Could the Western Allies Win Without the USSR?

Reallocation of resources...

You know if the Allies rethink the Strategic Bombing Campaign all those 4 engined bombers can instead be used to cover convoys which would require far fewer of them that means the Allies can use their 10 man crews for other purposes like maybe far more fighter pilots for far greater fighter numbers,imagine the US building fewer B-17's,B-24's but building say 150,000 fighters instead of the Historical "America's 100,000", the same for the UK.

In tanks if the Wermacht never encounters the T-34 will the Mk. IV even get upgunned? Maybe the Mk III stays in production still keeps the 5cm/42 versus the 5cm/60 ? The same with the Pzkw 35(T)? The Pzkw 38(T)? The 8.8 cm/71 never goes into production? The 5cm/60 stays the main AT gun versus the 7.5cm/46? The STg III keeps the 7.5cm/24??? All this because Hitler never invades the SU and the T-34/KV-1 were never encoutered. The M4's, Cromwell's and heck even the Valentines,Grants & the Stuarts don't have the problems they did historically and at that don't look bad at all compared to their German contemporaries.

Now bringing up the non-invasion of the SU again,it was brought up earlier that Germany was trading with the SU up till July,1941 but according to Paul Carell's "Hitler Moves East" Hitler was in debt to Stalin to the tune of 239,000,000 Reichsmarks( and remember Hitler already had all of Europe but the SU at this time) so just how long will Stalin put up with Hitler running up deficits? The US & UK during the war bought out the Turks from supplying Chromium to the Germans maybe the Allies can do the same regarding the SU supplying Hitler with grain,manganese,chromium,platinum and cotton? It's not like the Allies don't have the money. In other words Germany was still having economic problems despite being in control of most of Europe while not being at war with the SU.

Oh if no war in the East would Germany finally mobolise like it did under Albert Speer?

 

These are good points Brian.

In fact, if there is no invasion of the Soviet Union, one has to wonder why Hitler has started the war in the first place. What are his war objectives? The occupation of Europe? That doesn't make any sense because Hitler was overwhelmingly concerned with "Lesbensraum", the provision of "living space" in the lands of Eastern Europe (i.e. Soviet territories). Specifically these lands were to be colonized by native German agrarianists and were to produce food for Greater Germany. But this doesn't work if the Soviet Union isn't invaded.

If "Lebensraum" is to be carved out of the European territories such as France, Belgium, Denmark, Poland, etc., the native populations of these areas have to be eliminated. If the Germans start doing that, they will soon have a huge problem on their hands just keeping the Europeans pacified.
Essentially, this was the same problem Napoleon had, and the results will probably be the same. Napoleon had a huge and very powerful army, but, other than keeping the Europeans in line, he had no way of employing it (power projection in modern terms), or bringing the power of his army to bear against his primary enemy, Britain.

That leads me to believe that the Western Allies would pursue a strategy of containment; they would simply contain the Germans in Europe and wait for them to self-destruct which they assuredly would do in a matter of a few years. There would be no need for a ground invasion, the RN and USN would blockade Europe, and in conjunction with the RAF and USAAF, would gradually destroy the KM and the Luftwaffe. Your point of German indebtedness to the Soviet Union is well taken. With no foreign exchange coming in, the Soviets would soon reach the limit of their generosity and cut off supplies to Germany. That is, if those supplies weren't purchased by the Allies first.

Eventually, Germany would be reduced to a hopeless position with no chance of achieving any logical war objectives. If the US develops the atomic bomb, this situation would be rapidly accelerated by atomic attacks on the German homeland. In fact, the Western Allies might actually emerge from a war of this nature in better shape than historically, and the Soviet Union almost certainly would. Germany, of course, would become an uninhabitable wasteland for the foreseeable future.

