Could the Western Allies Win Without the USSR?

I tell you again. It was not just the 300 Spartans. They were a small part of the Greek Force.

Germany entered Russia short of 3000 trucks. Losses by August were equal to monthly production and by November were twice production. 1 Panzer Division and 3 Infantry Division were completely outfitted with captured French trucks. They went dowhill from day 1 and could not even replace losses. Great use was made of captured vehicles in both Russia and N.Africa.
In 1944 for example losses by August (109000) were greater than total production in all of 1943.

 

It might be the time to reflect on just how many German Divisions actualy surrendered in 1945. Perhaps some believe they all fought to the very end but the OKW Map below shows just how many laid down their arms. Add in Norway for the full picture.

 

He didnt "suck" because he lost. Merely he, like other nations; learned of the vast reaches of Russia the hard way.

 

Why the Western Allies could not win (the ground combat argument):

German operational casualties in Normandy:

23,000 KIA + 67,000 WIA = 90,000 (from 06/06 to 31/08)

Source; Robert J. Kershaw 'It Never Snows in September'

Allied operational casualties in Normandy:

237,600 - 19,000 missing = 218,600.

Source; Carlo D'Este 'Decision in Normandy'

Cost of allied and german soldier in terms of munitions per year:

Allied: about 3.000 dollars

German: 1.800 dollars

Source; Mark Harris 'Resource Mobilization for World War 2'

Ratio of loss in terms of munitions:

655,8 million dollars/162 million dollars = 4.05

Production of munitions (1944):

US - 42 billion US$
UK - 11 billion
Germany - 17 billion (that would be at least about 25% higher, or 21.5 billion without the bombing and manpower lost in the east)

ratio: 53/17 = 3.12 (or 53/21.5 = 2.46)

So, in a long attrition war in Europe the western allies would lose on the ground since a superiority of only 2.5 to 1 in munitions is not enough to defeat the wehrmacht.

Note that this assumes that the ratio of losses in terms of munitions would be similar to the Normandy campaign, but in fact it would be higher because the allies would never be able to obtain air superiority to the same degree. In Italy the loss rate in munitions was about 5 to 1 to 7 to 1 eek. For example, in the battle of Monte Cassino the casualty rate was 5 to 1, with imply in a munition loss rate of 8 to 1.

 

I was being sarcastic...

 

You forgot the 198,000 POW's. The correct total is 288,000 German v 237,000 Allied.

So the German soldier was 10 times more likely to surrender than an Allied one!

 

Did any of you wonder why 2 different sources were used to obtain these casualty figures?

Well..................D'Este not only gives Allied casualties but he aslo gives the German total.
page 517:
German 200,000 kia/wounded.
200,000 POW

Not only that but he also informs us the Allied total INCLUDED Air Force and Naval casualties (16,700).
The German total does not!
Also note that the German total is for front line troops only. NOT ONE of the legion of support Units, base staff or non-Army personel are counted.
And finaly D'Este informs us a further 12,000 of the Allied total were incurred in PRE-OVERLORD OPERATIONS!
That is 28,700 EXTRA in the Allied total.
This really is the most blatant example of partial and distorted reporting I have seen in a long while. You must be really desperate to lie like this.

 

It gets better................there are 60,000 German dead buried in Northern France!

Mont d' Huisnes Cemetary - 11,956
Marigny Cemetary - 11,169
Orglandes Cemetary - 10,152
le Cambe - 21,200
St. Desir de Lisieux - 3,735
various British Cementaries - 2,300

Total = 60,485


The thing to remember with the German MIA total (c.200,000) is that this is a Unit reporting men as missing. Thus the assumption that they all ended up as POW's was not always correct. A good number would have been killed and thus the ONLY reliable German figure is their TOTAL of all casualties.
There is another German source (Müller-Hillebrand, Heer, Vol. 3, p. 171). Later casualty compilations by the Wehrmachtverlustwesen office for casualties of the army (including Waffen-SS) in the West from June to September 1944 were 54,754 dead and 338,933 missing. This includes casualties from Southern France.
As the earlier total given for Normandy dead was 23,000 then we must accept that the Germans lost more men in Southern France (31,000) than in Normandy! (that was me being sarcastic)

 

I quite agree, Guaporense throws around numbers that are really irrelevant and do not support his logic, even when they are not "cooked". But check out his sources, and you will find the numbers have been "cherry-picked" to support his arguments.

 

He should go in politics

 

You guys are not familiar with the concept of operational casualties. Operational casualties include only death and wounded and are used to evaluate operational performance.

For example, in 1940, the Germans lost 140.000 death and wounded and inflicted about 400.000 death and wounded on the French and British forces. They captured about 2.5 million soldiers as well, but that doesn't count. The german/allied casualty ratio should be 140.000/3.000.000 or 140.000/400.000? The second ratio is the correct one. Why? Well, because a surrender is not a real casualty. Armies surrender when they are surrounded and cannot win.

In Normandy the Germans lost 23.000 KIA while the Western Allies had 40.000 KIA. However, the allies had 40.000 missing, and almost all of them died!

