Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

That seems a fair point. I was a little more concerned about their eventual delivery to our Allied Air Forces so as to make them as capable as possible since this type would likely be the best they will ever see in service.

It is not a great concern and hopefully they will be adequate as is in their service.

 

I will adress this along with an example to further explain your earlier question.

First, our Allied partners are part of our upgraded training program. The program is 12 months long, more or less, based upon the individual pilots proficiency. First we have selection, then basic officer training and ground school, then basic flight instruction done with an instructor, then they solo, then individual advanced basic flight instruction where the pilot will be learning more advanced techniques, some in two seat types other times solo. Then they move on to training in their specific types, i.e. fighter, dive bomber, level bomber, torpedo, transport, etc. Early training will take place in training types, later training will take place in their specific types. Let's figure a minimum of 6 months before fighter pilots will be undergoing advanced fighter training. which starting today would place us in March 1942. For example purposes let's say we have 50 fighter squadrons, IJA and IJN, 15 Army, 35 Navy. Average operational squadron strength 12 aircraft and pilots, figure a couple of spare aircraft so around 15 planes. Then we have any number of fighter training squadrons. Let's say of the Navy's 35 squadrons, 27 are equipped with the A6M and 8 with the A5M. Of the Army's 15 squadrons we have 8 equipped with the KI-43 and 7 with the KI-27. Now say we have six factories producing 20 A6M series aircraft each or 120 A6M2-UA per month (for the sake of this example lets forget the field upgrade kits), two factories producing the KI-43 at 20 aircraft per month, so 40 KI-43's. We also have two factories producing the KI-27 for 40 aircraft per month.
With the first months production we can equip eight squadrons, with the A6M2-UA. We select to upgrade the fighter squadrons on our six fleet carriers with the A6M2-(UA), 90 aircraft, we're looking toward the SRA operation and there is no significant threat to our island bases so we use the additional 30 aircraft to upgrade the two most experienced IJA squadrons set to participate in the SRA operation with the A6M2-UA. This frees up 120 A6M2's and 30 KI-43's. We use the 90 freed up A6M2's to re-equip six of the eight remaining IJN A5M squadrons and return the 90 A5M's to the training pool for carrier training. We now have two A5M squadrons. 90 A5M's are probably sufficient to equip our carrier training squadrons for the forseeable future, so we cease production of spare parts for this aircraft, switch the suppliers over to building parts for the A6M series, and use all parts in the pipeline as spares. We now have 2 Army squadrons equipped with the A6M2-UA, six with the KI-43 and 7 with the KI-27. We have 70 unassigned KI-43's (40 new production and 30 from re-equips). We equip four of the KI-27 squadrons with the KI-43 (60 aircraft) leaving ten in the pool. The 60 freed up KI-27's are returned to the pool for training aircraft so with the new production we now have 100. Since the Harbin plant is producing the two seat trainer version of the KI-27 we leave it in production, we'll swap the other plant over to the A6M2-UA.
For our example let's say the plant is down for one week with a change within a model line and three weeks for a complete model swap.
In our example, the second month we'd produce 125 A6M2-UA's (the original 120 plus one weeks production from the KI-27 plant that swapped over). KI-43 production remains unchanged at 40 and we are now producing 20 KI-27 two seat trainers. The Army is heavily engaged so we decide to upgrade three more army squadrons that currently use the KI-43 (45 A6M2-UA's), we use 75 more of the A6M2-UA's to re-equip five additional Navy squadrons freeing up 75 A6M2's and leaving five aircraft in the pool. Now eleven of the Navy squadrons have the newest aircraft, if we use 30 of the A6M2's to upgrade the two remaining A5M squadrons, all navy squadrons will be equipped with the A6M2 or newer. 30 more A5M's go to the training pool for a total of 120.
We have 45 A6M2's left in the pool from the re-equip and 95 KI-43's (10 from the previous month, 45 from this months re-equip of KI-43 squadrons and 40 new production). We decide to go ahead and re-equip the three remaining KI-27 squadrons with the A6M2, returning the 45 KI-27's to the training pool so we now have 165. The 95 KI-43's stay in the pool because all Army squadrons now have either the A6M2-UA, A6M2 of KI-43.
Month three we have a new model of the HA-35 engine come out with increased horsepower. We have already been working on the next model of the A6M series, the A6M3 (in our alternate timeline). We have determined we will strengthen the wing, wing skinning and upgrade the armament to 2 x cowl mounted HO-103's, two wing mounted HO-5 20mm cannon and four wing mounted HO-103's. The horse power increase will make the change possible with no decrease in performance, in fact we will achieve a slight increase. With 95 KI-43's in the pool and since it is being replaced with the A6M series we decide to swap one of the KI-43 plants over to the A6M3 (down three weeks so it will produce 5). This will give us 115 KI-43's in the pool as of this month, plus any from a re-equip. We decide since we are in fairly good shape with our current service type that we will take down half of the A6M2-UA plants to upgrade to the A6M3. So this month we would produce 60 A6M2-UA's, 45 A6M3's (three weeks production from three plants, one week down time per plant because of change within model line) and 5 A6M'3's from the converted KI-43 plant, for a total of 50 A6M3's.
The following month we would swap over the remaining three A6M3 plants. By this time all Army squadrons should be using the A6M series, additional KI-43's entering the training pool due to re-equips, so the remaining KI-43 plant could be swapped to the A6M3. We should also by this time have A6M's entering the training pool because they will be being replaced by A6M3's and A6M2-UA's. Alternately, if we decide to equip our allies with the KI-43 we would leave the one remaining plant open.
I know this is long and complicated, but it is the only way I thought I could clearly convey the process.

