Eastern Front victory conditions

Probably mentioned somewhere earlier but I think it´s good to bring these statistics up, as it was believed to be one of the key issues why the Red army would collapse: The murder of senior and junior military commanders since the late 1930´s.

Executed were:

Three out of five Marshals of Soviet Union
All eleven deputy defence commissars
The commander of every military distrcit
14 out of 16 army commanders
60 out of 67 corps commanders
136 out of 199 division commanders
and half of all regimental commanders

In numerical terms 40,000 officers from a total strength of 80,000 were arrested and 15,000 were shot.

At the time of the German invasion only a quarter of Red Army officers had been in their job for more than 12 months. The purge was so comprehensive that most senior positions were filled by men out of their professional depth. Only 7.6 % of the surviving officers had a higher military education and nothing more.
As Khruschev later observed: " The cadre of leaders who gained military experience in Spain and the Far East was almost completely liquidated..."

 

Exactly, Kai!

That is perhaps the MAIN reason why the Winter war was such a disaster for the USSR and why "Barbarossa" acvhieved so much... Stalin, with his policy of "not a step back" and beheading the Red Army almost destroys his country. What do you think would have happened if Stalin keeps ALL his officers alive and gives them freedom. Then Barbarossa would have been stopped before the Minsk pincers could have been closed... Bye, bye German Army by 1943...

 

Maybe the 13,500,000 slave workers POWs, KZ-inmates etc. who were added to the German economy during (meanly from 1942 onwards) had some effect, too?

Cheers,

 

Good point, but what about Khalkin-Gol? Soviet performance wasn't bad at all there.

Cheers,

 

Wrong. Historians are able to support thier thesises and opinions with factual evidence, like documents of that time. Even 60 years later, we have all the documents in the archives. Way more reliable than f.ex. memoirs written ex post with a certain agenda.

Halder noting in his diary on July 3, 1941 that "the Russian campaign was won during 14 days", is , as documented in his diaries, a documentary fact for his miscalulation, but not representing the fact (the campaign wasn't won).

If Halder and German intelligence services estimated the strength of the Soviet Army as 247 Divisions (Halder April 1941) resp. 155 (Foreign Armies East Jan. 1941), then this documents are facts for thier wrong assesment at thier time, but not representing the real facts.

More simple: What Halder, Bock, Guderian thought to be "factual" at her time (or even with hindsight after the war), isn't factual evidence. It's just a source.

Hope this makes it more clear.

Cheers,

[ 12. November 2002, 09:42 AM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

Some Soviet and German army facts on WW2:

By the fall of 1943, 60 per cent of the ground occupied by the Germans had been retaken by the Soviets.

At its peak, the Red Army had 12 million men in uniform. It faced the vast majority of Germany's armed forces - 70 per cent in June 1944. At times, the front line stretched over 1,500 miles.

Of the 5,700,000 Soviet PoWs, 57 per cent died in captivity. As many as 600,000 may have been shot. The rest were worked, starved, or beaten to death.

Red Army soldiers taken prisoner were declared traitors by their own government and treated accordingly when freed. The families of prisoners had their ration cards taken away.

http://2ndww.tripod.com/Kursk/myth.htm
-----------

The heavy tank KV-1 was less successful. A famous Soviet tank commander, Marshal Mikhail Katukov, noted in his memoirs the conversation with Stalin he had in summer 1942:
Stalin asked me:
- What do you think, do we have good tanks or not? Tell me the truth, without flattery.
I answered, that the T-34 tanks had stood the baptism of fire, and that we put a lot of hopes in them. Whereas the troops do not like either the heavy tanks KV or the light tanks T-60 and T-70.
Stalin frowned inquiringly.
- How come? - he asked after a pause.
- KV's, comrade Stalin, are very heavy, immobile, and that means - immanoeuverable. They surmount obstacles with difficulties, while to the T-34's all that is peanuts. Moreover, KV's break bridges, and generally they cause a lot of unnecessary troubles. And they are fitted with the same 76mm gun as T-34's. Hence a question, what kind of combat superiority a heavy tank can bring us? If KV's gun were bigger, one could reconcile with its weight and other construction flaws.

