Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Thank you for the clarification, indeed I missed that particular item. Once again excellent work. There may be a General's Star for you in the near future.

 

Respected Council Members,

As to the Focke-Achgelis:

I was looking at the aircraft and I notice one significant drawback, but I wonder if this can be remedied, and if the remedy might make the aircraft significantly better. We've been considering operating older aircraft like the D1A from our rear area aviation ships, be they MACs, CVEs, or amphibious assault ships. (Which we could designate something along the lines of LVA, since we intend them to have the capability to operate fixed wing aircraft, and not just helicopters.) The Fa-223 has a useful vertical capability, it can hover, and it carriers a better payload, but at the cost of a lower top speed, a much more limited range and endurance, and a very much larger footprint. It is larger in literally every dimension, and in the case of wingspan it is more than twice as large. I would guess it will effectively consume nearly twice the space of a D1A, though it's hard to be sure without doing very careful calculation, since the volumes involved are quite irregular.

Will its benefits be enough to justify carrying an airwing of about half the size of a conventional (and extant surplus) fixed wing aircraft? Also note: the VTOL and hover capabilities come at a greatly increased fuel expenditure. It is using 25% more engine to get a little better than half the performance. They're very flexible, but at what cost? How much better will they be in an ASW role? Would it be worth carrying a very limited number, say two per convoy and perhaps four per carrier force (since I'd like our carriers to have all the best ASW available), in order to gain some of the benefits without suffering all the penalties?

Respectfully,
Adm. Noka

 

I would think the significant drawback, for the IJN at least, of the Fa.223 would be the fact that it likely would not fit, even with rotors removed, in the hangars of all but our largest carriers. If not due to hangar height, than due to the somewhat restrictive size of our carrier elevators. Given these facts, if the Fa.223 were carried aboard ship, it would have to be on the flight deck, with all the attendant problems related to outside storage of aircraft.

Further, since ASW will be the primary function of these aircraft, the open air cockpit of the Ka-1/2 will most likely provide for superior observation of the surrounding area as opposed to the enclosed cockpit of the Fa.223. The way I see it, the chance of detecting a submarine is greater with the Ka-1/2, but the chance of killing a submarine is greater with the Fa.223.

Also, as Admiral Noka has pointed out, more fixed-wing aircraft, and with respect, far more Ka-1/2s can be carried per carrier than the Fa.223. This will allow for much wider continuous coverage.

As such, I don't see any advantage, from a naval standpoint, to acquiring the Fa.223.

 

Admiral's Takao and Noka,

Your concern's are not without foundation, but allow me to offer my thoughts.

Since we will have to first acquire the technical plans of the FA-223, fabricate a prototype, select a suitable poweplant of our own design compatible with the airframe, workout the inevitable gremlins and then begin production, it will be a period of time before this aircraft will become available for widespread use.

At best introduction would be late 1942, but more likely early 1943. Until this point we must use other types we have in our inventory.

Once in our inventory the primary user would be the Army, but I think it would have value in highly selective naval missions. They would have little or no value in our CV's, CvL's and most if not all CVE's.

Where I do feel they have value is in two applications.

Akitsu Maru class Landing ships.

As I understand it the FA-223 has a surface area of about 40'x80' when the rotors are turning.(source Hitler's Luftwaffe) The Flight Deck of the Akitsu Maru's is roughly 400'x60' in diameter. If my arithmetic is accurate, some 5 to 10 craft (depending on alignment) can be placed on deck with some degree of safety. If each craft can carry a full Rifle Squad and their equipment, then they would be able to transit a reinforced platoon to a small company of troops per flight mission.

In lieu of combat troops, specialists and priority cargo can be transported ashore and wounded, non-essential personnel and enemy PoW's can be transported back out of harm's way. This is a capability that none of our conventional aircraft can replicate. The ships hanger should be able to accommodate an equal number of FA-223's in a partially disassembled state, to be assembled as needed.

Merchant Aircraft Carriers (MAC's)

Initially we must use KA-1/2's or D1A's as these will be all we have available, but when the FA-223's enter service they will offer us some interesting options.

The simple flight deck would be similar to that of the Akitsu Maru's, so a group of 5 to 10 aircraft ought to be able to be shipped. This would be equal to, or better than, carrying conventional aircraft or AutoGyro's which require additional deck space to launch/recover. Since these ships have no hanger or elevators anyway, this becomes a non-issue.

A slower speed could work in our favor as a ASW patrol aircraft since spotting a Submarine is a difficult challenge under the best of circumstances. The size of the FA-223 could also favor us if we do develop a workable MAD system for aircraft. I very much doubt either the KA-1/2 or D1A could carry a device.