 

That is a somewhat loaded question.

The A6M2 Type 0 Model 21 that we have now has quite a phenomenal range, achieved by constructing a very lightweight fighter aircraft. However, with the various "improvements"(larger engine, armor, self-sealing fuel tanks, better armament) will all come at a cost in weight(and range - as more fuel will be consumed by a more powerful engine & even more fuel will be consumed to move a heavier aircraft). The additional weight will also change the A6M2's center-of-gravity, so weights will have to be moved around to compensate for this(as happened historically with the reduction of the A6M2's 518 liter main fuel tank to a 470 liter main fuel tank in the A6M3 Type 0 Model 32. During the Model 32's first major campaign - Guadalcanal & the Solomons, many Model 32 losses came about because the shorter ranged fighter simply ran out of fuel during the long flight from Rabaul to Guadalcanal & back. Thus the next version of the Zero, the Type 0 Model 22 was fitted with two 45 liter wing fuel tanks, which brought the aircraft's range back up to the original Model 21's.) Range would continue to fluctuate, but slowly fall with the various Models of the A6M5 series, but this would pose less of a problem, since Japan was fighting defensively, rather than offensively.

Although the A7M Reppu was still "in development" at the end of the war, most books give the A7M Reppu only a modest range, likely based on the the 17-Shi specifications for a 2.5 hour flight time(@ 225 knots/259 mph cruise speed) + 30 minutes of combat.

The synchronization problems had nothing to do with two guns of different muzzle velocities. The problem was partly due to the Browning design and partly to the technology used by the American and Japanese to synchronize their guns - Since the Americans also ran into problems synchronizing their .50 calibers to the propeller.

IIRC, both used a wire-based synchronization method that was tuned to one specific propeller blade. When the blade passed in front of the muzzle, the gun fired. The Browning .50s(the Browning .30s did not seem to have this problem and their based-designs sometimes could not fire a round, extract & eject the spent casing, reload a new round, and be ready to fire when the blade came by again. Thus, it had to wait for the blade to pass by a second time before firing. Also, the wire-based system required constant maintenance & daily checking to make sure it was operating correctly - making it very labor intensive. The Americans tried and failed to develop a system that would let the gun fire on the pass of any propeller blade, therefore they quickly dropped cowl-mounted .50s(in fact, the dropped all cowl-mounted guns almost completely during the war). With the exception being the Douglas Dauntless which retained it's cowl-mounted .50s throughout it's production run. For whatever reasons, the Japanese chose the opposite path and retained their cowl guns throughout most of the war.

