force. In addition to that the number of aircraft assigned to take the division and a half of British was smaller than that assigned to the 101st or 82nd division. Added to this the 101st were leaving their artillery behind, the 82nd wasnt taking much while the British had to take all theirs which took up a lot of space on gliders. This meant that the 101st would have their entire force on the ground on the first day, the 82nd would all be down by the second but the British would have to wait 3 full days before they would get down. Thsi combined with the fact they would have to fight the longest and the hardest seems to me to be the main reason Arnhem failed.

As for Monty, I think he was a good general. I hate it when people bring up Caen because it suggests to me they clearly are not thinking about it very hard. How about this for an alternative possibility, Monty takes Caen, the Germans realise they are not going to take it back and so forces who were defending the city (or is it a town) begin to attack the American lines, the American push inland begins to slow and much of the momentum is lost. Perhapse Cherbourg is not taken, supplies cant get through. Think about the possible concequences. If Monty had not pinned down 2 of Germany's best divisions imagine the harm they could have wreaked.

 

A few other bad things.

The radios did not have the correct chrystals. The Red Devils, did not know that untill after they were dropped, so, they did not have much if any, outside communication.

Then the Brit Div Commander, was stuck behin the German lines and his Div had no contact with him for many precious hours.

Another part of this bad deal was, that Gen Sosoboski (Spelling?) of the Polish Air Bde. and his Bde, were constantly being delayed about chuting in, and had to go from one airfield to another due to shifting fog.

By the time heis unit was dropped, was too late to have any good effect, and his good men were slaughtered.

 

I think that Market-Garden had a chance of success, but the one road thing was very risky, I've always wondered why they didnt also use the 6th Airbourne, might have made the difference, also was the US 17th Airbourne in Europe in Sept 44?

 

Also I have never understood all the Monty bashing, of course he was ego-centric, its an occupational requirement for Generals, I think he was a much better general then many of you are giving him credit for. Many people discredit him for not being as audacious (spellng?) as Patton, but Garden was just the sort of Op Patton would have loved

 

Im not sure if the 17th Para Div, was even aactivated at that time? Need to remember to research those guys.

Sorry to disagree with a bit of what you said on the Market Garden Op being in line of what Patton would love.

Actually, Patton would have been smart enough not to trust so much on Paras as Monty did. Patton would not have been that ambitious to have stuck his neck out that far. We know Patton did make a fauz paux, when he odered an operation to crack through the German lines--(I dont recall how far--possibly 50 miles??) and they were to rescue his Nephew of some relative from a POW camp. This operation was disasterous.

Patton unlike Monty--learned from his mistakes much quicker. I bash Monty, because he should have never been in command of an Army or Army Group, he should have been in command of nothing more than a Corps.

Patton would rely more on Mobile Inf, Armor, and Artillery and the USSAF. Im sure he would use Paras, but I really do not believe he would rely solely on Paras and an Armored Brigade as did Monty.

Im definately NOT saying Monty was a coward or anything like that, and not saying he wasnt a capable General--he just wasnt a great Fieldmarshall.

Pattons main fault was his ego, but one has to admit, he was one heck of a General. I dont admire Patton much more than Monty, and certainly not because he and I are Americans--simply because he was very brave--as was Monty, but because he WAS a great General. Also, im not giving Monty credit in this writing to appease anyone--but simply because he DID earn my respect and he deserves some.

 

I remember reading a little about that operation patton had. After a german counter attack almost all of the prisoners were recaptured along with alot of Pattons force. Thats all I can remember about it.

 

I dont remember much about that raid myself,, but I think you are correct. I dont know if patton was even able to get his relative out of there. The most info I have ever had on that stunt was from The History Channel, and that wasnt much.

 

The thing is about operation market garden was it was actually a good plan and a good idea. When it came down to it however it was quite literally a bridge too far and is was the last bridge so vitall to the suces of the operation. The reason it failed was that just one too many things went wrong. Lots of things in the plan went wrong and if just one of the things that went wrong haddant gone wrong then maybe the operation would have been a suces if you know what i mean the allies came SOOO close yet were so far.

 

Thats true and I concur with you--tooo many things went wrong. Had they not--????

 

Arnhem
It was those d*mn*d Germans - spoiling a perfectly sound plan !
My favourite comment is from a veteran in Middlebrook's book : -

' It was a gamble. Some you win, some you lose. We lost that one '

That 'little raid' of Patton's was the Hammelburg Raid. For anyone interested, there's a lot of research and photos in 'After The Battle' No. 91.

 

I tend to disagree with it being a good plan. There were too many restrictions. It was not flexible and left very little to chance. It would take only one mishap to cause it to fail. In this case, there were so many that the only reason they kept on was because there was no way to pull the paras out.

The single road was the major factor. The timeline to reach the last bridge was four days? Yeah right. Where was the alternate route? Could the paras hold out 4 days? What if they had to hold out longer, how much longer? The intelligence officer that noticed the tanks, nobody listened.

The Brits wanted to have the limelight regardless of the cost. Well they got it.

[ 21 June 2002, 03:52 PM: Message edited by: PzJgr ]

 

That plan.
You're right ( I was being a little facetious ).
The plan was thrown together too quickly, and relied on absolutely everything going well - which it obviously didn't. I once tried walking from Ginkel Heath to the Bridge. Eight miles is a very long way and I wasn't carrying 60 pounds of gear . . .
There was a severe case of overoptimism within SHAEF at that stage of the war, and not just in the British camp.
As always, the guys at the top screwed up, leaving the guys at the bottom to display almost unbelievable courage and endurance. And I'm not just talking British - I've stood on the bank of the Maas river where the 82nd Airborne paddled across and the thought of MG42s suddenly opening fire - very scary indeed.

