decisive battle debate

Victory of Viazma/Briansk was irrelevant for the speed of the German advance,which even if the Soviet front before Moscow had collapsed,would not be bigger :the speed of the motorized units was depending on the speed of the infantry(some 2 km per hour).If the motorized units advanced faster than the infantry,they would land in very big problems,as had happened in the summer of 1941 and as had happened at Dunkirk .The firepower of the motorized units was to small .

Tanks and trucks would not drive faster,the infantry would not march faster,if the V/B pocket collapsed quicker than it did historically .

If the Soviets had collapsed after V/B,speed would be no problem .

The speed of an advancing army was limited and what the enemy was doing was irrelevant :no ennemy does not mean that the speed would be bigger .

 

Zetterling and Frankson (in :the Drive on Moscow 1941) are giving the strength of AGC as 1.2 million,and IMHO,this is to high for 70 understrength divisions,2 million is the Verpflegungsstärke,the 14 PzD ,which on 22 june had started each with some 200 tanks,were down to 70 tanks .It would take the Germans several weeks to construct a inner and outer ring round Moscow .

 

Indeed. Mid April 1945 Berlin wasn't a happy place either.

I didn't want to add to the subject of this conversation but just to mention that it took so many bloody years to turn the tide back and to defeat the enemy. The war wasn't easy and was won by the very narrow margin. The future wasn't written in 1939 - it was decided gradually over the years by the changes of determination and strenghth of the opposing nations. We have won - that's important.

 

I don't see any reason for this patronising tone. Cris Belamy in 'Absolute war' talks about 1 929 406 German soldiers,more than a thousand tanks, 14 000 artilery tubes and 1 390 aircrafts (he is a profesor of military science and doctrine and in his works he claims he busted many soviet propaganda myths like last stand of general Panfilov. I'm not saying if if those are myths or not, but he clearly isn't a man interested in being part of soviet propaganda.) ; Michael Jones in 'Retreat' claims there were 1.5 million man, four thousand artillery peaces,1400 aircrafts and over 1000 tanks; David Glantz in 'Operation Barbaross' gives numers as around 1000 tanks,14 000 artilery tubes and 1400 aircraft; Lukin in 'In the Viaz'ma operation' gives the figure of 1700 german tanks. This last figure might be soviet propaganda, but these other I have no reason to suspect. If you have different sources ok, but it doesn't mean they are right.

I said sometimes mysterious and I believe they are. Or you say it is completely predictable that for example french gouverment would completely break instead of using so many options they had to continue the fight(colonies,fleet,large portion of undefeated army), and norweigan wouldn't but escaped and continued the fight with available means. Was it clear that defenders of Brest will fight for weeks,even the wounded without water and minimum ammo, while elsewhere hundreds of thousands of healthy troops just layed down their arms. Was it clear when and under what circumstances will political or poeple's will of the USSR break (there are clues that Stalin was contemplating suing for peace in july). Or was it obvious how long it was going to take for the moral of japanes troops or public to crack. (military circles wanted to fight on after the bombs and rout of Kvantung army by the Soviets). This is not exact science it is very complex and involves factors like psychology, behavior of the masses, propaganda efficiency , moral boosting qualities of leaders and countless other.

Again false. Speed of german infantry divisions was 50 km a day and more if needed. Much larger soviet forces failed at breaking through exclusively armored cordon than the forces left around Moscow after Briansk and Vyazma disasters. On 10th october Hoeppner's tanks were already at Medyn, 200 kilometers from their start positions and 120 km from kremlin,.and that was in spite soviet opposition, while Hoth took Kalinin, 340 km from his jump of point on 14th,while already breaking through several defense lines and helped create and reduce Vyazma pocket. As I said before, without opposition and with good weather Moscow would be encircled in 1-2 days.

 

Numbers of troops is irrelevant, its how many front line soldiers were available. Unfortunately Arca there was resistance and bad weather

 

You are quite right. These figures are total number of man in units that were appointed to participate in Typhoon on paper, including rear services etc,neither did all those units eventually participate, nor with same level of commitment (4th army).Available front line soldiers where significantly fewer.