By the outbreak of the war on 22 June 1941 only 634 KV's and 1225 T-34's left production facilities.In 1942 the Soviet industry produced 24,668 tanks of all the types (in this 50% were T-34's), while the German one - only 9,300 tanks.

in the autumn 1942 in the fights near Leningrad appeared first four German heavy tanks Pz.Kpfw.T-VI Tiger. And in January 1943 Erich von Manstein's grouping, fighting to break through to the 6th Army encircled in Stalingrad, had a unit comprised of 11 Tiger tanks. Altogether in 1942 two companies - Henschel and Porsche - produced 83 Tigers, and by July 1943, it means before the commencement of the operation Citadel, they produced another 264 vehicles.

the cumulative (hollow-charge) and capped (core) shells. The former were burning the armour through, while "glued" to it with their mantles made of soft-metal alloys; the latter were piercing the armour with their cores made of hardened steel alloys. Both of them were effective only when hit the armour at certain specific angles. Before the battle of Kursk only few of those shells per gun were delivered to the troops by air.

ISU-122 and ISU-152. For their capabilities to fight Tigers and Panthers Soviet tankers nicknamed them zvereboi (beast hunters), while the Germans nicknamed them Dosenöffner (can-openers) for the effects of their fire; one hit from 122 or 152 mm shell was able to knock the Tiger's turret off.

The Ultimate attempt to restore the superiority of the German armoured technics had to become the 160-ton heavy tank Maus, whose armoured plates ranged from 180 to 240 mm. It was fitted with 128mm canon, and 75mm registration gun. However the German industry managed to produce only three such tanks. Their speed did not exceed 12-15 km/h, and the colossal weight ruled out surmounting obstacles or riding across the bridges. One of them was used as an immobile bunker to reinforce the defence of the Reich's Chancellery in Berlin, another one was assigned to the same duty at the Wehrmacht's headquarters in Zossen, and the third one was captured in a tank range near Potsdam.

Wehrmacht:
In 1943 establishments for the infantry divisions were lowered to 12,500 and in some cases even to 9,657 soldiers.

In the end of January 1943 the Germans possessed only 495 functional tanks on the whole eastern front

In May 1943 the German military industry was at its peak of tank production: it produced 5.7 times more tanks than in an average month of 1941, and 3.1 times more than in 1942.

Yet in 1943 the Luftwaffe's Achilles' heel was not as much the machines as the crews. A severe shortage of experienced pilots had occurred. While in March 1942 the bomber aviation had a reserve of 127 crews, a year later it was already lacking 364 crews.

War plans for the year 1943 required substantial reinforcement of all the branches of the armed forces, and especially the land army. Conscription of 800 thousand reservists and recruits for the Wehrmacht according to the plan of total mobilization let them to compensate partly for casualties and to form over forty new divisions.

The only source of reserve divisions could be the passive, or so-called "uneconomical", sectors of the front. There were three of them: Demyansk bulge in the Army Group North, Rzhev - Vyazma bulge in the Army Group Centre, and Kuban bridgehead in the Army Group A. Although thereto Hitler opposed any ideas of "rectifying" the frontlines, now he was forced to authorize them. On 21 February units of the 16th Army started a secret withdrawal from Demyansk bulge, completed successfully by the beginning of March; belated Soviet pursuit could not challenge it. This way the Army Group North moved nine divisions to its reserve. On 1 - 23 March the command of the Army Group Centre also successfully carried out the operation of withdrawal of the 9th Army from Rzhev - Vyazma bulge to a new, shorter position. This way they moved to its reserve one army command, four army corps commands, fifteen infantry divisions, three armoured divisions, two motorized divisions, and one SS cavalry division. Whereas did not succeed the withdrawal of the forces from Kuban bridgehead, widely advertized as the Wehrmacht's reinforcements' reservoir. Active operations of the North Caucasian Front and the Black Sea Fleet in the vicinity of Novorossiysk and in Taman peninsula engaged the entire Germano-Romanian 17th Army in a protracted and exhausting defence. Only two armoured divisions managed to pull out of the deadly trap.

http://2ndww.tripod.com/Kursk/revenge.htm

 

I am not going to suggest here that the winter stopped the German advance in 1941, no! the German forces were driven to the maximum and the line of supplies was not reaching them, and as well the troops were exhausted and not getting enough replacements.I aggree totally with Andy on this.

