decisive battle debate

There is a mysterious unwillingness from a lot of people to accept the truth ,being : Germany was not bankrupt in 1939 and its economic difficulties (which were not greater than those of other industrial nations)did not cause the outbreak of the war .

I can only guess,but a possible explanation is : as nazism was bad,it could not have a successful economic policy :Auschwitz means that Germany must be broken in 1939.
It is the same for the SU :the Gulag means that the SU was saved by Lend-Lease .

In other words : the moral supremacy of democracies means that they were also economically superior,that the enemy was also economically incompetent .


Whatever ,the theory that Germany was going to war because it was economically babkrupt,is as wrong as the theory that Germany was going to war in 1914 because of political problems (the rise of the socialists):the theory of the Primat der Innenpolitik .

 

I think most people agree with that. Tooze does have his limitations, and sadly seems at times a tad unaware of them himself.

Undeniable is though that Hitler feared Germany being dwarfed and rendered impotent by the growing power of the Soviet Union and the US.

 

Tooze has his merits:he was the first to debunk the myth that the stupid nazis refused to mobilize German women because of ideological reasons (myth which is still widespread in Germany and proclamed by official works as Germany and WWII,something which is comprehensible,given the ideological climate in Germany),he also has put Speer on the place where he belongs :a smooth talker,who is claiming the merites of Todt .

But,Tooze is an economist (not his fault) without the required knowledge of agriculture,and,without the required knowledge of the préwar economy which is that different from the economy of 2014 as the economy of the middle ages .

 

Perhaps because it's not a "truth". In a very real sense the Germany either bankrupt or on the verge of it in 1939 and had the war not occured they would hve been defaulting on their loans in the very near future. Now that doesn't mean it caused the war but it was certainly a contributing factor. Especially when you consider that the economies of Germany's potential opponents were turning to military production in that time frame and the balance of power was moving against Germany.

Why make wild guesses when looking at the facts and applying a little logic can get you much closer to the truth.

I see. When in doubt create a straw man.

??? Tooze and economist who has studied the period extensivly lacks knowledge of the prewar economy? He also lacks "required knowledge of agriculture"? I'd like to see some support for those claims.

 

Tooze is an economist, not an agriculture expert (OTOH, most farmers would say that the definition of an agriculture expert is : some one who talks about things he knows nothing about).

While Tooze is right when he is saying that the German agriculture was less efficient than the British one,because,for the same results, it used more manpower,his claim that in 1939 the German agriculture was in crisis and this was influencing Hitker's decision to go to war,is founded on official statistics,which as usual are not reliable,because, they ignore the "invisible" agriculture:the millions of people wh had a kitchen garden(although they were officialy not farmers)and during the war,this number increased .
:
75 years ago, German (and European )society was totally different :millions who were officialy not peasants survived because of their kitchen gardens,they almost never bought meat,vegetables,potatos.Someone who has not the personal experience of this situation, is judging the pre-war agriculture with the norms of today .

It is the same for the economy :the prewar economy was light years different from the today economy,with its globalisation and other things .

There is also the point that economists have the tendency to ignore everything that can not be converted in statistics:as nature :nature was and is determining the yield of harvest ,not the agriculture policy.

 

One doesn't preclude the other. Furthermore I fail to see why he needs to be an agricultureal expert to have informed opinions and conclusions on the topic at hand.

Note that you did not answer the original question you simply waved your hands and gave an opinion that is quite questionable.

??? If they are the "official" statistics then they ware what officials (such as Hitler) are basing their decisions and opinions on although various fudge factors may apply. So we have another unsupported opinion on your part and again a very questionable one.

That is simply another opinion of yours. There is no reason that someone who has studied the problem wouldn't be aware of it. Indeed your statement of it suggest that not only are you aware of it but any who read this are as well. So your hand waving is rejected as any sort of support for your opinion.

So you are suggesting that there is no way to understand the economy of previous centuries? That is complete rubbish.