You mean fortunately?

 

1)Totally wrong

2)irrelevant : tanks is not the same as a PzDivision

3)Yes,you said it before,and you were wrong

 

1)
Robert J. Kershaw in his 'War without gauntlets' brings direct excerpts from soldiers,officer's and unit logs.
-Harald Henry infantryman in AGC recalls that his company was marching 50 km in one day.
- Another states that objective for certain day was 44 km
-98th infantry's division, AGN sector, log indicates that they covered between 40-50 km each day between 9-30 july
-Reporter Himlar Pabel spent a day 'in a typical infantry company's 50 km march'

2)
Germans practically never advanced with tanks alone, they moved forward in mixed Kampfgruppen. I said tanks colloquialy, not meaning that towns were took with nothing but tanks.

 

Proof that Harald Henry belonged to an infantry division ? And if so,proof that he was marching and not sitting in a truck ?


Do you really think that the 98 ID was advancing between 800 and 1000 km in july ?


About the KG:normally/in an idealized situation . they consisted of tanks and motorized infantry/artillery.But on 1 october,only 1/3 of the trucks remained and they were mostly used for the transport of supples,not for the transport of men . ,which meant that most soldiers of a PzD were marching on foot and that the speed of the tanks was adjusted to the speed of the infantry : 3 km per hour .

Besides: if a compagnie was marching 50 km in a day,that does not mean that an ID was advancing 50 km a day .

In may 1940,the PzG Kleist was breaking out from Sedan on 15 may,the first German units arrived at the coast on 20 may (Abbeville),the main forces arrived on 25 may ;distance Abbeville/Sedan :some 220 km,which means that the German mobile divisions advanced at 22/44 km a day,this also means that the story of ID advancing 50 km a day are unreliable, because they imply that the ID advanced faster than the PzD.

The 7 French Army (Giraud) needed also between5/10 days to go from Dunkerque to Breda (also 220 km),which means 22/44 km per day .

 

Do you have reason to believe that Henry was not in an infantry company? of that the company was not part of an infantry division? Whether or not motorized movement is included in the term "marching" is a good question not that it is critical to the question at hand though.

What makes you think he does? Advancing 50 km in a day is certainly possible. Doing it for several days is as well. Longer than that becomes somewhat problematic.

If not expecting action some of the men might well have ridden on the tanks. What's your source on the infantry having a speed of 3 km/hr? I find that a bit low if you are talking road movement as the US Army figured on 3 miles/her from what I recall. This FM though mentions forced marches in excess of 50lm/day and marching speeds of 4km/hr
https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/44F1CD5E-3A89-4F19-8BB4-CAEF8560BE71-1274317523244/21-18/FM211_5.HTM
And other sources I've run across indicate that 4mph (just shy of 6.5 km/hr or over double the speed you list) is a modern US Army standard.

That i a valid point. Larger bodies tended to move slower. Of course it depends on whether you need the whole division there at a particular point in time or just part of it. I.e. some of the log tail can be a day or so behind and it may not negativly impact the fighting capability of the unit.

You still have a strong tendency to make huge leaps of faith in your conclusions. The fact that on the above occasion a Pz Division was moving at a particular speed doesn't mean that an ID couldn't move faster.

Which is interesting but doesn't really do anyting to support your position.

 

Arca said that 98 ID (which belonged to AGS,not AGN) covered between 9/30 july every day 40/50 km,which means a total of 21X 40/21 X 50 km,which is very questionable

I have given 2 exemples of mobile forces which covered less than 50 km a day : 7 Army (Giraud) and PZG Kleist,thus,why should an ID be able to advance faster tha, a mobile division? A mobile division had some limited motorized transport (in october it was very limited) while the motorized transport of an ID was almost inexistent .A German ID had in 1939 1009 MT (trucks and cars) and 4842 horses.In october 1941 only some 350 MT(motorized transport pieces) remained,and these were used for the transport of supplies,weapons,ammunition,sick,and finally (if there were some remaining) to transport the advancing troops.

