decisive battle debate

About this story : see AHF : German advance on Moscow/Khimki

 

Well, after the war Halder&Co. were well paid to write history so they wrote everything they wanted and their bosses accepted that as the Gospel.
It is the same as if the Japanese Generals wrote the US history of the war at Pacific. Hence the "reliable" history is a kind of CT.

 

I disagree that there was no danger. Maybe you mean that on 5th december danger had passed,but before danger was very real. After the destruction of Bryansk and Western fronts,only 90 000 reserves standed between AGC and Moscow. Zhukov himself said that at the time he wasn't sure if they were going to hold.
Maybe Germans didn't see golden domes of Kremlin,but they for a fact reached last bus station,of a line that goes straight to the Red square, so definitly suburbs.I saw in Moscow the monument marking the limit of german advance,today it is well inside the city itself. To the southwest Kluge's 4th army was at Naro-Fominsk some 55 km from the Red square and about 40 from the city, while though bulk of Guderians forces were stuck around Tula,his spearheading 17th panzer reached Kashira some 80 km south and already east of the citiy.

 

The monument in Moscow , the high water mark of german advance.Today well within the city.

 

Of course,this was what Zhukow was saying : the greater the danger,the greater his role .

And,about the 90000 men : that does not mean anything : 50000 or 90000 (for how long) is irrelevant,because a situation has always 2 sides : an advance of AGC did not only depend on the opposing Soviet strength,but also on the strength of AGC itself :how far away were the Germans from Moscow after B + W? Not in km,but in days . What was the strength of AGC?Operational tanks,artillery,trucks,fuel ?If the Soviets could move their reserves faster than the Germans could advance,what was the danger for Moscow ?

 

80 km,40 km means :far away ,several days .

 

There would only be a danger for Moscow if the Soviet resistance before Moscow had collapsed,something which did not happen,besides,a German advance to Moscow did not mean :fall of Moscow :in september 1939,the Germans advanced to the outskirts of Warsaw,but Warsaw did not fall .

 

You perceive that battle (campaign) as a linear, given thing and that nothing could have developed in any other manner than it has. Truth is IMO more complex and chaotic. The historical outcome is a consequence of many eventualities and uncertain circumstances that weren't given in any way. Some were indeed given, for example forward Wermacht units were around Moscow on the end of a overextended and barely sustainable supply chain. With nearest railroad suplly point being as far as Vyazma, where everything from fuel,food or heavy weapons had to be put on trucks and transported for some 200km east on bad roads in worse weather.This adverse fact wasn't just given at that moment, but predicted during war games, still nevertheless disregarded. Many other circumstances were yet unpredictable.Weather being one example. If it was batter and Germans could retain at least to some level their formidable maneouvrability, things would look pretty bleak for the Soviets. This 'sea of mud' that countryside and most roads of western Russia turned to, reduced sophisticated, modern and mobile army that was Wermaht, in some ways to the level of the Red army and gave Red army soldiers a chance to fight their gallant battles at all those now famous places before Moscow, instead of just being easily outmanouvered and outflanked as was the case hundreds of times during past summer. This brings us to the second point that also wasn't given, the heroic Soviet resistance. No one can expect such desperate and devoted fighting to be something normal, taken into calculation. When Bryansk and Western fronts were surrounded, total panic set in, people were fliing the city, plundering, gouverment and foreign representatives escaped in hurry. This wasn't a show, it was reality, if they thought danger wasn't clear and present they wouldn't do such things for they were potentialy very dangerous for moral of the people and soldiers and for the country's prestige in the world. They didn't say; no worries our boys at Vyazma will fight to the death even though they have no more supplies,they are surrounded and we have no communication with them, and they will stop this so far invincible army . But they did, for a few weeks they bought crucial time. Also the manner Boldin's soldiers carried themselves at Tula or 1st guars motorised at Naro-Fominsk,battles at Borodino or Mozhaisk cannot be regarded as something normal. The moral, courage and also skill these man showed is something extraordinary and not something predictable, something that goes in the normal line of duty. Third moment is soviet leadership where Zhukov and his aides, in later stages of Typhoon skilfully played a very dangerous game of stopping the Germans with minimal units, while harboring the reserves for counter attack.This was one of the great command and operational planning examples of the entire war and not normal performance, specially for the soviet military leaders at that time.

Agreed. Actually Germans planned to envelop Moscow with 2.,3. and fourth panzer groups, closing the ring at Fedorolka east of the city and avoid city fighting as much possible.

 

???
They may have been stopped "far before Moscow" but certainly not permanently so. They did indeed reach the outskirts of Moscow and as they did not continue on to invest the city they obviously were stopped there. Looking back with 20:20 hindsight we can conclude (although perhaps erroneously) that Moscow was not in serious danger (it was clearly in some danger) but it was not so clear at the time to any of the participants.

 

1) The fact that some small German units were close by Moscow is no proof that Moscow was in danger .

2) On 25 november,the German QMG (Wagner) wrote : we are at the end of our material and human resources,which meant that Typhoon had failed

3) As is mentioned in post 168,the Germans planned to encircle Moscow,something which,even if the Soviet resistance had commapsed,would have taken weeks,considering the available German forces .

4) If immediately after Briansk/Wyazma,Moscow was not captured,it is obvious that these battles were only a shot in the dark

5) If the Soviets could start a big offensive on 5 december,it is also obvious that in the second half of november,they still had the forces needed to stop the Germans


6) Not only were Briansk and Wiazma a short in the dark,but they were also the proof that Typhoon had failed :the capture of Moscow was no German aim,the German aim was to defeat definitively the Red Army,which would result in the fall of Moscow:the Soviet Army could only be defeated if the Soviets had only few remaining reserves:the big Soviet losses at B +W indicated that this was not so: the Soviets did not run away after W +B,which meant that the only chance for Typhoon to succeed was lost .

