Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Forgive this humble and unworthy servants intrusion, but I have information that may be valuable to our cause...You have received a rendering that may be less than truthful, as a colour drawing of our new radial Ki 100 presented to you looks suspiciously like a member of the American Curtiss Hawk family. When compared to ancient wikipedia manuscripts, the rear cockpit is different and the tail assembly as well http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kawasaki_Ki-100...I only raise this whisper in the hopes of enlarging our sphere of prosperity.

 

Good catch. I was going to look at wiki first too......changing it.
Thanks Poppy.

 

So any updates on this project

 

Hope to hear some soon too.

 

Administrative/out of character post:
Gentlemen, my apologies for failing to post for an extended period of time. I have descended into researcher hell and have just recently managed to extricate myself. I was researching the aircraft question and my search for answers took me on a far ranging journey to a diverse number of subjects. On the plus side I've learned a lot and have generated huge amounts of data. I will give a quick summary of what I've learned (some of you are probably already aware of these facts), and we can discuss the individual factors more in depth if anyone requests we do so.
-It started with researching Japanese radial aircraft engines, a subject not well documented, with often incomplete, non-existent and/or contradictory information. One fact that was widely accepted was that the Japanese were highly advanced in radial engine design and manufacture. Why then did their engines produce less horsepower and high altitude performance than contemporary U.S. engines? The answer turned out to be engine tuning, aviation fuel octane and raw materials for high temp alloys for use in super/turbo chargers. Which led me to research the availability of raw materials within the Asia/Pacific region and the refining process for oil. Firstly, the raw materials were available, in fact they had the potential to control a huge proportion of worldwide supplies. A combination of Japan not planning for a long war and therefore not fully developing the resources in the region, mismanagement by the military in running the regional economy and the U.S. submarine campaign were the cause of the shortages. (The game does not model the individual resources as well as I would like to see. They use a more generic resource model. I have figure out a way I can simulate the individual key materials and I can manually scale back our manufacturing if one or more of the materials have their supply cut back due to allied bombing or supply interdiction). As to the question of oil/aviation fuel. I ended up researching the grades of crude oil produced at each location and the refining capabilities of each individual refinery. I had considered if we had the refining ability and technological expertise or sources of additives to allow us to produce the necessary high octane fuels that the U.S. produced. In short yes and no. The problem is basically this, many of our sources of crude oil have a high percentage of volatiles. This causes the fuel to ignite in the engine cylinder prior to being fully compressed resulting in engine knock and potential engine damage to to premature ignition. This can be managed by engine tuning and changing the richness of the fuel mixture, or increasing the octane rating. If the engine tuning/fuel mix method is used you can not get the maximum performance out of the engine. Historical Japanese Av gas was in the 87-92 octane range. It is common to express the octane ratings as two numbers showing lean/rich settings. The standards were 80/87, 91/96, 100/130 and 115/145 octane ratings. The U.S. actually produced and tested fuel in the 150-160 octane range, but they were able to do so by using a high-temp cracking process for producing a high grade base fuel that was developed after hostilities had commenced and the process was unavailable to enemy countries. To provide an example of how the octane rating effects horsepower outputs I'll use the Pratt & Whitney R-2000 Twin Wasp, it's outputs with various fuel grades is as follows: 1,300 hp @ 2,700 rpm with 87 octane, 1,350 hp with 100 octane and 1,450 hp @ 2,800 rpm with 100/130-grade fuel. Resistance of the fuel to premature combustion is also the reason for water and water-methanol injection being an effective method for increasing horsepower for short periods using WEP (war emergency power). To make a long story short I decided that to give us the capability to produce the highest octane fuels the allies had access to would be ahistorical and I will not add that capability. Several of the United States workhorse radial engines were designed to use 87 octane fuel because of fears that shortages would result because of the inability to produce sufficient quantities of the higher octane aviation fuels. These fears in the end turned out to be incorrect. Japan did historically have the capabilities to produce sufficient quantities of of aviation gas in the 100 octane range, why they did not remains a mystery to me. I present this source to support my position: Senator Harley M. Kilgore and Japan's World War II Business Practices

Some of the pertinent sections would be:

"Japan Gasoline manifested a new interest in Universal because of developments in iso-octane, a blending agent used in the production of high quality 100-octane aviation gasoline. Most major oil companies were engaged in research in this area at this time.23 Senator Kilgore pointed out that General Hap Arnold had stated the "limiting factor in air defense was not the ability to build planes or to train pilots, but the capacity to produce fuel for planes."24
Two phases existed in the production of aviation gasoline, the production of iso-octane and the production of a base stock which, when blended with lead and iso-octane, yielded 100-octane fuel. The Japanese were particularly interested in the base stock production process which, through catalytic cracking, required less processing and resulted in more gasoline. These processes were not in general usage in 1938.25 The alkylation process, which promised more gasoline at much less cost, drew the interest of the Japanese, as did the technology to produce the catalyst used in the process.26
The possibility that Japan Gasoline might acquire these processes piqued the interest of other Japanese entities.27 In March 1937, Masao Saneyoshi, president of Japan Gasoline, wrote Universal Oil that "owing to the urgent need to produce high octane gasoline for aviation, there is a strong tendency to develop the Polymerization Process in Japan, which would be reviewed by Professor Horie. . . ." Then he requested information concerning the new processes, including information on the catalysts.28 Fukio Horie, Japan Gasoline's chief engineer, also cited the demand for aviation gasoline: "Our Air Force requires keenly 100-octane fuel, therefore the quantity of iso-octane becomes the most essencial [sic] point in our client's plan."29 Likewise, Horie indicated in a letter in February that all of the refineries under discussion were basically under government supervision.30
The Japanese government was very interested in the deal with Universal Oil. Captain Yamagiware, who had visited the Riverside Laboratory of Universal Oil, was appointed to head up the fuel bureau. Believing that Universal was the best oil research institute in the world, he was willing to help Japan Gasoline become the vehicle to disseminate Universal's technology to Japan.31 Rokura Shinohara, a member of the Japanese Parliament, showed a great deal of interest in the processes. In fact, Universal attempted to use him to pressure Japan Gasoline to close a pending deal. Universal officials were aware they could be at cross purposes with the national interest when one of their executives wrote, "we are in a position where our Government could indicate some displeasure in our making these important processes of ours available to Japan."32"

In line with these agreements, Universal began to design iso-octane units to be used by Mitsubishi Oil Company and Nippon Oil, which had agreements with Japan Gasoline. Not only were the designs delivered to Japan in 1939 but Universal engineers were dispatched to help build these plants. Universal, prior to the signing of the agreements, informed the War and State departments of the pending transactions. Universal felt the Japanese could "secure practically identical results from the knowledge they have and will obtain through technical publications and by the issuance of our patents and inspection of other plants and those other groups that are competitive to us outside the United States." The War Department expressed no objection, even though the agreement was signed before the department's position was rendered.35
On July 5, 1939, Japan Gasoline Company exercised option two of its agreement with a payment of one hundred thousand dollars. This agreement allowed the company's technical staff to visit Universal's laboratories and other research facilities to obtain "all necessary technical know-how." Two months after the option was activated, a force of Japanese technical representatives arrived to spend four months in Universal's facilities. The technologists included petroleum, mining, and chemical representatives, and technical staff from the Japanese army and navy. Other Japanese scientists apparently had no contractual relationships with Japan Gasoline. In reality, Kilgore pointed out, the contract was "with the Japanese nation as a whole so that anybody in Japan could utilize it." Thus, it functioned as a Japanese government monopoly. The technical staff of Universal Oil "cooperated fully with them on their problem which was mainly the production of aviation fuel." In fact, Universal "carried out a very extensive program of research in catalytic cracking and hydrotransforming in order to arrive at a type of process which would satisfactorily meet the Japanese requirements." Eleven of the thirty-five people who attended were army and navy personnel.36

This apparently did not deter the Japanese, who through appropriate internal agreements were able to plan and construct five catalytic cracking plants with a total daily capacity of fifteen thousand barrels. Each plant included units to manufacture iso-octane for blending as well as five independent units with a 650 barrel daily capacity.


In the end what I have determined it would be perfectly feasible, with proper management is to have a higher (100/130) octane fuel available for our fighter interceptor aircraft and thus higher performance and a lower (87 octane) rating for other types. I can adjust the performance figures to reflect this change.

Which brings us to the next topic.....