There are enough exemples where in the summer the mobile divisions had to stop and to wait on the ID to close a Kessel,with as result a lot of recriminations between the ID and the mobile units (Kluge and Guderian).The same had already happened at Dunkirk,where the PzD had to wait on the infantry.
Also in may 1940 was AG B (Bock) advancing from Groningen to Dunkirk :450 km in 15 days,this AG,mostly ID who were more motorized than those of 1941 covered some 30 km a day,what not mean that the infantry was marching 30 km a day .

In 1941 the advance of the Ostheer was some 1000 km in 5 months (150 days):an average of 7 km.

 

About the modern US doctrine :the average rate of march for trained infantry under favorable weather conditions (thus not in october 1941 in the SU) is 2.5 miles per hour over roads (here we are talking about the SU in 1941) and one mile on cross country ,and per day some 12/15 miles (over roads),while it would be less than 10 miles cross country .

As the roads in the SU in october (if we may call them roads) were mostly reserved to the transport vehicles (HD/MT),the infantry was usually advancing cross country,thus 15 km per day would be something very positive and a maximum .

 

50k a day is maximum marching rate on good roads and no resistance. How ever that is not the rate the support services could move at, which was mostly horse drawn and thus moved at the same rate as Napoleon's troops did a hundred years earlier.

 

Indeed. It would be interesting to see exactly what the log said. So I too would like to see a source for this. Of course from what we have some of it could well have been by train.

Interesting that you still don't understand when you take faulty logic and combine it with a strawman your point is in question. Just because "movile forces" covered less than 50km a day doesn't mean that they couldn't cover more. Nor does saying that an ID covered more in one case say that it could cover more ground in the same conditions as a mobile division. Without comparing the situations and circumstances your examples are useless in support of your position.

Which is rather irrelevant to how fast a division was moving or even how fast the front could move over significantly shorter periods of time.

That's not what the FM I linked states. Where do your numbers come from? By the way some of that was incoherent enough that I'm not sure what you were trying to say.

As I mentioned above that's not what the FM says. The existance of even some motor transport can make a considerable difference in how fast the suppport services could move. That and the RR would mean that a division in 1940 should be able to move considerably faster than Napoleon's troops if necessary.

 

Proof is his log and of other people, if those are forged for some reason, than I'm misled.They describe paintful 15 hour marches in heat, no transport is mentioned. Source is as stated above: Robert J. Kershaw , 'War without gauntlets - -operation Barbarossa'.

I assure you that Kampfgruppen advancing on Moscow did consist of infantry and other elements as well as tanks. Not only Guderian or Hoepner wouldn't have dared advance with only tanks, but they wouldn't succeeded in penetrating any defense lines, let alone take any urban areas. Yet they did, so they must have been of mixed composition.

It sure doesn't.

This is irrelevant since I'm trying to point out at maximum speed those units could have and exploit potentially free space (if resistance collapsed faster) and nice october weather. You are even claiming they have no such potential with no resistance. Let me remind you than that Manstein's LVI panzer corp seized bridges on Dvina on 26th june. That's more than 400 km in straight line (so more on the ground) from their jump of points in 4 days! And it was through the enemy. Of course, they by passed them mostly, but manouvering also takes time and kilometers. Next example; Hoth's 3rd panzer group reached Villnius on 23rd june.That is 200 km in less than two days in a strait line, and they had to bypass western's front 3rd army in the process. They covered similar distance,again in straight line, and they went in a curved line to envelop armies withroving from Byalostok pocket to Minsk, in the next three days arching to south east and already threatening Minsk from the north. (as hapless Pavlov panicly signaled Moscow on 26th: 'more than a thousand german tanks are enveloping Minsk from NW.I have nothing to stop them.'). I could go on but I believe I made my point abut their potential speed. Also german fast divisions were not all to 30% of their mobility at Moscow. Situation was worst in PG 2, but AGC received 2 brand new panzer divisions prior to Typhoon and a few more were reinforced. Others could also use mixed Kampfgruppen for exploitation of space as they usually did and leave the slower parts to catch up. Therefore theory of invulnerability of Moscow, especially based only on immobility of german units is invalid. In october Moscow was vulnerable and in peril.

