Eastern Front victory conditions

dp

[ 02. November 2002, 10:23 AM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

I have to jump on only two parts of the discussion:

But the decision to rate Moscow as a thrid-prio target was made between August and December 1940!

I mean this included dozends of operational studies, meetings among the German military planning staff,Army Headquartes and military specialists.

Don't you think that the German generals involved in the planning had all the time to either convince Hitler that his "no Moscow"-approach is completely wrong or, if unsuccessful, pull the consequences (obey or resign)?

I think that at that time, the Generals might have had doubts on Hitler's strategy, but didn't dare to say it. After all, Hitler showed to be right at France - against his Generals advices.

The hindsight myth of "We knew it better, but Hitler f***ed it up", drawn by surviving generals after the war stinks as much as the after-the-pact-praisal of "Sichelschnitt" of those very same persons who opposed it.

"It's not about Moscow at all. I pay no attention on major cities, but on the core of the enemy forces between Moscow and us. They must be destroyed. Kiev was only a arm of the body which we cut off, this Operation ["Typhoon", A.W.] will break the enemie's backbone."

CiC Halder in a letter to his wife Oct. 2, 1941

It was ordered much earlier that Moscow shouldn't be captured, but encircled and starved to death, exactely like Leningrad.

As much as I agree that there was a resource problem with fuel, spare parts and rubber, as much I think there was enough ammo, food, manpower etc. to supply the Ostheer at least until November 1941. The supply crisis was more a problem of logistics: They didn't get the stuff transported to the troops (food was looted locally).

Let's see if i have still my notices out of General Georg Thomas' study of the german "Wehrwirtschaft 1918-1943" to throw in some numbers.

Cheers,

[ 01. November 2002, 06:20 AM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

Great discussion here, gents. I have a feeling I won't be accomplishing much this Friday at work!

Dasreich, this is an interesting one. To clarify a bit, regarding the victories in Kiev and the Ukraine- I don't necessarily think these operations used up all the resources needed ot get to Moscow. Basically, I don't think there were enough resources to get to Moscow in the first place. Essentially, I think the late summer campaigns of 41 were really all the germans could have hoped to accomplish. Considering the immediate supply disadvantage we have discussed, I don't think they could have made it to Moscow even if that had been their only target. It was just too far! Of course this part is really guessing- I guess we can't really tell if the germans had enough to get to only Moscow, since, as noted, they did not try that approach.

I also think Thrasher has a good point- even if targets like Moscow and Stalingrad had been taken, holding them would be another issue entirely. Looking at a target like Kharkov, which changed hands I believe at least 5 times during the war. Once Moscow or Stalingrad had been taken, occupation duties would have pinned down many troops. And more important, occupation of these targets would have required that the already over-extended supply lines be run constantly, at levels they could not have maintained.

Andy, I'd say the german logistical problem was about half and half- supply and transport. Murray (who seems pretty relaible- newer book, sourced well, etc.) notes that way too little ammo was stockpiled for the invasion. And you mention the looting of food- while this did address a large part of the food issue, it also tied down troops. We would likely not think of looting food as being all that much work- but looting food for a whole division could well take quite a few troops and many days of effort.
But on the operational level, transport was probably the bigger problem. Resources could always (to an extent) be shifted around among army groups or divisions. But actually getting those resources to said divisions was always a problem. We've mentioned the road and rail system in russia- completely unsuitable for the quick transport of supplies. This would play a major role in handicapping most of the german operations in russia.

 

Posted by CrazyD:

This is very true. We are arguing hypotheticals, and naturally we will each reach separate conclusions.

Posted by AndyW:

I agree that Hitler cant be held totally responsible for the failure of Barbarossa-even though it seems thats what I have been saying, I was only focusing on Hitlers part in this.

Posted by AndyW:

Yes logistics were a major factor. Perhaps they should have been planned better.

Gentlemen, our discussion here has spurned me to gather more information about the possibilities of a drive on Moscow. As my senior research paper is over this, I have been helped alot by my postings with forums members-even you AndyW.

 

O.K, I bite.

