German Tonnage War Strategy

I think there are many more problems involved then the sea planes finding the submarines. Consider first the problems the Milch Cow program encountered in mating with submarine on patrol. Next, consider why did not the allies use a variation of this said scheme with an underway tender and the Catalina flying boat.

As I see it, the following needs to addressed:
1. Aircraft maintenance
2. Fast changing sea states
3. Navigation from sub/barge to sub/Barge
4. Roaming Destroyers and Cruisers
5. Maintain crew morale on long patrols
6. a more efficient enigma for use on planes

 

I take it the starter of this thread is unaware that the early German airborne torpedo was so poor the only aircraft capable of flying slowly enough to drop it, without it breaking up on hitting the water, was the He 59, a very large and slow float biplane. It wasn't until May 1940 that the Germans were able to modify the torpedo enough for the He 115 to drop it, though the failure rate was still high.

 

It's interesting to see this thread revived. It sounds like innovative thinking, but there are so many practical problems that it could never be implemented. Germany did send a technical delegation to Japan in the early 1930's, but they were looking at aircraft carrier design and the collaboration produced the Graf Zeppelin design, a notable failure. The Japanese were not that advanced in aviation technology in the mid-1920's, and, in submersibles, were still exploring WW I German U-boat design at the time, so there isn't much advantage to be gained for the Germans to engage Japanese technology at this time.

I see some real problems with operating large seaplanes from submersible "tenders", not the least of which is weather in the North Atlantic. No matter what Shadowmaster may believe about German civilian seaplanes proving it was possible to routinely land and take off from the open sea (civilian airliners didn't land in the open sea), experience in WW II showed that each landing and take-off was fraught with danger. For months at a time, the North Atlantic is a hostile place even for large, well-found ships; operating sea planes from the surface of the open sea is literally out of the question. The second problem is precise overwater navigation; it didn't exist in WW II, yet it would be necessary for the kind of operations envsaged by Shadowmaster. Read Clay Blair's "Hitler's U-boat War"; it's clear that sea planes operating over long distances over the Atlantic seldom knew where they were, or where freindly U-boats or hostile convoys were located. Numerous times sea planes sighted Allied convoys, but time and time again were unable to guide U-boats to them. A lot of sea planes would be lost simply because they couldn't find their own tenders. After an attack, damaged seaplanes could not land on the water because, with their hulls damaged, they would sink before they could be repaired. A little thought, combined with some practical knowledge of what happens at sea would quickly relegate this idea to the world of fantasy.

An American PBY could carry two torpedoes, one under each wing, and could fly about 750 miles with them, but with a full load of fuel and armament, they could only take off after a very long run and on relatively calm water at that. Using a submarine-mounted catapult (not steam, because U-boats didn't have boilers) would be out of the question for two reasons; the first being how do you lift a massive four-engine sea plane, carrying four torpedoes and tons of fuel, onto a catapult which is mounted on a sub rolling heavily with it's decks awash? If you try to use a crane the plane will be swinging about uncontrollably in anything but a dead calm, which is very rare in the North Atlantic.

The second reason is, even if you figure out an answer to that question, it's going to take a very long time to spot and launch even one aircraft, so your strikes will consist of single aircraft attacking one at a time; dead meat for any CAP and ship board AA. American PBY's were used to attack merchant vessels and warships, but were found to be so slow and vulnerable to AA fire, they could only safely make attacks at night, using radar to locate their targets; Germany didn't have ASV radar until early 1942, so it's highly unlikley that they could successfully make attacks on well-armed vessels

Another problem is the size of the U-boat tenders; German U-boats tended to be very small. One of the larger ones, the Type IXC was only 1,150 tons. The largest was the Type X, still only about 1,700 tons, only a little larger than an American Gato-class Fleet boat. The Japanese I-400-class boats were 5,223 tons, and operated three single-engine float-plane bombers. To support even one four-engine sea plane, a submarine woud have to be monstrous, six or seven thousand tons or more. That would make it extremely large, cumbersome, slow to dive, and very vulnerable to ASW measures. Add the towed submersible supply barges, and you have a huge, very costly, and practically defenseless investment that is quickly going to be destroyed.

Another problem is building this fleet of very large U-boats, and the very large sea planes; it's going to be extremely costly and resource intensive. Once it is built, there are many details of equipment, tactics, and doctrine that are going to have to be tested at sea to work out the bugs, and develop operational doctrine. That's not something that can be done without arousing the attention of potential enemies; and Britain and the US will quickly design and develop counter measures, such as escort carriers with modern fighters.

All of this presumes that Germany plans to wage a commerce war against Britain about fifteen years before the outbreak of WW II, and about ten years before Hitler comes to power in Germany. That certainly wasn't the case, and I can imagine no historical changes that would make it likely. Certainly nothing mentioned in the poster's original scnario supports such an idea.

 

You take it correctly!

I am amazed that this thread has been dug up after so long in the graveyard, lol.

If there is actually any interest in this thread's innovative concept, I suppose that I can reprise the basic idea to include the MAR/DT that we recently discussed, Devilsadvocate.

I still have your last post there in mind, but I have been very short on time to actually make any posts here.

While on that subject, am I the only one having trouble logging in here? Every day I get that danged 'broken link' garbage, is this happening to everyone else or is it just me?

Any way, before I dive into this [or these] topics again, I need to have the time and the ability to draw pictures that I can post here to show concepts.

The earliest that this might happen is my next semester break, between 18th and 28th of Aug.

If anyone is really that interested, you can just PM me with the points that you would like covered in the new thread and I'll do my best.

