decisive battle debate

I won't get involved any further in this debate, but this is one point I have to call BS on. I've never bought the arguement that "you don't know about the situation in _____ country 70 years ago because you're not from ____ country". This doesn't hold water if both parties were born after the events in question. I fail to see how anyone's opinion is "more valid" solely on the grounds of where they live. If anything, all it means is that each party has a different bias, but this does not exclude one from being "right" nor does it mean one is more knowledgable about the topic. The person who is from the country in question may have been exposed to more "correct" primary-source information, but that doesn't mean the other person has not been either and there's also the possibility of the former having a stronger bias due to this exposure. Note that if one party grew up during the events in question and the other did not, that's another issue entirely. But that is not the case here.

Overall, this is a very poor arguement to make. I'm reminded of a thread we had here a few years ago about the Dutch fleet where the OP ignored the messages from everyone who disagreed with him because they weren't written by Dutch nationals and as such presumably the posters were not "qualified" to state their opinions on the topic.

As a Canadian, does that alone that make me more knowledgable about the Canadian fur trade in the 1700s than someone in Germany? Absolutely not.

 

All these numbers prove very little indeed.

The number of cars in the population says nothing about how many actually could drive, and even less about how many could quickly learn to do field repairs. Learning to drive in '30's was a matter of hours, not weeks, and taking a license was as involved as showing that you knew where the indicator and the break pedal were.

In the age of motorization, people were fascinated with engines. You can't just count cars or trucks, to see how well versed a population is with the combustion engine. You should count all forms of motorised transport: you've handily forgotten motorcycles. Your mismanaged statistics put Germany of the 30's handily on par with Vietnam of today. Are you suggesting that you cannot find a mechanic or driver in Vietnam today? Perhaps you should travel there... I assure you, you'll find no shortage of people willing to drive a truck for you.

Apparently, you are a European with no real conception of what the European continent was like in the 1930's. What's your excuse?

 

Oh come on..

Sure strategical and prolonged operational movement of the armies was provided by trains, but tactical and very often operational mobility (if only short termed) was enabled by trucks. All german victories were achieved not through strategic but through tactical and operational mobility. That was their leverage over the Soviets. Soviets had strategical mobility, that was not their undoing. I wouldn't go so far to claim that lack of trucks was a reason for german defeat.

 

In a way I agree with arca regarding that the lack of trucks not being the main reason for the German defeat. Compared to enormous size of the Red Army, there was definitely a lack of not just trucks but there was also a lack of tanks and other armored vehicles to counter the large number of Soviet armor. And there was also the lack of soldiers, if you also consider the large pool of men for the Soviets, to counter the Russians. The German defeat wasn't just based on the lack of trucks but there is also the lack of tanks, armored vehicles, and men for the Germans.

 

It was said on on several occasions that either Germans would either win in several weeks or not at all. I believe that is incorrect from multiple aspects. The result depended on both sides.

Germans had little space for mistakes, but actually they didn't have to change their structure of forces,their tactics or operational doctrines.

One great german flaw was bad intelligence based greatly on wishful thinking. Such fatal underestimation of available soviet forces and mostly their capacity of mobilisation supported the comfortable position that german leadership had toward internal politics. German leadership allowed their people for far to long to believe that the war will be won without any sacrifices. Consumer goods were curtailed much belatedly, and while Hitler in january '42 said offically economy will formally be subordinated to war effort, real turn happened only after Stalingrad.As is turned out Germany's industry output doubled concerning tanks and aircrafts from '42 to '43 and almost doubled again in '44, while trucks doubled from '42 to '44. As Hitler decided for war against USSR as early as june 1940,if their assessments of soviet potential were better and they started mobilising industry and population for longer war, by winter of '41 their production could have been considerably higher.

Despite everything Germans were still winning in october '41 but it was then time to stop. Advance on Moscow in november was probably mistake that cost them the war.It allowed the Red army to fight them(around Moscow) on more equal terms without their tactical and operational superiority in mobility and without air superiority. If the Germans stopped for the winter after Vyazma, they would defeat with ease soviet offensive that was sure to come in december or january, and than take Moscow in spring. Than they would have the chance to win the war in 1942. What german high command failed to appreciate is what was the most valuable factor in that whole game. It was not hastily destruction of soviet armies,it wasn't quick capture of soviet industry or even Moscow. Most valuable asset was their army which was superior and undefeatable for the enemy. This is what they must have preserved at all cost. For this sophisticated highly trained army was not replaceable like those of the enemy.

