Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Gentlemen, I hope you enjoyed your chance to refresh yourselves.

Col. Bobimoto has proposed we organize a resupply and re-equipment of Vichy forces in Madagascar. I find myself holding a low opinion on this venture for several reasons.

There is the great distance to be considered and the need for us to offer convoy protection after the start of hostilities. As there is a limited supply of materials in Indo-china, and some of that would need to go to any Noumea operation, I suspect that it must come from our own stocks and I am not sure we can afford this at this time. Lastly we would be sending aid/supplies to an outpost that could easily switch sides of its own accord or be overwhelmed by a English military operation.

Unless we are determined to make the Indian Ocean an undisputed Japanese Ocean, I can not see how we can justify this largess.

 

An alternative: we could make a British military expedition to Madagascar very expensive with the judicious use of submarines. Further, if we forward deploy Dai Ichi Kido Butai to Cam Ranh Bay or another suitable anchorage in southern Indochina we could perhaps hope to interdict a British force we detected passing the Suez Canal. (We could not do so without ourselves being detected, but I don't think surprise would be necessary, so long as we move quickly enough to prevent the British positioning submarines along our own route of advance, particularly in the Sunda Strait.)

Given our needs in the Southern Resource Area I think it would be worth considering expanding our Naval presence in Indochina. Does anyone have records of current facilities in Cam Ranh or Saigon? Nha Trang and Quy Nhon also have good harbors, as does Rach Gia, though it is less developed. There also seems to be a decent roadstead off Con Son, and an island amchorage would provide some security advantages. The associations with the French prison are rather gruesome and perhaps something we would wish to avoid. (It might be a good gesture to bring about the closing of the prison.)

 

All of your reasons apply just as equitably to any Noumea operation.

Either island is quite far from Japanese controlled territory, and well within Allied controlled territory. Either island is well outside the normal operating range of our aircraft, thus long-term aircraft carrier support will be needed if we are to maintain control of either island. Either island will require a sizable military force to maintain local control(more so for New Caledonia/Noumea since they have already "switched sides") and repel any Allied attempts to re-conquer the said island - this will likely require frequent resupply convoys that may not be available to make the long journey. Either island will require military support from our own stocks since our French "allies" or not well-equipped to handle such large operations - at best they will probably be able to provide a "token" show of support.

Making a British expedition to Madagascar very expensive for the British will require more than "judicious" use of our submarines, especially since the British are becoming more proficient at killing submarines. Furthermore, it would be wise to presume that this invasion fleet will be well escorted since they will first be encountering German U-Boats before reaching any of our submarines.

At this point in time, our war with the Allies has not begun yet, so forward basing Dai Ichi Kido Butai in Vietnam so to support Madagascar, is essentially moot. We will have to conquer Malaya and the DEI for the carriers to safely sortie into the Indian Ocean. Still, Vietnam is to far away to provide Kido Butai with a reasonable chance to interdict any British landings in Madagascar. Vietnam is a good 10 days - but probably a few more - steaming at 16 knots from Madagascar. Also, I don't see the British taking the route through the Med and Suez Canal. The would likely take the "easier" route around Africa and avoid any unnecessary "entanglements" with German and Italian naval and air forces in the Med. By going round Africa, it will give Kido Butai far less reaction to to contest any British operation, and the British will likely be able to put their troops ashore and establish a secure beachhead before our forces arrive. While Kido Butai will most certainly be able to chase the British naval assets away, they will be unable to do any appreciable damage to the troops ashore, before being forced to return for resupply. What would be needed would be a Japanese troop convoy following on the heels of Kido Butai to deal with any British troops ashore.

As to a forward base, what would be needed is the capture of Diego Garcia, which is much closer to Madagascar. Although the atoll would then have to be developed into a small replenishment base.

 

the only port in SE Asia that can handle large ships is Singapore . CR bay is not built up with facilities and Saigon is not large enough and only limited repair facikities

 

I don't know, the Japanese gathered some 30 transport ships at Cam Ranh Bay for their Southern invasion there. US PBY overflights reported 20 ships on December 2 and 30 ships on December 3. The next overflight on the 4th reported that all ships had sailed.

