decisive battle debate

So your saying that Dragoon forces linked up with Patton in August? And that Patton was the only one fighting the Germans in Western Europe?

 

Proof that I have said this ?

 

One can not say that patton was stopped because MG received priority for supplies: Patton was aready stopped before the MG preparations started.

One can also not say that Patton was stopped because supplies had to come from Normandy,because,when other supply sources were available (Marseille was ONE of these),Patton still was blocked .

The obvious conclusion is that Patton was stopped because the Germans had recovered .

The Patton excuses are on the level of the Guderian excuses:there also,everything was the fault of the supply boys .

 

For you, apparently.

You stated "no proof" Patton was stopped by fuel shortages, and yet in the article kindly shared by Takao it clearly states the fuel/logistics issues that were affecting the entire Western Allies armies, in that period.

"The fact was that the momentum of the pursuit could no longer be maintained with the amounts of fuel which the armies had received in mid-August."

and it goes further and explains why

"The constantly accelerating demand for gasoline must be explained rather by the round-the-clock hauling operations of not only the regular QM truck units but the many provisional organizations formed with the vehicles of artillery, engineer, and other types of units, and by the tremendous increase in mileage involved in lateral communications behind the greatly expanded army fronts. Not only had the lines of communications been extended several hundred miles, but the armies had fanned out as they advanced beyond the Seine, widening the army group front from less than 100 miles in mid-August to 200 miles in mid-September. The inevitable result was to add to the already heavy burden on transportation."

Furthermore

"Inadequate transport was in fact the chief limiting factor in the logistic support of the American forces throughout the period of the pursuit, and when the First Army first reported a critical quartermaster supply situation on 26 August it recognized that the major difficulty was not so much one of inadequate supply levels as it was a problem of moving supplies forward into the army area."

It goes on to discuss several interesting facts regarding the POL pipeline.


In general I find this thread very peculiar.

It is a series of outrageous statements by LJAd, which continuously derail the conversation entirely. Each time LJAd is proven wrong, another outlandish statement arrives. Or a needless insult.

 

Well replacement rate is rather irrelevant is it not? Also note that the replacement vehicles represented a greater capacity than the replacement horses. You also need to consider the replacement of wagons.
When a truck is worth 30 horses saying that you can send 3 horses or one truck is not a statistic in your favor.

How many miles would the team of horses travel in a year? Note that you have to feed horses every day of the year and you need to keep them warm and exercise then periodically whether they are used or not and theirs vet bills as well. Then there's the matter of how long it takes to get the horses in and out of harness when you use them. It's far from clear that a horse and carriage is more efficient than a truck in this case.

How is this relevant?

Your statement about hauling capacity without a lot more information has essentially no bearing on what was more efficient. Now it does turn out that if the tracks are already down or a navigatable river exist then railways and barges are more efficient at moving items if you criteria is cost per mile. Railways can even be faster than trucks although in many cases barges are slower. The problem is of course when you are moving something you very seldom start or end at a railhead or pier. I'm not sure why you think the above argues against the German need for additional trucks though.

When your tanks are running out of fuel in combat there's a supply problem. The germans had not "recovered", they may have been recovering but if he could have continued moving at the rate he was the recovery may well have been cut short.

And if his log system hadn't needed to send as much fule they could have sent more ammo and other classes of supply. Of course this just makes the point that he had to hault due to outrunning his log support.

 

1)Fuel/logistics issues existed but this does not prove that Patton was stopped by fuel/logistics issues

2)This is wrong :the moment of the pursuit could be maintained with the amounts of fuel which the armies had received in mid-August, but with smaller forces.The problem was that the Germans were already that strong that smaller forces could no longer advance.

Logistic issues are caused by the presence of the enemy: the weaker the enemy,the less fuel you need : in the beginning of august,Patton could have advanced with less fuel,because there was pratically no German resistance .At the end of the month,he needed more fuel because the German resistance was stronger .

 

Horse before cart.

The shortage of allied fuel for the mobile forces in the front, allowed German resistance to stiffen further.

