decisive battle debate

For those who can read German,there is also (available on Wiki) :

Pferde im Einsatz bei Wehrmacht und WSS.

 

Interesting, SteveO...Was there a certain breed of horse the Russians used- maybe some kind of pony related to Ghengis Khan's days...were the German horses more along the lines of Arabian? (not a horse guy, but have often talked to a man about a horse)

 

No, your original point is a mirage, as you have not yet identified if it would actually be more economical from a manpower perspective, to have motorised transport, or horse power.

I pointed out, that your grumblings about the amount of manpower more trucks would swallow up, was already being consumed by the labour-intensive task of maintaining horses.

Motorised transports require fuel, drivers and mechanics, whereas horses require... fodder, rest, teamsters, & drivers.

In order to reach your conclusion, you have to show that the use of trucks would consume greater numbers of men to maintain, than the horses they would be replacing.

If a German infantry squad captures a pot of warm soup, and two ham sandwhichs, which do they eat, and how is that relevant for an organisation the size of the Wehrmacht?

 

Im not sure about the breed, but the Russian horses were adapted to the primitive conditions and could survive on food the German could not. I remember reading about this but cant think of the book. As far as mobility to say the war was not dependent on it is absurd since the German plan was dependent on reaching its objectives before winter. The key difference between the truck and horse is the distance one can cover verses the other and the speed it can reach( depending on conditions)

 

Why would the trucks replace horses ? It is not a question of trucks or horses :the men who were maintaining the horses could not be used for maintaining the trucs :exemple : 100000 men were maintaining the horses and 100000 men were maintaining the trucks ,if more trucks were available,more drivers and mechanics would be needed:thus extra manpower would be needed,if the horses were shot,these 100000 men would remain as part of the Ostheer,becoming again infantry.

Result :more men would be needed .

 

Victory was not dependent on mobility,once the Germans were victorious in the summer,mobility would be no problem :in 1918,the Germans were going to the Caucasus without trucks (they were not going to the AA linr in 1918,because the West had priority),they used mainly trains.The same would happen in 1941 if they were victorious ,they would go eastwards using what was available : trains,trucks,horses.Who would stop them ?

 

I live in a village. Yesterday I have seen a couple of good horses with a 5-6 months old foal. A great scene nowadays. My hart breaks when I see how the horses have suffered under the Germans. Only the utter bastards may treat such noble animals in a such ruthless way.

 

Are you really that dense?

No one is talking about reaplacing all of the horses with motor transport at a single point in time. You suggest that men who could work with horses could not be trained to be drivers and possibly mechanics? Why not? It might have been a problem if it had to be done over night but no one but you seems to be thinking it would be done that way nor could the trucks have been made available that way. Nor are they saying that the German Army would have to be completely horseless. You seem to think that the raito couldn't be adjusted where clearly it could. The fact is that to move say a ton of material by horse 100 miles required more men than to move it by truck. Furthermore the truck could move faster so motor transport in general is much more econmical of manpower. There are cases where it's not true but they tend to be pretty rare exceptions. Comparing food for horses and parts for trucks is also a very poor comparison. The equivalant of repair parts for horses would be vetrinary care and as even you noted horses died in huge numbers. It's also interesting that you seem to indicate repair parts weren't much of a problem when it's brought up in regards to nonstandardization yet you bring it up here to support your argument. Finally simply stating that more motor transport would not speed the advance is a matter of opinion on your part and you have done absolutly nothing to substantiate it yet some of your earlier arguments certainly would imply otherwise. For instance the armored and mobile units having to wait for the leg infantry units. If the latter were motorized the wait wouldn't have been as long if at all.

 

Gibberish. You are relying on a figure you don't believe in to prove your point. Even if the number is accurate it's not the number of motor vehicles that's important but the their capacity. If the German number includes all non combat motor vehicles there is a considerable number of motorcycles and cars in the mix not to mention light trucks. I strongly suspect the average hauling capacity of the British motor pool was somewhat greater.

Of course it was. "Blitzkrieg" as a concept had mobility as one of the fundamental pillars.

To have any chance at all of victory the Germans needed to be very mobile. Had they been significantly more so then they might have achieved victory. Had they been significantly less they wouldn't have come anywhere near as close as they did.

 

1)The British motor pool also included cars and motorcycles

2) Blitzkrieg is a hollow and meaningless concept invented by Western journalists .And, I like to see that some one could prove that Barbarossa was based on the idea of Blitzkrieg .

3) Nofor the Germans :to have any chance at all for victory the Soviets needed to be much weaker,politically and militarily .Victory /defeat did not depend on the Germans but on the Soviets .Everything depended on the first weeks and mobility was not essential for what happened in the first weeks .

 

Indeed but what were the ratios? The whole point is hauling capacity, which you seem to be deliberately trying to avoid.

It may have been invented by journalist but it is hardly "hollow" or "meaningless". In fact it's a pretty good description of German doctrine of the time. And it defintily relied on mobility.

An interesting combination of 20:20 hindsight and utter garbate. The German plan did invision that the Soviets were weaker politically but the "kick in the door" part relied heavily on mobility. As for the Germans having a chance of defeating the Soviets we've had this arguement before and you have yet to produce any conclusive proof that the Germans had no chance of defeating the Soviets after August. Indeed the status of the Soviet forces at the end of the war suggest that it was indeed possible. However the Germans would have had to rethink their objectives and the earlier the better. And yes mobility was essential in what happened the first few weeks. Without the mobility of the armred and motorized units the Germans couldn't plan on advancing anywhere near as far as they did historically which would have meant a far weaker "kick" and subsequently a greater chance of failure.

 

It matters not that it wouldn't be the same men.