 

Didn't the Western Allies single-handedly destroy the Luftwaffe? If memory serves, the no. 1 crisis of the Luftwaffe in 43 was not fuel or aircraft shortage, but the extinction of their pilots. Fear of German retaliation is a red herring, as the atomics were meant to be dropped on the Germans but applied to Japan when that target surrendered. They could start with decapitating Berlin, destroy the fission materials in Stuttgart (though the Germans were no where close to successfully build a bomb), then move down the Ruhr region if the Germans still refuse to surrender.

I really don't think Hitler's position was as secure as the Emperor's. His men tried to bump him off more than a couple of times. Faced with complete obliteration, I think a little bit of "regime change" would be more likely.

 

Even a periphereal attack, like against Norway or Sicily is a very tough proposition with a strategic 1:2 numerical disadvantage in combat ready divisions. The allied navies may be able to seal off Sardinia, but what good will it do? (and remember the Italians invaded Corsica after Torch without the Allied navies being able to do much about it). Closing the Messina straits against a Germany with no Eastern distractions is nearly impossible, all the Germans need to do is lay a few defensive minefields and bring in a few dozens Siebel ferries and 170mm mobile gun batteries to to turn it into a very very expensive proposition (think dardanelles WW1).
Even worse goes for the Kattegat, sorry no USN operating in the Baltic, maybe at the bottom of it but not in.

The allies would be uncapable of doing the same sort of unescorted bombing operations against Germany they did against Japan, an A bomb carring plane has a high chance of being cought by Flak or Fighters, in a no Eastern Front scenario you will have Me262 (and if you put 2 Mk103 in it instead of the 4 Mk108 or equip them with R4M air air rockets the B29 defensive armament is outranged no matter how good a FC it has, both weapons were production ready in late 1944 so are likely to be in widestread use by the time the A bomb was ready). One stroke of bad luck and the Germans get a bomb to play with, do you really think it's worth the risk?

We need to understand what are the limitations of the US war machine, and especially the motivation issue as with no Pearl Harbor FDR will not get the sort of backing he historically had.
- If the US raises the 200+ divisions needed to fight the German army will it affect production and how much?
- Will US national will support the massive casualties an invasion of continental Europe against the full German army will cause?
- How much will a partial demobilization help German industry?
- How much will having to operate at the end of a 3000 miles supply line offset a greater production capacity?
- Will a protracted bombing campaign actually push European pubblic opinion against the US and get Germany more cooperation?
- Will some technological innovation (proximity fuses, Type XXI boats, homing torpedoes, long range patrol bomber killers, etc.) change the picture significantly?

AFAIK the western allies defeated the German navy and air force but it was the Soviets that crushed the German army and the army was Germany's main strength. It was again the soviets that kept the bulk of the Japanese Army busy guarding Manchuria, so you still need Soviet help for a "Japan first" strategy, if those divisions can be moved to Burma .......

The more I think of it and the more I'm convinced an allied victory without either France or the USSR is a very difficult proposition.

 

Much is being made of using occupied Europe to expand the German economy however they conquered France in June of 1940 and contracted to have French aircraft factories to make Luftwaffe aircraft on Feburary 12,1941 for 3,000 aircraft & 13,500 engines. However to do this french factories needed aluminum and while France had bauxite & smeltering capacity they also needed coal to generate the electricity . The French calculated that to meet German demands they needed 120,000 tons of coal per month but Germany could only provide about 4,000 tons.By the end of 1941 the British had taken delivery of 5,012 US made aircraft while Germany had recieved 78 aircraft from the French & Dutch despite having occupied them for almost 2 years and placed contracts a year before. For the entire war Germany was only able to get 2,517 aicraft from France & 947 from the Holland .
Now Germany's European Empire(before going to war with the SU and while still recieving supplies from them) was starving for food,coal and oil. Siezing French oil supplies in 1940 hardly alleviated that in fact those 1940 victories actually added heavy oil consumers to German economic worries. Look at the fact that thousands of litres of milk wasted in France because of no fuel to get it to market.
On coal Germany main trading partners Sweden,Norway,Denmark,Switzerland,and Italy all relied on coal imports from the UK .France also imported large amounts of coal something like 30,000,000 tons. Only with extreme care,superb organisation and unqualified technical co-operation could the coal defeicit in Western Europe have been overcome.