And the end of 1939 ammunition was considered to be a top problem. Hitler ordereed to triple the German ammo production (for the upcoming German-French conflict). Wehrmacht weapons inspectory called for a 12-month reserve in ammo at average fighting intensity (that would've been some 800,000 to 1,000,000 tons!).

German ammo production in 1940 was 865,000 tons. After the end of the French campaign, which surprisingly consumed "only" 88,000 tons and the Battle of Britain (52,000 tons), Germany was still sitting on huge stockpiles of ammo. Consequentely, ammo production was ordered to be reduced at July 1940, again in November 1940, again in February 1941 and finally again in July 1941. In Nov. 1941, when ammo shortages became evident (not the "logistical" shortages, but production/stockpile shortages), it was ordered again to produce more ammo. The total for 1941 was 540,000 tons, unfortunately I have no by-month details here, that would be interesting).

The German Army in the East consumed approx. 500,000 tons until the end of November 1941. It started with one half "ammunition package" (= 91,000 tons) at hand and "2 to 3 basis packages plus a minor reserve" (= approx. 500,000 tons) in the back. At mid-September, it was reported to have still 0.5 (AG South), 1 (AG North) and "more than one" (AG Center) ammo packages, approx. 112,000 tons at hand, so the ammo at hand was raised compared to Day 1 of Barbarossa, hardly a sign for a crisis in ammo production.

However, if I do do the math, I might agree that the Germans didn't had their planned 12-month reserve at day one of "Barbarossa", but still enough ammo to comfortably fire away at least until November 1941:

1940 production (865 ktons) + parts of 1941 production 'til November 41 (lets be careful and say 250 ktons) - French and BoB consumption (88+52) - other consumptions (Balkan, Norway, Atlantic, Med.Sea, Africa, I have no numbers here, so lets take for the sake of the argument a unreal high guess of 100 ktons) - Barbarossa consumption 'til Nov. 41 (500 ktons) = 375 ktons left or at least enough for three months of heavy fighting.

If Murray is right and there was too less ammo stockpiled at the beginning of Barbarossa, I wonder what had happened to that 1940 production of 865,000 tons?

Cheers,

[ 02. November 2002, 09:59 AM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

Bloody hell! I come very, very late to this thread, but anyway. It is one of my favourite discussion topics.

First of all, Germany launched "Barbarossa" with an enormous lack of force. There were not enough men, guns, tanks, planes, trains and lorries to get all the goals of "Barbarossa". This is a logistics, tactic and strategic problem by itlself! To defeat the Soviet Union, and that would be partially, Germany needed to attack with 25 Panzer divisions, not 17; 20 motorised divisions, not 14 and it needed some 30-50 more infantry divisions and keep them in the reserve! Beisdes, the industry should have started working at 100% in 1939 so the 1941 Wehrmacht would have been entirely mechanised and had many, many reserves of ammunition, tanks, men, lorries and planes. Neither of the three army groups were strong enough to accomplish all their tasks. Army Group North needed: Kriegsmarine's big ships artillery support (all compromised in the war against Great Britain), more bombers, much more artillery and many infantry divisions (8 could have made a difference). With that, Leningrad would have fallen for sure. Army Group South needed some three more Panzer divisions to form another Panzergruppe, so it would be mobile enough to do its own encirclements and anihilation battles (kiev made only by AGS). It needed many more infantry divisions (mechanised infantry) with many lorries and trains to advance faster and accomplish its tasks. Army Group South had the largest distances to cover of all the three Army Groups, so it needed a very, very mobile and strong force with adequate supply lines. It needed a lot of transport planes to cover the big distances, it needed many bombers and more naval (light) support as well as more (less mobile but stronger) infantry divisions to take all the fortified cities in the Black Sea as Odessa and Sebastopol. More armoured and mobile infantry forces to fight Kiev by itself and after that and a little break, with enough reserves advancing towards Rostov and Khárkov by late November as maximun. As you see that means a lot, a lot of more resources needed. They could have been supplied. Perhaps the only big problem was the fuel. But if the war ended in winter 1941 then it would not have turned very, very serious because the conditions strated deterorating until then. Army Group Centre perhaps didn't need a lot of heavy artillery and many bomber's support because it did a more mobile war. But it certainly needed more mobile forces, more Panzer and motorised divisions. As well as many, many more lorries, trains and half-tracks as well as transport planes to solve the situation and keep the troops supplied. And the second aspect is that it needed more than the others many more mobile infantry units as reserve. The battles of anihilation, the typical German Kesselschlacht was the only strategy and tactic to defeat the Red Army: surround them very quickly and destroy them before they could retreat into the deepsness of Russia. But it is also a very expensive tactic, specially for the infantry, which has the task of anihilating the enemy. By november 1941 the infantry units had only 50% of their men and they got the reinforcements until 1942. Too late. There were needed fresh infantry reserves to attack and not giving the Russians a single break! Also, many tanks were needed in the rear as replacements as well as some two fresh Panzer divisions to keep pushing. With all of these then you have three Army Group self sufficient, independent and strong enough to accomplish their tasks. And even if you cannot supply them all entirley you need AGC to be the most mobile, strong and with many reserves as well as strong supply lines. Because with the fall of Moscow you take away the main rail-junction of the country. Even if all the Soviet industry is already working behind the Urals, without Moscow how are the weapons reaching the other fronts? You can accomplish the fall of the communist regime and therefore can cause anarchy in Russia. Besides, the morale and strategic blow means that all the other fronts might collapse by themselves, because they won't receive orders nor reinforcements.