 

Of all your points I like this one the best, putting all the eggs (or at least a lot of very expensive ones) in one basket by creating a force that will fit one scenario and be useless for almost anything else is not the way a conventional military thinks, that's what "special ops" visionaries do and they won't usually get a big slice of the budget.

Another point is that the availability of bases in France was what made the historical Atlantic campaign possible, without them the Type VII, that formed the core of the U-Boat fleet would not be able to operate far into the Atlantic and the hypotetical sub-carriers would suffer horrible attrition going round the British Isles to resupply.
No pre-wear German planners could count on having bases in France and if you can base them at Bordeaux a Do 19 or a Ju 290 makes a lot more sense than the whole sub-carriers thing. Had the Germans built something better than the awful He 177 an Hs 293 armed long ranged plane would be a threat to any convoy without carrier escort even as late as 1943.

 

First of all, no, you aren't the only one having trouble signing on to the forum. Ever since the "new, improved" server came on-line, I am essentially barred from the forum from about noon until the morning of the following day. About noon, or sometimes even earlier, I start to get those "web page load" errors, or the "web address unknown" garbage. I am basically limited to three or four hours access to the forum each day.

Second, my statement stands; there is no historical, or alternative-historical, reason to believe any group of "industrialists" would foresee the specific conditions extant in WW II, or be able to convince a significant segment of the political leadership of Germany to take action based on such a vision. What events in the historical record would cause such beliefs to appear realistic? None that I can think of. Simply endowing a bunch of businessmen with extraordinary powers of foresight is not enough; what events, real or imagined, might cause them to exercise their visionary abilities and cause others to credit them with amazing foresight?

I am not particularly interested in the technical details; based on what I know about the state of technology at the beginning of WW II, such a scheme was patently impossible. A rudimentary knowledge of WW II submarine capabilities, coupled with a basic knowledge of the difficulties of operating aircraft at sea, would rule out any possible solution to the imposing technical problems. Frankly, I doubt very seriously that even today, given an unlimited budget and decades of research and development, that the scheme could be made to work satisfactorily. In the two decades before WW II, there were other, more technologically practical, and less costly (and risky), approaches to commerce warfare at sea.

 

Yeah, that's about what is happening for me as well. I tried clearing my history and cookies in the hopes that that might help, but no luck.

IIRC, Germany suffered greatly from the naval blockade of her foreign trade by the allies in WWI and did if fact make the stockpiling of material a priority before WWII started. Also, wasn't the Blitzkrieg really all about winning quickly (basically an improved Schlieffen Plan)? Given these facts, I don't see where it is that big a stretch for the Germans to realise that the UK has to be defeated, and this means at sea, and that the aircraft (and not the submarine and surface raiders) is the weapons platform that offers the best return for their investment. Basically, from their experiences in WWI my premise is that a group of people look at how they lost the war and how to prevent that same situation from developing a second time. This doesn't require second sight, but rather common sense.

This part can serve to highlight some problems I have with being able to participate in good discussions with people, because I am either reading things wrong or reading to much into them. Here I have to ask: which beliefs?
A) That aircraft can be useful in sinking merchant shipping?
B) That France can/will be overrun quickly?
C) That the UK will have to be defeated, and at sea?
D) That seaplanes can operate in the middle of the ocean?
E) That submarines can serve as resupply vessels for the seaplanes far better than a surface ship?
Basically, here I have to know more of what you are questioning. IIRC, the proof of sinking a BB with aircraft bombs was demonstrated in the early to mid 1920's, so sinking merchant shipping cannot be ruled out at this point. Even if the original plan was simply to deny the allies the intended superiority in aircraft and submarines that the treaty mandated, it would seem logical that mail carrying aircraft could deliver secure communications to submarines if a way could be found to bring the two together quickly and easily. And from there it would just be a natural extension to refuel the seaplane then and there, and from there to thinking, wow, wouldn't it be great if the seaplanes could go scout for enemy shipping for us? And how long after this would it be before someone realised that an armed seaplane could be used for sinking enemy merchantmen?

Well, if your not interested in these details, perhaps you should refrain from claiming it is impossible.

Obviously, we disagree on this point. I'll come back to this one.

Name three, and I'll do my best to debunk them....

Some things you should know about me. When I tested for aptitudes, personality and psychological profiling, some interesting facts came out, including the one that identified me as an INTP {you'll have to google this one}. So basically, I'm the kinda guy that you never tell "It can't be done", because I have an uncanny way of seeing solutions that others don't.

For instance;


While serving in the Berlin Brigade as an assistant gunner, I found myself with my second chance to fire live rounds from the M60 machine gun during the crew served weapons qualifications back in 1987.
I learned how the Zeroing fire was being done. Each gunner would fire at several groups of man-shaped silhouettes upon a 3' by 4' target 10 meters away. These silhouettes were about 2-3 inches tall and roughly an inch wide and were to simulate a distant formation of enemy troops. As my turn approached, I remember thinking that it was strange that my gunners 6-9 round bursts were basically 'spraying' the targets in no apparent order or grouping. When I remarked upon this, Al (my gunner) said that that was the normal dispersion pattern from a short burst and I remember thinking to myself, "I wonder if there is a way to get the shots into a tighter grouping" and set myself this task. Once it came time for us to switch places I determined that I was going to make my mark.


