Defeat on the Eastern Front

My opinion:

1- First and foremost: Subestimation of the Soviet Military capabilities. The nazis thought that their most powerfull enemies were the western allies, but in fact the soviet union was much more powerfull than even Stalin thought possible. Resisting unimaginable causalities and producing more tanks and rifles than the US (with only 10-15% of the industrial base of the latter).

2- Other fronts. The URSS managed to survive and attack by 65% of the nazi armed forces, but what about 100% (maybe more since without other fronts we don't have the bombing problem, with means more weapons and manpower*)? That fact that the germans thought that they could defeat the soviets with 65% of their army is related to point 1.

3- Lend-Lease supplies. Ammounted to 100 billion rubles, about 20% of the total war expenditures of the country (lend lease paid 25% of the military expenditures of the URSS in 1943 and 1944). Without the 400.000 trucks send to them they probably wouldn't be able to take the initiative.

4- Subestimation of the weather problems and the size of the country. If the URSS was of the size of France they would have been defeated in a few months. The supply system wasn't adapted to handle "deep war" in a large country.

* 2 million men were allocated to clean up and rebuild bombed areas in 1944. The anglo-american bombing effort produced a drain in manpower second only to the eastern front.

 

Interesting, but that idea of the Ardennes attack was to push on the weakest point of the allies, the western front. If the attack defeated the allied forces, they would suffer a serious blow and the idea was to make them concede to a conditional peace, not a unconditional surrender. However, the germans underestimated the size of the western allied forces, numbering 5 million strong (against only around 1.2 million men!). The soviet front was a massive 6.5 million men wall, impossible to defeat. The fact was that at the time germany was finished, and didn't have the capabilities to fight against 12 million soldiers. The most rational allocation of forces at the time was to full defensive positions, that way they could prolong the war about 1-2 months (with more death civilians by bombing!).

 

The URSS was spending a larger fraction of their resources on military stuff in 1941 before the invasion than the germans were in 1939, before the war. However, the Russians didn't think they were unprepared at the time. In fact they thought the had the most powerfull armed forces in the world.

 

True, but the Germans should have known that the Allies would have never stopped once they were that close to Germany. if it were me, I would rather use the tanks in reserve for when one side broke through there would be armor to try to hold them off if necessary.

 

2-There were no 65% of the German armed forces in the east :maximum was some 3 million
4-The Germans did not subestimate the weather problems and the size of the country :they knew how big the SU was and they gambled to be able to defeat the SU before the winter .
3-LL is overestimated ;the SU was not dependent on trucks,they were dependent on horses and railways ;they had no motorised army and no motorised army was able to operate in the east .

 

2- In 1941 the german army consisted of 5.5 million men. They attacked the URSS with 3.35 million men (note that not all of the 5.5 million men were ready for the front). Second to glantz, the german army allocated these proportions to the eastern front:

1941 - 69%
1942 - 79%
1943 - 63%
1944 - 62%

3- LL consisted of 98 billion rubles of war materials. That made the difference: In 1943 the soviets were spending 58% of their income on the war. But, without the lend lease, they would have to spend 73%, a unsustainable war effort. In 1942 LL was important to, with lend lease the soviet union was spending 66% of their income in the war, but without LL the military expenditures would consist of 76%. Overall, lend-lease supplies paid 15-20% of the war for the soviet union.

 

If you mean army and not Wehrmacht,you are right for 1941 ,but for 1942 your figure is much to high!! The German strength in the East in 1942 was under 3 million ,you figure should mean an army strength ol less than 4 million .The same for 1943 :fieldarmy (without reserve army ):5.4 ,in the East :2.6
For LL :I have to pass today,but I think that LL has been debated on this forumand that the conclusion is that the importance was much less .
Cheers