Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Thats a good gesture, Bobimoto-san! No atrocities against western allies will lift our reputation much higher than any other political act can do. We´re not well known for keeping an eye on the Geneva convention, but that can polish some stains out of our vests.

 

Western Prisoners and Displaced Civilians

I am largely in agreement with Col. Bobimoto, but would propose the following

Neutral Western Civillians

Civilians from nations currently at peace with the Empire of Japan are to be transported to the United States or some South American state not at war with the Empire of Japan. Such persons to be allowed to take any personal and portable property in thier possesion. Fixed property, such as land, motor cars, business's etc. are forefit to the Native people's we Liberate from Western Colonialism. This will show humanitarism to the west and solidarity to Native populations. Once they reach their refuge, they may go as they please.

Belligerent Western Civilians

The same as above but must remain in the nation that accepts them until peace is concluded between the Empire of Japan and their parent nations

Western Military Personel

Enlisted Personel, Corprals and below or their equivilents the same as Belligerent Civilians.

Senior NCO's and officers retained by us as Enemy POW's. Both groups represent career military personel and the heart of their military culture.

NCO's, by my understanding of the Geneva Convention, can be required to work and should be employed in the food industry. They should be offered the same ration's as an enlisted man in the Imperial Forces as well as any international aid offered.

Officer's should be offered the chance to work for the added incentive of ration's equal to what we give Imperial officer's, otherwise standard enlisted rations and aid packages only.

Since NCO's and Officer's represent a small portion of any military organization and the numbers should be within our ability to feed and house (especialy if we make them grow their own food and build their own housing). Those too sick or injured to work and not a threat to the Empire can also be repatriated with the others. Those we retain can be a valuable asset to us as we are forces to employ ever greater numbers of our men for military operations.

Please Advise,

The Prime Minister

 

Dear Prime Minister,

your advices to handle the strangers and the POW´s are sounding good! You´re right about the NCO´s and the Geneva Convention. They should work but in any industry except the military industry. I don´t trust any workers which should make me a rifle to fire against their comrades! Build up POW Camps after western standards and allow the International Red Cross to visit them. There will be no better way to reach a good reputation.

Sincerely

Field Marshal Nishio

 

lol, probably not.

Very good!
Part of your post I agree with, however I'm afraid the last part is not at all correct, based on the evidence that I've seen.
I'm going to point out where I think your conclusions are in error, then I'm going to make a few suggestions.

First off however, I'd like to make clear that I am not representing British interests (in this post), but offering advice as a neutral observer (to inprove your excercise)


In addition to what Takao posted, we're starting in October 1941.

Correct. In addition, there were other lessons to be learned from the events of 1939-1941

The point was rather moot, as Britain had no enemies in the region in WWI. Nor was there any capability of the Central powers to invade India, Australia or Malaya in WWI. There were a few commerce raiders (SMS Emden, sunk Nov 1914) but no U-boats operated in the Pacific.

This is absolutely incorrect, as the US never protected British interests in Asia before WWII, and in fact was working to undermine the British "Colonial system".
Britain's plans to defend Far Eastern possessions before WWII did not involve the US but instead were based on cooperation with the French. Britain based a large number of troops in it's Far Eastern & Indian Ocean territory, built airbases throughout the region, and based hundreds of aircraft there.
They planned to send a sizable fleet to the East in event of war with Japan, and spent some 60 million pounds between the wars to build the Singapore naval base.
There's no possible way that you could describe their pre-WWII plans as "relying on the US"

Again I would disagree with this, the US was not "pacifist" but merely opposed to participation in a European war.

The building of a sizable fleet and building up of the Philippine army would tend to contradict both the US being pacifist, and being unable to protect her interests.

This is wrong in several ways. The Japanese never underestimated the danger substantial British naval or air forces on operations there, they hoped to strike quickly before the Allies could react.
The primary danger that the British Empire would pose would be with air & naval forces
The British military situation is very different in the fall of '41 than it was in the spring.
During early '41 the British are fighting Germany in Greece, Crete, & Libya, while simultaneously fighting the Vichy in the Levant, the Italians in East Africa & an Arab rebellion in Iraq, while facing the bulk of the Luftwaffe & Wehrmact. By the fall of '41 the British have evacuated Greece & Crete, ejected the Vichy from the Levant, put down the Iraqi rebellion, and defeated Italy in East Africa. Germany also shifted the majority of the Luftwaffe to the East, and has 95% of the army fighting the Soviets or garrisoning Europe.
So the British are in a far better position to oppose Japan than they were a few months earlier.
Let's keep in mind a few facts:
The British Empire is the world's leading aircraft producer in 1941, and build more aircraft than all 3 Axis powers combined

This is wrong on three points:
1.) The Japanese did not "know" any such thing, they had no idea what US contingency plans were, nor did they know what agreements FDR had made with the British & Dutch. The analysis done by the IJN & IJA about future US actions was at best a "guess". The Japanese had un fact assumed in their analysis that the US would support the British in the event of war. In truth, any assumption on the future actions of the US is at best a crapshoot.