Assume if you will for one moment, that if you need 40,000 men and 40,000 horses to do the work of 10,000 trucks with 30,000 men (10,000 drivers and let's suppose an amazing number of mechanics 20,000 mechanics) and you replace the horses with trucks, then you have made a net savings of 10,000 men. Your assumption, which does nothing to prove that more trucks would not at least partially ease the Wehrmachts's supply, logistics, and manpower shortage issues.

It is not sensible to assume, that in an army of 3-4 million men, that you cannot scrounge together some more mechanics. The fact is, it wasn't a shortage of mechanics facing the German armed forces. It was a shortage of manpower. Therefore all labour saving devices were sorely needed. Including trucks.

In 1930, it was estimated that to move a 2-ton load 120 miles by horse required a 4-horse-team, four men and 4 days. Whereas a truck took 2 men 10 hours to move the same load. 20 manhours vs 16 mandays. That's one order of magnitude difference.

So not only are you transporting goods faster, you're doing it with less manpower.

 

1)It was easier to replace horses by horses than trucks by trucks,because there were more horses available in the occupied parts of the SU than trucks : til 1 december 1941,the horse booty was 83138 and the MT booty was 5800

2) In the occupied parts of the SU it was easier to find food for the horses than spare parts /fuel for the trucks


3) It was easier to train people to take care of horses than to take care of MT :most Germans never had driven a truck .

4 ) The ecological footstep of a horse was almost inexistent compared to the ecological footstep of a truck .: a truck requires drivers and mechanics,he requires fuel and spare parts :all things that had to be transported from Germany or farther,the transport of a truck requires more space than the transport of a horse


5)Given the bad situation of the Soviet roads,a truck was not more efficient than a horse

6) If the Soviet resistance had collapsed in the summer,horses nor trucks would be needed to occupy the rest of European Russia,trains would be needed .

7)In 1918,without trucks,the Germans advanced til Rostow and farrther;in 1941,with trucks and horses,they also advanced til Rostow .

8)The German failure in the summer was not caused by a shortage of trucks.

9)In WWII,mobility was not provided by trucks but by trains .:the fact that the allied forces were strongly motorised in the summer of 1944,did not prevent the fact that after an advance of a few weeks,they were halted .If in september 1944,the Germans had given up,non motorised /less mobile Allied forces would have crossed the Rhine and have gone to Berlin .

 

This is meaningless : if the Soviets had collapsed in the summer,tere would be no need to transport supplies over a distance of 120 miles .

 

If only you knew how ironic that was....

 

1) irrelevant for the purpose of your original comment.

2) You have not shown this. Considering that the Red Army had the more tanks and armoured cars, than the rest of the world combined in the end of '30's.

3) You have not shown this. Indeed, it is quite a preposterous assumption. It's a wonder that anybody managed to learn the infernal intricacies of the combustion engine at all. I mean, compared to the knowledge of how to care for animals, which is basically inherent in all mankind.

4) Nonsense. 4 horses requiring 12 pounds of feed daily, + the food for the teamsters is in excess of 50 pounds per day, for 4 days to haul 120 kilometers (the same distance the truck does in 10 hours) requires 200 pounds. How far can a truck get with 100 liters of fuel?

5) That explains why the Russians still have not adopted the motor vehicle. NOT. There are a few weeks each year, that the truck is worse than a horse. It sort of makes up for that during the rest of the year. Look at the photos of the territory the Panzers are driving on. It sure isn't road.


(Not a road)

6) Irrelevant. The collapse needed to be encouraged first, not the other way round.

7) Vastly Irrelevant.

8) This, you have still failed to show

9) Non-motorised occupiers are irrelevant.

 

Trucks (and tanks) without drivers/crew ,are useless:while in 1941 the Soviet army had more tanks (NOT trucks) than Germany,there was a big shortage of drivers,crew,mechanics,which resulted in the collaps of the Red Army : whole tank divisions disappeared without having fired one shot .

Even in 1941,the Red Army had more horses than trucks,even more horses than motor transport:

operational forces (2742881 men) :automobiles :148271(of which 106691 trucks) +24409 tractors AND 245612 horses

Stavka reserve (618645 men) :automobiles : 26094 (trucks 20232) + 2992 tractors + 78694 horses

For the same amount of men 53.3 million),the Germans had more MT (between 500000/600000 against 200OOO) and more horses (570000 against 325000) and still,they failed in the summer of 1941.Thus,the German failure can not be blamed on a shortage of trucks.

 

About point 3 :you are excused,because ,living in the US,you have no idea how was the pre war situation in Europe about MT (and in Germany,the situation was even worse than in the other European countries : MT (especially trucks) was a luxury artickle which most Germans could not afford ,and there was also no need for a big truck productin .

Truck production in Germany :

1934 : 28000

1935: 45000

1936 : 70000

1937 : 79000

1938 : 98000

1939 : 102000

There were in 1938 in Germany 1.6 million cars for a population of 76 million (less than in France and Britain) and 30 million in the US for a population of 130 million..

There was in the US one car for 4.25 inhabitants,in Germany one for 50 inhabitants,thus,it was not surprising that only very few Germans could drive a truck .

Why would Germany need more trucks before the war ? And why would it need more trucks during the war? It won in 1940 with a smal existing amount of trucks,while in 1941 it failed with more trucks ,in 1918,it was going to Rostow without trucks .If it had trucks in 1918,would it have gone to Astrachan ?

 

The Germans were not planning to advance as they did historically with armoured and motorized units .

 

You're excused for being a bigoted European with a large sef-inlated ego that doesn't quite grasp English. Why? Because I'm nice like that. Care to make any more assumptions?

PS: You're wrong. You're so wrong, it hurts.