FDR and the oil embargo.

First you call out people as conspiracy theorists
Then you make false statements which you do not retract
Then you call people silly
Then you bring in animal comparrisons

I just know too well from which corner you come from - further remarks from you are no more off interest to me.
You are now on my favorit list - the ignore list - so don't bother to post your remarks

Kruska

 

The US reaction in 1940-1941 was curious,in that sense,that before,they did nothing.
The Japanese behaviour at Nanking did not cause an American embargo,nor did it stop the US trade with Japan (selling of oil,.....)that made it possible for Japan to make war in China .
One could also argue that the US reaction was incomprehensible for Japan .
To play the Devils advocate :for Japan was the embargo an act of war :the embargo,which would cause the stagnation of the Japanese economy and which would make Japan defenceless against the US Navy,would only end after the Japanese retreat from China .But,what,if the US embargo would continue after the Japanese withdraw from China ,and the US did demand other things :withdrawal from Korea and Formosa,end of the monarchy,appointment of US "advisers" ,dissolution of the army and navy ?
Japan had not forgotten the humiliation of 1852. It would mean the end of Japan's independence .
The embargo meaned that Japan had the choice berween surrender...and fight .
What would be the US reaction if all oil exporting countries,under the direction of Venezueala,proclaimed an oil embargo till the US withdraw its support for Israel,and ,if the US said yes, posed new demands :dissolution of the Strategic Air Command, withdrawal of all US troops outside the USA,return Texas,etc.. to Mexico .......?

 

I have read 'the Japanese Monographs' Part III Appendix 6 (declarations by Tojo )and I don't think it's contradicting my post .
But the big questions are :why the Embargo and what did the US expect Japan would do ?
Personally,I do not believe the conspiracy theory ,I suspect it was ignorance (Btw:was J.Grew,ambassador in Japan,consulted ?) of the Japanese mentality and also a feeling of race superiority :US would teach the yellow bastards a lesson!
An other question:who was the 'instigator' of the embargo? The White House,State Department or Congress ?
I doubt it would be Congress:were there anu votes to win with the embargo (We all know that members of Congress are thinking on only one thing:to get reelected )?

 

Embargo is not an act of "war", a blockade is. Embargo is purely an economic pressure, and with America's Neutrality Acts in place there wasn't much we could do when Nanking was pillaged and r*ped in 1937. The Japanese "apologized" and paid a fine for sinking the USS Panay, and two Standard Oil tankers in the Yangtze.

I think the embargoes were by executive action, and approved by the Congress, which was only marginally Democratic in 1937. I could be wrong, but I believe the "embargo" tactic came from the executive office, but only long after the Nanking incident.

 

The US has had a long history of embargoing many countries since the inception of our country. The first was passed through congress in March 1794. More importantly, before that time, few European powers used an embargo as a weapon of economic coercion, as direct military conflict was much easier to obtain when the powers in question share a boarder.

Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, the US had been putting diplomatic pressure on Japan through trade. In May 1937 the United States informed Japan that they were withdrawing from the 1911 Treaty of Commerce in the hopes that Japan could take a “hint”. The terms of the treaty allowed the United States to restrict or terminate exports to Japan after six months. With no Japanese response other than the continued conquest of China, the United States then faltered on following through. For more than a year, no trade restrictions were applied toward Japan, until July 1940 when the US restricted Aviation Gasoline as well as some other items pointed out by Clint earlier, though I don’t think they went into effect until August. Note at this time they could still purchase crude oil for shipment to Japan.

Even though the Japanese had all US exports of oil in any form in July 1941, The United States was no longer neutral in the conflict. Earlier that year Congress had passed the “An Act Further to Promote the Defense of the United States” commonly referred to as the Lend-Lease Act of 1941. It gave FDR the power to “manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure...for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.”

This single piece of legislation, passed by a Congress adamant about avoiding war, pushed the United States out of Neutrality and into non-belligerency. We would not yet take part militarily in the conflict, but we had picked our side, and all but joined the fight.

On the other side of the coin, Japan had also made a good deal of mistakes in dealing with the United States. First, they entered negotiations with the United States to relieve some of the trade restrictions with the belief that war was already un-avoidable. Japan had been planning the Pearl Harbor attack long before oil sanctions included crude oil. Second they simply chose full economic collapse over “losing face” in China.

So what could the United States do? We could avoid embargo's and go straight to war, or we could happily trade Japan the supplies she needed to commit genocide on the Asian Continent. Or we can do as we did historically and embargo Japan of the resources needed for aggression in China.