Soviets on the other hands had to change everything,as they indeed were aware of and already started the painful process. They had to change composition and force structure,tactics,equipment,organization and doctrines. Their commanders would have to adapt to entirely new art of war and gain experience while under horrifying blows threatening to break moral and political will. They would have to successfully pull out mobilisation of a scale never before or since achieved by any society and do it with largely underdeveloped industrial base and basically peasant, backward rear. Enormous difficulties of such mobilisation of industrial age army out of peasant undeveloped rear was foreseen by Shevchin more then decade ago. These problems were greatly exacerbated by capture of resources in 1941: 57 percent of coal,68 of pig iron,58 of steel, 60 of aluminium and 38 percent of grain production was in german hands.Everything had to be done fast for by fall 1941 they were losing the war. Germans lost around 350 000 man killed or captured in the east,in 1941 while Soviets lost some some 6 million man,half POWs. This ratio was unsustainable and led to defeat.

Soviets miraculously manage to mobilise their large country and produced equivalent of incredible 500!!! divisions in first 6 months. These divisions lacked everything from mobility(46 000 produced in '41 and 32 000 in '42) to firepower, specialised units or even ammo or rifles. Yet they were there to bleed profusely for little damage to the enemy or more if enemy allowed it like at Moscow.

Greatest soviet achievement was IMO their ability to reform the army and learn from it's foe amidst the crushing blows.Return to enlightened prewar doctrines of 'deep battle' in combination with emulation of the enemy enabled the Red army to graduate in fall of 1942 and demonstrate capability of mobile warfare on operational(Uranus) and even strategic scale(operation Little Saturn) for the first time using it's reborn mechanised forces organized in mechanised and tank corps and tank armies. When they finally demonstrated ability to perform defense against german prepared effort at Kursk and maturation of it's mobile forces command cadre,composition and tactics, the game was finaly over for the nazis.Stalingrad was IMO not a moment to to early for Soviets to learn how to win because they couldn't take much more one sided punishment. Stalin's order 'not a step back' and desperate, superhuman resistance in Stalingrad also indicate this.

 

There is one simple reason why the Germans needed more trucks. Horse drawn transports cannot keep up with motorized transport. The whole German plan was based on reaching Moscow before the end of summer, since Soviet resistance did not simply collapse as was believed and the Germans had to fight way beyond the expected time frame, the tank forces were expected to do far more then planned. Since there was a lack of transports to allow infantry support and supplies to keep up with the demands that Guderian and the other tankers wanted the Soviets were granted the time they needed to bring up the next wave of troops. Despite the fragility of the Soviets units and the ease they were destroyed, the Germans could not maintain the attrition battle they found them selves fighting.

 

About the correlation between MT and defeat/victory :there is no such thing .

In 1940 the Germans won,although they had much less MT than the Allies .In 1941,the Germans failed,although they had more MT than the Soviets . Thus ...

Other point : in 1940,MT was a common good in the US (it was 32 million in 1940),while it was a luxury article in Germany . It is obvious that more MT means more mechanics and more people with knowledge about cars.Thus,the assumption that it would not have been difficult to find an extra 40000 candidate mechanics among the members of the WM is more than questionable.

 

Some of these points are questionable,as

1)the tank forces were expected to do far more then planned : everyone had to do far more than planned

2)the ease they were destroyed : that is not correct .

Generally : it is not so that in the campaign in Russia tanks were decisive and that ,if there was more MT for the infantry,the campaign would be won :with the existing forces,the Germans destroyed the existing Soviet forces,but still,they failed :the reason is simple : the Soviets succeeded to send (on an average) 1 million men to the front.If the Germans had now more tanks,or trucks,or anything else,the result would still be the same : a German failure .Only an Ostheer of 6 million men,10000 tanks1.5 million MT cCOULD (not would) have succeeded,but this was out of the question .

Other point : for the Germans,the problem was not lack of MT,but the heavy losses of the infantry :an infantry unit which was down to 50 % of its original strength would still be weakened,even if it had more MT .

And,may I again refer to 1944:when the Germans were defeated in Normandy,the Allied motorised units started the pursuit,and,we know what happened after a few weeks ;the same would have happened in the east if the Soviets were retreating east of the DD line and the Germans started the pursuit .

