Could the Western Allies Win Without the USSR?

The Japanese going to war with the US is a point of view. Had the Americans not cut oil trade to the Japan then there would be no real reason for Japan to go to war with America directly, there only wars would have been due to expansion either into China, or historically south into British territory.

Why would the Americans be fighting Germany's ally? I assume you are talking about the non-aggression pact between the Germans and the Russians? If so this is simply an agreement not to attack each other not an alliance of any kind and neither one is required to go to war in support of the other.

What is our timeframe?

 

Now that production numbers have been tossed, I thing I am curious about is how many troops some other allied nations could have sent. HistoriclyBrazil sent a division to Italy, and Mexico offered to commit land forces toward the execution of the war. While I don't pretend to know the populations of those countries in the 1940's perhaps those two countries combined could have produced a few corps for the war effort. With no Japan in the fray, New Zealand and Australia commit larger numbers of troops as well, and maybe some of the Caribbean nations could combine too create a couple divisions?

 

How many troops could India have supplied? Without the worry of Japan and US production commited to weapons for ground forces I would think that there would be considerable numbers available.

 

First and foremost is that the USA didn’t just "drop the embargo" on Japan out of the blue, we warned them from about 1934 on to stop their military aggressions on the mainland, and kept upping the ante until the final complete embargo on oil and getting Dutch Royal Shell and the UK to also cut them off from their Pacific oil fields in the East Indies. America at that time produced about 60% of the worlds oil, and with Venezuela and the few known Mexican fields thrown in, about 75% of the petroleum was originating in the western hemisphere. The Soviet Baku fields put in another small percentage, 15%(?).

From December 1940 on, additional materials were placed weekly on the embargo list for Japan, and thereby an economic sanction policy was in force, except for oil. But American refined high octane aviation gasoline was embargoed. Then on July 26, 1941, the United States declared a full-scale embargo ending all trade with Japan and freezing their assests in America. Great Britain and her Dominions and the Dutch authorities did the same. So by mid-July of 1941, shortly after Hitler attacked Stalin’s Soviet Union, Japan was running on oil reserves since all the major producers had stopped selling petroleum products of all types to them.

The Imperial Japanese were fully aware of America's "displeasure" with their military aggressions on weaker neighbors for years. From the era of 1931, for another eight years the US had sort-a tried to pull that "aggression" back to something which could benifit both the Japanese nation, and the others in the area. Sec. of State Hull had publicly stated in 1940 that American bases for both ships and planes would be made available to either UK or Netherland forces if needed.

This would/could put both British and Dutch sea and air power in the Philippines, Guam, Midway, and other American bases which would be of any aid.

I posted this before, but have lost track of where; In 1940, when Japan occupied French Indochina (Vietnam area) upon agreement with the French Vichy government, and joined the Axis powers Germany and Italy in The Three Power Pact (in Sept), these actions intensified Japan's conflict with the United States, and the other powers which were to evolve into the western allies.

With Japan’s European partners over-running the Low Countries, the Dutch government in exile in London became a de facto partner with the British, and Secretary of State Hull publicly stated; "...it was certain that Japan would assume that, whether or not the United States and Great Britain had definite agreements in regard to naval and air bases in the Pacific including Singapore, the special relations between these two countries were such that they could overnight easily establish cooperative relations for the mutual use of all these bases.", this was an open secret, and well understood by the Imperial Japanese. Even then the Imperial Japanese knew that the USN Pacific fleet would need to be "neutralized" before they could fully expand into their "Co-prosperity Sphere". So trying to keep the US out of the Pacific problem and attacking the British and the Royal Navy alone, was more than unlikely.

