Allied bombers shot down by Swiss forces during WW2

I must point out that historical publications are professionally edited (by someone other than the author) at least twice before release-for-printing and subsequent publication. To that end, there is no way of knowing what words Dwight had originally chosen.

To meet "the acceptable writing styles" of publication houses and professional journals, a professional military historian MUST use phraseology that is neutral, non-inflammatory, non-judgmental -- yet describes the circumstance being treated in the text. In that vein, the use of the word "incident" is appropraite to the style that military historians are expected to utilize. The editors will aggressively check & change word choices before allowing release & publication. (I know from my own experiences in this field of endeavor.)

Similar to the press and justice field are expected to refer to criminal charges as an alleged murder (arson, rape, whatever) even if the crime is blatant and obvious. (Example. since Lee Harvey Oswald was never convicted, he will forever be the alleged sniper in all publications.)

 

IMO in this instance the editors either failed to remove the bias or actually added it, that piece is anything but unbiased. Bombing a neutral town is an incident while shooting at bombers invading your airspace is "unprovoked hostilities" ?

There is some very good info on the size of the internment "phenomenon" in switzerland in this thread, aircraft actually shot at where rare exceptions amongst the voluntarily landed.
http://www.ww2f.com/weapons-technology-wwii/22804-aircraft-brought-down-neutral-countries-9.html

 

The context's of Dwight's reference to the SAT 01 APR 1944 U.S. bombing of the Swiss city of Schaffhausen (with just over 22,000 inhabitants ) was much larger picture than the reference to it simply as a bombing. Chapters have been written on "the who", "the what" and the political, military and diplomatic course of events that occurred - good things, bad things, tragic things.... Ike, Marshall, Hap Arnold, Hull....

Carl A. "Tooey" Spaatz, Commanding General of the US Strategic Air Forces in the ETO, reported that two bomber groups admitted bombing in the northern salient of Switzerland on that Saturday, although the pilots claimed they had missed the center of Schaffhausen. At first Spaatz dismissed it as a mistake cause by poor visibility and cloud cover. Then, he was corrected by his own staff - clear skies, unlimited visibility, readily-recognizable landmarks.

The polite Swiss foreign minister voiced his inability to conceive of Spaatz's explanation for what the Swiss Ministry of Defense felt was "a deliberate attack." He documented the tail number of several planes (esp. the lead bombers) among the two groups (numbering about 50 total bombers) that the killed and wounded Swiss civilians amounted to more than 100 civilians. The Swiss foreign minister noted that - even as Spaatz was offering excuses and denials without having time thoroughly review after-action reports of mission commanders - fires were still ravaging homes, factories, city buildings, and railway yards. Contradicting Spaatz saying bad weather accounted for poor navigation, the Swiss newspapers responded that the skies were cloudless, and visibility as perfect, and showed photos of the bombing runs being conducted in cloudless sun-lit skies..Nevertheless, the Swiss foreign minister ordered that radio and press announcements be restrained from expressing or reporting popular outrage.

The US diplomats and military command responded by going to great lengths to accept responsibility, express remorse, make financial reparations (about $M by the end of the war) and pledged to make accommodations to have re-occurrence. There was a lot at stake - keeping Swiss military and internal intelligence networks feeling the benefits of collaborating with Allied command.

No sooner that Switzerland accepted apologies and American statements of responsibility and remorse than Spaatz made a series of insensitive and dismissive public contradictory statements (e,g., his intention to focus fighting of the war forward, and not being "side-tracked into holding Swiss hands") Their publication in the world media unraveled the delicately mended fences between SHAEF and the Swiss people. The broad backlash by the Swiss public and newspapers blunted the execution of a covert Swiss/OSS info exchange about German agents, about escaped Allied POW's in the homes of French Resistance fighters in Annancy waiting to enter Switzerland , an internee swap with the Germans that went down the drain ... and more.
The greater picture with all these implications is commonly referred to as "the Schaffhausen Incident."

The Diplomacy of Apology : U.S. Bombings of Switzerland during World War II, by Dr. Jonathan E. Helmreich, published in Aerospace Power Journal -Summer 2000

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The U.S. State Department changed its diplomatic tactics regarding the responsibility for the bombing of Schaffhausen on the recommendation of the American legation in Switzerland and the British government. For political reasons stemming from Switzerland's neutral position and because of the future potential usefulness of Switzerland in restoring Europe's economy, Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew decided that it would be inadvisable to place "too great" pressure on the Swiss regarding trade with Germany and, in particular, the position of principle regarding downed fliers, as the most practical means of achieving the Allies' goals. The Swiss had been stubborn, and this new approach seemed worth trying to Grew, willing to be more flexible than Cordell Hull.