2.) The claim that there was US public resistance to becoming directly involved in the war and a strong isolationist sentiment is incorrect, and is very different from the gallup results posted by Opana Pointer. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/Gallup/Gallup.pdf There was public resistance to direct US involvement in a European war, but by the fall of '41 a large majority of the US supported FDR's efforts to prevent Japanese domination of the Far East, even if it meant risking war with Japan.
The greater acceptance of conflict with Japan was likely due to the fact that there was US territory to protect (unlike Europe), and that the (assumed) weaker capabilities of the Japanese meant that involvement would likely mean a bombing campaign & "Gunboat diplomacy" compared to the much more difficult involvement in Europe. (Wrong assumptions, but that's what many people believed)

3.)
The idea that the US would not intervene`is directly contradicted by the records of discussions between FDR, Halifax and Churchill. FDR had convinced Britain & the Dutch to support his embargo against Japan, so the idea that he would just sit on his hands as they marched through the South Pacific doesn't make sense.
There aren't as many surviving US documents, but there in the British cabinet records.
I'll quote the relevant passage from "70 days to Singapore", by Stanley L Falk (former chief historian US Air Force)

"On Nov 28, Brook-Popham (CinC Far East Command) asked for authority to launch Operation Matador
as soon as escorted Japanese convoys were spotted approaching the Thai coast." The Chiefs of Staff in London discussed the matter. "Only a prior guarantee by the United States to join the struggle, they concluded, would allow them to grant Brooke-Popham the authority to act" "Two days later, the Chiefs informed Brooke-Popham of the breakdown of negotiations, and that Washington had been asked to guarantee military support if the British acted to forestall an assault on the Kra isthmus" (initiated Matador)
"In Washington meanwhile, on Dec 1, FDR and the British ambassador Lord Halifax were discussing possible joint Anglo-American action in case of a Japanese attack. If it became clear that Japan was launching a southern aggression, FDR stated 'We should obviously all be together'. "
On the evening of the 3rd, FDR told Halifax that his assurance of support meant armed support. It seems clear incedentally that both Halifax & FDR were aware of FDR's constitutional limitations. FDR pointed out that American support might be delayed for a few days. It was Halifax's report of this conversation that allowed the Chiefs to give qualified authorization for Matador.
On Dec 5 the Chiefs sent word back - "Brooke-Popham was authorized to begin Matador without further reference to London, if he learned Japan was advancing with intent to land on the Kra Isthmus, or violated any part of Thailand"
　
So it seems pretty clear that FDR was prepared to intervene even if the attack wasn't on the US territory directly. (Note: he doesn't mention a Congressional declaration of war, merely that the US support would involve military action.)


I'll be interested to see if anyone has a different source that claims otherwise.
Does anyone have a reference that claims that FDR was planning to have the US stay neutral after initiating the conflict? (by starting the embargo) Is there any evidence that he would "throw Churchill under the bus" after promising support?

 

I am very much in agreement, bad commanders inciting the enemy to greater outrage - just counter productive. The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and the rest of the opening offensive was bad enough, inciting the American (and our friends) ire tremendously. The overall treatment of Commonwealth prisoners in the early going and the Bataan "Death March" a little later, cemented a deep hatred for the Devils that cost them dearly. Their catastrophically pig-headed thinking did not even allow them to take their own citizens suffering into consideration during the 1944-1945 collapse, fire bombings and atomic attacks. Something was intrinsically wrong with the megalomanicas in charge, the Axis Alliance was a perfect storm of sociopaths. The incredible aspect to this epoch was that so many willing participants jumped on the hellbound train?? WTF were they thinking really?

 

Freebird,

What your poll questions show me is that Japan's actions slowly but steadily alarmed the American public enough to begin to engender the willingness to risk war.

Risking war is not the same as actually engaging war.

Further as Japan's actions could lead them accept the risk of war, so too can actions such as we propose lead them away from that position as well.

FDR unlike most leaders had to work within both public opinion and that of Congress in the matter of war. Offering sancuary to combatents, repairing their military assets and even the outright gift of hardware he could do unilateraly, but actual war required much more.

Again after Pearl Harbor when Hitler's avowed ally attacted the US he did not ask congress for any DoW against Germany or even infer that active militarey actions other than those already approved would take place against Germany even though he and Chuchill had an understanding that Hitler was the greater threat. By this point Hitler invaded or attacked some 11 countries, 9 of which were neutral at the time.