This post comes mainly from info from "The Wages of Destruction" by Adam Tooze

 

Japan didn't have the logistics capability to move it's Manchurian army to Burma it was all it could do to keep what they had supplied. As far as the Italians siezing Corsica after Torch you must realise that if Japan is sitting out the war then there's no Pearl Harbor, no USN loosing 4 fleet carriers to IJN aircraft attack, it means the Arizona instead of being a memorial may actuall give good war service,the Oklahoma not being raised then resunk off the coast of Oahu to clear the harbor, other USN BB's not being damaged at PH, the Prince of Wales & Repulse staying with the Home Fleet. No Pacific War means the US doesn't have to have the fleet train that it built historically to just operate in the Atlantic.

 

XIV Army didn' have it easy, and it was facing less than half a dozen Japanese divisions, Japanese tactics required a much lighter logistical tail than other combattants (and were pretty wasteful of lives as a result but that's another story).

Under a Japan first strategy, and that's what I was talking about, the assets sent to the Pacific will still go there. If you are assuming a neutral Japan part of the Pacific Fleet may move to the Atlantic, but the Allies don't need additional slow BBs, they had plenty of those, the Italians partly decommissioned the slow BBs they had in 1942 and the British didn't make any effort to recommision the French ones and even "lent" one of theirs to the USSR. Against Germany the allies need convoy escorts and anti air platforms to keep the Luftwaffe away from the ships not slow BBs.

In a "no East" scenario, historical Torch is higly unlikely, even assuming the German army, with nothing better to do in late 1940 and 1941, hasn't kicked out the British from North Africa do you really think FDR can "sell" to the US pubblic declaring war on Germany and then invading French North Africa?
The most likely invasion point is Norway but it's iffy, I don't think the allies have the capability to interdict the Baltic and so you have those 200 divisions to deal with, the Germans may be able to reinforce Norway faster than the Allies do, look at what happened in the "Race for Tunis" and Norway is much closer to home for the Germans than Tunisia.

 

Britain had no political will to move against the Japanese in Burma until 1945 when it was obvious Japan was defeated, and it was in Britain's interest to appear to have "reconquered" it's colony there. Up until that time, Britain's only interest in SE Asia was defending India. That's why 14th Army received only minimal reinforcements, equipment, and support until 1945.

The Japanese Army may have required a "much lighter logistical tail" than other armies, but major Japanese troop movements between theaters still were logistically impossible for Japan after the end of 1942. They could move units in dribs and drabs, but if they tried to do it by sea these movements were severely hampered by the US sub offensive. Movement by land was dependent on rails or roads and these were non-existent between Manchuria and Burma. Ickysdad is correct about the difficulty of Japanese reinforcing Burma from almost anywhere.

As I understand the original proposition, there would be no war in the Pacific. Hence, the Pacific Fleet would hardly need any reinforcement and would most likely find the bulk of it's combatant and support ships transferred to the Atlantic or Med. Moreover, the massive naval construction program initiated by the US in 1938 and reinforced in 1940 upon the fall of France would not be focused on carriers and battleships, but on ASW and escort vessels. The slow BB's would still be very useful as anti-aircraft, convoy escort, and shore bombardment vessels. The RN did not transfer any slow BB's to the Soviets until after Normandy when the German Navy was essentially defunct. The Italians decommissioned some of their BB's because they did not have the fuel to use them, not because they didn't need them. In a war which does not include a Pacific component, the combined Anglo-American naval forces would quickly overwhelm any possible German naval effort, including a U-boat offensive. Basically, Germany would be denied the use of any combatant ships and would find even basic port defense a very difficult proposition

In this scenario, Operation Torch probably won't even be necessary, regardless of what the Germans control in North Africa. Complete Allied naval control of the Med makes German occupation of Africa logistically untenable.