 

Of course it is. Artillery is a signifcant danger to any city if it's close enough to hit it. It's a potential danger if it's getting close enough to do the same. Likewise all be it at grearter distance with aircraft.

And someone probably said something similar to that when they stopped in August. It's apparent that the German plan to defeat the Soviets quickly had failed at that point but it was not clear that the campaign had failed. Germany obviously did have more resources as they fought on for several years.

If Soviet resistance had collapsed it wouldn't have mattered nor would it have been necessary.

Or not, indeed mostly not.

The Soviets could have started a big offensive at the end of May or early June 1941. That doesn't prove much does it?

The above clearly illustrates your inability to form a logical argument based on facts but does show a considerable "apttitude" at generating such based on a mix of facts, opinions, and leaps of faith. You would save us a lot of bandwidth if you learned a little logic.

 

Agreed, at this stage it was only the matter how much deeper is AGC going to enter the trap that was being prepared.

This is completely false. With no resistance, if weather was still fine they would encircle Moscow in two days, and with worst weather in five.

I'm not sure what do you mean. That Germans lacked proper intelligence on soviet forces? Of course they lacked, as they did the previous summer and as they will for the next three and a half years. Still this didn't stop them before Moscow.

This is true for late november. But if these forces were thrown in immediately after de training or forming,without support or coordination they would be spent peacemeal just like countless times that summer. It took a lot of courage and skill on Zhukov's side for this dance between his forces,German penetrations and impatient Stalin.

Greatest German victory is a proof that operation failed? The capture of Moscow was german plan, they already accepted the war wouldn't end in 1941 and wanted Moscow as moral booster,prestige reasons,as transport hub,industrial and mobilization center.

As I elaborated before you consider this whole chain of events as the only possible, like it was predetermined by destiny or something. I believe this is false. If armies around Vyazma,just for example, didn't put up such desperate resistance inside the 'Kessel', nazis could capitalize on fine october weather and surround Moscow with ease as soviet reserves in that moment were almost non existent and armored reserves completely non existent. As we saw earlier in the west and earlier in eastern campaign such fighting in isolation was something extraordinary and certainly not something that couldn't have developed any other way.

 

It is not correct to say that B+W was the greatest German victory : it was a failure/defeat : it only was hurting the Soviets (as were all German victories in 1941) and Germany could not afford to hurt the Soviets .

The aim of Typhoon was not to surround Moscow,it was to defeat decisively the Red Army,which would result in the capture of Moscow without any additional fighting and in the collaps of the SU.(This was the same strategy the Germans pursued since 22 june).

The conditio sine qua non for a decisive defeat of the Red Army in october was that the Soviets were on their last batallions,because the Germans were on their last batallions,and B+W proved that this was ot the case .

Even without a desperate resistance inthe Kessel,an encirclment of Moscow in october was out of the question,an encirclment in october would mean tat AGC shouls advance some 500/600 km in october,something which given the situation of the Ostheer on 1 october was out of the question .

 

I'm calling Balderdash on that 500-600 km. Check the scale.

 

Briansk-Moscow : 380 km + the km needed for the encirclment :would 500 km be sufficient ?

 

Panzer groups 3 and 4 starting positions west of Vyazma - Red square 250 km. So 350 km would be more than sufficient.For PG 2 somewhat more. About claim that Germans were down to their last battalions..Well if you call nearly 2 000 000 soldiers,minimum 1000 serviceable tanks and around 14 000 artillery peaces employed in Typhoon last few battalions,then they sure were. While Soviets had about 1.3 mill men ,1 tank division and 13 tank brigades. After double encirclements there were only 90 000 soviet reserves left and no armor worth mentioning. Just to set some facts straight.

But this discussion isn't about this really. It is about your utter loathing and dismissal of tactical events. You've come to see this conflict only from aspect of strategy, more percisely grand strategy and consider it completely pre determened. You've forgotten somewhere along the way that in war thousands of small, unpredictable events create the big picture. Courage of individual soldiers, luck of a single reconnaissance pilot , spotting enemy formations, sudden weather changes, combination of various sometimes mysterious factors that determine moral of armies and rear and countless other factors. As famous soviet military thinker Svechin summarised in 1927.. 'Tactics make the steps from which operational leaps are assembled, strategy points out the path'. It can't be the other way around.

 

2 million men and 14000 artillery pieces ? Wiki is not very reliable .

AG C had on 1 october 70 understrength divisions ,which is some 1 million men,and on 22 june,the Ostheer had 7147 pieces of artillery .14000 is an invention from the Soviet propaganda .

 

Mysterious factors that determine moral of armies and rear ???

Haha

 

For an encirclement, you need a double ring, one for any attacks from the out side and one for the inside. Even with the manpower available, the Wehrmacht was almost as bad as the Soviets for mobility for the infantry units. Trucks were at about 35% toe and that is simply not enough to do supply runs and help the armored units defend their flanks. The issue Guderian an others ignore is that with an encirclement the tanks are not mobile and thus lose their advantage, unless Guderian would then claim he could march to Gorki and Kazan.

 

No, because your original statement is unproven.

You still have not shown how the situation of the Ostheer was incapable of advancing faster, had the Vyazma / Bryansk pockets collapsed quicker than they did historically. Historically, they'd captured Kaluga already by Oct 12th. (180 km from Moscow)

Meanwhile, in Moscow:





Mid October, Moscow was not a happy place.