But all that was very difficult to accomplish, because there was needed a German industry totally mobilised for war in 1940 and a defeated Great Britain. Another very important point is that the general staff and Hitler should have decided prior to the invasion its major objective (Moscow of course) and that even if the other two fronts (already reinforced in quantity) failed, the main blow should go on at all costs and take Moscow before November 1941. After all, the rest was easy and an armistice with the remains of Russia must have been done. Because pushing through the Urals in 1942 was far beyond Germany's capabilities. The Russians most have been treated nicely so the logistics could have been improved and to seccure the stability of those territories in the future. And another very important aspect, but rather improbable to consider: Japan's entry in the war. The Soviet Union couldn't fight a war in two fronts. The Japanesse taking some three important cities in the far East could have diverted the Siberian divisions used in the deffense and counteroffensive in Moscow. One thing is to hold and then defeat the 1st strongest Army in the world and another very different thing is to HOLD the TWO most powerful Armies in the world.

 

Posted by Friedrich:

The German Army attempted to expand the border in all directions instead of focusing on the most important obnjective: Moscow. Going after relatively unimportant targets like the Ukraine when dwindling resources should have forced them to drive at Moscow before the weather and the Red Army fortified the capital. Logistics thrown into a mess by the constant change in goals and admittedly the poor Russian road system. What you describe would have done nicely under the strategy employed in the USSR. With what they had, though, they were not able to keep up the offensive, and ran out of steam before they could get the schwerpunkt they should have been after all along: Moscow.

Posted by Friedrich:

This is the crux of my case. You mentioned that Germany needed more divisions and supplies to conduct Barbarossa. They certainly did for what they tried to pull off. Had they done what you said, Im not sure Germany would have needed too much more than what they had.

Posted by Friedrich:

Wasnt there already a skirmish in 1939 or 1940 where the Japanese were handily beaten by the Reds? Perhaps they wouldnt want to repeat that. Even so though, had Japan gone into the USSR instead of attacking Hawaii, I agree that the USSR would have a hell of a time fighting and winning under those conditions.

 

Indeed, das Reich. Zhúkov kicked very hardly Japanesse's asses in Mongolia in 1939. That made them fear the Russians a lot. That is why they didn't want to go to war against Russia during all the war and that is also why they hurried to surrender when they saw the posibility of a Soviet invasion of Japan. And of course, there were the A-bombs...

 

1.) Full focus on AGC, meaning to concentrating 90+ or so Divisions in that area was impossible. You can't supply that many Divisions with the given geography or infrastructure in that area (2 railway lines and one major street), period. Pre-Barbarossa wargames showed even huge difficulties to get AGC's tank and motorized divisons into "play" because of the infrastrucure and geographical limits. "Blowing up" AGC to a much huger operational force of 90+ divisions was plain and simple impossible.

Ever tried to get all Dutch, German, Skandinavian vacationists driving to Italy in ONE single week?