To be honest I feel it would be 50/50 weather or not the US would actually commit actively to a Japanese move at the DEI/SRA.

 

Actually, it is more like 95/5. At the moment, there is a US light cruiser, a destroyer tender, and two US destroyer divisions in Borneo waters. Somehow I doubt that they will only use there saluting guns to greet our naval forces when they enter DEI waters. Also, US forces have been actively watching, by air and sea, our convoy movements in the Formosa and French Indochina areas.

 

The Army and Navy General Staffs made a shrewd appraisal of the possible lines of action open to the Allied Powers. This estimate was as follows:[SUP]18[/SUP]

1. The Allies would attempt to isolate Japan politically and economically. At the same time, they would step up aid to Chiang Kai-shek in order to hold as many of Japan's effective forces immobile on the Continent as possible.



2. The United States and Great Britain would try to delay Japan's penetration of the southern areas by reinforcing their own air and sea power in the Philippines-Singapore areas and by holding these strategic bases as long as possible. The main body of the United States fleet also might, depending upon the trend of the early operations, attempt a trans-Pacific thrust, presenting the possibility of a decisive sea battle. Allied air and sea forces would harass Japanese sea traffic with guerrilla tactics to interfere with lines of communication.



3. When their mobilization was finally completed, the Allies would attempt a large-scale counteroffensive with air, sea, and ground forces, preparatory to a decisive naval battle. The United States would probably launch its counteroffensive from the southern and middle Pacific, where there were good sites for air bases. An offensive mounted across the Northern Pacific seemed unlikely because of unfavorable weather conditions. Should an American offensive be launched early in Japan's southern campaign, the chances were that it would be from the Central Pacific.


4. In the event that the United States and Great Britain elected to avoid decisive battle early in the war, they would probably limit themselves for the time being to submarine and air attacks on Japanese supply lines. At the same time they would endeavor to secure their communication lines with Australia and India with a view to the eventual use of these territories as bases for the start of a counteroffensive.



5. In all likelihood, Great Britain would be forced to employ the bulk of its strength in Europe, and would play a minor role in the Pacific operations. However, it could not be predicted with certainty whether the United States would elect to throw its main strength first against Japan or against the Axis.
Source: Chapter IV: Basic Strategy and Military Organization

​

 

One possibility is setting up independent governments in the taken countries and then sign long term agreements and if we can come to an agreement with Chiang then we can remove a major source of friction.

 

Some great idea's here, but my 2 cents to keep things real .....

1) How are you going to get the IJN and IJA to have honest and supportive relationships with each other? Institutional dysfunction was the norm between the two services throughout the war. How are you going to change things over night?

2) Don't give the IJN logistics infrastructure more capabilities than what it had for real. Any deep penetrations past the Solomons will need to be supplied. Add more engineering (sea-bee type) battalions is a fix, but that comes at the cost of immediate fighting power. Same with the raw materials and supplies that keep the war machine humming. Can Japan produce PSP matts for the runways in the wilderness area's of the south seas?

3) One thing that can be done right away without much adoo, is to coordinate the shipping schedules so that no ship is riding in ballast to and from the centers of raw materials.

I'm sure theres others that can be listed. Maybe someone else can expand on this?

 

The backstory here is that in mid 1941 Japan goes through one of her periodic political assaination frenzy's that is just stopped short of overturning the government from taking an even more radical form than historicly it did. So a group of people who otherwise would find themselves on the sidelines advance to positions of leadership. Using 'Networking' they tap others they know and trust to fill the voids, thereby giving a greater level of co=ordination between the Army and Navy.

That being said we still have differences, and those are what make this instructive and fun!

 

going back to the post about new caledonia, perhaps we could use the same type of pressure that was used in Indo-china, to get the vichy french to "authorize" us to "secure" it for them.

 

Actually I would go further and allow all civilians to go back as long as the promise not to enlist. Something similar was done with Italian colnists in Ethiopia/Eritrea that were sent home on specially chartered ships under the red cross flag.

 

Mr Prime Minister, What you mentioned above is exactly my reasoning for the suggestion of Fiji. Essentially the same use as proposed for New Caledonia only Fiji already has extensive air facilities which would not require large amounts of work. Of course the drawback is the distance and balancing what we can handle and over extention.

 

I can accept this, though there is no way we could enforce such a proabition.

 

Takao has a point about USN forces in DEI/Borneo. Thankfully, they're pretty light forces and they seem to be holding the bulk of their men and material in the Philippines for present. We could face a "Panay" sort of incident, but I think we should attempt to avoid their units unless they actually fire at us. I'm inclined to think Roosevelt will have a harder time getting a declaration of war through Congress than through the opinion polls. Further, public support for a war the U.S. initiates will be softer than support for a defensive war. We surely risk assaults on our lines, but if we're prepared for it perhaps we can make the price something the U.S. is unwilling to pay unless we give them their own reasons for vengeance. I'm still inclined to think our initial plans are sound.