 

I think operation Market Garden was a risky but good operation. A gamble with 50-50% of opportunities, perhaps more. On paper. Theorically it is a perfect plan as "Schlieffen" plan was or like the plan for the battle of the Bulge. But perfect plans are not worth it if they are bad performed as "Market Garden" was. Field Marshall Montgomery was a good tactician. A good officer who learnt everything he knew on academies and books. He experienced combat and also learnt but... you get my point, don't you?

Well, the operation went wrong because there was not simply enough aeroplanes to drop all the troops needed at once and much less to keep them supplied. Also, bad weather screwed operations because air to ground support could not be provided and the Polish reinforcements (who could not be dropped the initial day for the lack of enough transports) could not be dropped either the later days because of the weather. Both, British and US paratroopers fought very well, but they were just light infantry and the armoured forces delayed too much. Also, Bittrich's XXX SS Panzerkorps fought very well. And the allies did not expect to face SS Panzer divisions. They said: "Don't worry. There will be only Volkstrumm, old men and kids..."

Monty was good to design strategies but not good to perform them. Not even if they were from his own invention. He was too cautious at the real performance. That's the ironic. He disigned a risky plan which had to be led audaciously to suceed and he performed it cautiosly...

If weren't for this, the allies could have done better. Why? Because paratroopers were few; yes, because they were light infantry; yes but they were ELITE at last, weren´t they?

 

G'day

The Market Garden plan was a good plan but could'not be performed with the materials the allies had. Too little planes nd supply's for the ground forces. But the battle was lost before the battle started by waiting too long after the british had taken Antwerp. If they had pushed further north just 20 kilometers they would have cut off the german 15th army on the islands of walcheren in holland. This army had the time to withdraw and play a major role in opposing the british 30th corps and the american para's. Also the long wait on the dutch border gave the germans time to organize their defences which delaid the relief of the paratoopers, thus the operation failed its primary objective, the rhine bridge at arnhem. Because the germans could organize their defences they became an fighting enemy again, the days of panic withdraw were over. The allies underestimated the germans and thought the operation would be a walk in the park, but they got a good scare. If the british could have kept their momentum of advance going on the 10th of september they would keep the germans on the run. The build up of supply's was bad on that date but a minimal advance would be enough i think to cut of the germans in walcheren(holland) and keep the germans from organizing their defence. On top of that the paradrop would have to secure the bridges in this waterlogged land.

Popski

 

Arnhem
It's really interesting that I seem to have stirred up some very detailed and deeply-thought replies - thanks, everyone.
I think we can see why, in Britain at least, more books have been published about this single operation than any other of WWII with the exception of D-Day. It is endlessly debatable. I still think it could only have worked if the Germans really had been 'finished' - there you go, more speculation !
For sure, Arnhem provides the military scholar with a truly fascinating subject . . . .

 

G'day

I've been on a battlefield tour all the way from Joe's bridge to the Oosterbeek dropzone's and there is still so much to see of how difficult it must have been fighting there and still come that close to completing the operation. Books can't give you a panoramic view of the "devils mountain" and all the other places where there was fierce fighting.

 

Gentlemen,

I have followed this discussion with great interest and there has been some perceptive comment given,however as an ex British Army Para i must comment on Pzjgr'S "Limelight" remark.
Shortly before his death Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery of Alamein made the following statement to a close friend knowing that he would soon be meeting his maker>

"Soon i must go to God and explain to him why i killed all those men at Alamein and Arnhem".

The British "Limelight" as you put it weighed heavily on his shoulders even up to his last days.

I had the honour to know the father of a close friend who won the Military Medal at Arnhem and although Monty had his failures as well as his successes his opinion was that Monty was a Soldiers "Soldier" and that was all that the troops on ground could ask of their commander,very similar to what the 3rd Army would have said of Patton i would think!!I have also met many other former Arnhem Paras and despite their Sacrifice their opinion is the same.

Next you will be suggesting that Monty tried to grab the Limelight in Normandy when the British and Canadians locked horns with the Leibstandarte,Hitler Jugend,Panzer Lehr,21 Panzer Div,s.SS Pz Abt 101/102 to name but a few.

Paul

 

Thanks, Paul - I was starting feel as beleagured as one of Johnny Frost's men at the Bridge !

To be serious, I find the post-war 'allies falling out' aspect of Arnhem rather unsettling.
I'm sorry to cite yet another book, but an important ( and these days, often overlooked )work is 'Command Decisions'published in 1959 and prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army . Yes, that's the U.S. Army.
This includes a scholarly overview of the decision to launch Market Garden written by Charles B MacDonald.
He quotes Forrest C Pogue in the official history of Eisenhower's headquarters as writing :

' (Market Garden) appeared to General Eisenhower to be the boldest and best move the Allies could make at the moment.The Supreme Commander realized that the momentum of the drive into Germany was being lost and thought that by this action it might be possible to get a bridgehead across the Rhine before the Allies were stopped.'

MacDonald ends by saying that ' The operation was a daring strategic maneuver that failed...As British Field Marshal Haig put it on August 22, 1918,''Risks which a month ago would have been criminal to incur ought now to be incurred as a duty'' .'

To his great credit, Eisenhower always accepted full responsibility for the order to 'Go'. So I don't think it was all a monstrous ego-trip. As the veteran said, we lost that one.

 

I look at the operation only as a bungle with the unfortunate drop into the re-grouping of the sister SS divisions. I can imagine what would of happened had the two W-SS divisions been to full strength including full complements of armor and the inclusion of the SS Schwere Pz. Abt. 102 to their aid....... !
As been mentioned at length, if the two divisions had not been in the area(s) this campaign/op would of worked. Bold it was, and successful it could have become.

E

 

To paraphrase Sosabowski : -
'But.. the Germans, General. What about the Germans ?'