Barbarossa is well planned & executed, much like the sickle cut was.

You are repeating the very worst of the Nazi General excuses.

1) The best use of a tank division, is not to take a city. Capturing the city, is the job of the infantry. Bloody, yes. But tanks are extremely vulnerable in cities, and had they stayed, the losses would be far worse, and there would be fewer panzers for a very long time. Something the Russians either forgot or chose to ignore when they first tried to re-enter Grozny. Hitler could not have ignored the build up of forces in Kiev; they were too much of threat to his flanks, and the panzers were needed there to complete the encirclement.

2) Hitler changed the plan, after they attempted to and failed to enter the city, having already surrounded it. It was apparent, that actually entering the city was going to be too costly; the city was well defended, and at the time, there really wasn't a need to capture a city which he intended to burn to the ground anyway.

3) The tanks were halted, because they needed to be halted. No German tank commander will admit it. but they needed supplies, reparations, and to actually gain some R&R for the men. Too much panzer-chokolad is not good for you in the long term.

4) It really wouldn't have made much difference; Germany was not producing that many vehicles. Less than 200 panzer III's per month in '41 on average. Roughly half that amount of all other types.

5) Because the ammunition production was ridiculously high in '39-40, which also had nothing to do with Speer. Speer was a fantastic self-propagandist. Read Adam Tooze; the Wages of Destruction. Armour was present, but there was only so much they could do to help siege Sevastopol.

Once again, Germans blaming their defeats, losses, and inadequacies on circumstances they should've been better prepared for, but never, ever due to enemy action. Like them or not, Russians don't sit around bitching afterwards about the mud, the snow, the frostbite, the lack of ammunition and supplies, the lack of food, the rain, the heat, the bad decisions, the terrible allies they had. Yet at one point or another, the Russians had good reason to complain about a great deal. But they didn't, they don't make excuses. Beat a German, and it wasn't you that won, it was he that lost because of something he couldn't control, it wasn't really your "win". Even when Germans win, they would've won better if it wasn't for the mud / snow, food, ammunition, lack of toothpaste, sunspots, veneral disease, or extra day for leap year.

6) Hindsight is like that. But that is the least of the problems with your scenario.

7) For the umpteenth time; you cannot attack Leningrad from Finland. It doesn't matter what Mannerheim or Manstein thinks. Finland was and is a Western-style Democracy. No other European state fighting against the USSR avoided total subjugation. Finland needed to retain the Goodwill of the Western powers, and when you are a bantam weight involved in a slugging match between super-heavyweights, you hedge your bets.

 

1) I don't know what city concerns you. I stated that Guderian bypasses and isolates Leningrad, 150 of his Panzers head to meet with Höpner's force and 300 head to Moscow. Likewise, I stated that Kleist's and Hoth's Panzers bypass Odessa and head nor Nikolaev, etc, The other few tanks are in the Murmnsk and Kandalacha operations.

2) Capturing Leningrad after it was heavily fortified and reinforced and while there weren't enoght Panzers (Höpner's few Panzers had been trounced repeatedly in Raseiniai, Tikhvin, etc, sent to Moscow, etc,), cannon, shells, planes and men to simultaneously fight the Soviets trying to break the Siege was out of the questions. All because of Hitler chaned the plans, sending Guderian to Kiev, Hoth to Leningrad and Klesit to Uman and Nikolaev. Capturing a completely ill prepared Lenngrad on the first days of the war, with Fresh forces (which didn't have to march from Poland and E Prussia) and after sinking the ships and wiping out the planes, etc, is another story.

3) Güderian was halted in Frnace (with potentially fatal consequences), fortunately for Germany, he talked his supeiors into authorizing a recce in force, so he continued advancing and trounced the allies (by denying them time to redeploy, reinforce and regroup). Manstein knew a lot more than distant generals who knew little about his situation and Blitzkrieg or you or me and he was as upset when he was halted as Guderian had been in France. Unfortunately for Germany, his superiors did not relent. Panzer commanders and troops know that stopping and resting means encountering much heavier resistance when they resume the thrust. They stopped the tanks for infantry to cathch up not for RR.
After months of continuous fighting and advancing a much longer distance (more wear) than Kleist had advanced in days when he was halted, Guderian was ordered all the way to Kiev from Smolensk as fast as possible, without any RR or overhaul time. He was then ordered back north, where his troops had taken a beating in Yelnia without tanks and supplies (which had gone to supply Guderians and Hoth's odisseys). It interesting how Hitler, Halder, etc, knew when to stop the experts on their tracks and where to force to continue fighting and rolling for months and thousands of km.

4) Kleist lost 200 Panzers on the first weak and continued losing heavily every week and many of his dwindling tanks were outclassed and heavily worn Pz I and II, yet he received no tanks for the critical months of good weather. Had he received even 50 new tanks per months [38 (t), Pz II and IV] his force would have been much more effective and suffered fewer experienced crew losses. Höpner's force was even weaker to start with and he had some very unreliable 35 (t), so 50 tanks per month would also have made a huge difference. The same applies to Guderian and Hoth, whose tanks were sent for ridiculously long detours just before Typhoon. Irocanically, the new tanks began arriving when the decent weather was passing and when they could not be used or supplied during the rasputitsa.