 

I thinl we're putting the cart before the horse here. Perhaps I mis-stated my position as to Madagascar and the time frame involved. Initially, I think we must concentrate our assets on the SRA and Malaya. Then we need to simultaneously focus on building a Pacific defensive perimeter and securing the population/resource centers in China. I disagree with Takao on the similarities of Noumea and Madagaskar. Madagaskar is much more distant and exposed than Noumea would be. Noumea is easily supported from Truk, especially once we go to war with Britain. It has the potential to blackmail Australia into sitting on the sidelines and if not to give us the means to severely disrupt an allied buildup there, and to inflict severe attrition to logistical assets attempting supply them. From Noumea our G4M's and submarines could control the seas for thousands of miles around. An additional factor that argues for the invasion of New Caledonia is Kone and Thio. Located on the same island and just northwest of Noumea, this is the location of some of the richest nickel ore deposits in the world. It is a strategic metal and we need it for our manufacturing needs and we need to deny it to the allies. Additional supplies can be obtained by taking the Soroaka mine in the Celebes. The nickel production here alone surpasses the combined nickel production of the US, USSR and British Empire combined. Canada (they have the bulk of the world supply) can supply most of the nickel needs of the Allies from it's Sudbury mine in Ontario, but it will be in short supply. If we are to have adequate supplies of this strategic metal we need New Caledonia.

 

At first blush I am inclined to agree with Col. Bobimoto. It is true that New Caledonia is roughly as distant from our current lines of communication as Madagascar. It is also quite certain that the efforts involved in a New Caledonia operation would be quite extensive, but I think the rewards could be much greater. As Bobimoto has said, it would support lines along which we already plan to advance. If we find ourselves at war with Australia it could be made mutually supporting with bases in the Solomons, Papua, New Guinea, and the Bismarks. If it helps to prevent war with Australia it saves us tremendous effort in securing our southern perimeter.

But any operation begs several questions. Does this operation help us to secure the resources that we need to ensure our continued independence from Western interference? Does it advance the cause of Greater East Asian Independence and Prosperity? (We have expressed many quite lofty ideals. I suggest that we should specifically enumerate those concerning our relations with the west in something which we might call the "Bobimoto Doctrine", since Col. Bobimoto has been most instrumental in bringing this council into existence and in helping us to remain focused on what Japan can be, not on what it is now or has been before. Think of this as a sort of answer to the U.S. "Monroe Doctrine.")

I believe that any operation we undertake must work towards these two ends. (And the second has always made me a little uncomfortable working with the French, unless it be toward a peaceful "decolonization" of French possessions in Asia and the Pacific. Their record to date is not one we should envy, though our own presence in China has been plagued with some of the same troubles.)

But I would like to address a few side questions. First, while I fear that Gen. Terauchi is correct and that the present state of facilities in Indochina is quite inadequate, I do not believe this precludes the idea of developing a forward fleet base there. Such a base would not be primarily intended to protect Madagascar, but to aid us in our liberation and defense of the Southern Resource Area. We have several forward bases that we intend to develop further along our eastern perimeter, we do not presently have any such facilities closer to the SRA than Takao, and the closest well developed base might be Kagoshima, though the repair facilities at even the latter appear to be fairly limited. While our biggest military challenge will be war with the U.S., would it not be worthwhile developing something slightly closer to our initial objectives than Kyushu?

With deepest respect,
Adm. Noka

 

I feel I should repeat that my support for the New Caledonia operation is both measured and conditional, rather than enthusiastic. Conditional upon the requirement that in no way delay's more important objectives and that it recieves its proper share of attention and resources in competition with more vital outposts, and that it can be dispenced with for an aggreement with the Australians.

That there are usable strategic materials does rise it in my estimation, this however now makes it far more difficult to yeild the islands in exchange for peace with a potential enemy. As I have said before I am troubled by a fixation within our our military establishment that seems to make it impossible to walk away from any location were our flag has rested as a matter of pride.

There are several critical differences between New Caledonia and Madagaskar. The former can be supported by bases within arial range of other outposts and our primary fleet anchorage is within supportable range of this island group, and it can be used to either support operations against Australia or be traded in exchange for a diplomatic solution. None of these seem to apply to the latter.

Madagaskar would require too much and return too little to be worthwhile in my opinion.

 

If we have Singapore then there is no urgent need to build up ports in SEA except for smaller craft. We have a lot of needs and the time and materials it would take to build up CRB could take from Truk and other bases we need. The big thing about CRB is that it is a wonderful anchorage, but we would be starting from scratch to build a base there.

 

Singapore is indeed an excellent base for our fleet for controlling the SRA and for forays into the Indian Ocean. I personally think the development of Cam Rahn Bay is critical also. It will provide a much needed base for isolating or attacking the Philippines, if necessary and I see it serving as the middle link for our convoys bringing fuel and resources from the DEI and Malaysia. I think we can improve it without hampering the build up of bases on our defensive perimeter.