If we deploy the FA-223 with its Flight crew of Pilot/Co-pilot and two observers/gunners aft, it will have four sets of eyes to conduct visual searches, twice that of a D1A and 4 times that of the KA-1/2.

The FA-223 might not have the speed or range of conventional craft, but its ability to hover over a suspected submarine, rather than fly over, then turn around to re-attack, would seem to have some use in situations where the enemy is in the process of submerging.

A second advantage to the FA-223 is that it can effect rescue of crews from torpedoed merchant ships. Stopping a convoy is not practical (or safe), having a special duty small craft sail along is wasteful and using an escort deprives the convoy of protection when it most needs it. This could prove to be most elegant and cost effective way to husband our merchant sailor's in harm's way.

One last advantage presents itself. If the concept proves out, then we can employ a wider variety of merchantmen to carry this aircraft. Essentially for ever 60' of unobstructed deck space, one FA-223 could be operated. So if we give a smaller ship with say 180 to 200 feet of flight deck, then it could carry 3 such craft. Since our tankers are prime enemy targets, and those with a flight deck more so, then a measure to spare them is advisable. This would also allow us to use these smaller MAC's in those areas we do not need or wish to risk our best tankers.

Much has to be done to prove this out, but it is worth the investment.

Prime Minister

 

As Ambassador Kourei will soon begin negotiations with the European Powers for Technical exchanges, perhaps we should consider what we have to offer them?

Clearly our "Long Lance" torpedo design is one item.
Technical plans on our Carrier Strike Aircraft
Testing Data and evaluation of our Carrier designs are others.

We have or soon will have access to natural resources unavailable to Germany and Italy, perhaps adaption of our Aircraft carrying Submarines to cargo carrying vessels that could meet with German U-boats to exchange these for the Technical plans we desire?

Alternatively we could use these same boats to act as resupply ships for Germany's WolfPacks in the extreme western Indian ocean and Deep South Atlantic? Fuel is fuel and food is food. Can our older 21 inch torpedo's be adapted for their use?

Any other thoughts?

Prime Minister

 

Good thoughts. Subs could exchange documents, small items, personnel, etc. but for any significant volume of cargo it's probably better for one boat - ours or German - to make the full trip. I wouldn't want to see too many of our boats tied up in long cargo vovages though. The 'exchange' of strategic minerals, rubber, etc. is likely to be mainly of benefit to them.

The Germans make extensive use of both submarines and surface supply ships to support operations in distant waters. It would be more economical - and probably safer - to support operations the western IO or South Atlantic from the Far East than Germany. Again it could be either our ships/subs or theirs. From the communications/command and control point of view, it might be easier to make it primarily a German operation, even if using our bases and supplies.

Ironically our Type 92 21" submarine torpedos are based on German models! The Type 95 oxygen torpedo is about 2m longer than German types. The Germans appear to have solved the torpedo problems they experienced early in the war, so that may not be an area where they need much from us; indeed we may benefit from some of their ideas. We could ask if they are interested in the Long Lance for surface applications. The concept of oxygen enrichment is well known; most navies have just declined to use it.

 

Adm. Karonada wrote:

I aree sir.

I think they would benefit greatly from the extended range, increased speed and larger explosive charges of our types. It is also my understanding that pure oxygen types, like ours, have a greatly decreased bubble trail, making detection more difficult. Germany does have the wakeless G7e electric type, but it is very high maintenance, requiring it to be serviced every 3-5 days to prevent malfunctions. (Historical note-I'm not very knowledgeable in the area of German torpedoes, but it was my understanding that while the contact detonator problem would have been largely resolved by this time (Oct '41) the other problems with the magnetic detonator and improper depth keeping were not fully resolved until December '42)

I say we offer them the torpedo technology, if they accept fine if not it is a bargaining chip.
Other offers I would make:
A.) Our advances in antennas and magnetron development would be shared, if Germany agreed to a joint development program where we fully share all technological advances. I suggest we offer to send Professor Hidetsugu Yagi, a world renowned leader in the field, to Germany to head our exchange group and request the Germans reciprocate by sending a similar group to japan to work with us. All advances would be shared.
B.) Request an exchange of submarine officers, our officers and some senior NCO's could serve on German submarines and some of their officers serve as advisors on ours. Lessons learned in tactical employment and best practices would be shared.
C.) Offer the Scharnhorst conversion. We will pay the costs of the conversion and perform the work. A small select group of German naval crews and aviators will serve aboard her and our Fleet Carriers, alongside our naval personnel, in order for Germany to develop a capability in aircraft carrier operations. The knowledge gained could be taken back with them to Germany to be shared so that Germany's aircraft carrier when completed could be crewed and operated. Worst case we can turn Scharnhorstover to them for commerce raiding in the Indian Ocean.
D.) Request Vichy French cooperation for Noumea/Kwangchowan seizure. Stress opportunity to cut off Australia from rest of Commonwealth, possible redeployment of Australian assets away from England and the middle east, and deployment of more British assets to the Pacific. Weakens Britain.
E.) Access to resources seized from Britain and the Netherlands in SRA, most notably rubber and tin.
F.) Request continued and expanded technological support for our sybthetic fuel plants.
G.) Offer shared research and development in the area of radial aircraft engines.
H.) Request all plans and technucal information on Fa-223 and if possible a working example.
Finally, I would suggest we set the stage for continued discussions on technological cooperation and cooperation in the war on a strategic level. Coordination of effort.