 

Japan, China, the United States and the Road to Pearl Harbor, 1937-41

At the outset, U.S. officials viewed developments in China with ambivalence. On the one hand, they opposed Japanese incursions into northeast China and the rise of Japanese militarism in the area, in part because of their sense of a longstanding friendship with China. On the other hand, most U.S. officials believed that it had no vital interests in China worth going to war over with Japan. Moreover, the domestic conflict between Chinese Nationalists and Communists left U.S. policymakers uncertain of success in aiding such an internally divided nation. As a result, few U.S. officials recommended taking a strong stance prior to 1937, and so the United States did little to help China for fear of provoking Japan.

U.S. likelihood of providing aid to China increased after July 7, 1937, when Chinese and Japanese forces clashed on the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing, throwing the two nations into a full-scale war. As the United States watched Japanese forces sweep down the coast and then into the capital of Nanjing, popular opinion swung firmly in favor of the Chinese. Tensions with Japan rose when the Japanese Army bombed the U.S.S. Panay as it evacuated American citizens from Nanjing, killing three. The U.S. Government, however, continued to avoid conflict and accepted an apology and indemnity from the Japanese. An uneasy truce held between the two nations into 1940.

 

Following is a rather lengthy post that I prepared for another forum some time ago. It covers a series of penalties – including the oil embargo –that the United States. government imposed upon Japan during the period directly leading up to World War Two. At the time all this happened I can remember being somewhat aware of it from coverage in the newspapers and on the radio (and "Pathe News") — at least as much as you would expect by an almost-- eighteen--year-- old who knew, that if there was a war, he would be a part of it. This is not meant as an argument for, or against, other posts that appear on this forum, it’s simply a collection of information on the subject that I thought might be of interest to some in this forum.

In 1930 Japan was a small industrial-based island nation with few natural resources and a limited agricultural capability. She was dependant on foreign nations for almost all of her critical necessities, both military and domestic. The United States was Japan's principal source of supplies. Scrap iron and scrap steel from the U.S. were the basic raw materials needed to make Japanese steel. Copper and other nonferrous metals were also imported from the U.S. The US was also a major supplier of agricultural products to Japan. However, especially critical to Japan were oil imports from the U.S. for aviation gasoline, diesel fuel and other petroleum products to keep her military machine going.

Japan's driving ambition was to become a great power in the world community. One mark of great power status was the possession of colonies. Another was self-sufficiency. Therefore, Japan embarked on a course of action to achieve both goals at the same time ... by conquest and control of new colonies and the materials, supplies and military advantages they offered. This military coarse of action was cloaked under the deceptine title: ‘The Greater East Asia Co--Prosperity Sphere."

Early on, Japan seized Formosa and Korea. In 1931 Japan seized Manchuria. In 1937 Japan undertook a large scale invasion of China proper.

Then, in September 0f 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Because this pact was primarily directed against the United States it immediately put the U.S. and Japan on a collision course. The Tripartite Pack also helped Japan facilitate opportunities that, if successful, would provide them with some of the colonial aspirations they desired. Germany's conquest of France and the Netherlands had left the colonial possessions of those two countries -- French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies -- unprotected.

In September, at Japan's request, Germany put pressure on the French Vichy government to grant Japan military bases in French Indochina.
Germany also put pressure on the Netherlands to grant Japan access to the vast sources of oil, nickle, tin, boxite, crude rubber and agricultural products available in the Dutch East Indies.

The U.S. countered Japan's signing the Tripartite Pact by placing an embargo on the export of American oil, scrap iron and steel, and other strategic materials to Japan.

In July of 1941 Japan occupied Indochina and its rich source of raw materials. The United States countered this action by freezing all Japanese funds and assets in the U.S.-- effectively halting all trade between the two countries.

The seriousness of the U.S. export embargo and the freezing of Japanese assets prompted Japan to attempt negotiations for a mutual and peaceful working agreement between the two countries -- at the same time protecting the Japanese Asian military conquests.

Before entering into talks on an agreement, the United States demanded a complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indochina, and the abandonment of all territorial rights in both areas.

This demand was entirely unacceptable to the Japanese government. To give up China, Manchuria, and Indochina would prevent Japan from achieving her goal of world power and self sufficiency.

