Fleet Air Arm in the Pacific

The Lexington was damaged very little by the bomb hits she sustained at Coral Sea, and in the words of her skipper, "The flight deck above the 5-inch ready service compartment was bulged upward slightly, the wood deck was splintered, but the damage was not sufficient to cause any interference with flight operations." None of the bomb hits were sufficient to impair Lex's ability to steam at 25 knots and operate her aircraft. Even the torpedo hits did not seriously damage her immediately, and it was only the induced gasoline vapor explosion that inflicted mortal damage. Essentially, the bomb hits were pin-pricks. BTW, it was not USN practice to fill the gasoline refueling lines with inert gas on it's carriers when Lex was lost. It was as a result of the Lexington's loss that the USN started that practice

I'd suggest you study up on the actual reasons each US carrier was sunk before criticizing them for not having armored flight decks. Every US Navy fleet carrier lost in the Pacific was due either directly, or indirectly, to damage inflicted by torpedoes, which of course, could not be deflected by an armored flight deck.

BTW, there were only three IJN carriers at Coral Sea; Shokaku, Zuikaku, and the Light carrier Shoho which was sunk. The Hiryu was in the Inland Sea undergoing refit and retraining for the Midway operation, and was not present at Coral Sea.

As I've admitted before, the armored steel decks of the British Illustrious Class carriers could usually shrug off kamikaze hits, but this ability came at a very high price in offensive capability, and carried with it serious design trade-offs which rendered the British ships vulnerable to damage that was unheard of in US Navy carriers. As I've also pointed out, the wooden-decked Essex class carriers also often shrugged off kamikaze crashes, and when damaged, were easier and quicker to repair than their British armored deck counter-parts. I urge you to read the references in the posts I've made in this thread, the information is all there, if you really want to learn the details.

 

By late 1944, US Navy SOP was to leave an Aircraft Carrier's Torpedo Squadron ashore in order to ship aboard an additional fighter squadron for better all round protection against kamakazes.

 

Maybe, but the naval aircraft location returns for the week of 27 December, 1944, show the following Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers still have full or partial torpedo squadrons in their assigned air groups;

Yorktown.................................15 TBM
Essex......................................15 TBM
Franklin....................................20 TBM
Hancock..................................15 TBM
Intrepid...................................4 TBF, 12 TBM
Hornet.....................................15 TBM
Lexington.................................8 TBM
Cowpens..................................9 TBM
Belleau Wood............................9 TBM
Chenango................................12 TBM
Kula Gulf..................................12 TBM
Cabot......................................8 TBM
Independence...........................7 TBM
San Jacinto..............................8 TBM
Ticonderoga..............................18 TBM
Wasp.......................................18 TBM
Princeton..................................18 TBM
Suwanee..................................7 TBF, 5 TBM
Bunker Hill................................18 TBM
Randolph..................................18 TBM
Enterprise.................................8 TBM
Bennington................................18 TBM

Granted, many of these aircraft were probably flying many more level bombing missions than torpedo attack missions by then, but they still had the capability of launching torpedoes, and the carriers themselves still had torpedoes in their air ordnance magazines.

See; http://http://www.history.navy.mil/a-record/ww-ii/loc-ac/1944/dec1944/27-12-44.pdf

 

I must be getting soft headed. I should have said by June, 1945. Once Okinawa was invaded on 1 April, 1945 and the kamikazes started attacking the US Pacific Fleet in force, all bets were off.

 

I concur. By the spring of 1945, there was little in the way of shipping flying the Rising Sun that was worth a torpedo, anyway.

 

In the book, "Clash of the Carriers", about the Battle of The Philippine Sea in June, 1944, there is an account of an element of two TBM's, escorted by a single F6F, which encountered eight Zero fighters. The American fighter and torpedo bombers went after the Zeros, and each plane shot down two Japanese planes, causing the remaining two to flee. Of course, this was after the cream of the IJNAF pilots had been killed and their replacements were of very low quality.

 

guess by everyones acceptance i bow to wooden flight decks being superior...will the Nimitz be converted back to wood soon??

 

Such a question could only be posed by someone who has no understanding of carrier design and warfare now, and during WW II in the Pacific. Moreover, since explanations by expert authorities of the pertinent issues have been posted in this thread, the question reflects an obstinate refusal to learn the facts regarding these issues.