With that position stated, and it must be remembered that the following month, in October, 1940 Hull re-enforced this point with; "nothing could be more dangerous for our nation than for us to assume that the avalanche of conquest could under no circumstances reach any vital portion of this hemisphere. He stated that oceans gave the nations of this hemisphere no guaranty against the possibility of economic, political, or military attack from abroad; that oceans are barriers but they are also highways; that barriers of distance are merely barriers of time. Should the would-be conquerors gain control of other continents (the Secretary said), they would next concentrate on perfecting their control of the seas, of the air over the seas, and of the world's economy. They might then be able with ships and with planes to strike at the communication lines, the commerce, and the life of this hemisphere, and ultimately we might find ourselves compelled to fight on our own soil, under our own skies, in defense of our independence and our very lives". (Source: U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 [Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943], pp.79-86)

Secretary Hull’s public pronouncements in 1940 certainly gave the Japanese a pretty good idea of "how the US would react". The isolationist movement was on the wane in the US after 1939 and with Nazi Germany’s aggression toward Poland, coupled with the occupation of Denmark, Holland, Norway, Belgium, and northern France in early 1940 it was literally a dead issue. A Gallop poll of 1940 showed that only about 39 to 41% of voting age Americans wished to avoid war at all costs, while the remainder wished prepare to defend our own borders and territories from Japanese or European attack. But at any rate, ignoring the USN Pacific Fleet harbored in Pearl was not going to be to the Imperial Japanese advantage, moving to the Dutch East Indies would possibly only allow the all US bases to be used by the UK and the Dutch for aircraft, submarine and ship patrols in the "choke point" between the Philippines and the Asian mainland.

To go "around" the Philippines would also not be "free of interdiction", since then it would be too close to other British colonial territories again, and they may burn more oil than they can deliver even if they get through! America's Pacific Fleet had to be neutralized as a first step to any expansion to the south and southwest Pacific area.

Here is some fun for any one who believes we (Americans) just went "whoop-t-do", we are going to strangle their economy. After many, MANY and years of meetings in the thirties this was one of the final ones (minutes exist on both sides):

Ambassador Horinouchi and Secretary Hull met when the Export Control Act of July 2, 1940 was signed and authorized the FDR, which was basically in the interest of our own national defense (to prohibit or curtail the export of basic war materials to aggressor nations).

Under that act, licenses were refused for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline (crude oil was still allowed) and most types of machine tools, which was to be implemented one month later, in August 1940. (most of this comes from cross-referenced minutes of both parties)

After it was announced in September that the export of iron and steel scrap would be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940 that this might be considered an "unfriendly act".

Secretary Hull then informed the Ambassador that it was really "amazing" for the Japanese Government, which had been violating in the most aggravating manner all the American citizen rights and interests throughout most of (mainland) China for years, to question the fullest right of this Government to impose such an embargo.

To go further and call it an "unfriendly act", the Secretary said, was still more amazing in the light of Japan's conduct in disregarding all law, treaty obligations, and other rights and privileges as well as the safety of Americans, while proceeding to an ever-increasing extent to seize territory by force on the Asian mainland.

Then Ambassador Horinouchi replied that he very much regretted the differences between Japan and the United States and that strife between them would be extremely tragic for both.

Hearing this; Secretary Hull agreed that such an occurrence would be exceedingly unfortunate but added that this Government had been extremely patient. The Secretary went on to say that we (America) stood for law and order and treaty observance and justice, along with genuine friendliness between the two countries; that it was clear now, however, that those dominating the external policy of Japan were; "…as we here have believed for some years, bent on the conquest by force of all worthwhile territory in the Pacific Ocean area without limit as to extent in the south and in southern continental areas of that part of the world".

"Furthermore, we and all other nations seem to have been expected by Japan to sit perfectly quiet and be cheerful and agreeable, but static, while most of Asia was ‘Manchurianized’, which would render practically impossible all reasonable or satisfactory relations so far as other nations were concerned, and would result ultimately in correspondingly lower levels of existence for the people of most of Asia."

Then Secretary Hull reiterated that it was unheard-of for a country engaged in aggression and seizure of another country, contrary to all law and treaty provisions (it had signed), to turn to a third nation and seriously insist that the latter would be guilty of an "unfriendly act" if it did not cheerfully provide some of the necessary implements of war to aid the aggressor nation in carrying out its policy of invasion.