To begin with, I assumed the prone firing position (this is one of the best positions to fire a machine gun from, as it reduces your visibility to the enemies return fire while maximizing your ability to hold your weapon steady-which is essential for long range, automatic weapons fire) and took careful aim at the target. I used everything I had been taught, taking a deep breath, letting it halfway out, and then (while holding absolutely still) gently squeezing (and holding) the trigger until all the rounds were expended (we were using the standard 6-9 round belts) for the firing exercise. Moving from silhouette group to silhouette group, I fired a burst into each one. After the first of the three firing sets was completed, everyone on the range checked out their targets, evaluating what they needed to work on to be able to bring effective fire upon a distant target. I got a bit of good natured ribbing from Al (I guess my belief that I could do it better had leaked out before when we were going over Al's shooting, and it was payback time) and some of the other guys when we looked over what my first shot groupings were like, as they were more scattered and orderless than Al's had been. To say that I was a bit disappointed was an understatement, but I resolved to do my best to improve. I had to first figure out *why* the rounds were all over the target. In the minute or two that I had to think about it, I realized that the aiming of the weapon was not the problem (after all, the rest of the gunners in the battalion were using exactly the same techniques) and that the rounds were almost certainly being scattered by the machine gun 'kicking' as each propellant charge ignited. With this thought in mind, I took my place on the
firing line for the second set.

The second time around, I determined that I was going to hold the weapon much steadier, and see if I could get my shots into a tighter group. Using the techniques describe above, along with the addition of very tightly holding the weapon against the recoil, I once again went through the firing exercise. When the last echo died away, and with the gunpowder smell dissipating on the slight breeze, I once again approached my targets. This time around each shot group consisted mainly of closely spaced holes, several of which overlapped, and in a few cases had large, ragged holes blown into the target where the rounds had passed through so tightly that they all were touching! My disappointment must have been all to easy to read on my face, as Al told me that my last set were on a par with the best of the gunner's shot groupings, but I was more determined than ever to do better with the third and final set. You see, being as good as everyone else was never enough for me (this probably dates back to my experiences in junior and senior high school), I had to be better than everyone else!


Finally, I determined that this time around, I would be absolutely ruthless in maintaining control over the weapon. I wanted nothing to mar my shot groups this time. When the last firing set began with the order to "commence fire", I tensed up every muscle in my body, from where my left hand rested upon the top of the feed tray, down through both arms and both legs, and even my toes! I made absolutely positive that no part of my body was going to be moved by the recoil this time. Along about the middle of the set, I decided to not just hold the weapon tight, but used every bit of my strength to pull it painfully tight into my shoulder, making it virtually an extension of my body. This was a bit awkward, hard to maintain, and not a little painful. For that reason, I only used that technique for one target. When I finished firing the third and final set, I approached the target with mixed feelings. On the one hand, I knew that I had done everything I possibly could to deliver the most accurate fire that I could to the target, while on the other hand I was not sure what improvement, if any, I had accomplished. For the third set all but one of the shot groups were comprised of a single, ragged hole. Al was impressed, and if truth be told that alone would have made my day, and remarked that I had made such improvement. The only shot group that didn't match this pattern was the one in the middle target. That target told an entirely different story.


To this day, I can still see the puzzled expression on Al's face when he looked at that target. He remarked that I had just hit the target one time, and must have missed with the rest of the shots in that burst. This didn't make any sense as even if the rounds had somehow been so far off as to miss the printed silhouette entirely they would have to have hit the target somewhere. I had Al look at the first two sets shot groupings and compare them to the third set. I reminded him that he was right beside me while I fired at each target, using a short, controlled burst. I reminded him that the silhouettes were printed on a target 3' by 4' at a range of just 10 meters. Finally, I pointed out that this one hole was both out of round, and noticeably bigger than any of the single round holes on the target. Al followed this reasoning closely, that puzzled look still on his face. His look rapidly turned to one of skeptical, "yeah, right" through disbelief, and finally amazement.


Cost of a round of 7.62 mm ammo, 7.5 cents.
Cost of a live fire training exercise, several thousand dollars.
Cost of the look on Al's face when he realized the truth: Priceless!


All the rounds from that burst had passed through the same hole. Needless to say, it was immensely gratifying to hear the excited tone in Al's voice as he spread the word about this accomplishment of mine. Several of the other gunners came over to see what all the excitement was about, and I remember being asked how I did it once they had overcome their skepticism and disbelief. All I said was that I had held the weapon tightly.


I recalled the dismissive way I had been spoken to earlier that day by the battalion's #2 gunner. He had remarked that every time he attended the battalion top gun competition, he was always bested by my roommate, Dan. Since Dan was on leave at the time, Carrol thought that he was going to be the sure winner. When I remarked that I had not fired yet, Carrol actually dared to say, "yeah, but you're just an AG" in a tone that was meant, and succeeded, to show me what he thought of my chances to best him. So naturally....

I was on the firing line, happily dropping targets (between 600-1000 yards out) and basically having a ball when suddenly, there came a most irritating tapping upon my Kevlar helmet. Looking up (the M60 is usually fired from the prone position at distant targets), I see the range officer standing beside me. This guy tells me to use 6-9 round bursts for each target (I was using 2-3 round bursts) as that was the training standard at the time. Not wanting to rain on the guys parade, I let him think that he could have his way. Once he walked away I went back to using the 2-3 round bursts, until he caught me at it a second time that is.

So once again, that most annoying TAP TAP TAP on the helmet followed closely by the inevitable "6-9 round bursts". "Grrrrr" I say to myself, "that's twice this idiot has interrupted my fun". So I switch to the longer, mandated 6-9 round bursts until the guy walks away, whereupon I went right back to the 2-3 round bursts I was doing so well with. Unbeknownst to me however, that sneaky sob had just walked away till I went back to shooting, and then snuck up behind me and thus caught me yet again!

TAP TAP TAP on the helmet for a third time! 6-9 round bursts or I'll throw you off the range! OK, THAT TEARS IT!!! Without moving my M60, I turned my head to the right, gave the miscreant a good hard glare, glanced downrange, and fired one round. When I turned back to look him in the eye, with one eyebrow raised in my best "Oh really" look, he started saying, "alright-you'er off the...at that moment, the target dropped, immediately followed by his jaw, and then he shut his mouth"!