5) Munitions stocks and production were so low and consumption so high during the invasion of Poland (destroying Warsaw and dozens of cities and insignificant towns), that when the Soviets finally attacked, the WM and LW had nearly run out of shelss and bombs, so the Soviets saved the day. Had France invaded Germany in force at the time, the latter would have been short of munitions to stop an offensive. A similar situation happened in France, had the Germans invaded with the original plan, they would have been short of munitions after 2 months of heavy fighting. Manstein saved tha day by defeating the allies in the sickle cut. In Barbarossa there was not enough of anything. There were fewer planes )the most valuable asset of the war) than when France was invaded and many of those available were heavily worn and spread over a much large front than in France. In France there had been more planes than tanks, in Barbarossa there were more tanks than planes and a much longer front, with much deeper advances.

If Finland wanted to remain in good terms with the allies and the USSR, it would have had to deny Germany rights for troop transit (as a true neutral nation would). it would have had to forget about the land that it had ceded to the USSR. However, Finland knew that the allies had not moved a finger when the Soviets invaded it or even when they invaded Poland.

 

Just one of the interesting points is that Finland did not use artillery fire against Leningrad or bomb it with planes. Mannerheim and president Ryti were playing the game of doing something but not going all the way....

 

The usual repetition of incorrect claims in post 62 makes them not correct
.

While it is so that there were production and transport problems for ammunition (not only on German side), these problems had almost no influence on the fighting.

In Waffen und Geheimwaffen P199 F.Hahn writes the following :The army could replenish its reserves (of ammunition) in the 4 first months of the war .

In Poland the ammunition consumption was :87694 ton, in may/june 1940 88460.

For Barbarossa the figures were

june :1864

july : 101594

august :108855

september :107670

october :90563

november :68035

december :83547

The ammunition consumption was related to and caused by the intensity of the fighting : the more fighting= the more consumption .But the consumption did not determine/influence the fighting :the Germans advanced more in november than in august,although the consumption was lower .

Other point : to talk about a big French offensive in the beginning of september 1939 is wishfull-thinking : a such offensive was out of the question and would fail because the French were much to weak :the only thing they could do and did was a small offensive : the Saar offensive .

Last point : to claim that Germany would have lost without Sichelschnitt and to give Manstein the credit of Sichelschnitt is to prove an ridiculous admiration for non existing superior war heros as herr von Lewinsky who was only a swollen-headed general .

 

Guderian in his book says that in ca early or mid-September he required new tanks to replace the worn-out ones, these had been in action since June 22nd, and practically no new ones received. Hitler could only promise 200 new engines (!) for the worn-out tanks. Does not sound very promising for the soon-to-follow major offensive towards Moscow.....

 

Acronym for Original Time Line.

As opposed to ATL = Alternate Time Line.

 

LJA,
1,864 ton for the first week of Barbarossa and over 25,000 for each week after that is absurd. You're missing a zero.

Besides there being complete munitions supply failure in Yelnia, etc, (which lowered consumption and caused the loss of many of the scarce guns), shelling was never adequate during Barbarossa in Bryansk, Minsk, the Stalin line, Smolensk, Leningrad, Kiev, Rostov, etc, compared to Poland or France. It is obvious that using about 90,000 ton in narrow fronts, over a short time and against much less armor, artillery, planes and infantry than in Barbarossa's huge, heavily defended front results in much heavier shell concentration than in the latter.
The heavy use of munitions to reduce many pockets and bombard many cities and towns during Barbarossa, resulted in even more limited availability for extremely intense and costly battles in inclement weather over an even wider front against more experienced Soviets, with better tanks, artillery and tactics and shorter lines of supply in Typhoon, such as Rostov, Kharkov, Moscow, etc,

Note that the Panzer columns in the 10 days of the sickle cut itself used little munitions (and much of that to break through Sedan), most of the munitions being used to support infantry's slow advance.

 

http://wiki.alternatehistory.com/doku.php/alternate_history/atl

 

Some make more use of ATL than others...I believe ex-member "dabrob"(or over on AHF "robdab") made great use of it.

 

The whole concept is a non-starter for very basic transportation issues:

The Germans do not possess the maritime gross tonnage to move the AND SUPPORT the force structure suggested in the OP. Its not even close and also of note is the very obvious security issue. If the Germans try to move an entire Pz Army, huge Luftwaffe assets and their corresponding support structure across an open expanse of water that the Soviets are just as free to roam at the same time, common sense suggests they might see the traffic?
So basically, its impossible for the Germans to do it for multiple reasons and even if we allow this fanciful scenario to move on for arguments sake, the Soviets see the build up anyway.

2nd Trans issue is the limited road net in the Baltics is too small to accommodate the force structure suggested to be moving there. Think of NYC traffic at rush hour, only it doesn't end. Too many vehicles with not enough road capacity means deadlock. The specific point to look at is all of the small bottlenecks that create the massive traffic jam behind them, don't get stuck on the overall quality of the road.