My intent for Madagascar was not to make it a primary target for defense or seizure. What I had in mind was limited aid to the French holding them to make it much harder for them to take. When the British attempt this invasion, IF we have sufficient freedom of movement within the Indian Ocean, and IF we have sufficient Naval and aviation assets, not required elsewhere, I'd like to go after the British invasion fleet. We need to plan for it as a contingency, even if the situation never allows it to be implemented.
Noumea on the other hand is critical. It prevents or delays a U.S. counter offensive aimed at the Solomons and the Southwest Pacific. This flank must be secured before a determined assault against our central pacific bases can be undertaken. Noumea also would provide an optimal location for basing aircraft and submarines to influence Australia's position in the war. If we can intimidate her into maintaining neutrality, we eliminate her usefullness as a forward base for the allies. If she decides to join Britain in war with us, the allies will have to commit tremendous resources to keeping her supplied and to build her up. This logistical effort will consume supplies, personnel and assets that would otherwise be tasked with offensive operations agains us. If we attack this logistical effort with air, submarine and surface naval forces when possible we can hopefully cause sufficient attrition to delay the allied war effort.
Noumea has an excellent harbor, and as I stated earlier, an excellent source of nickel is located a short distance to the northwest, a key material required for our industrial production. I have made an extensive study of key resources and their locations. If we want to produce the required weaponary and equipment to fight this war we must have these key material. I have not stressed them thus far because many of them will fall into our hands as a consequence of our other operations.

Historical note: Nickel was of great strategic value and Japan never had adequate sources for it. The ore deposits in New Caledonia would solve this shortage by more that doubling our available supply (I am working on the assumption we will seize the Soroaka mine in the Celebes).

 

I guess it depends on the term base. yes I agree on building up an infrastructure, but I was disagreeing on the idea of making it a naval shipyard

 

Agreed, if we possess Singapore we have the major naval shipyard we need.

 

I would like to clarify a point: I did not intend to suggest that we should build a naval construction facility in Indochina, merely invest in improving the naval facilities presently there. (And Cam Ranh Bay has several advantages as a potential naval base, not the least being the excellent anchorage.) I do think it might be worth considering stationing logistical assets there and constructing some permanent facilities for fuel storage, warehousing, barracks, and so forth.

Of course, we are not without alternatives: Bangkok might serve as well as Saigon or Cam Ranh Bay. While there are, so far as I can tell, no major repair facilities, the port is quite well developed and we could perhaps persuade Thailand to ally with us more closely, since they would surely like to retain their gains from the Franco-Thai war; which prospect seems unlikely should the Western colonial powers prevail against us. (Of course this may not play well in the Khmer territories in the French Indochinese Union, but I suspect this union will not last beyond our war. Any states formed from the French withdrawal will require careful thought on our part. A strong and peaceful union seems worthwhile, if it can be maintained, but local grievances could be difficult to mollify.)

 

It would seem prudent to look into the development of an alternate fleet anchorage in the region beyond Singapore. First we do not possess it and even when we do there is no telling how long it might take to make it operational after any English acts of destruction aimed at preventing our use.

On the matter of aid to Madagascar I feel that if we must balance cost vs gain. In all our other objectives we have used the quite sensible criteria to determine if it is truly worth the investment in time, money and material. An objective needs to either provide natural resources, a good defensive position to protect the former or a tripwire to warn us of a threat to either.

Madagascar may have exploitable resources, but getting them back home seem unlikely in the long term unless we are prepared to park a significant portion of the Kido Butai in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis, something we know we can not do long term. It is too far away to provide any measure of protection to any existing or planned Imperial outposts, which seems to eliminate the second use.

I have long favored bringing the Royal Navy to battle and destroying the same before any American entry into the war and Colonel Bobimoto offers this as a possible advantage to sending aid to the far outpost.

In my opinion however there are far too many imponderables to make this worth the effort. As any English invasion of the island would originate at least 2,000 kilometers closer to the target than our intended fleet anchorage of Singapore it would seem that we must know well before they sail to have any hope of intercepting this at sea. The Kido Butai would have to be deployed either at Singapore or in close proximity to have a chance to strike. It would also need to have at hand enough fuel and ordinance to be an effective strike force. Lastly it would need conditions that would allow it to be so very far from the heart of our Empire.

Surely there must be better ways to lure the Royal Navy out to its destruction?

 

Most of the recent discussions here have been outside my area of expertise, but I have to agree that major operations in Madagascar are a bit of a stretch. A ke point about the areas we plan to secure and control is that they are mutually supporting, most importantly within air range of each other. Our battle fleet and Kido Butai can serve as a mobile reserve, occasionally striking beyond the perimeter, but as sustained commitment as far off as Madagascar is impractical.