In the next firing cycle, I had a target that I couldn't drop. I mean I must have put 30-40 rounds into that blasted piece of plastic, and it just refused to drop. When I complained that the target must be broken, the guy smugly told me that all the targets were working, and that I had simply missed it! I said that that wasn't possible, as I knew that I had hit it over and over again, but he responded that I just didn't want to admit that I had missed it.

Once that cycle was finished, all the targets were dropped automatically in preparation for the final cycle. All the targets, that is, except the one I couldn't drop, as it was broken! I got my payback when the guy was forced to admit that "well, I guess it is broken".

On the final firing cycle, I ended up with two targets that wouldn't fall, and when I said that "that one is broke too", he started to say "no it isn't...", but my raised eyebrow look caused him to amend that to "Well, we'll see". Sure enough, both those targets had had their mechanical mechanism shot out.

When all the firing was completed, the range officer came up to me and asked me where I learned to shoot like that, and my reply was 'basic training'. He couldn't believe that I had only fired the M60 once before that day. Then my gunner Al walks up, and says that if he (the range officer) thought the record fire was something, he should take a look at my zero target. When that young Lt finally realised that I had indeed put a 6-9 round burst through one hole, he was floored (most satisfying). It was made even better when he found out that I had been using 'Kentucky windage' during the whole qualification fire, as I had been forced to let two other gunners use mine when theirs broke down, and they had zeroed the weapon to their aiming, and when I got it back I had no idea where the rounds were going! I had had to use the entire pre-qualification fire phase to get the sights almost back where they belonged.


Epilogue: Naturally, I went on to win the day and take the battalion top gun award. The obstacles that remained, including proving myself to various "doubting Tomas'es" that had to learn things the hard way, I overcame as I encountered them. All in all, I believe that my time in the infantry was time well spent, and I especially enjoyed the training I received on the various weapons systems then in use. My all time favorite would still be the machine gun, but the hand grenades, claymore mines, and M72 LAW (Light Anti-tank Weapon) were also fun to learn to use proficiently. Yes, I sometimes still miss not being in the infantry.

Another example might be my Avatar, where I clearly came up with the best method for killing bombers that I know of. There was much skepticism, and not a little bit of "That will never work" but once we got down to it, it became apparent that my reasoning was both sound and superior.

So basically, never tell an INTP "It cannot be done" because they will likely find a way to prove that it can be done.

Looking forward to a good, lively, entertaining debate {provided we can actually get on the board, that is.}

 

Just some more issues I thought of while thinking about and researching this proposition;

Far from being a new idea, aircraft-carrying submarines have been around since 1915. That year Germany managed to launch a seaplane from the deck of a submarine at sea. At least five other nations, including the US, UK, Japan, and France experimented with the idea in the 1920's and 1930's, but only Japan got any further than operating two, single-engine seaplanes from a submarine. Japan, in the late 1930's launched a class of huge submarines each capable of carrying three single-engine bombers. The common denominator in each of these experiments was that the navies concerned, except for Japan, decided that the time spent on the surface launching and recovering the seaplanes made the sub too vulnerable to ASW counter measures, by destroying the natural stealth attribute of the submarine.

Of course, all of the experiments were with small aircraft which could be folded, or otherwise disassembled, and stowed in a "hangar" on the submarine's deck. In most cases maintenance was either carried out in the hangar while submerged, or more commonly, simply ignored. Of course, in the case of large four-engined aircraft capable of carrying large fuel and ordnance loads, stowage in a submersible hangar would not be practical; the aircraft would have to remain on the surface, where all maintenance, refueling, loading of ordnance, etc. would have to be carried out. Just how practical this might be in typical North Atlantic weather can only be imagined. The US Navy estimated that the operational life-span of carrier aircraft, exposed to salt spray, was only 4-5 months. Since most carrier aircraft were either destroyed or damaged beyond repair operationally or in combat within that timespan, corrosion and airframe wear and tear was not an issue; would the same be true of the specialized four-engined sea planes?

The effects of actual take-off and landing cycles of large sea planes in the North Atlantic can also only be surmised; no historical experience of any statistical significance exists as no entity attempted to routinely operate sea planes from the surface of the open ocean. Certainly such landings during WW II weren't undertaken lightly, and a take off of a heavily loaded aircraft from the surface of the open sea would be highly problematical. A description of one such adventure shortly after WW II is informative;

"On July 23, 1947, the BIBB and her 150-man crew were assigned to Ocean Station Charlie, and they needed help! A crew member, Seaman Joseph Johns of Helena, Georgia, was seriously ill with a ruptured appendix. The ship did not carry a Doctor, and the Pharmacist Mates on board believed Johns’ condition was beyond their capabilities to help. The Captain considered steaming for Argentia, Newfoundland, but the situation dictated that Johns needed to be airlifted immediately to medical help.

Fortunately for Seaman Johns, the Air Detachment also had two long-range PBY-5A twin-engined amphibious aircraft capable of landing and taking off from the ocean. One of these aircraft, PBY-5A Bureau Number 48314, was made ready for the mission. The pilots and aircrew for this mercy mission were Patrol Plane Commander (PPC) LT. William Morrill, First Pilot (PP1P) Aviation Pilot First Class Clayton. Roll, PP2P and navigator, Chief Aviation Pilot Kenneth Franke, and crew members Aviation Machinist Mate First Class (AMM 1/C) John Pallam, AMM 2/C J. C. Entrekin, and Aviation Radio Man First Class (ARM 1/C) Walter Corbett.