 

Once we have completed our expansion into the SRA and pacified China we will control a huge percentage of many of the world's key natural resources. Why Japan did not make better use of this asset is again based upon three factors: 1.) Failure to plan for a long war 2.) Mismanagement by making the military responsible for exploiting them and 3.) The U.S. strategic use of airpower and submarines to attack the supply lines.
--Japan did not attempt to fully mobilize it's economy until 1943. What if we were to do so right off the bat?
--Japan did not attempt to protect it's supply lines until it was too late. We can do better. How many realize that Japan actually fielded an effective anti-submarine MAD device? It was fielded early in 1944 and was effective. Part of the problem was not training adequate numbers of pilots, so few were available for airborne ASW work. They again attempted to correct this problem in 1943, a decision we have recently made here to rectify immediately. Japan began work with radar, but belatedly gave it the priority it deserved. They fielded crude but effective units early on (a unit was captured in 1942 when Marines invaded Guadalcanal and Tulagi, and U.S. authorities were alarmed because they did not realize Japan possessed this capability) and back engineered U.S. and British designs captured early in the war in Malaysia and the Philippines. They even captured handwritten notes from the British detailing it's operation, capabilities and the underlying theory for it's use. Japan was very advanced, among the most advanced in the world with regards to Radio research in particular they were very advanced in magnetron development (exceeding Great Britain) and had produced the world standard Yagi antenna for VHF.

From Lt. Wiki:
"Radio engineering was strong in Japan’s higher education institutions, especially the Imperial (government-financed) universities. This included undergraduate and graduate study, as well as academic research in this field. Special relationships were established with foreign universities and institutes, particularly in Germany, with Japanese teachers and researchers often going overseas for advanced study."

Historically, Japan received very little technical or material assistance from Germany. When technical missions were exchanged they tended to focus on general topics, excluding specific, secret research and applications. The relationship between the U.S. and Britain was entirely different and both sides benefited from the research and advancements of the other. IMHO, we need to either sheet or get off the pot. We need to approach Germany and insist on full cooperation or cut our ties with them to strengthen our political situation. Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to suggest that you assign General (Ret.) Kourei Yuushou, (Tired Old Soldier) to begin negotiations with Germany. He can come up with a proposal and we can submit it to our moderator for a decision as to it's acceptance or rejection. We need to do this immediately so we can send and receive technological missions before we attack Britain and the Netherlands. Once war is initiated we can keep our LOC, with Germany, open by the use of submarines. How many realize that Germany actually shipped five Bf 109 E-7's to Japan aboard Japanese submarines for evaluation purposes. (note:a fly-off with two Ki-61 prototypes took place using one of these planes. The Ki-61, the Ki-43-I, a pre-production Ki-44-I, a LaGG-3 (flown to Manchuria by a defector), a Bf 109E, and a captured P-40E Warhawk all participated. The Ki-61 proved the fastest of all the aircraft and was inferior only to the Ki-43 in maneuverability). They also shipped 800 MG 151/20 to Japan by a submarine in August 1943 for use in the Ki-61. In addition to technical expertise in areas we are more advanced in, we could ship to Germany by submarine, critical raw materials. Tungsten, needed for electrical components and for use in armor piercing shells, we control or will control 80% of the world's supply. Rubber, needed for many applications, we control or will control 90% of the world's natural rubber supply.

From Lt. Wiki:
"Self-sealing tanks have multiple layers of rubber and reinforcing fabric, one of vulcanized rubber and one of untreated natural rubber that can absorb oil and expand when wet. When a fuel tank is punctured, the fuel will seep into the layers, causing the swelling of the untreated layer, thus sealing the puncture."

Germany had to resort to a rubber coated leather system for their fuel tanks. They could use the rubber. Plus it takes some stress off the synthetic petroleum production in Germany, they don't need to divert as much to synthetic rubber production.

Quote:
"Rubber was the only bulk industrial commodity more readily available to Japan than the United States before the war. The rubber tree originated in Brazil, but the British smuggled seeds to Ceylon and began establishing plantations there and in Malaya. Large plantations also existed in the Netherlands East Indies by 1941. These plantations largely drove Brazil out of the world market. With the capture of these areas in early 1942, the Japanese secured ample rubber for their needs. At the same time, they denied natural rubber to the Allies. The resulting severe rubber shortage led to rationing of gasoline throughout the United States in order to save automobile tires. An effort to collect a million tons of scrap rubber in 1942 was unsuccessful, yielding only 335,000 tons of scrap rubber, much of it useless for manufacturing tires.