As for Roosevelt "selling" involvement in a war on Germany, recall if you will that the fall of France resulted in the "Two-Ocean" Naval Rearmament Bill (as well as massive air force and Army appropriations) sailing through Congress in 1940 with minimal interference from the isolationists. These Acts virtually guaranteed that the US would eventually become embroiled in both the European and Pacific Wars and is certainly an indication that the American public had, by 1940, no hesitation about taking the necessary steps to militarily oppose Nazi domination of Europe.

Without a Pacific war, the Allies will not only interdict the Baltic, they will completely close it to German naval operations, including troop transportation and import of raw materials. An invasion of Norway probably wouldn't be necessary. Just as an invasion of North Africa would be mooted by the impossibility of German logistical support of any overseas Army, so would Norway cease to be of any value to Germany's war effort when the iron ore shipments from Sweden were cut. In any case the overwhelming naval presence of Britain and the US would confine German forces to continental Europe. The Allies would clamp an airtight blockade on Germany and gradually starve the Reich into surrender.

Commerce with the Soviets might prolong Germany's ability to survive, but realistically, how long do you think Stalin will refrain from either cutting off material support, or actively attacking Germany, in view of Germany's dim prospects for eventual victory?

 

After re-reading my post I see where the misunderstanding occurred. I should have been more clear. What I intended for my post to state was that the U.S. had more resources and man power than Germany, the U.K. did not.

 

This is completely wrong given that Japan has been defeated and the US and Britain are now completely focused on Germany with the time being about 1944. The entirety of both nation's navies are concentrated against Germany. In a Norway scenario what the Germans have there is what they get to fight with. There won't, and can't be any substancial reinforcement of that by them. First, they lack the naval assets to move large units there to reinforce. Sending even a fast convoy of just a few ships across the North Sea to Norway would be detected and the ships sunk in short order given that the Allies would have as many as a dozen plus large carriers and as many small ones along with escorts covering the area not to mention land based aircraft.
The Germans would be virtually without aircover and had no way to detect, coordinate and, direct an air defense at sea. Strikes would get through the ships would get sunk.
Sending reinforcements by air is likewise impossible to achieve. Here the Germans would have transports flying pretty much on their own subject to interception over the ocean by the same naval forces. Flying at night does no good as the Allies have radar and naval night fighters too.
So, in Norway the Allies can pick and choose when and where to strike. The Germans are limited in strategic and operational mobility to respond.
The same can be said for Sicily. The Allies could mine the Straights of Messina so thoroughly the Germans could almost walk across. Historically, the Germans and Italians were limited to nightime operations in the Straight due to control of the air by the Allies. While this might be contested this time, the Germans would still have the problem of logistics to support a sudden huge increase in air assets brought in to cover the area.
Taking Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Norway, the Channel Islands, Crete etc., is not prelude to an invasion per se but rather a means of forcing the Germans to react by wasting huge amounts of assets on building a fortified line around the entire European coastline.
Longer ranged bombers operating from bases that historically didn't exist also makes a bigger problem for the Germans. For example, the US might station B-29's in Syria or Egypt to bomb Polesti. Nuking that oil site would have definitely put a huge crimp in the German economy.