Instead I think it´s good to show this part of an article to see what kinda weather might have been facing them. And the different views on this which also cause confusion on this subject.
------------

"In 1941 winter weather arrived in Russia earlier* than usual.2 Initially, that was not entirely detrimental to German operations, because it cut short the autumn rasputitsa, the period of heavy rains which twice a year turns the unpaved roads of central and northern Russia into an impassable morass of mud. The temperature dropped sharply at the beginning of November, causing the roads to freeze, thus allowing the movement of trucks and tanks.

Although there is general agreement concerning weather conditions on the Russian front through October 1941, there are many conflicting versions of the severity of temperatures during the weeks and months that followed. For example, Field Marshal von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, recorded in his war diary on 5 November 1941 that the mercury dipped to -29°C (-20°F),4 and Albert Seaton reported that around 24 November it was a steady -30°C (-22°F).5 In contrast, Marshal Zhukov, then responsible for defending the approaches to Moscow, stated that during the November general offensive the temperature on the Moscow front remained stable at -7° to -10°C (+19° to +14°F).6 In a work specifically refuting German accounts, another Soviet spokesman cites the Meteorological Service records of the minimum temperatures for the Moscow area in late 1941: October, -8.2°C (about +17°F); November, -17.3°C (+1°F); December, -28.8°C (-20°F).7 There were also many reports of temperatures as low as -40° during that exceptionally cold winter,9 and at least one report of -53°C (-63°F).9

There had been some snowfall as early as October 1941,10 and heavy, cumulative snows began about 7 December. Strong winds and blizzards followed, creating massive drifts.11 The exceptional cold caused the snow to remain unusually powdery and deep long after it had fallen.12 Marshal Emerenko estimated the winter's lasting snow cover in the region between Moscow and Leningrad at .7 to 1.5 meters (28-59 inches).13 This snow cover greatly restricted German mobility,14 but it also hampered the Red Army. One German source frankly states that the fate of the overextended Army Group Center would have been even worse had there been less snow, concluding that "complete collapse [of the German units] was prevented ... especially by the deep snow, which constituted a major obstacle [to the Soviet counteroffensive]."15 Discussing the plight of about seven divisions that were cut off in January 1942, a German commander observed that "the deep snows protected the encircled German troops around Demyansk from annihilation. Even the Russian infantry was unable to launch an attack through those snows."

It is no wonder that thousands of Germans froze to death that winter.22 By the turn of the year they had suffered about 100,000 cases of frostbite, more than 14,000 of which required amputations.23 By the end of that terrible winter the number of frostbite victims exceeded a quarter of a million, and more than 90 percent were second- and third-degree cases.24 To these must be added thousands of cases of pneumonia, influenza, and trenchfoot.25

Nevertheless, the unseasonable cold of early November caught many Russian units by surprise. On 9 November Marshal Kirill Meretskov, then commanding both the Fourth and Seventh Armies, personally checked the condition of the troops who had lost the town of Tikhvin the previous day. He found the troops still in summer uniforms.29 A week later a German attack on a hill northeast of Rzhev succeeded because the Soviet sentries, who had not yet received winter clothes, were too cold to be alert.30 However, winter uniforms were available at Russian supply points, and distribution was soon accomplished.

A German officer who witnessed persistent Soviet attacks near Shuvaevo in mid-January 1942, when the temperature reached -40°, reported that "the Russians suffered even more [than the Germans] from the cold despite their winter clothing, since they were out in the open.

Russian tanks, especially the T34, KV1, and KV2, were effective even in deep snow because of their wide tracks and good ground clearance. These features gave them a marked advantage over the tanks that the Germans employed during the first winter, tanks which became stuck because of their narrow tracks and limited ground clearance. The Soviets frequently used T34s to break paths through the snow for the infantry.

It could only have been in total ignorance of the Arkhangelsk campaign more than twenty-two years earlier that the German Army in 1941 could be "surprised" (as General Rendulic expressed it) that because of the extreme cold the mechanisms of rifles and machine guns, and even the breech blocks of artillery, became absolutely rigid.53 The recoil liquid in artillery pieces also froze stiff,54and tempered steel parts cracked.55 Strikers and striker springs broke like glass.