The United States negotiated the purchase of the limited South American production in July 1942, but this was far short of requirements. Some effort was made to revive the Brazilian rubber industry, but with a seven-year period for a rubber tree to come into production, there was little hope here. The Allies turned their efforts instead into the manufacture of synthetic rubber from petrochemicals. Fortunately for the Allied cause, this effort was successful, though replacement tires remained unavailable for the civilian market until nearly the end of the war."

We also control between 60 and 70% of the world's tin supplies. Another critical war material. We have sufficient quantities of manganese and chromium, but very substantial supplies are available in the Philippines. If we can strike a separate peace/trading relationship with them, outside U.S. control we would benefit greatly.


There are huge coal reserves in China. This topic up next.....

 

one suggestion for industrial advancement is to say that some advancements require a HI level of x which requires a lot of investment.

 

I fully endorse empowering Ambassador Kourei's effort to reach a comprehensive agreement with Germany to fully exchange technology and natureal resources.

Prime Minister

 

From the Military attache in Rome.
Exchanging resources with Germany (or Italy in a very few areas where they have something usefuy) is limited by the difficulty of actually shipping it, since Barbarossa submarines are the only viable means of transporting goods (before then ships could go the artic route).
Germany has no large hull type submarine in production that can be adaped easily to the transport role. We should encourage our european allies to build some or convert some larger Italian boats to the role as we don't have the excess capacity to build enough ourselves.
The following materials (besides technological samples) should be given priority:
Outbound:
- Rubber
- Tin
- Tungsten (if the europeans can't get it from Portugal).
- Our oxigen and aerial torpedoes are more advanced than what they are currently using but may be too radical designs for them to adopt.
- We could sent some carrier ops instructors to Germany and Italy in the hope what the ships they are building force the allies to keep more CVs in European waters but I believe it's a long shot and good instructors are much more useful training our own pilots.
Inbound:
- Mostly technology samples, our european allies have very little raw materials to spare, in particular we should look for:
--- Aircraft engines (including jet engines)
--- Advanced fighters
--- Radar technology
--- Remote control bomb technology, the large anti-battleship weapon currently under design is probably too large for our planes but the smaller Henshel weapon looks promising, coupled with the extreme range of our torpedo planes it would be a real pain to counter.
--- Tank prototypes in the 25 or 30t class, we will need something heavier than our current models if we ever face the soviets again, and the USA are likely to develop something in that class for use in Europe and then use them against us.
--- Some medium gun designs, for example the 88/56 Krupp cannon, if it can be adapted to our production processes, would be well suited to our use, while not the best AA gun in the world it could provide our forward bases with a good defence against both air and surface targets and it's relatively light weight makes it easy to ship. The 75/46 currenly in development by Rheinmetall also looks promising as a field/AT weapon though it's high velocity is likely to make barrell life a bit on the short side for a field gun.
--- Some German planes like the Ar 196 look very useful in our strategic situation, should get hold of some saples to explore the "concept" (a patrol floatplane with enough firepower to act as interceptor).
--- Automatic cannon designs (20 to 30mm), while we currently have too many of them of(designs not cannons) we should look at the best before standardizing on one model.
--- Cheap, mass producible small arms (the MP 40 and the very promising "cheap" successor to the MG 34 are good examples, though both use cartriges we dont't currently mass produce the 9mm Parabellum and 7.92 Mauser are probably the most common cartriges wordwide today).
--- We should also look if there are some useful automatic rifle designs built around our standard 6.5mm cartrige, that's one area where our less powerful round could actually be a big advantage, equiping elite units like the SNLF with such weapons could be a very good idea.
--- Last but not least mortars, they are ideally suited to our kind of warfare but are current designs are not very good, eventually they should replace more economically most infantry and "jungle/mountain" guns. The Italian 81mm copy of the Brandt is probably a lot better than our 90mm Type 94 (very similar performance for a lot less weight).

In the aircraft debate do we need an "intermediate" twin engined floatplane/seaplane for patrol areas where the Jake is too sort legged but the four engined types would be wasted?

One thing we should probably offer is basing for a few German subs to close the Vladivostock route, even a handful of them are enough as the US cannot provide escorts. This will of course make Stalin unhappy but I believe we can run that risk as long as we mantain "plausible deniability" on where the subs are getting their supplies (BTW we would be providing a lot less support for the KM than the "officially neutral" USA are currently giving the RN, so it's ulikely to cause an incident on that side).