But, this presupposes that the Allies change nothing in their strategy while Germany miracluously somehow still develops all the technologies they historically did and applies them correctly to the changed situation.
Here, the Allies with a Japan first strategy only use thier air forces in a war of attrition with the Luftwaffe much like the RAF did in early 1941 with hit and run raids on the European coast. If the Allies adopt a strategy of raiding with aircraft at low and medium altitudes in Europe while still developing both a night and high altitude bomber force for strategic purposes but applying it against Japan first, the Germans won't develop the R4M, the Mk108 or other heavy bomber killer weapons. Nor will they waste alot of time on developing high altitude interceptors.
If anything, the Luftwaffe will react to Allied initiatives far moreso than develop initiatives of their own. The Fw 190 with a BMW will be seen as perfectly suited and efficent as a fighter for medium and low altitude interception. The 109 won't be seen as armament deficient against medium twin bombers and Allied fighters. The Me 262 and other jets will languish due to the horrible efficency of their engines. The RLM will demand that these be made more efficent before being put into production. Without an Allied impetus to develop jets as a "wonder weapon" to counter overwhelming Allied air power the Germans will simply and blindly engage in an attrition war in the air over France and the Low Countries.
If the Allies felt that bombing Germany via manned aircraft was simply too costly and risky they could also have pushed alternatives. They might have built something like the V-2 (see the US MX 772 project for example) or V-1 (something like Rascal for example) giving them a stand off capacity to nuke a city from say 100 to 300 miles. They could do such development in Canada or the US or elsewhere such that the Germans would have been completely blindsided by the results whereas the Germans have considerable intelligence flowing to the Allies about their programs and initatives (eg., spies, resistance networks, Ultra intercepts etc.).

The US could have raised 200+ divisions and far better ones than the Germans. The US raised roughly 100 divisions historically. They also put the equivalent of about that many more into semi- and non- combat units. The Seebees alone numbered almost 1 million troops on VJ day. The US supplied the French with equipment to man 6 divisions, two armored and, 6 more partially. The Soviets got equipment to stand up roughly 4 armored and motorize about a dozen divisions from the US. The British were supplied sufficent Shermans etc that these represented about two thirds of their available armor in 1944. The US had in Europe about 800 Shermans in depots awaiting issue post D-day.

It is interesting to note that the US took more civilian casualties from industrial accidents than losses in combat.... far more. Unlike today, the US of the 1940's would have taken the losses to win the war.
Also, as happened historically, since the Allies have the initiative they can simply wait and plan things so much like D-Day historically they simply overwhelm the Germans and then crush them in the field.

That the US is operating overseas only slows the rate of build up. It does nothing to offset the vastly superior capacity of the Allies industrially. Even if the Germans partially demobilize and require less manpower in their army they will still have to maintain a very large mobilized force to guard their territory. The Allies have more flexibility here being sea powers. They can build as large an army as they need when they need it.
Germany having no navy and lacking the capacity to build one that could match that of the Allies is pretty much hit. They are on the defensive and lack initiative to be able to force the Allies to react to them. They cannot invade or hold territory overseas anywhere. The Allies could invade almost at any point so, the Germans are forced to defend everything.

At sea a Guerre de Course using U-boats would be expensive to defeat for the Allies as it was historically. But, once defeated, it isn't going to be resurrected with some new marginally better technology (eg., the Type XXI). Also Guerre de Course (aka merchant raiding) is not a winning strategy at sea. It is a spoiler. It buys time for the nation using it in an otherwise unwinnable war at sea.

But, the Western Allies didn't mobilize their full resources for a land war. The British / Commonwealth and the US between them could have easily raised 300 divisions and fielded them. That would have put a huge strain on their resources but is something the Germans couldn't have matched either. Being sea powers (the US is also a land power) the Allies can also take their time holding the initiative to simply out technology and out produce the Germans while forcing them into a war on their terms.
The Allies don't have to adopt strategic bombing. They could adopt alternate air strategies and equally defeated the Luftwaffe simply through attrition and technological innovation at a pace greater than the Germans can keep up with. They did it historically. I see no reason they couldn't do it here too.
Having the Soviets in the war simply made it easier for the West. The Soviets provided the land power hammer while the Western Allies provided the anvil that crushed the Germans industrially and technologically. Without the Soviets in the picture the West will have to pony up the land army too. They had the means they just didn't produce it to the full extent of their capacity because they didn't need to.

The more I think of it and the more I'm convinced an allied victory without either France or the USSR is a very difficult proposition.[/QUOTE]

 

From my knowledge as much as 30-40% of the Luftwaffe was lost in the East.....

