Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Would it be possible to have these river patrols co-ordinate with aerial patrols using light attack craft? Could this not offer some measure of heavy fire support, at least during daylight hours? Could Artillery bastions be emplaced to offer indirect fire for anything the patrol cannot overcome?

 

You did mention the Assam river a few days ago, on the 5th

 

Thank you sir. We will return to the drawing board and prepare a new proposal on the riverine craft incorporating your recommendations, and bring them back for your approval.

 

We will coordinate with aircraft during daylight hours looking for suspicious activity which the riverines can be vectored in to investigate. Artillery bastions are a bit overkill for forces we expect to encounter and require a good deal of manpower to garrison and defend. We don't expect to encounter large enemy concentrations or heavy formations. Infiltrators, armed smugglers, small guerrilla bands, etc. We need to pull over vessels travelling the rivers to look for arms and supplies being smuggled. We may need to raid a village where we have intelligence that guerrillas are being harbored in or where hidden weapons and supply caches are located. If we encounter a smuggler vessel that is armed and they decide to fight, I'd rather blow it out of the water than have to board it and take it in hand to hand combat. The two Admiral's suggestions should be sufficient firepower for what we might encounter on the Yellow River.

 

I went back and looked on the date you provided and can't find where I mentioned it, but the Prime Minister did here:

I've tried not to get too much into mentioning Burma and India for two reasons. First, I've been too busy with other AO's to really look much ahead to that area. The one recent exception is when I replied to your question. The second is that this area of operations would most likely fall under your command and when the time is right I assumed you would lead that discussion.

 

Was this comment meant for me or the Colonel?

If it was intended for me, please allow me to explain the context of my comment.

The Colonel had briefly mentioned the need for us to keep in our thoughts objectives and operations we might need to prepare for during the next year to be implemented during late 1942 and through out 1943. With that in mind I had mentioned the possibility that we may need to advance beyond Burma to effectively close any Southern Terminus of a supply line to Chaing's Nationalists.

This course of action may prove un-neccasary if our other projects create the desired result. If it does not then of course we must at least consider such a course of action or give up upon the idea of severing Western support for Chaing. In any event as we plan to advance into Burma a reliable line of supply must be created within this country and it would make sense to make it robust enough to support further advance should it prove needed.

As the good Colonel points out you must first seize the Eastern Maylay peninsula and then the western side leading into Burma. This gives us time to consider this at length after we have finished with their briefing on China proper.

I hopes this answers your query.

 

Before we continue let me reiterate that the geopolitical subdivisions we are proposing correspond to JEF-China’s, subordinate armies, areas of responsibility. So the region we just described as the operational area for Army of North China (AoNC) corresponds to one of the geopolitical regions we are setting up.

The next region will be the Army of Central China (AoCC) area of operations. It is smaller, territorially than the AoNC AO, but has a much larger population with numerous urban areas. The AoCC AO will probably be the most difficult for us to make significant progress in. It includes Shanghai and Nanking. The latter is the location where the infamous “Rape of Nanking” occurred, and there is much residual animosity and distrust. Fortunately, Chiang and his forces have been equally, if not more brutal and there have been sufficient atrocities committed by him and his generals that the public is wary of him as well. The northern border is the Yellow River which forms the southern border of the AoNC. The eastern border is the Yellow Sea. The westward border is formed by the rail line running from Sinyang on the AoCC/AoNC border, south southwest to Hankow and continuing on to Wuchang. This is the same railroad that forms the outer perimeter of the Army of North China and runs north northwest back to Peiping. The segment between Anyang in the AoNC area and Sinyang in the AoCC area is controlled by the Chinese in several areas and interdicted at numerous other points. Successful operations in AoNC, as already described, will eventually secure this as a contiguous line of supply and outer boundary.
The southern border of the AO will be from Hangchow, inclusive, along the main highway to Nanchang located on the Kan River where it enters Poyang Lake. From there along the main highway west and northwest to Chinese controlled Changsha.
The area is bisected by the Yangtze River, the third longest river in the world. Two thirds of the operational area falls north of the Yangtze and the other third, south of it. It is critical that we maintain complete control of the river and that is the reason during our briefing on the AoNC area we mentioned that we were concentrating our existing riverine forces, gunboats, etc. there, and wished to build and employ armed Daihatsu’s on the Yellow River.
This area will prove our greatest challenge in China. While we have a well developed and defined battle plan for the AoNC AO, we basically have a general outline for operations in AoCC and need to flesh it out with input from the council. In many cases there are no good options, just less “bad” ones. There are large populations in a number of large urban areas along the Yangtze we must deal with. In the western portion of the AO we face a large number of large formations of Chiang’s forces. On the plus side these forces are of poor quality and are not well supported, however their sheer size proves a threat.
If it meets with your approval Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to take each particular problem, one at a time and after council input, form the decisions into a cohesive plan.

 

Please do Colonel. Let us not get too far ahead of ourselves

 

I agree I just wanted to make sure we weren't discussing operations beyond the natural boundry.
Also, I am reading a book about the first year of the Pac war and the book mentions that Japan does not have a 50 cal machine gun, so that seems like something to remedy

 

Your book is "technically" correct, but wrong.