OUT of character historically the Germans planned to "swap" some Italian large "oceanici" subs to be converted to transports with some type VII and Italy did design a trasport class but only two entered service in 1943 and at that date they would probably be used to ship materials to NA. I also have somewhere an article about the Japanese military mission to Italy that inspired my "role" and could contain more data, will have to see if I can find it again.
IIRC the Japanese actually bought a tiger tank, but could find no way to ship it.
I doubt the game models small arms differences but ..... it was fun.

 

I can fully support much of what our Ambassador propose's. I think however we have an acceptable medium tank design of our own that should meet our needs as discussed earlier. I would like to add portable Anti-tank weaponry to our list os technology requests. Otherwise a very sound proposal.

Prime Minister

 

since we dont really need a tank unless we are fighting the Soviets, we should consider a model like the stug. this would be more then adaquate for the Sherman or British tanks.

 

I repectfully agree tanks are not apriority and that portable AT weapons may be enough to mostly neutralize enemy armour in the close terrain we will be operating in, I was not suggesing putting a 30t class tank in production immediatly, but to get protoypes to have one ready if/when the need arrise. Our current "medium" (CHI-HE) weights in at 17t from a design that started at 15t (CHI-HA), while there are designs for a 24/30t detivative (Type 4 CHI-TO) and some are even proposing a 37t (Type 5 CHI-RI) it's far from sure the basic Type 97 design can be stretched succesfully that far from the original weight.
I expect we are going to come up against subtantial numbers of western armour on any front where there is a chance to deploy them, both the British and the USA have given tanks a high production priority so they will have plenty to spare for use against us.
I disagree with the "stug" proposal, in the close terrain we will operate turning the vehicle to face the enemy may prove problematic in a lot of instances, limited traverse vehicles operate best at medium/long ranges.

 

There are a few islands where AV are practical, the Phillipines, Okinawa and the Marrianas, the other islands I agree they are not practical. My thinking is that since they are cheaper and easier to make, they can be of limited use.

 

I Fully support your idea of having the Germans press the Italians into making the submarine conversions you mentioned, as I see most of the bulk materials making the Japan/Asia to Germany route instead of vice-versa. What I was really looking at was an exchange of research/technical personnel. Plans and critical machine tools. I think we can send some of our researchers/technical personnel with knowledge in our advanced magnetron research and antenna array expertise (we are very advanced in these two areas and marry them up with German/Italian/Vichy French scientists/technical personnel, currently working in the practical applications of radar, which German currently leads us in. They can send the same type representatives to work in Japan with our scientists/researchers/technical personnel. By combining our research efforts and marrying up the best minds from all four nations, I see us making rapid advances in the technology. Germany has the technical expertise to more rapidly prototype experimental units, so we can use them for more rapidly fielding technological leaps in technology. I would also like to see experienced German U-boat officers sent to lend their technical/operational expertise to our submarine forces and to work with our ASW forces in developing better tactics. I would like to see technical/managerial people from Germany/France and Italy sent to help us develop, manage and exploit our newly seized resource assets.

I think that the additional range, power and reliability of our torpedoes will quickly overcome any hesitation by their leadership towards adopting our technology should we be given the chance to demonstrate them to the Germans.

I disagree with the last point. I do not forsee the Germans or the Italians completing or fielding aircraft carriers at anytime less than several years down the road. Perhaps it would be better to allow German Naval officers to serve with our carrier fleets to observe, gain technical/operational insights and develop useful operational expertise, instead of sending our instructors to Germany. They can then return home and share their knowledge with the rest of the German navy if they ever field carriers.