Sound travels farther in very cold weather. On the Russian front in World War II the noise of troops advancing over heavy, crusted snow deprived them of the advantage of surprise.
Horses provided the most reliable transport on the Russian front in winter. The small but acclimatized native horses proved superior to larger breeds accustomed to the milder climate of Western Europe.
Mines often failed in winter. This was true when the snow was sufficiently deep to cushion the fuse and when alternating melting and freezing created an ice bridge over the detonator.
Charcoal was better than wood for heating because it created less smoke to reveal troop positions.
Soviet wide-tracked tanks had better over-snow mobility than the early German models because of their lighter ground pressure.
Explosives were useful for constructing foxholes and larger shelters in frozen ground.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Chew/CHEW.asp#3

 

Thanks for the link, Kai, but, as usual the cgsc.army.mil ain't workin'. It's taken from Dr. Allen F. Chew's Study: "Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case
Studies", Leavenworth Paper No.5.

I was pointed on this earlier on a different board, so thankfully I can copy & paste much of my critique on that study

I became suspicious reading "-29 Celsius in EARLY November, WOW!", so i checked v.Boccks diary entry. Result: There is no such diary entry in von Bock's war diary of Nov. 5, 1941. Pure fanatsy. Neither a typor (Entry for Dec. 5, 1941) So much for the validity of Turney.

Temperatures in Nov. were as follows (all at AGC's area):

Nov. 5-7, 1941: first frost/Snow. (I did _not_ find an entry in Bock's diary that mentions a temperature of -29 Celsius). Turney had been proven being inaccurate on several occasions in his book (see: Reinhardt, as mentioned earlier)
Nov. 8-9, 1941: Thawing
Nov. 11, 1941: moderate forst; temerature down to -10 Celsius in the evening
Nov. 13-18, 1941: Frost; temperatures in the -20s Celsius
Nov. 19-Dec. 4,1941: deep frost, temperature minimum -35 Celsius
Dec. 5, 1941: Frost, heavy snowing.

Note that this data is from German War diaries of AGC and her Armies. Zhilin's temperatures seem plausible. The long-term average temp of November was -2,8 Celsius, while it was -5,3 Celsius in November 1941 (acc. to Ten Kate).

First, I have no frostbite losses for 1941 at hand. Losses b/c of coldness (heavy frostbite, frozen to death) at East Front in Jan. 1942 were 93,000:

Jan. 1, 1942 - Jan. 10, 1942 (10 days): 25,890 men
Jan. 11, 1942 - Jan. 20, 1942 (10 days): 24,538 men, incl. 1,856 amputations up to that date, which makes Haynes' number of 14,000 amputations in 1941 VERY doubtful
Jan. 21, 1942 - Jan. 31, 1942 (20 days): 42,139 men

My source are German Quartermaster reports of Jan. 15 (Nr. I/298/42), Jan. 25 (Nr. I/494/42) and Feb. 2, 1942 (Nr. 720/42) all issued by OKH/GenStdH/GenQu/Abt. H Vers/ Qu2 (III).

As frost during the AGC's advance towards Moscow did only occur in early November (mildly frost) and from mid-November onwards (see above), the impact of frostbite/coldness in terms of losses is irrelevant for the time of the German advance towards Moscow (until Dec. 5, 1941). I try to get an info on German sickness reports covering the 2nd half of Nov. 1941, to evaluate if the number of sicknesses (which would without doubt might should have rosen drastically) had an decisive effect on german menpower strenght.

I'd like to point out that the German advance on Moscow was stopped in late November / early December. Soviet counteroffensive was launched Dec. 5, 1941. So if we discuss the impact of winter in the German operations on Moskow, we should discuss the winter conditions until the date when the German advance was stopped.
German war propaganda and post war memoir literature had a tendency to mix up the (without doubt harsh) weather conditions of December 41- February 1942 with the failure of the German advance in late November 1941. Surprisingly this "catch" seem to have worked among many people who still claim that "winter stopped the Germans".

Cheers,

 

Thanx for the comments, Andy!

Unfortunate if the link does not work for you.Indeed, it does take quite a while to load, but if interested I can put it all here?!