The British and Germans used hydraulic-based synchronization gear which was both more reliable and faster than the wire-based ones, thus they maintained a far higher firing rate. The Germans went one step further and developed an electrical-based system.

You have this the wrong way round - First the Japanese decided on a round they liked, then they designed a gun to fire it.

In the mid-30's the Japanese Army was looking for a larger caliber round for their aircraft. The Japanese took a liking to the Italian 12.7 * 81 SR round, but were far less enthusiastic about the Italian HMG. So, the Japanese designed their own machinegun to fire the 12.7 * 81 SR. The Ho-103 was based on Browning's M1921 .50 caliber machine gun(not the more famous "Ma Deuce"), and to allow the gun to function using the less powerful round, a muzzle booster was fitted.

The Japanese Navy would develop their Type 3 13mm machine gun directly from Browning's M-2, however it would be chambered for the Hotchkiss 13.2 * 99 round then in mass use, however, this gun would not see use until 1943.

 

I believe that the nose .50s on the P-40B were only good about 425 rpm, and IIRC, the P-39s nose mounted .50s were limited to 300 rpm. Same guns, same reduced rate of fire.

Seems that the Browning .50s just were not meant for synchronization, although I have never seen a good solid explanation why.

 

Most sources give the Browning .50 as very difficult to syncronize.
IIRC The 12.7 * 81SR was originally wickers round, not Italian.
But what concerns me as ambassador is tthe request for importing MG 151/20. (Historically 388 K 61 were equipped with them). I don't want to use pecious submarine transport space for aircraft cannon. We need to clean up light cannon production, though it will be hard to do as we will be at the same time stepping up 20mm and 40mm production for the navy.
After the army took over Nihon Tokusudu KK the 20mm production for the A6M had to be limited to the new Tomioka weapon works and they initially could only produce only 100 guns per year with plans for 500! Something must be done to remediate this. (possiby the game doesn't model this but it's an interesting ... )

 

Colonel Bobimoto, thank you for your detailed explanationof the proposed fighter production. To be honest I have neither the need or desire to delve quite so deeply into this subject, that's what I have you for!

I am a little concerned about the time of the shut down for the A5M spare parts production line.

Is it wise to end this before it's replacement aircraft type (A6M) begin to filter into these Training Squadrons?

While the change over from Ki-43 to A6M production should proceed smoothly, is it not possible that events outside our control like sabotage, enemy action, internal dissent or even natural disasters might slow this project, thus slowing the pace of new aircraft delivery? Could not a un-desired American early entry raise our aircraft losses enough to have a similar effect? Might not we expand out Allied pilot training to include Indo-Chinese, Malaysian, Burmese and possibly Indian pilot cadets? (Granted they would not need a Carrier capable fighter for this, but its nice to have the option of their use as a simple trainer)

In short is there no possibility that we might need to keep these aircraft in the training command for years to come?

Perhaps I am being too cautious in this, but I rather not go about the Empire shouting "A trainer, A Trainer, My kingdom for a Trainer"

 

Belasar wrote:

Yes, sir I understand that, however my replies to you are also for the entire Council. I wanted everyone to understand how all our production and upgrades effect our overall air forces. Our operational commanders also need to pre-plan for upgrades based upon perceived future needs. We don't want to overproduce an aircraft with a limited service life, neither do we want to under produce because we have a large surge in pilots coming down the road, nor due to factory changeovers can we immediately react to changing war situations. We're not like the United States where we can afford to scrap our older aircraft when something newer or better comes out.