Japan reasoned that a war with the United States in the Pacific theater would be basically a naval conflict and that Japan -- with one of the mightiest and best trained navies in the world -- would be superior to that of the United States. A war with the US would require the initial destruction of the US Navy, followed by the build-up of Japanese military strength in the entire Pacific area.

Germany had already conquered France and Eastern Europe, and had invaded Russia, and was on the verge of invading Great Britain. Japan had already started building up troops in China for a possible movement against Russia in compliance with Germany's wishes Japan reasoned that, if the United States entered the war, Germany would keep the U.S. involved in the Atlantic theater of war while Japan, in turn, could build up strength in the Pacific and then attack Russia from the east in a pincers movement with Germany. Japan concluded that the U.S. would
be forced to sue for peace -- on Japan's terms.

The loss of Japan's position in China and Indochina and her leadership in Asia would reduce her to a third rate power, economic stagnation, and increased dependence on foreign powers -- the very things Japan wanted to avoid. Japan considered the United States' latest demands an ultimatum from which there was no deviation. The only option left to the Japanese Government was to go to war with the United States.

At 6 p.m. on November 26, 1941 a large Japanese task force sailed from Hitokappu Bay in the Japanese Kurile Islands with sealed orders. The sealed orders contained instructions for a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

If you’ve gotten this far, I hope it was all worth your time.

vcs-ww2
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Certainly was...the bold sentence near the end is worth revisiting by us all occasionally.
Good post.

 

The Hull note said that Japan must withdraw from China and accept the Nationalist government as the only legitimate ruling party in China, (and Manchuria?). Can you cite a precedent for equivalent demands being passed during negotiations between any Great Powers of the modern era?

 

Obviously we are forgetting two very important facts here. First, it was not an ultimatum, but a counter proposal to the Japanese Proposal B handed to Secretary Hull on 20 November. In it, Japan offered to withdraw all troops from French Indo-China after the establishment of peace with China. In the meantime they would remove all troops from the southern half of Indo-China, and halt advances in China. Secondly, the Hull note was handed to Nomura on November 26th in Washinton. At that time it was November 27th in Tokyo. The largest problem with the "straw that broke the camels back" theory is that the Pearl Harbor attack force had left Hitokappu Bay the day before.

No, Manchuria was not mentioned in the Hull Note.

Other then the third so called "demand" (pulling of troops from China and French Indo-China) the other nine points are actions to be taken by both parties, not just Japan.

 

I'm not at all sure where you are going with this. Remember there were various color plans that involved war with Britain and Canada as well.

 

I didn’t say it met the definition of an ultimatum. I asked for any precedent in modern history whereby one Great Power told another Great Power that it must do X and Y, where X and Y were of an equally serious nature as was the demand that Japan must evacuate China and recognise its Nationalist enemy as the only legimate government of China, (status of Manchuria?). For example, if Hull had instead ordered Great Britain to leave India, what would London's reaction have been?
You haven’t cited a precedent yet.
Precedent is pretty much what defines is ‘in’ or ‘out’ for measuring the diplomatic legitimacy of specific demands; the apple does not fall far from the tree and the latitude for innovation in the political spectrum is not all that great. Here, we have the US making demands of a type that I am not aware of any Great Power matching in another situation, at least perhaps when the Great Power in question was not fishing for war. In comparison to Hull’s note, the German demand to occupy Toul and Verdun during the 1914 crisis (also not an ultimatum BTW) would have been as nothing. And yet, history’s verdict is that the German non-ultimatum to occupy these fortresses was outlandish.
That is to say, while Hull may not have intended to provoke the Japanese, I can see where the actual message delivered would automatically be interpreted as an ultimatum in Tokyo. Now, given that the United States in point of fact abandoned China after the war to a fate perhaps even more brutal than the Japanese occupation, the occasional poster may wonder why the US suddenly drew a sharp line in the sand for an issue that they themselves later demonstrated was not, when push came to shove, actually very interesting to the United States.

I haven’t suggested that the US didn’t have the right to take a hard line with the criminal and out-of-control Japanese Empire. My personal belief is that Wilson would have better served American interests to have declared war on Japan in 1917 cleaning up what was already looking to be a serious threat to Asian stability, rather than waste effort in Europe. The Japanese were outrageous and brutal, so if the US had simply declared war it would have been a valid response, IMO. The Japanese were at fault for causing the situation.
But what also seems fairly evident is that the Hull note was intended not to reach a diplomatic solution. If this is not so, then please cite a precedent in international Great Power relations for similar demands given when the receiving Great Power had not just lost the war.

.p