 

You know, Kai, I've been thinking- how does one actually eat or drink WW2? Those rations MUST be pretty nasty by now...

Andy, that is a REALLY good point about the winter/advance on Moscow correlation. The "winter conditions" ARE often cited as one of the major reasons that the german attack on moscow failed. And yet, the germans hardly experienced any of the russian winter before their advance was halted! Only November and a tiny bit of december. I don't know for sure, but I'd guess that January and early february would be the worst months of winter.
Now that I found Murray and Millet, War to be Won, buried on my desk at work, I'll see what they have to say...
And funny- when I un-buried this book, a little light went on over my head...

On that ammunition issue with Barbarossa...
Unfirtunately, I don't have much to give you- Murray and Millet don't cite it directly. I'll just quote the passage...

Italics mine... That's it. No footnotes in that paragraph. I checked the notes from before and after, and they are not referring to logistics.
One thing I did notice- as one source, they repeatedly cite Halder's war diary. Reliability? I'm sure that's not the only source they used, but...

[ 15. December 2002, 02:01 AM: Message edited by: CrazyD ]

 

Apologies for the *bump* on this one... want to make sure Andy sees my prompt and timely reply to a query he raised!

[ 17. December 2002, 01:44 PM: Message edited by: CrazyD ]

 

Thanks, CrazyD!

I'm in a hurry, so just something on this: "they calculated that ammunition expenditures for the campaign would not exceed those of the battle in France. Consequently, the invading troops crossed into enemy territory with ony two to three basic units of fire (a day's estimated ammunition) in the hope that the supply system would cough up enough shells until the collapse of Soviet resistance" (Murray)

Now, if a full "basic unit of fire" should be the same as a "Munitionsausstattung" (provision of ammonition), it would be wrong to say that this would be a "one-Day" ration. A full "Ausstattung" was thought to last for one month of heavy fighting.

According to Donat (1) the German Ostheer started "Barbarossa" with 91,000 tons of ammonition of all kinds or more than one half of a full "Munitionsaustattung". The ammo supply for the Ostheer was as follows (2):
June 41: 23,077 tons
July 41: 101,594 tons
Aug. 41: 108,855 tons
Sept. 41: 107,870 tons
Oct. 41: 90,563 tons
Nov. 41: 68,035 tons

I think it's fair to say that German ammo consumption was approx. 100,000 tons per month during the heavy fighting in the initial months of "Barbarossa". So the "beginning balance" of 91,000 tons was pretty adequate.

Furthermore, the total german ammo consumption in Russia during Aug. 41 (an average heavy fighting month) was in total slightly higher compared to May 40 (an average heavy fighting month in France), but per barrel only 60-80% of the average consuption during France May 40 (3).

With the exception of some local ammo crisises (Jeynja) the German Ostheer didn't face serious ammonition shortages until late September 1941.

Cheers,

(1) Donat, G., "Der Munitionsverbrauch der deutschen Wehrmacht im Feldzug gegen Sowietrussland 1941-1945" in: "Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift", 1964 (the Ammonition Consuption of the German Wehrmacht in the Attack against Soviet Russia 1941-45" in: General Swiss Military Digest)

(2)Report OKH GenQu Gruppe Munition II a dated 10.12.1944, Cit. in Halder: War Diaries

(3)Memo Chief of AHA (General Weapons Dept.), Fromm dated 23.10.1941

 

Read some stats on Robin Cross´s book The battle of Kursk:

Untill March 1943 up to nearly 8,000 German tanks were lost since june 1941 the beginning of Barbarossa.
During the first three months of 1943 2529 tanks were lost which was 59% of total German tank production for the year for 1942 (!)

As well from the same book:

General Thomas, the head of the economics at OKW estimated, that losses in the East up to Stalingrad were about 50 fully equipped divisions for Germany.During Stalingrad alone the losses were 45 fully equipped divisions.

( I am sure the latter figure includes the Romanian and Italina losses but anyway quite a figure to face!)

 

Good stuff here, gents...
(Kai, (if you are talking about "American" football), hope you did NOT watch the Patriots play this monday. Ouch!)

Good info, as usual, Andy.