As long as the Soviets could send more men to the front than they were losing,the Germans had no chance .

 

The old urban contempt for the peasants

 

Question : why should Guderian be in Moscow before the winter,while Montgomery/Patton were not in Berlin before the winter ?

After all,the task of Montgomery/Patton was easier : better roads,small distances,more trucks (haha),air superiority,less resistance (at a certain moment "the Hun was on the run",while Ivan never was on the run ).

Maybe,the (hidden) answer is : give the Germans a 1944 US Army and they would have crushed the Soviets .

If so,this is proving tat the German post war propaganda still is ruling the internet .

 

A horse needs no fuel

 

It needs to eat. It needs water. It needs far more care at the end of each working day, than any machine.

You might imagine that it could graze while working, but you'd be wrong again. A working horse needs high-energy food.

So guess again.

 

1940 irrelevant. The depth is far less.

Thus, it is also irrelevant about the number of mechanics in the US. As I've shown. repeating your non-point, does not make it correct.

 

I doubt that soviet theoreticians had by their world view contempt for peasants, not to mention that would be heretical and highly dangerous hadn't it been very true. (and even then at most times)

Because German army of '44 was so much superior to soviet of '41 that it's beyond comparison.There is no way soviet army would contain allies in Normandy for as long nor were they capable for offensive like in Ardennes except in conditions of opponents mistake like exposure of AGC before Moscow. In short Germans could effectively fight and hurt it's opponent, therefore impeling them to greater cautiousness, while Soviets could not except through unordinary feats and bravery.
Second Germans were in a hurry to gain as much of soviet industry,population and destroy as much army as possible in shortest time, while allied armies were trying to minimize it's losses. .

What is the proof in this what's being discussed here that it's based on german propaganda?

 

Never heard of Bagration ?

 

Take away the US motorpool, and see how well Montgomery and Patton would be doing....

The not-so-hidden answer, is, you're obstinate, and wrong (again).

You clearly stated they had nothing to gain from more trucks.

The argument is not about if Guderian would be in Moscow, but if the Wehrmacht could use more trucks. You insist on putting the horse before the cart, and drawing a premature conclusion.

Your so-called counter arguments include such tripe as "the number of trucks in the US economy", "Why wasn't Patton in Berlin?", and insinuations about how horses do not need care, food, and teamsters. I've shown, a team of horses was a worse solution to a problem (shifting goods from one place to another) by a factor of almost 10. Which means over time, you could replace 100,000 men working with 100,000 horses, with 10,000 men working with trucks... This would not move the goods faster, but save on manpower. Or, in crease the number of trucks further, and save on time.

You've done nothing to support your argument that German's are mechanically disinclined, or vastly incapable of learning how to make repairs. I've pointed out, that cars & trucks are not the sole limit of combustion engines in a society. Furthermore, it doesn't require genius level intelligence to effect basic repairs on a motor from 1939.

 

The point is that the claim that peasants are backward,is not only proving the old city contempt for peasants,but also not correct.Besides,in 1941,the Soviet agriculture was more motorised than the German one .
Other point : in 1941,the importance of oil in the Soviet energy mix was greater than in the other European countries,including Britain and Germany . The reason was very simple : the SU had a lot of oil,the other countries had to import their oil .

 

You have shown nothing :it is not because trucks could move goods faster that horses were a bad solution : you have to prove

a)that it was needed that goods were moved faster

b) that these goods were available

c) that it was possible to build more trucks,to train more drivers and mechanics,that it was possible to move more fuel to the east(or maybe you are thinking that the Germans could do as Mozes:hitting the ground with a stick and the oil would come out.)As it was the best solution to use horses in the German agriculture and tractors in the Soviet agriculture,it is perfectly possible that to continue to use horses in the WM was better than to use more trucks,if these were available,if these could be transported to the east,etc,etc .

 

Food for horses was available in the SU,fuel for trucks was not available in the SU .

 

2 other points which are wisely avoided by some people


If more trucks would be used,more would have been to build,and the building of more trucks would result in the production of less other things.


If more trucks were used to move things faster,the result would be that more goods would have to be moved :ONE exemple :in the OTL,the MT of the Ostheer was consuming 30000 ton of fuel a day in july 1941,if more trucks were used in the ATL,the result would be that more fuel would be needed and that the benefit of more trucks would be annulled by the needs of more fuel,spare parts,echanics for more trucks (the same problem happened in NA)