"The total effect of the gasoline shortage is difficult to assess, although its immediate consequences for the conduct of operations are quite apparent. Since each day’s deliveries were consumed and the establishment of reserves was out of the question, tactical operations became wholly contingent on day-to-day deliveries. The crisis came when these could no longer be depended on, and the unpredictability of deliveries acted as a depressant on all planning and cast a pall of uncertainty over all operations, even as much as twenty-four hours in advance. In the closing days of August the mobility of the American forces was noticeably reduced, with the result that they could not take full advantage of their potential striking power and could not maintain the momentum of the pursuit. In the period of the shortage some units were allowed to continue their advance until their tanks ran dry, in spite of all the risks entailed. "

 

1)Horses were available and it is more economical to use something that exist than to buy something new ,besides,the cost of a horse that is used is the same for a horse that is not used

2) It isrelevant,because before WWII,people had not the time to drive 12 miles with their car to a garage

3)You are wisely forgetting to ask the question :why were the tanks running out of fuel ? Because there was a combat,which implies the presence of an enemy,which means :the weaker the enemy the less fuel you need,the stronger the enemy,the more fuel you need,or : if you need more fuel,this proves the presence of a strong enemy .
If the enemy is weak,and you have not much fuel : no problem: you advance with less tanks and trucks ,which means :if the Germans facing Patton had collapsed,Patton could have advanced to Berlin with a fewtanks and trucs .It is the same in 1941 in Russia : if in the summer the SU had collapsed,there would be no logistical problems to go to the AA line .

 

NO : the stiffening German resistance meant that Patton needed more fuel,etc(also more ammunition,not only for tanks,but for artillerynly artillery could break the German frontline),the German resistance depended on what Germany could send to the front:men,weapons,ammunition,etc.

 

YES: read the passage again.

 

1) No, the cost of an under-utilized resource is not the same as the costs associated with that same resource utilized.
I can sell an unneeded horse.
I can kill an old horse and eat portions, and sell other bits to glue manufacturors.
I can lend an under-utilized horse to someone, and earn a portion of their earnings, or their good will, something generally not to be sniggered at.
Horses, like humans, consume more food when under moderate labour, than not.

2) People didn't have time to drive 12 miles to the garage?!? Where do you dream up this nonsense?

3) Let's see. If I understand you correctly. my Toyota land cruiser is now a cross-country perpetual motion machine: as I have no enemies, the distance it can travel is unlimited by mundane things such as fuel consumption, and fuel availability? I no longer need to take these issues into consideration when planning my travels? Excellent News!

 

Trucks were available as well as we've shown. With different planning and priorities more trucks could have been available. Nor is it true that cost of a h orse used and not used is the same. A horse that stays on the farm and works there is working at or close to it's "fuel" supply and not creating it's own demands on the log system especially critical as the railways to the east were pretty much maxed out. Also if the effort had been to mechanize Germany sooner then the number of horses would have gone down and the number of trucks and the capabilty to build and support them up.

???? And yet they had time to walk miles to the vet? Again you are only lookiing at one side of the equation. How often did one need to take a vehicle to the garage back then? How often did horses require a vet? or reshoeing? Which required the greatest investment in time and money? Until you can answer those questions satisfactorily your point is at best open for debate and I'm quite skeptical.

No, that's an assumption that you are making. If you are advancing you are burning fuel. If the opposition is weak and you are pushing rapidly forward you could well be burning as much or more fuel per day than if you are forced to stop. Furthermore the further you move from your suppy head the more fuel will be consumed by the vehicles keeping you supplied. Your position is questionable and evidence has been presented that it is indeed mistaken.

That is a recipe for dissaster, especially if it's not clear just how strong your enemy is or when you will reach a well defended point. Such tactics leave you extremly vulnerable to counter attacks for instance.

No. Unless by collapse you mean they surrnedered.. Even then it's questionable.

That is an assumption on your part, history would indicate that it is questionable at best. The failure of the log system might be less critical in that case but that does not mean that it would be perfect.

 

From the evidence presented in this thread alone it's not clear that that will help much if at all.

 

Indeed not, but it's there for posterity, should some other interested party happen by

 

Its clear that if the American army had not given up on horse drawn wagons, the US army could have easily marched to Berlin since they would not have needed so much fuel.

 

In the winter of 1942/1943,Montgomery advanced to Tripoli in 73 days.Why ? Because he was advancing with small forces (small forces are advancing faster than big forces).Why was he able to advance with small forces ? Because the Axis opposition was almost meaningless .

This proves that the speed of an advance is determined by the amount of forces that are advancing,and these are determined by the possible opposition of the enemy .

Conclusion : it's the enemy who determines the speed of an advance ,not the logistics of the advancing force .

 

It is clear that this is wrong : one division is advancing faster than 2 divisions,and the possibility to advance with one division depends on the enemy .

 

Sorry not at all conclusive. Only real conclusion you can draw from this is yours are unwarrented.

No. Depending on circumstances one division might be able to advance at the same speed or even slower than 2. The rate of advance depends on a number of factors of which the enemy opposition is one and not always the dominant one.