The Allied bombings of Switzerland is one more reminder of the desperate nature of the total global struggle then occurring. Overall tension between State Department and Pentagon, between general headquarters and field command, between Army intelligence and OSS was not unusual. The same could be said of tension between the desire to prosecute the war fully and the need to tread lightly with neutrals harboring downed fliers, and balancing between the aggressive zeal of pilots and the fine lines of regulations easily obscured by climate and war. The peculiar relations of the United States and Switzerland provide a microcosm that sets these global problems in especially sharp focus. The global ramifications of the war and the tensions it produced were far reaching.

 

There were several shoot-downs of Allied as well as Axis aircraft by Swiss Air Defense as well as anti-aircraft guns. The Swiss maintained that they were required to do so, in accordance with Chapter VI "The Hague Rules of Air Warfare" a highly organized, comprehensive code for control of aviation in warfare (62 articles). Delegations from Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States met at The Hague from 11 DEC 1922 to 19 FEB 1923. The section in question is Belligerent Duties Towards Neutral States and Neutral Duties Towards Belligerent States.

• ARTICLE XXXIX: Belligerent aircraft are bound to respect the rights of neutral Powers and to abstain within the jurisdiction of a neutral State from the commission of any act which it is the duty of that neutral State to prevent. That is No damage committed to neutral nations..
• ARTICLE XL: Belligerent military aircraft are forbidden to enter the jurisdiction of a neutral nation.
  
  • 
    
    • That is No flights through neutral airspace.
• ARTICLE XLII: A neutral government must use the means at its disposal to prevent the entry within its airspace of belligerent military aircraft and to compel them to alight if they have entered such jurisdiction.
• A neutral government shall use the means at its disposal to intern any belligerent military aircraft which is within its jurisdiction after having alighted for any reason whatsoever, together with its crew and the passengers, if any.
• ARTICLE XLIII: The personnel of a disabled belligerent military aircraft rescued within neutral airspace and brought into the jurisdiction of a neutral State by a neutral military action shall be interned.
• ARTICLE XLVI: A neutral government is bound to use the means at its disposal to prevent the departure of an aircraft and any member of the combatant forces of a belligerent Power.
• ARTICLE XLVIII: The action of a neutral Power in using force or other means at its disposal in the exercise of its lights or duties under these rules cannot be regarded as a hostile act.

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There was a rumour that the bombing was deliberate as part of "putting pressure" on the Swiss, though AFAIK no supporting evidence ever came up, as to the treatment of downed airmen the Swiss where a key elerment of the red cross, I can hardly believe an organization that strongly supported the rights of POWs would tollerate systematic mistreatment of internees "close to home", though I'm ready to believe there may have been some local abuses.

 

Actually the ICRC found ample fault with SOME treatment of the former-internees incarcerated in Wauwilermoos punishmant camp, located near Lucerne, (about 42km south of the German border) and under the command of Swiss Army Hauptmann André Béguin.

HOWEVER, if it was determined that once an internee (of any nationality) tried to escape or broke Swiss law, the ICRC determined that they lost the protection of the Geneva Convention. The ICRC rules protected POW's held in hostile territory by their opponents, but gave little protection to the internees in a neutral nation held any a neutral power - they were covered by the Hague Conferences articles.

Nonetheless, the ICRC still found that punishment of Allied formerly-considered internees at the punishment camp were “contrary to international conventions.” One such report is an inspection report of Swiss Col. Auguste Rilliet, Rapport sur les plaints concernant le camp disciplinaire de Wauwilermoos, dated 16 JUL 1945, SFA, Box E5791, 1000/949, Vol. 740)

The ICRC found that punishment of Allied former-internees at the camp were “contrary to international conventions” and filed a series of official protests with the Swiss national government in Bern. (One example is found in "Inspection report of Col. Auguste Rilliet, Rapport sur les plaints concernant le camp disciplinaire de Wauwilermoos" dated 16 JUL 1945, SFA, Box E5791, 1000/949, Vol. 740)

Based largely upon the ICRC reports and formal notice of violations filed by the ICRC, Béguin was convicted in 1946 by a court-martial of thirteen violations of the Swiss Military Penal Code, including fraud, embezzlement, bribery, abuse of authority, forgery, and disobedience. The court sentenced him to 3.5 years in prison and expelled him from the Swiss Army with no rights to pension or benefits. (Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft Urteil das Divisionsgericht 8 im Straffalle des Hptm. André Béguin, dated 20 FEB 1946, SFA, Box E5330, 1975/95, Vol. 1945/2918I, p. 110-12.)

 

Looks more like an exception to the rule than widespread practice to me, and it doesn't look like that sort of behaviour was tollerated from higher up, you will always find some of that sort of thing in jails or concentration camp environments (think Abu Grahib) IMO the critical differentiator is how the higher echelons react when it's reported.

 

View attachment 18497

Check this out.

 

Bomber crews landed in Switzerland only as a last resort. Not wanting to be interned.

Film of Emergency Landing at Duebendorf during WW II

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mjNnqGGgvR0