One essential preparation for this mission was the installation of Jet Assisted Take Off (JATO) bottles. Four 14 KS 1000 JATO bottles, two on each side, were mounted on external racks located on the aircraft hull just forward of the gun blisters. Each JATO bottle, which weren’t “jets” at all, but actually small solid-fueled rocket motors, would produce 1000 pounds of trust for 14 seconds when fired. This extra thrust was extremely helpful in accelerating the aircraft at un-stick speed during takeoffs in rough seas with a heavy load. However, the bottles were practically impossible to mount while the aircraft was on the water, and so they were loaded before takeoff from Argentia. Once these and all other preparation were complete, the crew took the runway for takeoff in the marginal weather, including minimum visibility, for the 600-mile over water flight to Ocean Station Charlie.

Upon reaching the BIBB, the crew of 314 prepared the PBY for a water landing, while studying the wind and sea conditions carefully. Open-sea landings were always a very hazardous operation, and the pilots flew back and forth while the ship made several wide turns to help dampen out the surface of the turbulent ocean. Meanwhile, the electrically operated wing floats, which were retracted in flight to form the wing tips to the “P-Boat,” were lowered, and the main wheels checked locked in the retracted position in the sides of the hull. The nose wheel was checked retracted and the nose wheel doors closed and locked shut. The auxiliary power plant (APU) beneath the flight mechanic’s position was started and its output checked, to ensure it was available for the electrical power needed to keep the aircraft batteries charged and provide power for radio communications with the BIBB while the engines were shut down after landing. The APU also powered the aircraft’s built-in bilge pump, which siphoned any sea water that might enter the hull from leaks caused by landing, or open hatches, and provided the needed electricity for restarting the engines.

After all preparations were made, and the wind and sea conditions evaluated, the pilots flew the P-Boat ever nearer the ocean surface, and finally made a power-on full stall landing. They applied engine power and controls to keep 314 on the water while preventing an uncontrollable bounce back into the air. After coming to rest, the crew members checked the hull for popped rivets or other damage, and placed the bilge pump hose on the deck in the blister compartment, where the sea would most likely come aboard when the blister was opened to receive the patient.

The crew of the BIBB placed Seaman Johns in a wire Stokes Litter, and transferred him from the ship onto the cutter’s 26-foot pulling boat. The boat, manned by six oarsmen and a coxswain to man the steering oar, rowed for the PBY, with Johns and attending medical personnel aboard. They approached 314, which was bobbing up and down on the ocean swell with the engines shut down to prevent a propeller from striking the boat or a crew member. The coxswain edged the pulling boat in close, while being careful to avoid colliding with the plane’s hull, wings or tail plane. The blister hatch was opened, and the patient was quickly transferred into the aircraft and placed in the bunk compartment, just forward of the blister compartment. The plane’s crew secured Seaman Johns carefully, so he would not bounce around and suffer injury during the potentially rough open-sea takeoff.

Aircrew member J.C. Entrekin then climbed out the blister onto 314’s hull to make the final electrical check of the JATO firing circuit and to install the black powder igniter into each bottle. However, instead of four bottles, Entrekin found only three. One of the port side bottles had apparently been jarred loose during the open-sea landing.

The pilots considered the situation, and decided that an extra 1,000 pounds of thrust on the starboard side would not be uncontrollable, since the bottles were mounted near the center line of the plane, and especially considering they needed all the JATO thrust they could get to make the take-off. They had Entrekin install the igniters and connect the electrical circuits for all three remaining JATO bottles. That completed, the crew member crawled back into the aircraft, soaking wet from the cold ocean spray.

The pulling boat backed away, but held a position to stand by in case of an emergency during the PBY’s takeoff. The two engines were restarted and everything prepared for takeoff. Entrekin stayed with the patient in the bunk compartment to assure Johns that all would be well. He was also there to make every effort to get the patient out of the aircraft if things did not go as planned.

The BIBB had continued her wide sweeping turns to dampen the sea surface, and the crew turned the PBY into the best conditions for takeoff in the rough seas. Lieutenant Morrill handled the controls, while first pilot Roll tried to bend the throttles forward to get all the power available from the engines. At the proper moment, LT. Morrill fired the JATO, and first pilot Roll needed every inch of his six foot four frame to stand on the right rudder to keep 314 on a straight takeoff run. After several bone-jarring bounces, the PBY stayed airborne and headed back to Argentia. With a cruise speed of about 100 miles an hour, it took six hours for the return flight. As they neared their destination, the crew learned that the weather at the Naval Air Station had deteriorated severely, and they diverted to Torbay Airport at St. Johns, Newfoundland."

Three months later, the Coast Guard Cutter BIBB was involved in another mid-ocean sea plane landing which illustrates other problems with operating aircraft over the ocean; this time it involved a Boeing 314 Clipper flying a commercial passenger route from Europe to the US;

"Less than three months later, on the night of October 13-14, 1947, the BIBB and an aircraft from NORLANOPAT Air Detachment Argentia teamed up again to make a dramatic open sea rescue. One of the famous Boeing 314 Clippers, The Bermuda Sky Queen, en route from England to the U.S. on a charter flight, encountered 100 mile-an-hour headwinds after passing the “point of no return.” Unable to make the coast, and unable to get back to Europe, the pilot decided to ditch in the stormy North Atlantic at Ocean Station CHARLIE, where the BIBB was once again on Ocean Weather Patrol.

A PBY-5A, 48335, was launched from Argentia with additional life rafts and survival equipment to provide air search and rescue assistance if The Bermuda Sky Queen proved unable to reach or find the BIBB.

