My G-d! I have just become corporal! Just like Adolf! Now, all of you out there, are really going to see the power of my argumentation :lol: .
To put it blantly I think the Germans would try to nagotiate a better which probley never would of happen at least the russians would go all the way but I think this is my personal opion the war would of been over bye the end 0f '44 becouse the german people would no longer heav a in there opnion "GREAT" leader and just fall a way
A small war would break out in Das Reich between Hitler loyalists and the patriots. This sounds a lot like the American revolution...
Mr Rommel, a possible coup détat by the Wehrmacht is dificult for me to relate in any way to the American Revolution. But, generally, the problem of July 20th is extremely interesting because it was so close. Rarely in history can we meet a situation where speculations "what if.." can be made so realistically. The discussion has been going on for some time and seem to be dying. Lots of wise opinions have been shown. Is there anybody who would like to sum up the conclusions and close the panel?
I don't think I can sum this up, but I would like to add a little something. I don't think the Morgenthau plan was ever taken seriuosly by the US or UK governments, other than in a "wouldn't it be nice if Germans were peaceful farmers" kind of way. Enough was known about it that both the Nazi (and Soviet) propoganda machines were able to use it to instill fear in their people (or justify their own methods). Not that this is really relevant to the discussion. Okay, it sounds like most people feel the German generals would have tried to make peace with West to continue the war in the East. The German generals may or may not have proposed a peace basd on a return to the pre-war borders (pre Sept 1939? even Poland? pre April 1940 in the West? pre April 1941 in the East?) There may or may not have been a German civil war between the pro-Nazi's (SS & Luftwaffe) and the German Army. The UK probably would have gone along to stop the bleeding. The US may have gone along in a desire to avoid further US deaths and a desire to settle the score with the Japanese. This position is supported by the final conditonal unconditional surrenders of the Italians and Japanese. The US may or may not have demanded occupation of Germany. Germany may or may not have agreed to being occupied. The US may not have gone along because of the unconditional surrender position based on an unwillingness to trust theGermans. Maybe some knowledge of what happened in the concentration camps would have afffected the US position. The Soviets would not have acepted a German surrender unless it included occupation of Gemany by the Soviets (at least in part). If the war didn't end, the german generals would have been able to extend a few months by bringing some rational startegy, but Germany would have been beaten in the end just the same.
Mr Canambridge, I´m afraid you underestimate the role of the MP. It was adopted as an official policy by roosevelt and (unwillingly) Churchill at their meeting in Quebec in 1944. Later, (a citation from a good article on this): “What were the final results of the Morgenthau Plan? What actual effect did it have on Germany? "While the policy was never fully adopted," wrote W. Friedmann, "it had a considerable influence upon American policy in the later stages of the war and during the first phase of military government."30 Although President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill eventually recognized the folly of what they had approved at Quebec, Morgenthau, White, and the Treasury staff saw to it that the spirit and substance of their plan prevailed in official policy as it was finally mirrored in the punitive directive known as JCS 1067. In a very definite way JCS 1067 determined the main lines of U.S. policy in Germany for fully two years after the surrender. Beginning in the fall of 1945, to be sure, a new drift in American policy was evident, and it eventually led to the formal repudiation of the directive in July of 1947. Until it was officially revoked, however, the lower administrative echelons had to enforce its harsh provisions.” Prof. Anthony Kubek, The Journal for Historical Reviev, Volume 9 number 3. I agree with you on most points. There were truly many possible outcomes. As to the position of Luftwaffe, I am pretty sure they would have joined the Army following the planned capture of al major NSDAP bosses, incl. Goering (not a particularly popular in Luftwaffe circles). I am also sure that USA would only agree to negotiate if Stalin would have agreed. And an agreement of Stalin would have most certainly included occupation as a condition sine qua non. The accumulated knowledge about concentration camps and mass killings of Jews would have stiffened the American position as to occupation also, if not for other reasons, so because of a, by then, a strong Jewish lobby in USA. They would have certainly demanded full access to all camps, American help to the survivors, punishment of all involved etc. In other words – an American occupation, although probably less severe and less prolonged. We must not forget the formidable influence of Harry Dexter White on Roosevelt, which would also have made a concerted response of the two to any German ouvertures unavoidable. (Dexter White was later found out to be a Soviet agent by FBI). So, to sum up: 1. A probable German capitulation 2. Occupation of Germany by all the Allies almost certainly 3. More lenient Western occupation and possibly – less industrial transfer from the Western zones to USSR 4. Probably – less rapid and less profound Sovietization of the Soviet zone Are there any objections to our (Mr Canambridges and mine) conclusions?
Yes, Stalin. Would he have settled for Germany simply saying 'we surrender' before the Red Army had even set foot on German soil?
Ricky, look at point 2. Any peace treaty is preceeded by cease fire. In the cease fire phase the Allies would enter Germany and occupy it. I am also unable to imagine a soviet agreement to any peace without occupation. At that moment he had already formed the future political elites for all east European states. For him everything was just a question of time. Btw: do you remember how much days it took RKKA to reach Oder line after crossing Vistula?