 

I think it was a poor attempt at sarcasm DA. But I have to concur. Reading the responses it appears that you are right.

 

True, and perhaps a refusal is a choice given by millions killed allowing me this choice, as is my 2 sons from Canada opting to fight with the US Army instead of Canadian peace-keeping roles done by their own Canadian soldiers,,,Gerald served 4 years, and was wounded in Iraq..Johnathon just re-upped and made master Sargent teaching life survival skills stationed i Idar-Oberstein Germany...and as such i received a presidential personal invitation (which i cherish) for the first receiving line on the first day among other head of state...lol...unsure how being a farmer from southern alberta canada qualifies me..but hope to other members their...

 

The number one measure for fleet defense is to have fighters. Anything that enables a carrier to carry as many of them as possible improves the odd's that the fleet will be protected.

The Essex class carriers could carry nearly double the number of aircraft the RN carriers could carry, so this in itself, was justification to use wooden flight decks.

Then there is the raw numbers of having several wooden deck carriers with large capacities operating together in a task force. It would take ten RN carriers to operate the same number of aircraft as five Essex carriers. And when you work out the fleet resources required for ten carriers vs five, your logistics issues go up exponentially.

In the end, the USN was better served by having its carriers built with wooden decks.

 

and

No, not true, they did not leave the VT squadrons on the beach - - - Never was SOP. I am confident for any carrier you can name as deployed there was a resident VT squadron, right up to the bitter end.

Speaking of the bitter end - - - while it is certainly true that in the last deployment of TF-38 in July and August 1945 not a single torpedo was dropped on a naval or merchant ship by the fleet and light carrier VT squadrons of TF-38, they were certainly represented in the mix and performed yeomans’ service in bombing attacks on the Japanese home island, routine patrol activities, and as aerial communications links.

TG 38.1
Bennington (CV-20)
VT-1 - Lt Cdr RW Ramage; 12 TBM-3, 3 TBM-3E
Lexington (CV-10)
VT-94 - Lt Cdr FC Bamman; 15 TBM-3E
Hancock (CV-19)
VT-6 - Lt Cdr WG Privette; 15 TBM-3E
Belleau Wood (CVL-24)
VT-31 - Lt Cdr JR Bowen / LT EE Wood; 9 TBM-3
San Jacinto (CVL-30)
VT-49 - Lt CH Peters; 9 TBM-3

TG 38.3
Wasp (CV-18)
VT-86 - Lt Cdr LF Steffenhagen; 15 TBM-3E
Ticonderoga (CV-14)
VT-87 - Lt Cdr BA Miles; 15 TBM-3E
Randolph (CV-15)
VT-16 - Lt Cdr WR Leonard, Jr.; 12 TBM-3, 3 TBM-3E
Essex (CV-9)
VT-83 - Lt Cdr HA Stewart; 5 TBM-3, 10 TBM-3E
Monterey (CVL-26)
VT-34 - Lt FB Mooney; 9 TBM-3
Bataan (CVL-29)
VT-47 - Lt Cdr HR Mazza; 5 TBM-3, 4 TBM-3E

TG 38.4
Yorktown (CV-10)
VT-88 - Lt Cdr JC Huddleston; 14 TBM-3, 1 TBM-3E
Shangri La (CV-38)
VT-85 - Lt Cdr EV Wedell; 15 TBM-3
Bon Homme Richard
VT(N)-91 - Lt Cdr Smith; 18 TBM-3E
Independence (CVL-22)
VT-27 - Lt Cdr J. Dooling; 9 TBM-3/3E
Cowpens (CVL-25)
VT-50 - Lt Cdr CM Melhorn; 9 TBM-3E

And I’m not even bothering to mention the TBMs of the various VT and VC squadrons at sea aboard CVEs, nor the Avenger squadrons aboard the Royal Navy carriers.

No, the VT squadrons were not left behind. If there were a squadron type that was reduced over time to make room for, and provide pilots for, for that matter, it was the VB squadrons. These went from a high complement in the 30’s when they combined the VB and VS squadrons down to an average of 18 and then only on CVs, none on CVEs and CVLs. Not a few of the VBF squadrons one finds on CVs at the end of the war were commanded by gents who’s early war combat experience was in SBD VB and VS squadrons.

Rich