 

any status report on progress for the game?

 

Bob says he is nearing completion of data entry to this point and we should actually start real time debate. In the interim I offer this.

The Ki-30 light Bomber (Allied Code Name 'Ann') is in our front line service with the IJA. It can play a useful part early against the west, so long as we can maintain air-supremacy, but is at the end of its useful life. I recommend we no longer produce these aircraft and when we can deploy enough Ki-21 Heavy Attack Bomber's to take their place. Once replaced, they can be used in the training role and as Light Bombers for our Allied air Forces (China,Korea, et all).

The Ki-48 twin Engine Light Bomber (Allied Code Name 'Lily') Is another type in service with the IJA. Again it can be of use for the short term, but is another aircraft that I recommend we cease production of this type in favor of more G4M's. Again once replaced it can be sent to our Allies.

The Ki-49 "heavy" Bomber (Allied Code Name 'Helen') was intended as a replacement for our Ki-21 but does not seem to have the potential we need. As it is just entering service, I propose we discontinue this type in favor of a better option. Any we have now should be employed as transports or perhaps as Glider tugs for our Paratroops.

The Ki-67 Bomber (Allied Code Name 'Peggy') Seems to have the potential to serve as our replacement for the G4M as a interservice Bomber.
Good speed, payload and the ability to carry a torpedo. I suggest we pursue development of this type with the ability to begin delivery in mid to late 1942.

Prime Minister

 

we also have the Mary, is that of use?

 

Regretfully Prime Minister, your information is slightly out-of-date.

Production of the Ki-30 has already ceased as of September this year(1941), and has been replaced with the Ki-51. At the moment our Army designers are working to improve on the Ki-48 by adding better engines & armor protection. The Ki-49 has never lived up to it's specifications and is currently in low order production because of it's greatly increased range over it's stablemate, the Ki-21 "Sally".

Regretfully, design of the Ki-67 Hiryu is proceeding slowly, as the designers are endeavoring to produce the best design possible. If Mitsubishi rushes this design, we are likely to have yet another useless aircraft that does not live up to our high expectations. Also of note is that there are no plans for this aircraft to carry torpedoes(historically, this did not happen until December, 1942 - January, 1943, after the first prototype had already flown.)

Rather than looking at ideas that will marginally increase our aircraft output. Perhaps, we should consider the more important need of providing what aircraft we do have with a reliable supply of spare parts. This will become even more important once we go to war and begin establishing far-flung airbases in distant territories. Such as we have already seen during our air war in China.

For steverodgers801, The Ki-32 "Mary" was out-of-production as of May, 1940.

 

Thank you for your valuable input Admiral Takao. As per the KI-67, there are no plans to rush the aircraft, what the Prime Minister is suggesting we do is redirect the resources being used to develop and improve the other two aircraft (KI-48 and KI-49) into developing the KI-67. Historically we would be looking at December 1942, the game engine provides for acquiring aircraft earlier than their historical date based upon assigning additional factory, developmental and material resources. We are hoping to be able to start full scale production on this aircraft by mid-'42, but if delayed, december will be acceptable. As to the torpedo carrying ability, the historical aircraft was capable of this, since we are attempting to develop inter-service types usable by both the IJA and IJN the capability to carry a torpedo is a beneficial characteristic. We would include as a desireable trait in the developmental specifications we issue.
You are entirely correct as to the spare parts issue. One of the factors for attempting to cut down on the number of individual aircraft types and models is, streamlining our logistical support chain. Fewer types require fewer different parts. We also hope to see an incremental increase in aircraft production. Obselete types will be transferred to training squadrons or allied air forces. We will need to maintain some avenue for continued parts availability other than just cannibalization. I would suggest we move the machinery and jigs to China and set up small output factories there. Production of major types and their parts will remain in the home islands.

 

Ah, that's what threw me, I was thinking in historical terms, not simple game terms. Since, the Ki-48 was produced by Kawasaki, and the Ki-49 was produced by Nakajima, any cancellation of those aircraft would have no effect on an earlier completion of an aircraft being designed by Mitsubishi. However, once the design was finished and entered into production, it is a different story, and production could be done at any aircraft company we see fit.(Kawasaki produced almost 100 copies of the Ki-67, and the Tachikawa produced 1 copy).

