Did the Japanese REALLY have ANY concept of what they were doing?

Your right that Germany did not fight the war to gain territory, although the complicated events leading up to the war very much had to do with William's imperial ambitions. If it had not been for this Britain would have remained in her "splendid isolation" and events would have taken a much different turn.

Perhaps so, although I have my doubts. IMO the American entry into the war did two things. It started to break the hopeless deadlock on the western front, and with the buildup of American troops that would soon be ready to take to the field made the Germans realize that they would soon be overwhelmed. The perception of the German military leadership, both Ludendorf and Scheer, was that Germany's best advatage was to lift the restrictions on the submarines. But regardless, without America's entry into the war, Germany was still in trouble-mostly on the homefront. I doubt she could have mustered the resources, personnel and equipment, to have broken the line in the west.

Apology for the derail, I retract my statement about Germany in both wars and confine it to WWII only.

 

True if you consider Japan's situation without considering the world wide situation. Britain, France and the Netherlands were already at war with Germany. France had fallen, France and the Netherlands were occupied. Germany had invaded Russia. They all lacked the ability to seriously intervene with Japanese actions. On December 7th, Russia had it's hands full with Germany, Britain had been forced to increase the draft age to include all males 18-50 and had their hands full in North Africa and the Mediterranean. The U.S. was the only power that could do anything and they were only beginning to seriously mobilize. Australia and New Zealand had large amounts of their military power serving with the British against Germany. Japan did have a window of opportunity.

I agree both Germany and Japan were seriously overextended. But then again Britain and Russia were also.

 

Originally Posted by Tristan Scott

I agree that the attention of the public was focused on Europe, and they were surprised by the Japanese attack. I do not think the majority of the American public thought we would become involved, militarily in the war. There was an extremely powerful peace movement in the U.S. such notable Americans as Charles Linberg (who testified before Congress in early 1941 that the U.S. should negotiate a neutrality pact with Hitler), and Alvin York of WWII fame were involved in the anti-war movement. York in fact had refused to allow the story of his life to be filmed because he thought it would be used to drum up support for a new war in Europe. Gary Cooper and one of Warner Brothers execs (whose name I can't remember) managed to change his mind and the film "Sgt. York" was released in 1941. Because of his change of position York recieved tremendous amounts of hate mail, even death threats. Marine General Smedley Butler had made a series of speaches in the early 30's and released a book "War is a Racket" in which he made a strong case for avoiding involvement in future wars, the famous broadcaster Lowell Thomas was one of his admirers on the subject. It is not at all clear that given the size of the "America First" peace movement, President Roosevelt could have involved the U.S. in the European conflict. Once Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, America's anger was directed at Japan. A more politically astute Hitler could have still avoided war with the U.S. but he chose to Declare War and sealed Germany's fate. Even given Hitler's declaration, it took all of Roosevelt's considerable political skills to keep America committed on a Europe first stategy.

As for America's military, the Navy had been focused for years on Japan as the United States most likely adversary. It only makes sense, Italy wasn't really a naval power except in the mediterranean, Germany sans it's U-boats really had no navy of consequence, certainly nothing the Royal Navy couldn't handle without U.S. aid. Japan was the real naval threat. This naval focus on Japan goes back as far as the 1920's, in fact a Marine Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock "Pete" Ellis, died under mysterious circumstances while spying on the Japanese, way back in 1923. Not before he produced a paper, Operation Plan 712, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, his paper laid out the strategy that was actually used by the Navy and Marine Corps in WWII, "island hopping". It also led to the development by the Navy and Marine Corps during the 1930's of the amphibious tactics, doctrine and equipment that enabled the amphibious operations in WWII to include those in Europe.

If you are interested in further reading on Ellis here's a couple links:
Earl Hancock Ellis - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
HyperWar: Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia

I would agree that the U.S. Army was focused on Europe.

 