While the Japanese did not have a .50 caliber weapon, they did have the 13.2mm Type 93(1933) Heavy machine gun. It never saw widespread use in the IJA, being used primarily in the Type 92 Combat Car(light tank) and it saw limited use in their Field Machine Cannon Companies/Field Antiaircraft Machine Cannon Companies. The weapon was essentially a copy of the French Hotchkiss 13.2mm mle 1930. The problem being that the machine gun/cannon used 30 round box magazines instead of a belt feed. So, while the gun was capable, per se, of a firing rate of 400-475 rpm, however, the 30 round magazine limited it to about 200-250 rpm.

Given that we have an essentially "unmechanized" army, I cannot say that there is a compelling need to replace the Type 93 13.2mm with something that would be only slightly more efficient.

EDIT: Although the Type 93 did see widespread use in the Japanese Navy during the years of World War II, it would be entirely replaced by the 25mm on destroyer or larger warships, but was retained aboard smaller vessels.

 

I should have wrote it better, the troops in the field did not have a heavy machine gun.

 

Neither did the German Army, nor - for the most part - the British Army(IIRC, those that they did recieve through lend-lease almost always were vehicle mounted).

 

Is this the same HMG we intend to arm our aircraft with?

 

No, that would be the Type 3(1943) 13.2mm - based on the M-2 Browning, although the gun uses the same cartridge as the Type 93.

 

No sir, the HMG we intend to arm the aircraft with is the 12.7mm HO-103. A belt fed version of the US M-1921 .50 caliber Browning MG.



This MG also come in the HO-104 version which is a flexible mount that we mentioned using in our bombers in place of the 7.7mm flexible mounts. This gun has just been adopted this year. We could field a vehicle mounted/tripod dismounted version for ground forces, if an when our production levels exceed our aircraft requirements.

 

Ooops, forgot that was the one we had decided on.

 

Yes sir, we have this one available for use immediately. An M-2 Browning based version would be our next logical development because of the ability to configure it to feed from either side.
(Out of character, the Type 3 would be the better choice, I didn't suggest it due to its availability date. It is also a slightly more capable gun at 13.2 mm vs 12.7 mm x 81SR Breda. If we are going to go this developmental route with heavy aircraft machine guns, I'd just as soon do a direct copy of the browning, ammunition and all. BTW, if I remember correctly it was actually you that pointed out to me that the HO-103 was a copy of the M-1921 browning and not the M-2 browning, during our initial discussions on this topic. I listened, I remembered. I have learned a lot of information from you over the course of these discussions, I think I've retained the majority of it, and would just like to thank you for it.)

 

I have pondered, where best to start? I'll work from easiest problem to most serious, in order to develop a feel for the situation among Council members.

1.) The area from the Yangtze north to the border with the AoNC, (Yellow River) and inland from the coast, to a line running diagonally from Anking, north northwest to Sinyang, is primarily a well developed agricultural area. Enemy forces are thought to be minimal here except in the area of Sinyang. Sinyang is critical to our securing our outer perimeter line. This line runs along the outer rail line, the same as and is a continuation of the same rail line in AoNC, and is threatened by enemy forces in the immediate Sinyang area. The threat is not serious. The area in question is divided, in a basically north south direction by several features. The first feature and closest to the coast is the Grand Canal which divides this area from the Yangtze to the Yellow River, one end being on the other side of the Yangtze near Nanking to the Yellow River near Hwaiyin. A second line is created by a major rail line. It is the same rail line that will form our inner perimeter in the AoNC area, continuing SSW from Suchow, across the Yellow River to Pengpu where it splits. One arm continues on to the SW to the vicinity of Luchow, where it curves back to a point across the Yangtze from Wuhu. The other arm runs SE to a point across the river from Nanking.

We recommend a clearing operation here in order to secure the food producing population and to form an inner defensive line along the rail line. This area has a well developed road infrastructure that will likely help our efforts at stability and security internally and provide, along with the rail line, the ability to rapidly move troops to meet operational threats. We would like to execute this operation first, in concert with increased patrols, and vessels on the Yangtze. The increased activity on the Yangtze is intended to secure that flank and to intimidate the population in the large urban areas to help keep them passive until we can begin the governmental changes.

 

I most heartily endorse this course of action.

We have been remiss in our strategic considerations in the matter of Food Production. Our troops and sailors must eat, so too our industrial workers, and if we are to avoid general unrest, those peoples under our control. Utilizing every adult male suitable for either military service or employment in war related industries will place an extreme hindrance to domestic food production that can only be relieved by employing labor we will not subject to widespread conscription.

It does us little good to have the finest weapons if out soldiers are too feeble to wield them. The securing of good lands suitable for crops is nearly as important as our other material needs.

 

That is one of the things Nishio and I took away from our initial strategic discussions. We feel that if we are to adopt a long war view we must have the tools to stay the course. Food is a basic tool. We do not have the land or workers to greatly expand our food production in the home islands. We will, as a part of our bringing the economy to a full, wartime footing, have our cililian populace plant victory gardens in every spot available. This will be to supplement our own domestic food production, but if we are required to feed the people in the lands we control we will never be able to produce enough. We could force the people of occupied lands to increase production, but this will place additional strains on our military personnel to occupy and oversee all these areas. This is not an optimal solution. We feel the best option is to provide a situation where they feel they have ownership in their future and increasing production provides financial rewards and advancement. When a worker is working because it is in their own best interests, we have a better outcome.