Yes, I think German and Italian development in jet aircraft engines is an area where we could benefit from their technological advances. I would not seek further assistance in the DB-601 type engine development path. We have had technical and reliability with our version of this engine. It's widespread adoption would require a huge effort, on our part, in retraining maintenance personnel that are already familiar with our radial engine types. Our current radial types, in development, are producing comparable horsepower outputs and actually higher HP/weight ratios. Our current aviation engine types are more reliable and easier to maintain, and once again our maintenance personnel are well versed in servicing this type engine. The German's themselves have just recently introduced a radial engined fighter, the FW-190. It's BMW 801, twin-row, 14 cylinder engine is no more advanced than our Mitsubishi Kasei series engines. The Kasei is a development of the Kinsei, which in turn was derived from the Pratt & Whitney R-1690 Hornet. The BMW 801 was developed from the same Pratt & Whitney Hornet engine. So here also I see no advantage in pursuing German research. As for our airframes, I feel that the Germans here also have little to offer, when it comes to conventional airframe design. It is in the advanced types that will be required for the jet engine that we can use their help. In this area, jet engine and advanced airframe for use with said engine that I think we can find mutually beneficial. I suggest we combine our efforts, with full sharing of technical information, hopefully between the two of us we can field the aircraft type very quickly.

As mentioned earlier, this area should be both outbound and inbound. We have a lead in the area of magnetron's and antenna arrays, they in development of practical units using the technology. They also have the ability to more rapidly prototype new types for testing and evaluation. Cooperation in this are will markedly benefit both countries.

Interesting idea, an area I think further exploration would be worth our while.

I think we have an adequate tank for our present needs in the 17 ton Type 1 Chi-He. Our development efforts into the 30 ton range look promising and I think rather than going with an outside design, accelerated development of a domestic type is our best route forward. I would support development of a casemated type as an interim measure to protect against Soviet incursions in northern China. I believe General Nishio and I have discussed it unofficially. Also from his suggestion, it would appear that General Terauchi Hisaichi, would support this option as well:

The Americans at present lack the ability to transport and land amphibiously anything larger than the 16 ton M Stuart tank. So in the near term, other than on the Asian mainland we will have little use for a 30 ton tank. General Terauchi's suggestion for a casemated, "tank-killer" type, should present adequate capabilities to counter the Soviets near term. I do however like to plan long term. The allies will probably develop the capability of landing a 30 ton tank without benefit of port facilities. We need an effective counter. I propose we accelerate development of larger tanks and assign Admiral Noka to oversee design studies into the necessary ship types for us to deploy said tank amphibiously, when they become available.

We already have the Type 99 88mm L/45 gun. It is lighter than the gun you mentioned and has only slightly lesser performance. Type 99 88/45--Krupp 88/56: Muzzle velocity-2,600 fps vs 2,690 fps--ROF 15 rpm vs 15 rpm--effective range-15,500 yards vs 16,200 yards--ceiling 34,190 ft vs 39,000ft. I think we should stay with the gun we have, but develop a vehicle mounting for the casemated assault/tank killer type vehicle we have been discussing.

Here again we have a comparable type in the Type 88, 75mm gun.

The A6M2-N will soon be available and has similar firepower to the Ar 196 and is much faster, more maneuverable and with almost twice the range. We also have the Kawanishi N1K1 that should be available in the spring of next year that promises even better performance and almost twice the firepower.

....more to follow.

 

I agree the Italians or German fielding a CV in time to pause a threat (by late 1942 it's would be just a bomb magnet) is a long shot. But we should be monitor if we can help them get over some hurdles with little effort andthis requires being on site,on the other hand naval aviation instructors are too precious to send abroad but they could send some pilots here.

AFAIK there is no Italian jet technology of any value. I agree the BMW 801 is unlikely to be better than our radials but getting a few samples to check is worth the effort/cargo space, they may have some good "tricks" we could adopt (ex water/methanol boost).

The Type 99 is a derivative of the WW1 German naval 88 (not of the later Krupp AA) and is not as good as the 88/56 (BTW I think we don't measure barrel length the German way so the two may be a lot more similar than it seems at first glance). AA weapons are critical and having something better may give us an edge.

The A6M2-N is a floatplane fighter, IMO a failed concept as they cannot face an enemy airbase or carrier group on equal terms, a fighter strip is much better. For limited opposition scenarios (dealing with the occasional PBY or Husdon) a 20mm armed two seater patrol plane, that retains full ASW patrol capability, is a better bet, my suggestion was experimenting the concept with the Ar 196 and then deriving the actual plane from the Aichi E13A .

 

Even if the Germans did build a carrier, Goering made it clear he would not allow the navy to have luftwaffe pilots so Germany would then have to start a naval air program which would take years and I see no value what so ever for one German carrier.
I believe the value of a float plane fighter is simply to take on other scout planes.