Our first concern has to be dealing with the Americans if they come in, but if they do not, I concur with Belasar-sama's desire to engage the British fleet, or so much of it as they deploy to the Indian Ocean. Once we have secured a substantial portion of their Empire, the onus will be on them to try to recover it. They will also need to maintain communications with Australia if that country does not fall under the American aegis. They may have to come to us, especially if we refrain from blatantly displaying our combat power in the theater. As I mentioned some time ago, I would rather try to catch them with a sudden incursion than maintain a standing force in the I.O.

 

I am beginning to reconsider operations in Madagascar. One point that seems to be evaporating presently: we do not need to conquer Madagascar. It is already controlled by our erstwhile French "allies." We need only support it. It is not beyond friendly air range, since airfields in Diego Suarez and elsewhere would be friendly. The significant problem is that it is beyond the range of easy mutual support with our other bases. I do not wish to tie down a carrier force in such a remote ocean in any case, but might we be able to spare a more modest force? We could probably base submarine and air forces there right now, with no construction necessary. A small surface detachment, and modest submarine and air forces might well make Madagascar a very costly objective for the British.

If we retain control of Madagascar it would make passage for German surface vessels from Atlantic to Pacific at least feasible, while simultaneously making such transits for enemy forces much more difficult. (And significantly hindering communications between England and her Asian colonies, whose independence we should wish to encourage.) Think of the possibilities should England be facing significant unrest in Malaya, India, and South Africa while pursuing war with Germany. They ask much of their colonies. What do they offer in return? Are there Indian members of Parliament? Can Zulu tribesmen vote in their local elections? Can Cantonese natives of Hong Kong freely move to London? We need to actively encourage decolonization over the entirety of the globe, even if such a course means we must create greater freedom for Manchuria, Korea, and Formosa. Free and independent nations will more likely trade with us, and they are much less likely to form a large coalition against us and against their own local interests.

Forgive me. My temperament is, as my wife notes, prone to running a little hot. I do not think we should make a large commitment in Madagascar, but if we can cheaply make a British conquest costly I think we should do so. And we should consider what rhetoric and political maneuvers might undermine colonial positions worldwide. If we can assure the Malagasy that we will help them in their quest for freedom from the French they will remain our allies longer than expediency will keep the Vichy regime aligned with us. Liberté, égalité, fraternité gentlemen. These are words we should live. Words we can fight for. Words we might worthily die for, should it come to such a pass. Forgive my imperfect French, but . . . La vie orientale c'est égal l'occidentale. We must not let London, Paris, Berlin, or even Tokyo forget that.

 

If a suitable opportunity arises we should look at taking advantage of it, but further down the line once we know how America will react to us. The two conditions I see as favorable is either the isolationists take back control of the White House or the US becomes involved against Germany and will be hesitant to want a second front. One possible secondary operation could be the invasion of Ceylon. It would give us a better base for operations, be a direct threat to Britain and could be too hard for the British to decline to defend.

 

Yes, Ceylon would be an excellent objective if our early operations go well and the US delays entering the war against us.

 

One advantage to an operation in Madagascar over Ceylon is that we wouldn't need to invade. Holding Madagascar could help inspire Britain's South Asian subjects to liberate themselves. If we can encourage the Vichy regime to grant slow and orderly independence to her colonies it will send a strong message to all of the people along the Pacific rim currently living under European occupation. We might point out to France that an orderly and peaceful withdrawal could be the first step in creating a strong cooperative alliance (of which we would be the senior member) with her former colonies where an uprising would almost inevitably lead to further acrimony and distrust, even if by some chance France in her current condition were to prevail; an outcome I find most unlikely.

This will be difficult and will require careful negotiation with the French government and perhaps Marshal Pétain personally. Does anyone on this council have any knowledge of Pétain's temperament?

 

Gentlemen,

I share your confidence that the actions we take now will allow us to field more ships, planes, AFV's and the trained personell to operate them. This will allow us to have a chance to meet our enemies on a more equal basis, but it can not give us the total largess they will enjoy. Since we can not engage them in total equality, we must be careful where we will employ this expanded production. These additions do not give us the option of a ever more inexhaustable new list of objectives to add too our Empire.

To be blunt I fear we are rapidly becoming over confident.

Have we so soon forgoten the the apperciation we began with? That unless we acted with dispatch and prudent care, the combined industries of America and the English Empire would in two to three years time submerge us in a ocean of steel and fire. We can not enforce our will upon Washington and London, but we might with luck and sacrifice prevent them from imposing their will upon His Majesty's Empire.

What has become of our intent to make those objectives we must have to survive as protected as we possibly can?

Let us set aside these fantasy's about securing outpost's in the Indian Ocean and coast of Africa that we can not hope to supply, defend or draw out any valuable natural resources for any realistic period of time. Once America enters the war, and she almost surely will, we will have to expend nearly every facet of our Empire to hold this juggernaught at bay.

Prime Minister