Not sure about the Munitionsausstattung issue. Again, (unfortunately!), Murray does not clarify this issue at all. I wonder if the authors got confused as to the size/amount of a Munitionsausstattung? Or were the german troops not actually issued a complete Munitionsausstattung?

I do have a question though... If the germans were consuming 100,000 tonas of ammo a month, 91,000 tons in reserve would amount to less than one month's worth, correct? Would this not tend to support the idea that the germans began Barbarossa with seriously inadequate supplies? Even if each individual soldier was outfitted with three Munitionsausstattungs, three months ammo, only having enough for about one month in reserve would still seem inadequate.

The transportation network would also play a decisive role in this discussion. In one sense, it really mattered very little what kinds of ammo and supply stockpiles the germans had, because little provision was made for transorting said supplies! If these supplies could not be delivered to the frontline troops, what would they have mattered? With the transportation network as it was in russia when the germans invaded, ammo reserves would have had to be going out constantly to units in the field. One partisan attack, one broken down train... In the war in russia, you almost have to look at transport as a PART of the ammo stockpiles, because of how directly the two are tied together.

One other thing that could be at issue here. I hate to rip on the French, but one possibility seems to me that the germans were simply forced to do more shooting in russia. In the battle for France, maneuver was the key factor- the panzer divisions and their dash to the coast. If the germans used this as their basis for calculating the offensive in russia, this would have neglected the vast territory and larger numbers of russian soldiers. In a war of maneuver, like in France, the battle does not need to be won through a shoot-out. But in russia, while the panzers and luftwaffe could out-maneuver and encircle russian troops, the infantry was still often faced with fanatic (if unorganized and ill-commanded) resistance.
This would explain the less-shots-per-weapon issue. At any given time, less numbers of german troops were actually directly engaged with the russians, but those who were engaged were forced to do far more shooting than in France.

Finally, in the ammo and supply stockpiles, I wonder what kind of ratios existed between the diffret types of munitions? The "reserve" ammo the germans had- was it primarily for the infantyr weapons? How much was artillery, or tank ammo? And what of bombs for the Luftwaffe?
I'd love to find a moe detailed account of WHAT exactly was in those stockpiles.
If the germans ammo reserve was primarily just ammo for infantry hand weapons... this would greatly change the situation, no?

 

Somehow I hate to just "throw in" numbers and stats iso posting a more comprehensive analysis on that issue, but, unfortunately I don't have the time these days to make more extensive posts, as much as I would like:

German ammo production 1941 (sorry, no numbers by quarter):

pistols, handguns: 1.34 billion bullets
other infantry-weapons (mortar, light Inf.-Arty etc.): 19.7 million rounds
AAA rounds and aircraft ammo: 77 million rounds
Arty rounds larger than 7.5 cm: 27 million rounds

TOTAL: 540,000 tons

Now, if the monthly ammo consumption was avg. 100,000 tons July-Dec. 1941 and the Ostheer started with a 91,000 tons beginning balance, I would say that Germany produced enough ammo of all kinds in 1941 (i don't think there was an essential Jan-June 41 consumption).

I'm sure like hell that, in certain times, some ammo-categories' production didn't met the needs and vice versa, but in general the "cocktail" of different kinds of ammo produced reflected the actual consumption. With the numbers for May 40 and August 41 I'm able to calculate a more sophisticated analysis of the "ammo cocktail" to see structural changes.

One "Munitionsaustattung" (I think "ammo-package" is the best translation) was the calculated ammount of ammo a unit needs to fight for one month without problem. F.ex 1 ammo-package for an average German Infantry-Division was 600 tons, for a Tank Division 750 tons.

In mid-September (12-9-41), Halder noted in his diary the ammo reserves as follows:

"Army Group North: One ammo-package
Army Group Center: more than one ammo-package
Army Group South: 0.5 ammo-package"

So it seems that in average (with a little shifting from AGS to AGC) the Army was able to supply her units with one month of ammo-reserve - at least until mid-September. As the supply numbers in my earlier posting show, the ammo-supply declined from September onwards (more a logistical problem than a production problem), with an absolute low in Nov. 1941. This indeed caused ammo shortages, as mentioned in some diary German entries/reports beginning Oct. 1941.

That's it at a glance, sorry that I can't get into deep right now, hope this helps anyway.