Secretary Hull made clear to the Japanese Ambassador that this Government's view was that both Germany and Japan were undertaking to subjugate both of their respective areas of the world (spheres of influence) and to place them on an international order and a social basis resembling that of eight centuries ago. (Memorandum by the Secretary of State Regarding a Conversation With the Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi, October 8, 1940)

Despite this Japanese protest, a total embargo on the export of iron and steel scrap to destinations other than countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain went into effect on October 16, 1940. However it wasn’t until July 26, 1941 that FDR issued the Executive order freezing ALL Japanese assets in the United States. These orders, and pre-announced actions by the USA brought under control of the Government all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests were involved, and the effect of this was to bring about the virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan. It was far from a "total" surprise to the Japanese, as they brought the embargoes on themselves and had been given multitudinous offers and options besides instigating a WAR. The Imperial Japanese plans for attacking the US had been in the works for years, as was our own Plan Orange (I believe) to counter aggression against US interests in the Pacific basin with Japan as the "supposed" aggressor. This complete idea of "color plans" was replaced by the "Rainbow Five" plan where Japan was concerned.

Let us see here, for almost a decade America had been sayingl "Japan, we don't like this stuff" you are doing in Asia, and we are going to start applying incremental economic pressure to you government to get you to stop it. Years later, there was no choice left, not chosen by we Americans, but made by the Imperial Japanese.

The Japanese had been getting only about 10% of their needs from NEI (Dutch East Indies), the rest from the USA, and with the 1941 declaration by both Britain, and the Netherlands to halt oil shipments along with the USA they would have to conquer that oil producing area to get the oil. They couldn’t do it before they did, and even when they did manage it the production wasn’t back up to pre-war levels until 1943. Going to the mid-east for oil is equally a non-starter, since they were easily sabotagued where they even existed before 1940. In 1937/38, the US alone accounted for 60.4% of GLOPAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTION, and Latin America another 15.3%, so more than three quarters of the world's petroleum production was in the New World (Western Hemisphere).

Seems to me that Secretary Hull had pretty well defined how "the US would react" in his public statements as early as the fall of 1940. I myself believe the Japanese made the most logical choice they could muster at the time. They mis-read America just as badly as we mis-read the Japanese culture. They believed that the "anti-war" sentiment was still strong in America (it was waning), and that a quick decisive blow would bring us to the bargaining table, not grit our teeth and focus on totally smashing them.

The American public opinion polls taken by Gallop in both 1940 and 1941 showed a growing (to over 60%) understanding and acceptance that the Axis powers would have to be confronted by arms, not simple diplomacy eventually. The isolationist movement had lost all steam and its popularity and membership was falling like a rock in a pond well before December 7th, 1941. Generally though the American public viewed Hitler and the Nazi as more of a threat, than the Japanese or the Soviets who had been involved in assisting the Nazis until June of 1941, and were now America’s allies and recipients of Lend-Lease aid.

 

I thought that it had been demonstrated ad nauseam that Pearl Harbour had NOTHING to do with Barbarossa,but that it was caused by the US oil embargo against Japan .

 

Proving my point japan vs US was going to happend the japnese was not going to stop war for American oil.

 

It wasn't just oil there were other critical resources involved. Oil was just the greatest in the short term. However without the oil embargo war with Japan probably doesn't start in 41. If it's delayed past the end of 42 Japan is too far behind to even think of keeping up. In that climate some sort of face saving agreement in China is not unreasonable.

 

It dosent matter the only good china did was holding back the japanese army the allies were only helping them because the bulk of the japanese army.

 

What do you mean here "...the allies were only helping them because the bulk of the japanese army." The bulk of the Japanese armed forces were most certainly NOT in China, they were mostly police forces by 1941, and only a few divisions at that. The Chinese had been fighting each other in a Civil war since 1927 (?) and only put that on semi-hold while they fought the Japanese. They still fought each other whenever the opportunity arose.

The Chinese received very little aid from the US or the other allies, compared to the rest of the allies.

 

I should have been more clear on my post number 338..
1. IMHO the Japanese may have been more skeptical going to war if the SU hadn't been invaded in July,1941 .
.2. Actually I was thinking more alongst the lines of some type of deal with Japan in order to Get at Germany first. Just MHO.
3. As Mr. Gardiner stated earlier the Allies could go for a Japan first strategy just contenting themselves with beating the U-Boats in the Atlantic.