While the germans had nearly 200.000 missing, almost all of them captured.

If you want to inflate german KIA with missing, well, them double the Allied KIA.

Anyway, by 1944, the allies should have arrived at a much better casualty figure.

 

The performance of the invasion of France in 1944 was unsatisfactory.

The allies had 3 times more men, 4 times more ground equipment, 8 times more combat aircraft than the Germans. The average American soldier had received 1 year of training, the average German soldier, 2 months. The railroad network with supplied the German army was destroyed by bombardment. The allied army had 100% logistical supply, perfect availably of all essential means.

What were the results? The allies had a ratio of about 2.5 to 1 operational casualties. Rougly 100.000 german killed and wounded agaisn't 250.000 allies killed and wounded.

Horrible performance....

Conclusion: The US and British armies were way worse than the german.

 

Men per men, the American and British armies were about as good as the Red Army. Well, the red army was not bad at all, but a formidable opponent.

 

Where are you getting these numbers and what are the dates between which these casualties occurred?

From the WW2 Victory in Europe Experience by Julian Thompson:

"The Allies had reached the Seine and Paris 10 days ahead of the 90 days forecast for the advance from the Normandy beachhead. Their success was costly: the Allied armies suffered 209,672 casualties including 36,976 dead between D-Day and crossing the Seine 77 days later. In addition some 28,000 aircrew were lost in operations over France before D-Day and in the subsequent battle.

The battle for Normandy cost the Germans some 1,300 tanks, 3,500 guns and 20,000 vehicles. More than 40 German divisions had been destroyed with the loss of 450,000 men, of whom at least 50,000 were dead."

 

Being in defence is in general a force multiplier, especially when the opponent is forced to move in his men piecemeal across very restricted landing grounds, and there's time to dig in tanks and infantry for ambushes. Compare e.g. the german seige of sevastapol.

 

Waffle. What you are trying to do is ignore 200,000 German losses.

Not true. Your own source (D'Este, Decision In Normandy page 517, clearly gives the Allied missing total as 19,189.



Are you saying the Germans took no prisoners and killed every POW?

Here is the page from Kershaw that you use as a source:


Note how he mentions the 'missing' but for some reason you left it out-again. The Germans did not know how many of the missing were dead so the 23,000 total is the ABSOLUTE MINIMUM for German dead. You must also add in Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine losses if you want to use Allied Air Force and Navy losses.. Do you have those totals?

Can you give me your source for this claim. Just the source so I can check it myself. You have a proven track record of fabrication and distortion and your word has no credibility

How can I 'double' the Allied deaths( 36,834 ground forces from your own source) when only 19,189 are listed as missing? Even if every missing soldier was murdered (as you claim?) then the total would be 46,023.
The later German estimate of their dead (Müller-Hillebrand, Heer, Vol. 3, p. 171) was 54,754 dead and 338,933 missing. This is higher than the Allied 36 834 (or 46,023 in your fantasy world) thus the Allies had a HIGHER kill ratio than the Germans.

Can you expalin why these Normandy graveyards hold over 60,000 German dead?

Mont d' Huisnes Cemetery - 11,956
Marigny Cemetery - 11,169
Orglandes Cemetery - 10,152
le Cambe - 21,200
St. Desir de Lisieux - 3,735
various British Cemeteries - 2,300

Total = 60,485

Can you explain why your own source (D'Este) says :

"6 German: 77,866.
He is talking about cemeteries and presumably adds in the bodies in the German Cemetery at Saint Andre. This was missed out from my list above.

Thus we have:
a) 77, 000 dead Germans buried in Normandy.
b) 54,754 accepted by the Germans themselves and 339,000 missing, of which a good number would be dead.

Game set and match to the Allies I believe.
Your pathetic attempts to claim only 23,000 German dead are laughable and you have been soundly trashed by your own sources.

They did. See above and reflect on your error.

 

You are now resorting to outright fabrication. Sadly I must conclude you are either a fool or a charlatan. Which is it?

 

What Van Creveld thought of the German Army:

"the German army was capable both of fighting with the utmost stubbornness and of cold-bloodedly butchering untold numbers of innocent people. So strong was the grip in which the organization held its personnel that the latter simply did not care where they fought, against whom, and why. They were soldiers and did their duty, regardless of whether that duty involved carrying out an offensive in the south, a defensive in the north, or atrocities in the center". ( p.166)


"the fact remains that the American GI did win World War II. He did so, moreover, without assaulting, raping and otherwise molesting too many people. Wherever he came---even within Germany itself---he was received with relief, or at any rate without fear. To him, no greater tribute than this is conceivable." (pp.168-9)

"Between 1940 and 1945 the U.S. Army grew from 243,000 officers and men into a force numbering over 8 million. With eighty-nine divisions, made up of men who had shortly before been civilians in one of the world's less militarized nations, it crossed the oceans and played a decisive role in the defeat of two of the most highly militarized powers the world has ever known. It is doubtful whether any other nation would have been capable of such feats" (pp. 166-169)

Creveld is not only highly critical of the German army, but also makes clear that he does NOT hold it up as a paradigm to be followed by more modern armies.