Cheers,

 

More interesting stuff...Unfortunately, I'm short on time today too...
A couple points tho...

For one, I would be interested in the composition of the german ammo supply. I have gotten the idea from many sources that even when the germans innvaded russia, they were already using a pretty good variety of different weapons. I wonder if this could have contributed to creating ammo shortages? If german units were fielding many different kinds of weapons, this could have made it very difficult for the correct ammo to be gotten to the correct weapon. I am pretty sure that this was in fact a major problem later in the war- could it have appeared earlier as well?

And my other point would be to re-address the transport issue. Could it be that while there was enough ammo on hand for reserves, getting it to the troops in the field was causing major problems? I know the germans were drastically short on trucks and other prime movers...

Or are Murray and Millet just way off here?

Methinks some more research is in order...

 

Some info from "The battle of Kursk" by Robin Cross on Russian wartime production:

-------------

In the first three months of the war
( Barbarossa ) the Russian railway system moved 2.5 million troops westward and carried 1523 factories eastward: 455 were re-established in the Urals, 210 in western Siberia, 200 in the Volga region and over 250 in Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

There were gigantic bottlenecks and agonizing delays: of the twenty-six chemical plants evacuated to the east, only eight had reached their destination by the beginning of December and of these only four had started production.

In spite of the heroic efforts of the Russian worker there was a sharp fall in war production. By the end of Ocotber 1941 steel output had fallen by 58 per cent and total industrial output by 50 per cent. Aircraft production fell by two thirds. Shortages of ferro-alloys, nickel, non-ferrous metals, aluminium, copper and tin, and the loss of the chemical industries in the Donbas, palyed havoc with ammunition supplies. In the second half of 1941 the fronts were relying on ammunition reserves accumulated in peace time. These had been consumed by December when current production was falling 40 per cent behind Red Army´s requirements.

Even by 1945 the Soviet Union´s overall figures for the production of coal and steel had not returned to those of 1940. In 1944 Germany´s coal output exceeded that of the Soviet Union by 160 million tons and that of steel by 23 million tons.
( The figures for coal are Germany 281 million tons, Soviet Union 121 million tons; for steel Germany 35.2 million tons, SU 12.3 million tons )

Must remember that some of the Russian shortages were covered by Lend Lease, but as well it seems the Russians were clearly more efficient?

 

John Weal: eastern front Bf 109 aces

In the beginning of Barbarossa Germany had 2,598 first line aircraft in use ( fighters, bombers ) wheras in the beginning of May 1940 3,826 aircraft and during the BoB three months later
( August ) 3,705 aeroplanes!

---------

Osprey´s aces series is based on the allied fact: 5 victories and you´re an ace. Thus the Luftwaffe had over 5,000 aces...

---------

Early in the WW2 you got Knight´s Cross for 20 victories. In the later phase of WW2 you didn´t get it until over 100+ victories.

------

On 2nd March 1944 Erich Hartmann dropped 10 Russian planes and got his victories to 202, after which he was awarded the Oak leaves. Walter Krupinski ( 175 ) and Johannes Wiese (125 ) also got the Oak Leaves and were commanded to meet Hitler for the award. In Salzburg Gerhard Barkhorn joined them; he was to be awarded the Swords for his 250th victory.

On their way quite a lot of alcohol was consumed..

In the waiting room Erich Hartmann noticed a beautiful officer´s cap, which was way too big for him.It covered his ears. The other three were laughing aloud. Fortunately the adjutant managed to take the cap off his head before the Fuhrer entered-as it was Hitler´s cap!

 

Kai :

Uh that is not quite true about the KC being presented towards war's end. Actually a pilot could score 35 and receive the award depending on the circumstances, this is usually for a day fighter ace. for night fighter in 1945 around 40-45 would probably get you mentioned and a bit harder on the eastern front against Soviet harrassment a/c, most likely a score of around 50 plus.
It is interesting too that ground victories were not added on the rudders of the day/night fighter force or even the dive bombers. It did though act as an advancement for pilots going from one unit such as bomber to fighter and vice-versa. Rank as well as awards.

E

 

????

Over 5000 aces for the Luftwaffe???

Also, a question- does this have any influence on the victory conditions the germans faced on the eastern front?