2.) Leningrad wasn't planned to be captured, but encircled and starved to death. The German 18th Army had order to not accept a capitulation of Leningrad. Same was planned for Moscow.

3.) You can't have both: more armament _and_ more soldiers. To a certain extend, you can let those soldiers built her own weapons as industrial workers (actually this was done), but once you draft them, they're gone.

4.) the more motorization, the more fuel consumption. Given the fuel shortage in the Reich, the degree of motorization was restricted. Plus car/tank industries are very complex industries: Germany wasn't able to produce more than 65,000 trucks/year from 1937 onwards. The German Army started "Barbarossa" with approx. 200,000 trucks.

5.) the overambigious armament plan C ("Rüstungsprogramm B"), calling for 20 Tank divisons and 10 motorized Divisions, was even theoretically impossible to fulfill until Dec. 1944. "Programm C" was found out to be compete wishful thinking and therefor dismissed.

6.) An isolated "spearhead" to Moscow, with almost untouched northern and southern flanks with the mass of the Red Army threatening both of your flanks is strategic blundering. Actually this was what the immediately dismissed Feyerabend-plan of April 27, 1940 was about.

7.) Transport planes like the JU-52 were the most ineffective way of transportation. At full range, they consumed more fuel as they would have been able to transport.

Cheers,

 

Posted by AndyW:

As it should have been. AGN and AGS ideally should have been used to create massive flanking actions, in order to protect AGC's drive to Moscow. Instead at times they were given priority over AGC, in the form of withdrawing entire panzer or motorized divisions such as seen in the assault into the Ukraine. I agree with Friedrich to the extent that AGS should have been able to do this alone, but required in reality to take a good deal men and machine from AGC.

Posted by AndyW:

Indeed. I agree, however by focusing I mean more that oil/other resources have priority for AGC, and that the German Army as a whole not get sidetracked into various operations that were relatively unnecesary to the defeat of Russia. Plus, not having divisions taken away for the purposes bolstering AGN or AGS.

 

The bloody thread says what WAS needed. Not what COULD HAVE been done to win.

[ 02. November 2002, 09:46 PM: Message edited by: General der Infanterie Friedrich H ]

 

Its just a slight variation. Besides, non-wild tangents keep the discussions interesting.

 

Agree. I always have a certain tendency to get Reality and historic facts into those fantasy "if"s.

But I agree: If Germany would have had 180 million people, 35,000 tanks, 1,000,000 trucks, all the resources, time and industrial power to build gazillions of weapons and equipment, and if Western Russia would have been a kind of desert combined with the infrastucture of France, the war would have been different, for sure.

 

Not that bloody extreme, but yes.

What I said could have been done in a certain way if the industry would have been switched at full steam in 1939. If Germany would have bought A LOT of oil from the USSR while they were 'friends' and by calling to military service to all the reserves called into military service in 1942. I know, as have been discussed in other threads that the resources are a critical point in here. But I have always said: if the industry was mass-producing weaponry in 1944 with Allied bombers all over the place smashing your factories and communication lines, in 1940-1941 without them around it could have been done even better! The fuel is a very important issue, but if you remember well, it started being a problem only since November 1941. Indeed, more tanks and more lorries mean more fuel consumption, but if the synthetic oil production would have been improved and the buying of oil to the USSR would have been increased then it means a little bit more oil, just enough for a total and single campaign in 1941. But maybe the main issues here are the supply lines, the treatment to the Russian people, the problems of conduction in the high command and the lack of enough reserves. They could have been improved a little in any way or another.

And we don't need your sarcasm in here, Andy.

 

By the way, Andy. Here are some things needed which I have just found:

"Two of the highest ranking officers in the Red Army, marshall Simeon Tymoshenko and general Georgi Zhúkov had proposed a plan for a pre-entive attack against Germany in May 15th (1941) but Stalin didn't accept the idea because it could have provoked an attack that he wanted to avoid."

So it says that indeed, the USSR or at least Stalin didn't want to go to war with Germany in 1941 when they were all but ready and strong enough. But it is clear that planning had been made and discussions about this had taken place. And that is Stalin's opinion in 1941. If Germany would not have attacked I would like to see Stalin, with a powerful Red Army in 1942 keeping his 'peaceful' opinion.