 

That was a small part of Mansteins corps, that was not the whole corp that took the bridge

 

The problem is that people are starting from wrong assumptions : LVI Pz korps seizing bridges : no : motorised units from LVI seized bridges.Other wrong assumption = LVI was a PzKorps,thus it was fully motorized : no :most men of LVI advanced on foot.
All divisions were a mixture of motorised and non motorised units,the differences (in june 1941)being that the Motorised and Armoured divisions had more motorised units,but less infantry,thus less fighting manpower and even less firepower .
In november,the situation was that the level of motorisation of the motorised and armoured divisions was now on the level of the infantry divisions in june,and that the ID had lost almost all motorisation .

That motorised units were advancing 80 km during a few days,was totally irrelevant because (as in may 1940) during the summer of 1941,every time they had to wait on the arrival of the non motorised units (mostly ID) because they were to weak :the motorised units had not enough infantry(a problem which still exist today) and as usual,the infantry bore the biggest burden : in october most of the infantry units were on 50 % of their original manpower .

Thus,it is not correct to say that in a few days Moscow could have been surrounded if the Soviets had given up faster at Briansk and Viazma:

the motorised units were to weak to cover a distance of 380 km in a few day

if they covered this distance,they still could not surround Moscow ::an encirclment of Moscow would claim at least 20 divisions (250000 men,mostly infantry) and a lot of (horse-drawn artillery)

if the Soviets collapsed,there was no need to surround Moscow,if they not collapsed,the encirclment would claim big forces and resources

 

About the speed of the infantry :the following is from the Great War Forum (infantry's daily march distance)

From a German WWII manual :

Average speeds of march columns in miles of hour

Infantry (long marches) : 3



March distances:

ID :20 miles in a day ,but,under adverse weather or road conditions ,the rate of march may fall to 10 miles a day .



From the Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and Privates of Infantry in the Army of the USA:


The rate of march depends greatly upon the condition of the roads and weather,but the average rate for infantry is 2,5 miles per hour .

The total distance marched in a day depends not only on the rate of march,but upon the size of the command,large commands covering about 10 miles per day,while small commands easily cover double that distance .


My conclusions :

The German manual :

Speed : in ideal situations : 3 miles per hour ,in non ideal situations : 1.5 miles

Total distance per day : in ideal situations : 20 miles,otherwise : 10 miles

The US manual :

Speed : average of 2.5 miles per hour

Total distance :
Large forces : 10 miles per day,small forces : 20 miles per day .

As we are discussing the Germans,we should use the German manual,and the conclusion is that during Typhoon,the German infantry could advance 10 miles per day (= 17 km ) which is,IMHO,the maximum that could be done

 

An Athenian runner named Pheidippides was sent to run from Athens to Sparta to ask for assistance before the battle. He ran a distance of over 225 kilometers (140 miles), arriving in Sparta the day after he left.

Not Advancing per se, but the 1,000 Spartans sent to assist the Athenians vs the Persian landing at Marathon, then marched the 180 km to Marathon in 3 days, with all their arms and armour.

They arrived too late for the battle; the Athenians had already won. So, instead of sticking around for the victory celebrations, they turned around and marched back.

The stories do not indicate what shape they were in when they arrived back in Sparta.

 

I agree with most things written in last posts . It's true that only parts of those units made those gigantic leaps, and I'm not saying those were to be repeated before Moscow. My examples were simply answer to your(LJAd) examples in my demonstration of potential mobility of german fast units.