That's a generalization and an unsuppored on on your part (again). Indeed from what I've seen at least those with an interest in agricultural ecomics are quite aware of the impact of weather and other natural events. Agricultural policy is still going to have a signficant impact on harvest yield by the way. It's quite clear that harvest yield is a function of quite a few variables of which those two are of considerable import.

In short you have done nothing to support you position as requested.

 

I see. When in doubt create a straw man.


No strawman at all : every WWII website is swarming from the assertions that the nazis were stupid: they refused to mobilize women, Germany was only completely mobilizing in 1944, they murdered millions of Jews and POW who could have produced a lot of tanks,etc,etc ..

All this is founded on /resulting from the claim by Galbraith shortly after the war that the outcome of the war proved the superiority of liberal capitalism:democracy would always win from dictatorship ,which is something very dangerous ..

 

It is very simple : WWII was caused by Hitler's attack on Poland . And,there is no proof that this attack was caused by German economic problems.Besides, German economic problems would not disappear when Poland was defeated,it is the contrary : these economic problems would increase .

 

I am saying that one can not judge previous economies and compare them with the economy of 2014.

 

Yes indeed it was a strawman. You stated specifically:

I haven't seen that argument used anywhere on this WWII board which means it is clearly not "swarming" here nor have I seen it "swarming" on any of the other WWII boards I follow indeed it's noteable by its abscence. Furthermore while I have seen some of the other assertions you mention the false ones are usually challenged and of course they did murder millions of people although if you break them into enough individual groups no one except possibly the Jews (if you don't subdivide them) and the Slavs (again if you don't subdivide them) will get into the millions individually.

I doubt all of it is founded on or resulting from Galbraith but I do agree that it is dangerous and in fact rather obviously fallacious.

While that was the immediate cause economics clearly had a role. Indeed without the depression would the Nazis have even come to power? Economics or the perception of them also influenced both what Hitler thought Germany was capable of and what he thought various other countries were capable of. So you simply can't ignore economics. It isn't the only factor but it is a key one.

That's not what you said nor is that relevant to the discussion at hand. It's also as questionable as most of your other unsupported assertions.

 

This is irrelevant,unless you are thinking that without the Nazis having come to power,there would be no WWII.And,this is very questionable . No:it is wrong : the Kaiser and his boys started WWI.Not Hitler . Why should a von Papen,or an other one, not start WWII ?The trigger for WWII was created at Versailles.

 

Especially when you consider that the economies of Germany's potential opponents were turning to military production in that time frame and the balance of power was moving against Germany.





Reply :

that was not relevant ,because the rearmament of Britain and France did not mean that these countries would oppose German expansion .Britain and France would become dangerous only if appeasement was abandonned,and this happened only on 1 august 1939.

Besides : the balance of power was already moving against Germany in 1933.

 

A quick rummage through a small part of The Wages of Destruction resulted in several questionable statements

P 309":Without Romanian oil imports, Germany could not survive for long" : the truth is that in 1939,the Romanian oil imports constituted 20 % of the available German oil . Not more .

P 321:"In 1940,the SU supplied Germany with 34 % of its imported oil":the truth is that this was 12 % of the available German oil . Not more.

P 369 :"At Dunkirk,the British extracted 370000 men by boat ":the truth was : 330000 of which 200000 British .(Tooze seems unaware of operation Ariel)

P 375:"The WM had only 541 battleworth medium tanks,suitable for use against France ":this is implying that the big majority of the German tanks used against France,were not suitable against France .
P 376:"The German medium-heavy battle-tanks were not a match for the heaviest French tanks ": even if it was true (which I doubt),it was also irrelevant .

P 382 :"The Romanian oil deliveries were to form in the years to come a mainstay of the German fuel supply ": the truth :they formed 25 % of the oil supply in 1941,1942 and 1943

P 385:"By the end of 1940,thanks to ample deliveries of Romania,the booty taken in France,and the low level of military activity in the second half of the year, the alarming decline in the German fuel stocks had been repaired " .:that's implying that most oil was used by the WM,which is questionable : oil consumption may-june 1940 was 276000 ton,while in 1940,the available oil was 6.7 million ton .