"-The German Army WILL defeat the Red Army if we stand and fight. We can defeat them, but I don't think they will accept peace conditions.
-The loss of Leningrad, Moscow and the Ukraine will force the Russians to ask for peace and if they don't agree then a second campaign to Yekaterinburg will force them. The war production is doing very well, the economy is doing more than excellent and we have much more men than we had in the beginning of the war."
Conversation between Hitler and field marshall Fedor von Bock, February 1st 1941.

Ian Kershaw, "Hitler, 1936-1945. Nemesis", Allen Lane-The Penguin Press, London, 2002. pp. 343 and 488.

And another thing for all those who said that June the 22nd was not an adequate time for the invasion, that it was launched two months later than planned. That these two months could have affected the course of the war. This is not true. According of an essay on "Barbarossa" by general Günther von Blumentritt, chief of operations of marshall Von Kluge's IV Army: "The melting of the ice had come late in 1941, so all the ground was full with mud. It didn't get dry until the beginning of June." So, even if there would not have been a campaign in the Balcans, the operation would have been launched in June 1941.

 

I think the key here Friedrich is that we are arguing from circumstantial evidence. Was the likelihood there would be a war between Germany and the USSR high? Yes, insanely high. But Andy is arguing that there is no concrete proof that there would have been a war, 100% no doubt. And in that regard, I agree with him. We cant know without a shadow of a doubt there would have been a war. But I am of the opinion that the shadow is damn near invisible in this case...

 

Actually I'm not asking for "concrete proof" that Stalin planned to invade Germany in 1941 or later. There is no "concrete proof" that Hitler ordered the Holocaust, though, but there's not a shadow of a doubt that Hitler must had ordered it.

See, context is the name of the game, what's Zhukov's "pre-emtive-strike" plan worth if this plan was made in May 1941, say at the eleventh hour, and even that plan was dismissed by Stalin?

There are simply no political signs that Stalin was planning to invade Germany. You have to be very selective to create such a "preventive war" scenario.

So in the right context of taking all available sources into account, the "preventive war"-thesis remains wrong.

Plus the fact that a substantial point is missing: The Germans did not fear any Soviet invasion when they decided to invade the USSR back in 1940. Shooting my neighbor, to see later that he also had concrete plans to shoot me isn't "preventive", but coincidence and a ex post justification. Shooting him without being able to prove that he would have shot me is murder.

Cheers,

 

Actually, I said that Germany might as well get the drop on USSR because the liklihood was there was going to be war. Im not suggesting that Hitler knew about an attack and struck first. Im suggesting that there would almost certainly be a war, and its a good idea to strike first and have the advantage.

Maybe Stalin had no immediate plans to hit Germany, but plans change quickly, and the situation between the USSR and Germany was deteriorating before Barbarossas inception. And as Friedrich said, two powerful and ideologically opposed nations cannot coexist on each others borders.

 

You mean like NATO-countries and Warsaw Pact countries? Red China and Taiwan? North and South Korea? In all those cases war was/is ineviatable?

Does this "ineviatability" of war also count for religious opposition? (India and Pakistan?, Arabs vs. Israel or Christians, etc.)?

Cheers,

 

Posted by AndyW:

What kept Nato and Warsaw pact nations was a little thing called Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD for short, at the hands of nuclear weapons. In fact, USA and Russia frequently clashed. Korea, Cuba, Vietnam...what kept them apart? You guessed it...the fear of nuclear holocaust. And what about Red China and Taiwan? The only thing keeping the Chinese from occupying the "rogue" province is the US support for it.

Posted by AndyW:

The Arabs and Israelis have frequently gone to war...so the question of whether or not war could happen between them has already been answered. India and Pakistan are on the brink, and I hope for their sake they can hold back...and remember, both nations are nuclear, which has been a significant deterrent to any potential war. Religious ideology and political ideology can be equally powerful in some respects.

We must keep in mind that Germany and the USSR did not posess nukes in the early 40's. WMD played no factor in their relationship.

[ 04. November 2002, 01:55 PM: Message edited by: dasreich ]