At CHARLIE, the BIBB turned on all possible lights, and maintained radio contact with the clipper until the pilot made visual contact with the ship. Once again, the BIBB made wide sweeping turns in an attempt to dampen out the extremely high seas, and at dawn’s first light, the Sky Queen’s pilot landed his fuel-starved clipper along side the BIBB. While maneuvering toward the BIBB, he water-taxied into the ship, smashing the nose of the Boeing against the ship’s hull. The clipper stayed afloat, and the passengers and crew remained on board the aircraft, but after a couple of hours the heavy seas and high winds forced the cutter and clipper apart. The BIBB then launched all its small boats to the rescue. With skillful seamanship, the boats’ crews rescued all 62 passengers and seven crew members of the ill-fated Boeing Clipper.

The P-Boat overhead stood by throughout the rescue, and when no longer needed, turned into the same headwinds that claimed the Sky Queen, and completed the flight with nothing left but fumes in the fuel tanks. One engine starved out during taxi-in."

See; OCEAN STATION Charlie - US Coast Guard North Atlantic Weather Patrol

Other problems would involve navigation; there was virtually no such thing as "precision" over-water navigation during WW II.. Pilots and aircraft navigators seldom had more than a rough idea of where they were at any given moment, making a rendezvous with a submarine in the wastes of the Atlantic would be , at best,. problematic. Historically, German aircraft searching for Allied convoys would often make contact, yet be unable to vector U-boats or other aircraft into contact with the same convoy. This got so embarrassing for Donitz that subs and aircraft who managed to make contact were ordered to shadow the convoy and send out homing beacons to guide other units to their position. Of course, this was highly dangerous, as those beacons could also be picked up by the Allies and used to eliminate the plane or U-boat. It also alerted the convoys that they were being stalked.

Just some of the problems that have to solved before this idea can be called anything other than a fantasy;

1. Open ocean landings - virtually impossible in anything more than a Force 4 breeze (11-15 knots) with no swell (and there is always a swell running in the North Atlantic).

2. Open ocean take-offs - again more or less impossible in more than a Force four breeze and with a swell running, especially with a heavy ordnance and fuel load. a take-off would require a very powerful catapult (how would the aircraft be lifted onto the catapult?) or JATO assistance. The Germans had the equivalent of JATO rockets, but as the article mentioned, they can't be attached at sea.

In the link for the wave height prediction map for the North Atlantic below, notice how the wave height can grow from 2-4 feet to 16-18 feet in a matter of hours in any specific location in the North Atlantic. Also note this forecast is for a typical summer period in the North Atlantic when northern hemisphere storms are at their lowest point. It represents the best possible conditions that could be expected in the North Atlantic. Even so, the North Atlantic hurricane season runs from June 1 through November 30, and on an average, produces 11 named storms of which an average of six develop into full hurricanes, the majority of which track out into the open reaches of the North Atlantic.

Wave Model - North Atlantic Sea Height (STORMSURF)

Landing and taking off in 2-4 waves is possible though with some degree of hazard of damage to the aircraft. In higher waves or swells the risk of damage quickly becomes prohibitive so that 6-8 foot waves will completely preclude such operations. It's clear from the wave height prediction model that operating sea planes in the open North Atlantic is highly problematic about ninety per cent of the time, and totally impossible during the winter months.

3. Maintenance - How do you carry out engine maintenance in the open ocean? Or airframe repair? Or, for that matter, how do you repair damage to the hull? The aircraft can't be taken aboard the submarine, so how is ordnance loaded? suppose an aircraft is attacked by an Allied fighter or hit by ship board AA fire and the hull is punctured; where does it land safely? During storms where does the aircraft take shelter? Does it attempt to ride out the storm on the surface?

4. How many aircraft would each sub be responsible for? And how would they be kept together on the surface while the sub was submerged? Would they taxi around in formation? Wouldn't a batch of sea planes taxiing around on the ocean's surface be a dead giveaway that there was a submarine tender somewhere in the vicinity? How would the sea planes defend themselves while on the surface?

5. Refueling - How is refueling accomplished and how long will it take to refuel each plane? What will happen if weather prevents a plane being refueled? How much aviation gas will the sub carry and how much fuel will the aircraft need for an average sortie? How long will it typically take to refuel each plane?

6. Communications - How would the planes and the sub communicate when the sub is submerged?

7. Numbers - How many subs and aircraft will be required to effectively cover the convoy routes? In what ocean areas will they operate? Does the "one-third" rule apply?

 

Weren't radio communications a big source of intel for the Britts as to where German subs were operating especially early in the war? Wasn't this also the reason the Britts were able to track down most of Bismarck's support ships during and after her raid? I'd think that the planes would have to be making pretty extensive radio contact with the subs for this to work. Not good for either if a Britt DD shows up in the middle of a resupply op.

 

Yes, that's my understanding. The Brits didn't have to read the German codes, but simply DF'd sub locations and used that information to either avoid them or attack them. Of course, reading the German codes involved and DF'ing sub locations gave the Brits a pretty comprehensive picture of what was happening with Donitz's toys.

Presumably, the aircraft involved in these scenarios would not spend all their time in the air, but would have to wait on the surface for a convoy contact to be developed. Then they would somehow be fueled, armed, and sent on their way to attack the convoys. Or maybe they would already be fueled and armed, and simply have to use the sub's catapult for take-off. I'm still not aware of how that would work, or how the plane would be mounted on the catapult if the seas were anything more than a flat calm.

