Battle of Savo Island

Mikawas flagship Chikuma was hit in the forward gun turrets and causing deaths. The americans also had 16 destroyers ( two damaged) with which they could have put up a defence for the convoys.


( I wasnt aware an Atlanta class cruiser was present in the vicinity, any more info on this?)


P.S. why do u consider the Savo battle as not a complete victory? Mikawa didnt lose a single ship in the action except the next day a cruiser was sunk to a sub. That wouldnt count as part of the battle but as a different action. As i c it, destroying ships with no sinkings in return is a TACTICAL victory. U may be right in indicating it wasnt much of a complete Strategic victory.

 

There were three groups of allied ships guarding the transports. The western approaches were guarded by the Northern Force, of three USN CAs and two USN DDS, patroling between Sava and Florida Islands, and the Southern Group, 2 RAN + 1 USN CAs and two USN DDs, patroling between Savo and Guadalcanal. The eastern approaches were guarded by a lighter force consisting of the Atlanta class CLAA San Juan and the RAN light crusier Hobart and two USN DDs. None of the Eastern group were actually involved in the battle, but were available if Mikawa had continued on after the transports. The RAN CA Australia, part of the Southern Force, had left the group to bring RN Vice Admiral Crutchley to a conference with Rear Admiral Turner, who was in overall command of the invasion force. Australia was not engaged either and would also have been available.
I think Mikawa did win a total victory, however he has been second guessed for not going after the transports. I think he made the right decision and based it on what his opponents were capable of doing and not what they might do. If Turner and Crutchley had done the same the battle might have gone differently.

USS SAN JUAN (CL-54)
Displacement: 6,000 tons
Length: 541’6”
Beam: 53’2”
Draft: 20’10” (26'8"?)
Speed: 31.8 knots (33 knots?)
Complement: 820
(original?) Armament: 16x5”/38 (8 twin turrets); 16x1.1”; 8x20mm; 8 x 21” torpedo tubes; 2 depth charge tracks; 6 depth charge projectors
(final?) Armament: 16x5"/38 DP, 5x2 40mm, 1x4 40mm, 9x20mm, 2 depth charge tracks, 2x5 21" torpedo tubes
Class: ATLANTA

HMAS HOBART
Displacement: approximately 7,000 tons standard, 9,000 tons war load. Length: 562.25 feet
Beam: 56.75 feet, draft 15.75 feet
Speed: 32.5 knots at 72,000 SHP
Armament: 8 x 6" guns (4 twin turrets), 4 single (later 4 twin) 4-inch AA guns, 3 quadruple 0.5-inch AA machine guns (later replaced with 20mm Oerlikons), 2 quadruple 21-inch torpedo tubes
Protection: armour belt 102mm, magazines 60 mm maximum, deck and other armour 38 mm - 32 mm.
Complement: 570
Class: AMPHION

HMAS AUSTRALIA
Displacement: 9,750 tons (standard), 13, 450 war load
Length: 630 feet
Beam: 68.25 feet, draft 16.25 feet
Performance: 31.5 knots at 80,000 shp
Armament: 4 twin 8-inch guns, 4 single (later increased to 4 twin) 4 inch high angle AA guns, 2 quadruple 2-pounder AA guns, 2 quadruple 0.5 inch AA machine guns (later replaced with 20mm Oerlikon guns), 8 21-inch torpedo tubes
Protection: armour belt 25 mm, deck 35 mm, magazines 76 mm maximum, other armour 38 mm maximum
Complement: 700
Class: KENT (County)

 

Yes, i new about the composition of the forces in both sides, what really got me confused was when u said :

the USS San Juan, an Atlanta class light anti-aircraft cruiser


instead of reading 'an Atlanata...' i read it as and, obviously i wasnt aware the San Juan was an Atlanta class.

So the final escorting forces boiled down to 1 CA plus two CLs and the 16 destroyers (8 didnt participate in the battle as they were in close escort and shore bombardement duties).


Sorry for the misunderstanding and thanks for the really great info on the cpabilities of the cruisers!!

 

To be fair to Turner and Crutchley, they were both no doubt in shock over what had just happened, the transports were now without the strongest part of their escort force, and the survivung Allied ships had no air cover whatsoever. On top of all this, as far as they knew, the Japanese had every intention of coming back and finishing what they had started.

It should also be noted that the ATLANTA-class AA cruisers were little more than floating magazines for their five inch guns, with almost no armor protection. Definitely not at their best in a surface action.

 

The Atlantas had a 3.75in belt and a 1.25in deck. Their belt was thus thicker than Furutaka's, and their gunhouses were thicker than the turrets for any Japanese cruiser. I'd say their armor was fine for a design of their size.

 

Indeed? Have you read Eric Hammel's book on the Naval Battles of Guadalcanal? One gets a somewhat different impression of the ATLANTA class cruisers from that work.

 

That's the straight dope. It doesn't tell the whole story of the ship's protection, of course, but it should show that these weren't fragile things. The main drawback of the design regarding surface warfare was the 5in battery. These had little oomph against heavy opponents.
Hey, on other matters, am I about to be promoted to butterbar? I wanna stay an NCO!

 

Yes, you will likely soon be an officer. But if being a butterbar bothers you, we can always make you a margarinebar... :lol:

 

Well, seems like i made it to NCO!

 

Congratulations!

 

And now its to butter bars!

 

Margarine is still better for you.

 

HeHe, thanks again :lol:

 

One thing I think that is worth noting about the Japanese is that they either overetimated the enemy while they were victorious and thought it was a trap like here, or they underestimated the enemy after a victory and thought they destroyed them like in China.

 

The Japanese are a study in contrasts, even today. For example, their cartoons and comic books portray incredibly graphic violence on a scale not found in mainstream American media, yet they have a very orderly society with a low crime rate.

In the case of Admiral Mikawa, it must be noted that he had no idea that Fletcher had withdrawn the American carriers. If he had known this, I have do doubt that Admiral Turner's transports would have had a very interesting experience at his hands.

 

Which in turn would have prolonged the inevitable for many months.

 

Perhaps. However, it is quite likely that the loss of the transports could very well have led to the Marines being withdrawn, for logistical reasons. It has to be recalled that America's shipping assets were nowhere near what they would be a year later.