Kawasaki would likely focus any extra effort on the Ki-45 Toryu(just entering production) and the Ki-61Hien (in development). Nakajima has several aircraft on it's plate - The Ki-43 Hayabusa, Ki-44 Shoki, Ki-84 Hayate, G5N Shinzan, B6N Tenzan, J1N Gekko, J5N Tenrai, and the C6N Saiun. The -43, & J1N had all just entered full production, with the -44 in limited production, while the rest of the Nakajima aircraft were in development.

As you can see, there are many needs to be met at the other aircraft companies, and all of them are necessary improvements over the aircraft that the will be replacing(with the exception of the G5N Shinzan since Japan had no true "heavy bomber"). We could probably combine the Ki-43 & -44, but this aircraft are quite dissimilar in function, the -43 being a "dogfighter" and the -44 an "interceptor." Thus the only one that is likely to be combined would be the Ki-45 & the J1N.

As we all know, very few aircraft successfully were integrated into two military branches.

 

It would seem prudent to employ the Ki-32 in a training role, since we will need to expand our training fleet to accomodate the large influx of new pilot cadets. This could allow the somewhat newer Ki-30 to be given to our Allies as they become available.

While I favored production ends on aircraft to be taken out of frontline service, I did not intend we discontinue spare parts production. Obviously in either the trainer role or as a second line combat unit for our Allies, we must keep sufficiant numbers of aircraft operational.

The movement of spare parts production is an ideal candidate for expansion of industry in China and Korea, freeing homeland factories for our frontline aircraft production.

In the case of the Ki-49, I am not sure how many are currently available, only that is has been introduced this year. Depending on how many we currently have and under construction at this time, I might favor complete cancellation of all production of this type. If we have a combined total less than say 150 units, then complete cancellation is in order. Using those we have in the transport or trainer role and slowly canibalizing them. If our fleet is larger than that, retain spare part production.

 

it may be wise to start work on a heavy for future use, I can see Australia and India being targets if needed

 

I have grave doubts on the effort to design and produce a "Strategic" bomber being within our budget and industrial limitations.

 

Honored colleages,
Just back in Rome from a fact finding mission through Axis Europe, touched Budapest Warsaw, Amsterdam, Dusseldorf and Paris. From my observations I agree with our leader that strategic bombing is something we should not engage in. Experience in Europe is that "terror bombing", can either shock an already shaken enemy into surrender or harden his resolution to resist and turn the war into a death match. There is also ample evidence that "precision bombing" by large formations is mostly a mith, a significant percentage of bomber crews will drop on anything that looks like a target, there are plenty of episodes where they attacked the wrong town.
Let's never forget that our war aims are limited, all we want is to avoid economic strangulation without having to give up what is already ours so a strategy that will probably increase enemy determination is to be avoided. Adding a four engined land based plane to supplement the Kawanishi H6K and H8K long range patrol bombers may make sense but we probably can't afford the large basing requirements of these planes and the H8K while more costly than a land based equivalent is also more flexible.

On the other hand we should accellerate the introduction of a more balanced medium than the Mitsubishi G4M, while it's possibly the best medium we have currently in production this plane's design sacrifices far too much to get it's long range, while this will be very useful in the expansion phase, when the enemy is still deorganized and will be hard pressed to defend all targets in range, once we stop expanding and are faced with a more attritional context it's vulnerability is likely to cause us unacceptable losses.

 

Heavy or medium, but having a good bomber for land operations makes sense. As far as the heavy Im thinking into the future once we have settled in with our new territories and resources.

 

It is not that I am opposed to the idea of long range heavy bombers per se, I can see where they could be useful to in some applications. My concern's are more complex.

Ambassador Kourei's observations are pertinent and vital to our deliberations. We need his insight to see how our actions are perceived by western eyes and I have little faith in indiscriminate bombing of population centers as practiced by both Germany and England. While I have faith we could refrain from such acts, I am less sure that another Imperial council would have the same forbearance.

No one expected us to hold the power we currently do, and we must be mindful that we too can be replaced as quickly. We have found how circumscribed our options are by the decision's made by previous occupants of this council, so we should realize that the choices we make might have consequences well after our departure.

While this is part of my reasoning, there is a greater and more practical concern. At this time we have no workable design to employ and I suspect it would take us a year to a year in a half to get a suitable design into production. This production would be rather expensive within our rather limited means. I have faith we will have greater freedom to produce what we need, but perhaps not enough to produce everything we want.

 

im not saying produce in a year or two but for say 4 or 5 years we can do R&D as it fits into our priorities