Anyway, it sounds as if the tender sub (or should that be sub tender?) would end up spending a lot of time on the surface. Combined with the need for extensive radio communications between the planes and the subs, and the sub tenders and whatever command and control elements were necessary, it sounds almost suicidal for the subs. I can see a lot of ways for the Allies to get a pretty good fix on the locations of the sub tenders and once that happens, the sub and all it's aircraft are in a world of hurt.

Maybe Shadow Master has a rabbit that he will pull out of his hat in this regard, but I sure can't imagine what it might be.

 

Yeah, I was looking forward to a lively and entertaining debate too, but it's now been over a week since your last post, and I still haven't seen any ideas on how you, or rather the Germans, could have achieved the "impossible".

Have you been completely unable to get on the forum, or have you just abandoned your idea?

 

I've been back a couple three times since we last posted, but RL has once again interjected itself into my leisure time activities.

My semester break starts in one month, and I hope to have the scanner (or drafting software) that will allow me to post drawings to show concepts and such. The biggie for me is going to be trying to identify exact areas that make people believe that things cannot be done, a case in point would be landings on the sea's surface.

For example, is it the roughness that is the problem, the aircraft's speed, or the swell that poses the largest difficulties?
Roughness (meaning a surface that is like a washboard but otherwise basically flat/level) would mean what as a workaround?
Large swells would typically accompany bad weather (when the seaplanes would either be deployed elsewhere or be ashore) so no real effort is really needed to adjust for this as the idea isn't to try to make the aircraft able to operate in extremely bad weather, but just to be able to carry out operations in calm and mild weather.
As for speed, I have some ideas in that regard, but I don't have the time till my semester break to re-post a combined sub/seaplane + MAR/DT thread unfortunately. I'm sure you'll agree that I have to have my classes taking priority over my hobby time.

I do have an answer for the mating of the seaplane with the sub (and it beats any surface ship/seaplane combo that I know of) and involves the simplest of mechanical measures. I do hope that you will still be interested in exploring these concepts once I get the time to do it right.

I'll PM you an email address that you can use to contact me directly to shoot ideas back and forth, so that logging on here will not cause any big problems.

Shadow Master.

 

1) Weather prediction at that time was significantly worse than it is today. German weather prediction for the Atlantic was much worse than the allies.

2) While heavy swells typically a company bad weather they also occur in the absence of said bad weather. I'm not at all sure that the Kondor could survive take offs and landings in typical North Atlantic swells. Especially repeated ones and given its weak frame.

 

Thanks for responding to my message; I was hoping that we could begin our conversations soon, but, of course, education of the formal variety should take precedence over education for pleasure.

I am not a pilot, thus have no direct experience, but my father was a naval aviator during WW II, and had some experience with large seaplanes immediately after the war. I do have some experience in small vessels, both sail and power, in the Atlantic, Caribbean, and North Pacific and I'm generally familiar with prevailing sea states in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Conversations with my father, and extensive research into sea plane operations lead me to believe that the problem with open-ocean sea plane operations is that wind-waves and swells induced a slamming effect on the hulls of flying boats and the pontoons of sea planes that was very destructive of the structure and fasteners (rivets) of the aircraft. Water, when impacted at speeds of 50 knots or more is just as unforgiving as concrete. A sea plane pilot would always try to reduce landing speed to the very minimum; that is why you will read of "stall landings" and "stall speed" when open-ocean landings are mentioned. Of course, the larger and heavier the aircraft, the higher the normal stall speed is, imposing much heavier impacts for larger planes. And landing a large aircraft at stall speed can be extremely tricky and very dangerous if the pilot makes even a small error.

Everything I have read, and discussed with my father, seems to indicate that sea plane pilots considered waves and swells of 2-4 feet to be the maximum safe sea state on which to land even large, heavily constructed, sea planes. The "period" of waves or swells also was of significance, but this was mostly tied to the height of the waves. Anything above four feet would almost certainly produce structural damage, the severity of which rapidly increases with wave and swell height. It was not uncommon for sea planes to be so badly damaged by open-ocean landings that they could not take off again; If the hull was breached by the loss of rivets and the opening of seams, sinking frequently resulted. Engine mounts, in particular, were subject to strain and damage but other heavy equipment, or ordnance, (the JATO rocket in the example I posted is an example) could tear loose from it's mounting and cause damage or crew injuries.

If there was a ship nearby, the procedure was usually to have it steam at high speed in a large circle which would usually produce a temporary patch of somewhat calmer water. Oil could also be released which, as every seaman knows, has the effect of reducing slightly the effect of wind in producing wind-waves, but of course, these measures would have no influence on swells which often are the products of storms many hundreds of miles distant, and would only produce a relative improvement with wind-waves.

The problem with swells is that they are produced by storms and can travel for hundreds of miles beyond the immediate area of the storm. In the North Atlantic, there is always a storm somewhere, so even if the weather (wind) in your immediate area is dead calm, swells will be running, the exact height and period depending on the power of the storm generating them and it's distance from the observer, among other things. In calm weather it is often very difficult to judge the height or period of the local swell from an aircraft, so the plot may attempt to land in dangerous conditions without even realizing it. Even in Summer, there are very few days in the North Atlantic when it is relatively safe to attempt a landing in a sea plane.

Another issue is landing after dark or during the last stages of dusk; the ability of the pilot to judge his altitude during the last few minutes before touch-down is severely curtailed by low visibility conditions and under no circumstances should landings be attempted during these periods. The results can easily be fatal.