 

The Japanese had enough trouble once they acheieved their conquests to supply about 1 division on Guadalcanal and just a couple of thousand on Wake Island. In Burma I think they basically had Two 2 division armies which was more then their logistics train could handle.

 

T.A., respectfully I continue to notice a pattern in your hypothesis which I have a problem with. It seems that all of your information on what the Germans might do is based on historical fact. This of course is perfectly fine to do if the Allies have the same handicap. You can not simply state (in this "what-if) that the Allies can do this and the Germans wont counter them because historically they did something else....

For example, you cant state that the Baltic is going to be flooded with U.S. Aircraft carriers and Germany not being able to do anything about this because of her limitations in Norway. Germany has to get the same handicap as the Allies. In this scenario Germany is not at war with the SU, which means that Germany now has thousands of planes to counter the U.S. fleet with. While reinforcing Norway with troops might be another matter, the skies over the Baltic would still belong to the Luftwaffe thanks the thousands of planes not fighting in Russia. This means no invasion of Norway.

Same can be said with Sicily. The allies had air superiority in the Mediterranean only because of the Eastern front. Would the Allies be able to clear the German mine fields with such ease if the Luftwaffe had an extra thousand planes in Italy?

Why is it that the Allies are able to improve and upgrade their equipment and tactics but the Germans arent? Why wouldnt the Germans "waste" their time developing a high altitude fighter if the Allies have one? Remember with no war in the East, the Germans have their hands free and can do a whole lot. To simply imply that the Germans arent going to do this based on their historical shortcomings is not fair as these hurdles were due solely to the Ost front which they will not be suffering from in this scenario...

Once again, what overwhelming air power? Historically the fight over Europe for air supremacy was not an easy one. Allies suffered heavy casualties fighting a much weakened Luftwaffe while having the advantage of numbers. What I imagine is a resemblance of the Battle of Britain except this time it is the Allied pilots who would have the disadvantage of fighting over enemy soil...

The Americans were only able to step up their missile technology thanks to the captured German scientists among them Von Braun. The Americans were lagging behind both Germany and Russia in missile tech mostly because they put their resources in developing better aircraft... Sorry T.A. but even in this crazy scenario I fail to see how the U.S. can get V-1 and V-2 rockets before Germany.

Better how? Surely you are not speaking of experience and leadership?

The American army (just as the Red Army) only began to improve once it came up against the Germans and such improvements were made in virtually all aspects (tactics, equipment, leadership etc.) and were not done overnight. Your 200+ divisions would more closely resemble those men at Kasserine pass which Rommel encountered.

Surely you can see the problem with this statement. D-day was only successful because of the Eastern front and still the British and the U.S. lads had a very difficult time fighting the 2nd rate German army who were outnumbered and outgunned and virtually every way. Imagine these very same men encountering the 6th army in the hedgerows with out their air superiority.

Agreed. Like I said, the Allies have the capabilities of containing the Nazi war machine in Europe. But Europe would be in Nazi hands.

Oh man, I feel a storm brewing....

Cheers

 

Sloniksp I wanted to make the same points you did but my browser "ate my post".

One additional point is that the "US way of war" was already tail heavy in WW2 compared to other countries, while this increased the combat troops effectiveness the amount of manpower required to support the 150 division "point" needed to tackle the german army is mind boggling. The allied bottleneck is not industrial capacity, it's manpower,

 

The devil is in the detail. The overwhelming mass of the Fighter Arm was destroyed in the West. The bulk of the AA Force was also in The West. However most of the Luftwaffe MANPOWER was in The East because the ground attack/transport a/c were in the East with most of the Luftwaffe combat troops.
It would be fair to say the 'expensive' and high tech part of the Luftwaffe was destroyed in the West.

 

Were beaten? Eventually.

In 1939 to 1942, Germany was beating the c** out of the allies.