The A5M is already out of production, having ceased in 1940. We still have spare parts being produced, but I'm not sure how long we need to do this. We sould have surplus A6M's for training purposes in large quantities by January 1942. In the meantime our stock is sufficient that we can probably cannibalize excess aircraft to keep our carrier training squadrons fully equiped in the near term. I feel it makes more sense to use the KI-43 as the advanced fighter training aircraft. It has excellent flight characteristics. We intend to use it to equip allied air forces. It will retain a sufficient level of lethality for some time to come if it needs to be pressed into service. The number of pilots we can carrier train at one time is limited more by available decks than by operational aircraft. Lastly, my example was for illustrative purposes only. It does not reflect our actual needs, nor stocks of aircraft. We actually have between 2400 and 2500 A5M's total.

 

I was not aware of that. Good stuff. Most sources just state that the HO-103 was a copy of the browning, but used the 12.7mm x 81SR Breda round, which allowed for a higher rate of fire and lighter gun.

I was aware of this, I just had a senior moment :headbonk: I was looking at an aircraft weapons comparison chart trying to make sure I had the weapons data correct and booted the weapons nomenclature by copying what was on the chart without thinking. I apologize for the mistake.

I was aware of this also. My question for you would be; do we even need to pursue this? From the data on it, it does not appear to be a significant improvement. It's heavier (HO-103/Type 3 13.2mm) 48lbs/66lbs., longer 49"/61", has a slower ROF 900rpm/800rpm, only a slightly higher muzzle velocity 2560fps/2590fps. The only area you see marked change is in max range, 2460ft/2950ft, however how important is this last since most engagement ranges are much less? If we do need a replacement would we be better off following the path of developing the Type 3 or just copying the M2 Browning directly along with it's round? This should mean virtually no development time. Also, could our synchronization issues be resolved if General Kourei could get Germany to share their hydraulic and electrical synchronization technology?

 

No, we do not need to pursue the Navy's Type 3. The IJN was spent quite some time testing, trialing, and tinkering with the Italian .50s and their cartridges('39-'42), so it is a safe bet that the Navy was satisfied with the cartridge, if not the weapons.

Hydraulics would be our best bet, as electronics tend not to fair too well in a tropical marine environment. Still, it is a crap-shoot at best - it might help a lot, a little, or not at all, but given the .50 Browning's capriciousness to synchronization, I doubt it will be worth the effort.

I would still go with a four cannon armament as opposed to a two cannon & 2/4 machine gun setup.

 

I agree sir, I have no desire to import the German weapon, especially since we have several capable types. We are going to attempt to cut down upon these and standardize our aircraft on the HO-5. You are correct with your statement as to light cannon production. We are not the United States and do not have a virtually unlimited industrial base. My thoughts are to go ahead and swap the Type-99-1 and 99-2 factories over to producing the Oerlikons for our naval vessels. Both of these weapons are a version of an Oerlikon design, the FF and FFL, so they have some familiarity with the base design. We will be replacing our Type 96 25mm on ships with a combination of 40mm Bofors and 20mm Oerlikons. I suggest we use whatever excess mountings we gain this way and have them reworked to be used as the light/med AA gun for our ground forces. We can convert the 25mm production facilities over to produce the HO-5 and the 40mm bofors while we build new or expand existing production facilities to build the numbers we need. In the short term we should be able to meet our requirements. We will have some time, due to operational requirements, before we can begin to upgrade our existing vessels to the 40mm (we have to start production) so we should be able to build a back stock of 20mm Oerlikons. New production of ships will also not require the light weapons until some time down the road (they would be mounted post launch during the fitting out period). We are ramping up our aircraft production so we will need sufficient HO-5 production to meet our A6M output. Admiral Takao is correct, eventually I too would like to have aircraft heavily armed with auto-cannon. It will just take us some time to increase production to where we have sufficient units for our needs. So in the interim I have requested we go with two auto cannon and multiple, large caliber machine guns. I would like to see a future version of the Zero with 4 x 20mm guns, we just need the weapons.

I would prefer that our industrialists run our production faclities vs our military. I have mentioned several times that I would like to see some type of war production board set up to oversee our industrial output. I would give them the power to re-allocate resources, close production facilities, transfer key personnel etc. in order to maximize our production. If we have an under performing facility they would investigate, make a recommendation of corrective actions, and see that they are implemented. The military will provide whatever, technical, developmental or testing assets required, but we need to put those that know what they are doing in charge of getting it done.