I would tend to think that we can let the U.S. build up the Philippines almost as much as they want. Michizane's "White Elephant" idea seems about dead on. I'll invite the generals to correct me, but I should think we could pry the Philippines from any defensive force the U.S. could begin to hope to put there simply because our own lines to the Philippines are so much shorter. We should be able to effectively sever nearly all their supply lines. At present they do not have the logistical capability to support a fast fleet movement to the Western Pacific. They have no developed fleet anchorages between Pearl Harbor and Cavite. Transit distances will work heavily in our favor. It's about 6,000 nautical miles from California to the Philippines. It's a little over 1,200 from southern Honshu. A very fast convoy traveling at 20 knots, a speed terribly wasteful of fuel, would need almost two weeks to make a one way transit. A more economical, but still fast twelve knot speed would require three weeks. (Assuming no stops to refuel.) A convoy from Honshu traveling at 12 knots could make the trip in a bit under five days. In the time it takes their supply train to transit one way we can make the transit, unload, return, reload, and transit again if we offload and reload fairly quickly. They would need something like three times the bottoms to effect the same supply to a fleet in Philippine waters. I suspect they can do the same math as we. I doubt very much we will have to concern ourselves overmuch with the U.S. defense of the Philippines. All boasting by MacArthur aside, we can take them at our leisure if we need to.

For now, let them be. The more troops and aircraft the U.S. commit to the Philippines the better. What we cannot capture we can nuetralize and ignore. We can completely control the waters around the Philippines. Units there will quickly be completely out of supply. The U.S. Navy could conceivably decide to upgrade their facilities at Cavite or Subic Bay. We should monitor the area to watch for this. We should stay appraised of what forces they commit to the defense of the Philippines. At present I believe it amounts to a quite modest force: A pair of cruisers, a dozen or so antiquated destroyers, 25-30 mostly antiquated submarines, some minesweepers and gunboats, a few seaplane tenders, and attendant auxiliaries. Certainly this is something we should be aware of, but it's nothing we cannot easily neutralize. At a guess, I would say they do not intend to contest the area and wish to minimize their losses should we attack. If their army does not come to the same conclusion it needn't concern us. There are no vital resources to be had there of which I am aware. We simply need to prevent them using the Philippines to threaten our own lines. Assets tied down there are assets they cannot easily move to more vital arenas.

 

Take a little time off from this thread and I'm 6 pages behind. That's impressive.

My understanding is that Japan was not self sufficient as far as food goes prior to the war. One has to be careful in this sort of thing not to make that problem too much worse. Fishermen may be among the best of recruits as far as sailors go for instance but fish is one if not the primary protein source in prewar/war time Japan.

A problem in the Japanese will have in this area is the troops are already in the Philipines. I.e. Philipinos. In early 42 (and late 41) they were poorly trained and poorly equipped but the US was shipping sinficant quantities of arms and Mac had a massive training and recruitment plan underway. This is something that could get out of hand. Also once the war starts having US subs based in the Philipines can represent a signficant threat to commerce to the home Islands.

A couple of other doctrinal upgrades that might help.
1) Damage contol. Japanese damage control relied on specially trained damage control teams. If it wasn't your job you weren't trained in it. This has a number of negative impacts. One of the most severe is if the damage control temas start fighting the damage during the battle you risk loosing most or all of them to later hits.
2) Fleet air defence. Perhaps in the article below Japanese fleet air defence is compared to that of the US. Basically they didn't seem to have well designed overlapping airdefence formations and ships were allowed to maneuver independently when they came under air attack.
3) How to fight a battleship action. See:
Were the Best Good Enough?
For some ideas on what to do and what not to do.

Another document you might find interesting:
What if the Japanese had not attacke Pearl Harbor?

 

I still favor a hands off policy with the United States as our best chance, however slim, to put off war with America. I would submit that as our forces strike the SRA, we stress strongly that our ultimate goal is to free the native people from colonial domination by western empires. We further stress that America's promise to grant the Philipines full freedom in the near future is accepted at face value by the Empire of japan and due to this Japan sees no reason why there should be a clash of arms between the Empire and the US. Indeed as a co-equal partner in the Pacific with the USA we share its desire to free these people from outside influence designed solely to fill the coffers of European overlords.

PM

 

Probably impossible to enforce but the numbers are likely to be small enough to not matter that much and if some break the agreement and it can be documented the propaganda might be worth it.

 

re philipines. Thats why I suggest approaching Quezon and work to reach an agreement with him that we will not attack the Phllipines if they are not used as a base to attack us. The most difficult place will be Guam, it has no harbor suitable for ships, but has excellent air base capacity.