Another unrelated issue is the major problem of Soviet mobilization centers and troop concentrations in White Russia and the Ukraine are not touched by this "plan". In the OTL those massive troop concentrations were eliminated within the first 2-4 weeks, this ATL allows them time to gear up and get moving while the 2nd strategic echelon moves forward undetected and unmolested. The "so what" of this is that all the while time is ticking away towards the fall rainy season when Barbarossa is terminated by a loss of mobility. The direct path to Moscow via Minsk is where the Red Army is and where the Wehrmacht needed to destroy them, Leningrad is a sideshow and puts the Wehrmacht out of position to attack Moscow and leaves them on a long axis that has horrible terrain that greatly favors the defender. Just to throw it out there...this is an incredibly stupid plan better suited to a game that doesn't involve reality (IMHO).

 

I did not miss a zero,but a 1:correct figure is 11864 for 9 days, not for a week :German figures were always related for 10 days .

 

The German plan was founded on quick-sands : the Germans could win only with "help" from the Soviets . An other plan had as "much " chance to win : a chance of 0 % .Going for Leningrad was stupid: the fall of Leningrad would bot result in the collaps of the SU ,but the collaps of the SU would result in the fall of Leningrad : Leningrad was encircled for 2 years in the OTL and the SU did not collaps .

The first requirement for a German victory was that the Soviets would come to the Germans,if the Germans would go after the Soviets, Germany would automatically lose :in the OTL the Germans were forced to go after the Soviets and they lost .
It was the same in august 1914 .

 

You really should read up more about the politics of why Finland did what she did. IOW, a snowball has better chances in hell, than the Finns severing the Murmansk railroad, and hosting 12 German motorized divisions in Southern Finland.

 

That's because LJAd negelected to mention that his figures concern only German artillery ammunition expenditures, and do not take into account ammunition expenditures from aircraft, small arms, tanks, etc.

 

mjolnir, you completely missed the point(s);

The road net can only handle a given density of traffic. In your mind more troops/tanks = faster victory. However, if the rate of advance is dictated by the resupply rate and the road net was maxed out in the OTL, more troops/tanks is counter productive. In order for tanks to advance or go anywhere for that matter, they require fuel. That fuel requires trucks that require a road net (extreme simpleton example).
There are 2 decent roads that run through the Baltics, by German doctrine each Corp requires one such supply route. You are suggesting that a fully motorized and bloated AGN can move quickly on 2 supply routes when its doctrinal requirement is more like 6-7? There is a mountain more detail about daily supply requirements of mobile divisions vs time/distance on a constrained road net that clearly escapes you to a degree that it isn't worth chasing.... I suggest you look up the Dunning Kruger effect first.

You also failed to address how such a massive German forces even gets to Finland and does so undetected. That's kind of a big problem for your "plan". The Germans lacked the maritime lift capacity, unless you suggest they stop importing/exporting ANYTHING to/from Norway/Sweden/USSR for 4-6 months while they move massive military forces under the Soviet's noses and hope they don't see it.

 

Black6
I have stated repeatedly that when the enemy has tens of millions of people willing to fight, winning a war is not about capturing or killing millions, it is about outmaneuvering and disabling the enemy.
Instead of wasting very limited good weather and resources in dozens of small encirclements, which require wild armor detours with heavy wear and losses and a long front impossible to supply well, especially during the rasputitsa, this plan aims at capturing a few key cities and advancing in a narrow swath along RR lines to Moscow, in order to encircle the bulk of the red army in the mother of all encirclements.
Precisely because the red army is strongest in Bryansk, Minsk, Smolensk, Grodno, Kiev, etc, and Germany has few and inferior tanks and very limited time, it makes a lot of sense to avoid those areas and advance rapidly where he is weak, than to collide with them, just like the sickle cut did. You attack where the enemy is weak and where it is hurt the most (the head), not where he is strongest and his losses can be easily made up.

The red army could not execute a single, half successful, armor counter attack in time during the barbarossa, in which the armor had to move more than 100 km (hundreds of tanks breaking down or running out of gas and the few which did arrive usually did so w/o infantry and air cover and were wiped out, sometimes by infantry alone (Grodno). Imagine the Soviets having to redeploy hundreds or even thousands of km to face the enemy in time.

If the 1st, 2nd or 3rd echelon in the center moves to counter attack the advancing Panzers along the coasts, it will arrive after the Panzers will have passed the area and leave the central front weakened. If it strikes the defensive line along the central border it will be decimated owing to its outdated tactics and competely incompetent offensive leadership (it is much easier to defend in strong positions, than to attack strong positions with poor logistics). Conversely, it is much easier for the LW to detroy redeploying than entrenched troops).

The sickle cut succeded because it struck precisely where the enemy was weakest and did not expect an attack (there were no reserves nearby to stop Guderian in time), so Guderian penetrated rapidly in one direction and with limited losses. In contrast, Barbarossa failed because the German struck precisely were they were expected so they suffered heavy losses, the Panzers rambled all over the place, advanced slowly and did not attain any of their goals, before the decent weather had passed.