Still I'm positive that final outcome for Moscow depended on many unpredictable factors and can't be calculated solely from mobility potential of the Germans. We do not completely agree on this ability either. My belief that german fast divisions still weren't reduced to infantry pace comes from actual situation in the field.One example being engagement of Katukov's reinforced 4th tank brigade with the main body of PG's 2 4th panzer division.After this blow 4th panzer was stopped in it's tracks for three days before being able to resume advance, which certainly wouldn't be the case if Katukov only hit some forward detachments or recconissance force. This engagement took place on 6th october on approaches to Mtsensk, some 250 km (in a straight line and through the bryansk's front 13th army) from german start positions.Another example is Kalinin which was 340 km away from starting positions(in a straight line and being behind western front and second echalon defense line) of 1st panzer of the XXXXI panzer corps. They took it on 14th october, 12 days into offensive,and not solely by tanks as has been suggested, but by full blooded Kampfgruppe consisting good part of a division.As Germans described fight for the city: 'Flamethrower tanks drenched machine gun nests while motorcycle soldiers were pinned down by the snipers.113 th panzergrenadier regiment sought to capture bridge over Volga intact. They took it after an intense battle over a canal bridge before the main bridge, where german mortar fire destroyed defender's positions.' It is evident from this that strong mix arms german elements were present in town. There are many such examples of german mobility. I grant that most of AGC and even of it's fast divisions wasn't as mobile, but certain number was.
If we take take those 3 miles per hour from german manual it means 30 miles is reachable(and more). But even if we keep it to those 20 miles it means it would have taken less than two weeks to encircle Moscow with infantry.Furthermore several panzer divisions that had good mobility and parts of other fast formations could have leaped ahead and blocked if not all approaches at least roads and rail roads leading to Moscow in several days max. As feeble as this ring might have been it was in no danger from 90 000 reserves left in Moscow, for a most part illiterate, untrained peasants given a rifle, with no armor. This force had no offensive capability only certain defensive. With Moscow cut of this way no reinforcements could arrive easily but with considerable delays. Any how first reinforcements from the interior arrived in mid and late october and greatest part arrived in november. If we allow those two weeks for infantry to hermeticly close the encirclement, this is still more than enough time before substantial soviet reinforcements arrive.
So what prevented Germans from exercising this scenario? Other factors, unpredictable eventualities. Weather for one. This speed of infantry and panzer divisions is possible in fair weather. (although the exploits at Kalinin and others were made during 'rasputica',the mud season).
Soviet resistance IMHO still being the most contributing factor. Biggest examples were mentioned battles around Vyazma and Bryansk, resistance in Bryansk pocket holding bulk of Guderin's forces until 23th! There were many other examples. Like when paratroopers blocked 4th panzers path as they resumed advance on Mstensk on 10th, when 4th approached in strength to break through, Katukov's T-34s ambushed them from the woods on their flanks.Battle raged entire day with panzer units triing repeatedly to outmanouvre and disengage but were stopped by Katukov every time. By night only smoking hulls remained of 4th panzer,marking first panzer division to be whipped out. Or when after several days of savage fighting Hoepner finally found a crack in Lelyushenko's defenses at Borodino and directed 30 tanks toward his unprotected HQ. Commander took out every man from radio operators to staff officers and stopped german tanks with molotov coctails, hand grenades and whatever was at hand. Down to single acts of desperate courage like soldiers throwing themselves with explosives under tanks to immobilse them or ramming tactics used by airplanes and tanks.
All these and other factors were highly unpredictable and outcome in october hung in balance.
Entire gouverment fled Moscow and Stalin himself walked along the train platform with his personal train waiting for him and than in one moment said to Mykojan and Molotov : 'You go,I' ll just stay here for a while', this also had profound impact on moral of troops and citizens. While general Wagner, army's quartermaster general, who in late november said offensive is finished, wrote in his diary on 5th october: 'Our impression is that final collapse is ahead.Strategic objectives are being defined.. east of Moscow.Than I think war will be over'.He must have had insight weather or not is it even possible to define such objectives. IMO opinions of QG of german army and soviet gouverment, about situation in october must have tremendous weight.