 

For practicle matters, it is of no concern to us if our carrier technology/expertiese is usefull to Germany/Italy in the near term, but rather what value they may think it has. If it gets us what we need or demonstrates that we are fully cooperating in an exchange, that is all that matters.

Prime Minister

 

Very well said Mr. Prime Minister. That is also why I think that we should also prioritize our wants. We need to push for the things we most need and desire first. The nice to have things can come later, if the relationship remains amicable.
How would I prioritize our needs:
1.) Advance our radar program.
2.) Expertise to improve our industrial manufacturing methods.
3.) Expertise in maximizing our economic capacity in the areas we capture.
4.) Synthetic fuel technology.

(#5. Has to be mentioned out of character because it hasn't been encountered yet and neither we nor the Germans are aware of it. The bazooka/panzerfaust/Faustpatrone/Panzerschrek type weapons.)

 

What about AT grenades in particular rifle launched ones. Wasn't that what the bazooka was developed from?

 

If we are talking hurdles to their design I would agree. If we are talking about learning how to operate a carrier, which is the big hurdle, I don't think anything beats actually participating in flight operations. German officers, embedded with our carrier crews during actual combat operations would learn all there is to know about carrier ops. They would also have the chance to offer suggestions to us for countering weaknesses they see in our operational doctrine. I fully agree with you as to naval flight instructors being at a premium. Perhaps we could allow some of their pilots go through the advanced stages of our training course and take the skill set back to their naval aviators.

We already have the capability to use water/methanol injection, but you do make a good point. it wouldn't hurt to look at one or more of their engines, in case there is some feature we could incorporate. As for the Italian's jet engine. The Italians have been playing around with jet engines since the early 1930's. Their first type was a thermojet. Then we have the Hungarians working on the turbo prop, György Jendrassik has had a working model in Budapest since 1939. I feel we should examine all potential paths within this emerging technology.

You are correct sir. The Type 99 is a derivative of the naval 88. We designed it in 1938 and it has been in service since 1939. The reason for my mentioning it was because we are already producing it, and it's performance numbers are very close to the Krupp 88. Should we really introduce another gun type, that offers only a minimal increase in capability, or are we better off to avoid any delays in production and produce what we already have. I think in this particular case the latter option is the more logical one.

I do not agree that it is a failed concept. No, the float fighter is not capable of defeating land or carrier based fighters, but it should be quite capable against the larger and/or slower types that will be reconnoitering or bombing. The Ar 196 is incapable of overtaking a PBY or a Hudson The PBY-5 which entered service in September of last year has a top speed of 196 mph the Ar 196 193 mph. When compared to the Lockheed Hudson it's even worse 193 mph vs. 246 mph for the MkI. How can it shoot down a reconnaissance aircraft it can't catch? We are in a similar situation with regards to the most likely U.S. carrier based search and reconnaissance aircraft the SBD, with a top speed of 255 mph they too could just outrun the Ar 196. Even the A6M2-N, I mentioned earlier does not enjoy a great deal of speed advantage, but at 270.5 mph top speed it does have a better chance of intercepting and downing prying eyes. And the enemy can't hit us where they can't see us. As for the follow on Kawanishi N1K1, we ordered it's design in September of last year and should have a prototype flying in the spring of '42. It should have a top speed of 298 mph.
For ASW/search work, our own Aichi E13A, which you yourself mentioned, is a much better aircraft than the Ar 196. Let's compare their capabilities E13A(Ar 196 A-2): Top Speed-234(193)mph--Range 1,300(670)mi--Ceiling 28,500(23,000)ft.--Rate of Climb 1610(980)ft/m--bombs 1 x 550lbs(2 x 110lb)--crew 3(2). Then we have the E16A floatplane which meets the 1941/16 Shi specifications that looks to be even more capable which should be appearing in the spring as well.
All this being said I do not think that once we complete the expansion phase of our operations we will have much need for float plane fighters, so I would not recommend that we produce them in great quantities. Once, we have entered the defensive phase we should be able to establish sufficient airfields, as to make the need for floatplane fighters negligible.

To address another point you raised:

I like this idea, but fear the Germans lack sufficient boats to operate in both the Atlantic and in the Vladivostok area. I would encourage you to open negotiations in this area however, to see what may come of it. I do think it may benefit us if we could send some of our submarine officers to serve aboard the U-boats in the Atlantic in order that we can benefit from German operational expertise in operating against both our potential adversaries.