 

On your point 1 :Japan and the SU had already signed a non agression pact in april 1941 :that means that Japan planed to go south,if the US embargo was not abolished before the autumn of 1941
On your point 3 :A Japan first politic,was very risky,Germany beying the strongest and most dangerous opponent

 

Overall, an excellent summation of the run-up to the Pacific War from the Allied perspective.

I would add just a few points in support; The US congress by June, 1940, was resigned to eventual war with the Axis, otherwise it wouldn't have passed the Naval Expansion Act of 1940, which Roosevelt signed into law on June 14. The US Navy however, in the person of Admiral Stark, wasn't satisfied; he went to Congress a few days later, and asked for an additional $4 billion for more ships and planes. Congress promptly amended the naval expansion act (now known as the "Two-Ocean Navy" Act), and gave Stark everything he asked for.

By 1940, Pacifism, as a political force in the US, was dead and Isolationists were clamoring for national defense measures to be taken.

Actually, the oil embargo had almost nothing to do with Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese had decided, in 1940, that the European war was too good a deal to pass up. While America and Europe were distracted by the conflict, they intended to seize the colonial territories of the Western allies in Asia and the Pacific. They believed that neither Britain nor the US had enough military strength to exert their influence in both Europe and the Pacific Asian area, and that both would choose to concentrate on Europe while negotiating a deal with the Japanese in the Pacific.

This logic may have had some validity until the Fall of France in June, 1940. That event precipitated the American Two-Ocean Navy Act which was clearly aimed at allowing the US to wage a war simultaneously in the Atlantic and Pacific. The Japanese now realized that the clock was ticking on their plans; they had only a year, or at most, two to seize the Pacific Asian territories they coveted and negotiate a deal allowing them to keep said territories. That was because within two years the US would have an overwhelming naval superiority and the Japanese window of opportunity would be closed.

Since Japan had already made their decision to seize the colonial Asian territories of the European and American powers, and since they knew this would mean a war with those powers, it therefore followed that to be successful, they would have to fight that war before the US was able to significantly expand it's Navy. That is why Admiral Nagano Osami, Chief of Staff of the Japanese Navy, in an audience with Emperor Hirohito five days prior to the announcement of the US oil embargo, advised Hirohito that to have any chance of success, Japan would have to go to war with the US "as soon as possible". At that time Nagano was well aware that the Japanese Navy was already planning the attack on Pearl Harbor and that the plans were well advanced; by "as soon as possible", Nagano meant no later than the end of that year (1941).

The US oil embargo and freezing of Japanese assets lent urgency to Japan's plans for war, but in no way altered the basic plan, nor changed the timing of their attack on the US.

See above.

Japan's time table for war with the US and Britain was NOT based on the US oil embargo; it had been set prior to to July, 1941, and was based on the already underway expansion of the US Navy. Japan's window of opportunity was narrow because they knew those new ships would start coming off the ways no later than mid-1943 (the first of these vessels, the Essex, was actually commissioned on December 31, 1942). Therefore, Japan had two choices; abandon the whole scheme of aggressive conquest in Asia and the Pacific, or engage the US in war as soon as possible.

Of course, the embargo increased the pressure for an early war, but the basic decisions and the timing had already been decided by the Japanese.

 

Could German win without Romania and the others?

 

Germany could win without Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria...they could not win without italy because italy protected their southern flank for a good portion of the war. Japan was needed to keep the allies in a two front war. (Mainly America)

 

AH, but had Germany not allied themselves with Japan they may have avoided a war with the US, at least for a little while. Just like ww1, the introduction of the Americans into the European war was enough to turn the tide.

 

Well if we did not enter The war and no dday would western eroupe be under soviet control?

 

Nope, the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989.

 

Technicially, Germany was under no compunction to declare war on the US as the treaty with Japan only required a declaration if attacked. As Japan was the aggressor, Germany could have foregone declaring war on the US>

 

But how long would it last........

 

I would say not very long.