 

To distract from cannon for a moment I'd like to reconsider floatplanes very briefly. I think that General Nishio and General Terauchi slightly misunderstood my suggestion. We are currently fielding a floatplane version of the A6M for defense of our seaplane bases and seaplane tenders. While this aircraft is useful to ward off enemy scout and observation planes the floats diminish performance so much that the aircraft is entirely vulnerable to virtually any enemy fighter. Would it be possible to develop an explosive mechanism to jettison the floats in emergency? The pilot would then be forced to make a water landing and the plane would be lost, but the pilot might be able to compete with enemy fighters in the interim. (Even seaplane bases and tenders might find themselves with unwanted attention occasionally.) This would need to be an emergency expedient, of course, but I was wondering if a such a mechanism could be built affordably enough to make it useful, and possibly installed on our extent floatplanes as an upgrade. I would not advocate production of further aircraft, only retrofitting of those already in inventory.

 

explosive materials may not be good on a plane, especially one landing on a hard surface like water and would the plane be able to land with out its gear.

 

I think Admiral Noka answerd the latter part about the landing gear. The float would be jettisoned in an emergency situation and the aircraft would make a "crash" landing in the water.

 

The intended carrier version of the ju 87 (he Ju 87C IIRC) had explosive bolts holding the udercarriage, there is a well known propaganda pic of one of them without landing gear after being damaged by Polish AA fire.

http://books.google.it/books?id=2956G46C-64C&pg=PT62&lpg=PT62&dq=ju+87+no+undercarriage+hela&source=bl&ots=6AODhTUsym&sig=uLx5wOyfYeYAFumo2x84kcxp_FM&hl=it&sa=X&ei=eYVyUemmHcOL4AT83IDoAw&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAA

So it's doable.

 

If it is theoretical, then we should investigate the matter. If then it is possible, do we consider using such devices on all such aircraft? It would make all such a little more survivable and give Fleet search planes the option of staying longer with a sighted enemy fleet.

 

The technology is available, will it work as planned? That's another question. In 1939 we (the IJN) ordered that an high speed reconaissance aircraft with a main float that could be jettisoned in an emergency, be developed. The aircraft is scheduled to make its first flight in December of this year. (Kawanishi E15K1 Shiun ("Norm"), while testing indicated that the float would jettison as designed, in actual operation it did not function properly)

 

I wonder whether it's worth spending the resources to continue researching the subject long enough to make it work. Ambassador Kourei: Do you know whether our German allies mechanism to discard the gear from their Ju-87s is sufficiently effective? This is a minor concern and given the fairly limited utility of the aircraft in question I would not favor expending terribly much in the way of resources on the question.

 

I believe that persuing the technology to allow a seaplane to eject its pontoons is worth the investment. If made effective we can employ it across all types of seaplanes in our inventory save the Flying Boats.

Fighters could fight other enemy fighters on even footing.

Search and Attack craft could enhance their escapability if confronted by fighters, or if forced down over land, they stand a better chance without the floats.

A search aircraft who finds an enemy fleet, could if the situation warrents, lose the floats to extend their flying time over the target allowing a strike to be guided in.

If this technology does not work as planned, the investment would be limited, but considering how much we must rely upon this type of aircraft in our defences the cost seems worth the investment.

 

Mr. Prime Minister and Council members,

I have asked Lt. Col. Gaikotsu Hokkoku of General Nishio's staff to join us on an advisory basis. He is on General Nishio's planning staff and acts as an air and naval liason officer for the General. General Nishio has often expressed reticence in expressing an opinion in air and naval related matters, preferring to concentrate on his land forces. Granted, initially he has some of the largest objectives of us all, the invasion of Malaya, the reduction of Singapore, while maintaining the status quo in China and preparing for a renewed offensive there with the goal of bringing a resolution to the conflict that has plagued us there for many years. I believe Lt. Col. Gaikotsu will aid him by coordinating all our assets naval and aviation, to support his efforts on the ground.