Originally Posted by Tristan Scott

True but it was this very same Admiral Yamamoto that became infected with "victory disease" and strongly pushed for the Midway Operation that led to the destruction of Japan's greatest offensive capability, the Kido Butai. Have you read "Shattered Sword"? They really do a good job of covering the politics within the Japanese High Command and how a number of their ill fated operations came to be. I really think that the relative ease of Japan's early victories, and the decisiveness of them led Japan to overreach. This was the "Victory disease" of which I speak. Had the Port Moresby operation been carried out with the same principles of concentration of force as most of their earlier operations, Lexington and Yorktown would in all likelyhood have been lost at Coral Sea, Port Moresby would have fallen and Australian forces on New Guinea would have been isolated and cut off. With the Hornet and Enterprise, returning from Doolittle's raid, left as the only operational U.S. carrier force in the Pacific, Nimitz would have been hard pressed to defend against a concerted Japanese assault against the islands that protected Australia's lines of communication. Especially in the face of an undiminished Kido Butai. Take Australia out of the picture as a base for operations in the South Pacific and for supporting U.S. submarine operations and it would be very hard, if not impossible to mount a counter-offensive prior to the Essex class carriers joining the fleet in 1943. Then you'd have to re-take the islands along Australia's line of communication before you could attempt to undertake the historical campaigns in the Solomons and New Guinea. Until Saratoga rejoined the Pacific Fleet in mid-June 1944, Nimitz would lack strength to oppose Japanese occupation and base development in New Guinea, the Solomons, the Santa Cruz Islands, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia. I think if Japan had attempted to take Fiji, Nimitz would have been forced to throw whatever carrier forces he had at Japan, no one can predict the results. Remember the Essex class carriers didn't start joining the fleet until 1943 (Essex May '43, Yorktown July '43, Intrepid Dec '43 and Hornet Feb '44). If Nimitz had been forced, because of lack of advanced bases and an intact Kido Butai, to delay until he had sufficient strength we have an additional year to two years added to the timeline in the Pacific. The Marianas were captured in the summer of 1944. What if we dont capture Tinian in August of 1944 but in August of 1945 or 46. Only then can we begin to use long range bombers against mainland Japan, would our first mission from the captured island be to drop the atomic bomb? I don't think so. How much stronger would Japan's defenses have been with an additional one to two years to prepare, and with a reduced capability of U.S. submarine operations because of the loss of Australia as a base?

 

The Gallup polls present a rather different picture. They show, from what I recall, a US populace already resigned to military action against Japan by mid 41 if not before. Now in general they may not have seen it as developing into a full blown war but reporting on events in China such as the "rape of Nanking" was sufficent to bring it to the attention of most Americans.

 

I think you mean mid-41, not 31 "lwd". It is true that by late 1940, early 1941 the general American populace had shifted well away from total isolationism, and toward military preparation as well as action. There were qualifiers, but they clearly showed the "stay out at all costs" idea were things of the past.

 

Quite correct, good catch. I've fixed it to avoid any confusion.

 

My perspective: Japan did not like what was going on with western politics. They thought there was a chance to correct perceived imbalances, also aquire more territory and resources ( Lebensraum? ). ..I felt there was some racism which swayed the Japanese into believing victory was assured as long as it was accomplished within a timeline ( also feel the U.S. was racist in it's perceptions ). Japan may have been victorious if it possibly had considered and reinforced its replenishment capabilities. Nothing moved in the waters that wasn't blasted to smitherines around Japan's vitals....Joe six pack

 

About your assumption on World War 1, The Americans joined (Very late) and pretty much missed the show. And not to mention they had so many men but outdated equipment and it took them a long time to mobilize they're troops, actually I don't think they actually got troops into the mud untill 1918. Sorry mate but i'm going to have to give the Jolly 'ol Brits the credit for stomping out the Jerrys. Although American entry DID however created a blow to German morale.

 

I am not going to argue that British, French and Commonwealth troops bore the brunt during WW1, but, I will take umbrage in your assessment that the US showed up with outdated equipment

 

I believe that was "Operation Michael" launched by Ludendorf, and a major defeat for the Kaiser's troops. Something that Hitler could later get around by claiming they were never forced back onto German soil (question is what were they doing on the soil of other persons?). While the Americans were late coming into the game as fighting men, they had been supplying the western allies with war goods and food the entire time. The more rational Germans understood that even with the withdrawal of the Tzar's troops on the Ost Front, the inclusion of the fresh American troops in the west was the "last straw" in their ability to actually "win".

Not marching Allied troops through the streets of Berlin, allowing the Heer to withdraw with their small arms and machine guns in a parade formation in "pride" was the true sowing of the seeds of WW2. The Germans as a whole population never really grasped that they had been defeated on the field, while they were being starved out of food, fiber, and fuels.

 

Of course, the Japanese portray themselves as victims of an economic war, which, of course, is not true. The US was still
supplying vital war supplies to japan almost up to Pearl harbor. FDR should have embargoed scrap iron and oil in 1933, when he
would have been perfectly justified - it certainly would have saved a large number of Asia's Japanese victims during the 30's.
As for Yamamoto's Operation Hawaii, I have no clue as to why anyone would believe that he was ordered to produce a plan
to attack Hawaii. The plan was originated by Yamamoto himself, and opposed by the Gneral Staff, who should have done
any Naval planning.Only after Yamamoto threatened to resign unless his plan was approved did the GeneralStaff cave in and
"order him" to attack Pearl Harbor. Few Japanese planners felt, as Yamamoto did, that the US would go to war to
protect the Dutch and British colonies in Southeast Asia, the main target of Japanese expansion. Yamamoto seriously misread the American mind - he thought the destruction of the Pacific Fleet's battleships would so discourage this country that
war would not be embarked upon. A more brainless notion from a high level commander cannot be imagined. It was
Yamamoto that provoked the US into war, no one else.