The inferiority of men and materials was for sure the major factor in the defeat of Germany in WW2. However, without the USSR, this inferiority would be more than halved in terms of men (the USSR mobilized 34 million men, compared to the sum of 21 million for the US+Britain). And the allies would count with roughly 60% of the materials historically available (including only 40% of the tanks).

The ground forces of the united states faced, at most, 30 german divisions, of 360 available in june 1944. The USSR faced 230. To think that the United States ground forces had relevance in the outcome of WW2 is to be ignorant of history.

They didn't divide their full strength when they fought the USSR. Germany used almost its full strength agaisn't the Soviet Union. The western allies never faced more than 35% of Germany strength, the united States faced about 16% of the german armed forces.

Japan was a poor third world country with few military capabilities. Americans think that Japan was a great power because they fought then alone, while the USSR and Britain inflicted 95% of German casualties in the war. The US never did most of the fighting in the european front.

The US had more industrial capacity, but they had a more costly war: The logistics of maintaining an army thousands of kilometers from mainland.

 

Makes you wonder why 3 years of 'beating the c**p' never got them anywhere.

What? Not even a thank you for showing you that the earlier total of 15 you gave was wrong? The 30 total is up to mid July. Do I have to list the others that came into the battle (and were destroyed) in 1944-45?

 

Some Statistics:

German KIA, Polish Campaign: 16,343 German MIA, Polish Campaign: 320 German WIA, Polish Campaign: 27,280

German KIA, Norwegian Campaign: 4,975 German MIA, Norwegian Campaign: 691 German WIA, Norwegian Campaign: 1,600

German KIA, French Campaign: 46,000+ German MIA, French Campaign: 1,000+ German WIA, French Campaign: 111,640

German KIA, Balkan Campaign: 1,206 German MIA, Balkan Campaign: 3,915 German WIA, Balkan Campaign: 534 German KIA, Balkans 1941 - 11.30.44: 24,267 German KIA, Balkans 1941 - 11.30.44: 12,060 German KIA, Balkans 1941 - 11.30.44: ??

German KIA, Eastern Front 1941 - 11.30.44: 1,419,728 German MIA, Eastern Front 1941 - 11.30.44: 997.056 German WIA, Eastern Front 1941 - 11.30.44: 3,498,060

German KIA, Afrika Campaign 1940 - 5.43: 12,808 German MIA, Afrika Campaign 1940 - 5.43: 90,052 German WIA, Afrika Campaign 1940 - 4.43 ??

German KIA, Italian Campaign 1943 - 11.30.44: 47,873 German MIA, Italian Campaign 1943 - 11.30.44: 97,154 German WIA, Italian Campaign 1943 - 11.30.44: 163,600

German KIA, the West 6.06.44 - 11.30.44: 66,266 German MIA, the West 6.06.44 - 11.30.44: 338,933 German WIA, the West 6.06.44 - 11.30.44: 399,860

*Interesting that the combined British and American forces inflicted only 11.000 KIA per month on Germany, while France inflicted 30.000 KIA per month back in 1940, while the Soviet Union inflicted 1.5 million KIA in 41 months, about 36.000 KIA per month. To manage to hold the full height of the German army, they will have to inflict about 50.000 KIA per month on them (that was the monthly KIA in 1944).

In Normandy Germany suffered 23.000 KIA, the Allies suffered 240.000 casualties (all types).

Assuming that American forces face Germany's army alone in a large front they would lose about 550.000 men per month (mostly wounded). So, they would have to transport 5 million wounded men back to the US and supply 6.5 million replacements per year. Industrial production would be heavy affected.

 

Sure. War sucks... Nobody gained in WW2, only power hungry dictators/politicians like Stalin and Roosevelt.

Obs. Cool pictures, but you don't need to get angry, all right?

 

15 divisions were the forces in Normandy in July, that were facing the combined British and American forces. So, in June/July, the Americans faced about 7 German divisions.

30 was the number of divisions that they faced simultaneously at peak.

The USSR destroyed 760 German divisions!!! They faced about 200-250 divisions during the 4 year war.