Last point(something which an economist should know):what was the importance of oil for Germany in 1940? What was the energy mix ?

In 2013,it was : mineral oil :31.8 % and gas 24.8 %.

We can only assume that in 1940,the importance of oil was much lower,and this is relativizing the importance of the Romanian oil even more:the German economy (as most economies) was in 1940 founded on coal .
This is proving the difficulty of understanding and comparing/translating to today the economic situation of 70 years ago .

 

It may be questionable but it is hardly clear that it is wrong. Many of the provisions of the treaty of Versailles were going by the wayside prior to the Nazi takeover and it was likely that many of the worst ones still in place would follow. The chance of a war in Europe would still remain high but a world war? Very questionable. Even if it did the time frame would surely be different and the sides likely as well.

The balance may have been against Germany in 33 but was it in 35? or 36? It's not at all irrelevant because appeasement was a policy that was pretty much guaranteed to end at some point and there's a pretty strong case for one of the reasons for being the fact that Britain and France were not prepaired for war. This was changeing with each aggressive move made by the Nazis.

The two positions are not inconsistent. If Germany had a huge stockpile of oil and was producing more than she needed then the loss of 20% might not amount to much but that was hardly the case was it?

??? You really should read things more carefully. 34% of imported oil could easily 12% or even less of available oil or more for that matter.

As has allready been granted Tooze is an economist and not a military historian. The fact that he's off by a bit over 10% doesn't really invalidiate any of the points he's making does it?

Is it? Or are you just reading that into it.

That may be a valid point but I'd have to take a closer look at the context given your record to date.

Actually it's not.

But Tooze made just that point. Indeed as I recall there are charts depicting the percentage of energy derived from coal, oil, and other sources by Germany and several of the allies if I recall correctly. The US was the only one where oil even came close to coal from what I remember of the chart. So yes Tooze is aware of that and indeed makes a point of it.

We are wandering off topic though and you've already proven you have a hard time supporting your positons with fact and logic maybe we should leave it here.

 

What the issue is that Germany was going to go bankrupt if it tried to build an army, navy and airforce big enough to take on the US. It was the vast expansion that Hitler wanted that was causing all the problems. If the German economy was so wonderful, then why did Germany need the imports from the SU during the blockade and why did Hitler cancel the Z plan when Britain declared war.

 

But, did Hitler try before the war to build a Wehrmacht that was big enough to take on the US ?

The Z plan was cancelled because it could not be finished before 1943,and the war started in 1939.


I should not overestimate the "need" of the imports from the SU .

 

It is interesting to note that even Manstein downplays the importance of Kursk, his the last »lost victory«. But, is the Krursk so insignificant? Manstein devoted to Kursk just about dozen of paragraphs. Nothing more.
Over the past weeks I have re-read several books dealing with Kursk from different points of view. For me, the best assessment of Kursk is:

»Soviet success at Kursk, with so much at stake, was the most important single victory of the war. It ranks with the greatest set-piece battles of the past – Sedan in 1870, and Borodino, Leipzig and Waterloo from the age of Napoleon.« ( Overy, R., »Why the Alies Wion«:, pp 96.)

On the 98 page he continues:
»Soviet victory in the campaigns at Stalingrad and Kursk effectively determined the outcome of the war.«

Without any need for using the word »decisive« he explained the essence of battles fought during winter 1942/43 and summer 1943:

Battles fought at the eastern front during late 1942 until late summer 1943 were essential for the outcome of the entire war. Decisive, so to speak. It appears that the Western allies have landed on shores of Europe just two days before the war was essentially decided - at the East.

 

Can it be argued that Kursk is important because it represents the passing of initiative in the East from the Germans to the USSR? Kursk was the last attempt by the Germans at an offensive that might have made a difference to the outcome of the war in the east. One might discount operations like that around Lake Balaton in Spring 1945 as being too late and too little. After Kursk, Germany is and remains on the defensive in the East.