Thus far, I have only been discussing issues with open-ocean landings; take-offs present problems not only with the slamming effect induced by waves and swells, but with achieving enough speed to become airborne, especially with a heavy load aboard. Because hitting a wave tends to reduce the speed of the aircraft, it is difficult to generate enough speed to get the aircraft's hull onto the "step" where it is planing and can reach enough speed to break the suction of the water and become airborne. The rougher the water, of course, the more pronounced this becomes. Very large hulls tend to mitigate this to a certain point, but they also cause more "suction" from a greater area being in contact with the water, so it is almost universal that all large flying boats carrying a heavy load used some sort of thrust generating assistance such as JATO rockets. A catapult could be used, but it would have to be an uncommonly powerful one for the largest flying boats.

After researching what I could find on then web about open-ocean sea plane operations, and watching the wave-height prediction model for the North Atlantic, my estimate would be that it would be possible (but not entirely safe) to attempt to operate sea planes or flying boats in the North Atlantic for about 2-3 days each month during the summer months only. I think the biggest problem you have to overcome is that there was no way to accurately predict wave heights or sea states in the 1940's and prohibitive conditions could propagate within mere hours. That means sea planes could easily find themselves trapped by rapidly changing conditions of weather and sea state. They might find themselves on the ocean's surface unable to take-off and faced with deteriorating conditions, or in the air with rapidly diminishing fuel reserves and no place where there is any possibility of a landing. Of course, these things happened to land-based aircraft during WW II, as well, but the weather conditions which caused these situations were much more common at sea, and, in particular, the North Atlantic, and sea planes based on submarine tenders would have much lkess margin for coping with adverse weather.

Not sure what you are referencing when you mention "speed". Do you mean the speed of the plane? Or the sub?

Excellent, I'm anxious to hear it. But I suspect it will only raise other issues and difficulties. I have done some research into WW II sea plane tenders and the technology behind them, and discovered some things that are probably not commonly known about their design requirements.

Great, I look forward to it. I have had entre days recently when I couldn't acces this forum due, apparently to heavy traffic on the host server. It is very annoying to have to get up in the middle of the night in the hope that the traffic will be light enough to allow me to post something.

 

A most excellent post, sir!

"The plane, the plane..."
(mimics the 'Tattoo' character on 'Fantasy Island' from yesteryear. Sorry, I couldn't help myself.)

I would be very interested to learn more about these.

I too have had that problem. It's even worse when you only have a small amount of time when you could be posting, and then cannot because of connectivity issues. On the plus side, this just means that there are more folks on the WW2F!

Basically, I think we have some good starter areas to concentrate on already. Your excellent post(s) goes into some good detail on the landing difficulties, and the takeoff's w/wo catapult assistance, the command and control problems, RDF games and such to name but a few.

Other mentioned difficulties include weather monitoring/predictions, navigation on long, over water flights, mechanical repairs/maintenance among others.

When I reprise this thread from 2006, I intend to merge it with the MAR/DT discussion because these two divergent branches lead logically to the same R&D tree, namely naval aviation vs. merchantmen. It is my hope that I can come up with concepts and technical guesswork that will at the least give people a chuckle as they read them, and hopefully cause some interesting discussions inspired by these far fetched (erm, far thinking) ideas.

For right now, I am currently thinking that the original idea is so far from anything I would posit today, it doesn't really bear much resemblance to the original thread at all (no basing the seaplanes out on the sea's surface, no heavy 4 engined seaplane torpedo bomber w/4 torpedoes, and oh yea, no steam catapults!), and with the inclusion of the MAR/DT aspects, this new thread is going to be quite a bit different.

Seeing how things look better with pictures, I will start the new thread with the maps from the MAR/DT thread, so right from the beginning everyone reading can see where the action is going to take place, the distances involved, and the areas where land based air would have to be avoided.

My break starts on Aug 18th, so that is when I will try to have everything done. I was counting on my financial aid kicking in on time this year, but of course it didn't, so now I find myself in a mildly bad situation at the time I should have been set. In case bad goes to worse, can anyone recommend a good CAD program that is low cost/free? Or worse, a cheap scanner that I can use for uploading hand drawn images?

I would really like to make a thread that would be worthy of the WW2F.com WI section (not like this one, that is actually more than a bit embarrassing), but one that is well researched, with documentation from useful sites (and working links to them), as well as a bit of humor.

Well, I'm rambling on so I'll call it a post and get outta here, later.

 

You have thought this matter out quite a bit, the answer may be that Hitler would have been better to forgo invading the Soviet Union for a year and throw the entire German industrial might into churning out hundreds of u-boats to deploy against England in 1941. England has historically always been a maritime nation, and particularly in the 20th century, depended very heavily on imports to have the capacity to wage war. If Hitler had been able to cripple British imports, the English may had been forced to sue for peace. In the period after the Fall of France, the effect of the U-boats could have been even more decisive than even the Battle of Britain (which in the short term, was basically strategically inconclusive for both sides).

With britain starved of imports of everything from oil to steel to gunpowder, and no American intervention in sight, even Churchill might have been forced to choose to strike some sort of face-saving bargain with Hitler. (Famously Churchill once stated, that the only thing during the war that ever gave him serious concern and kept him up nights, was the U-boats.)

Anyway since you are very interested in WW2 submarines, if you like video games like i do, there is a mind-blowing game you won't believe until you play called "Silent hunter 4" from Ubisoft. It is fairly complicated but you can learn the commands, they involve almost all the keys on the keyboard, and basically you are an American sub commander in the Pacific in world war 2. You can make it as detailed and life like as you want, includes torpedo targeting the actual way they used to do it, and the game is UNBELIEVABLY realistic. You can look at your own sub and enemy ships from "camera angle" button and even track your torpedoes after you fire them! You issue orders to your crew who carry them out like complete robots and you'd have to play this game to believe it. anyways if you do like video games it DVD is now $5 or so from amazon, used, a tremendous bargain if you enjoy this genre, i recommend to get the "Gold" edition because it includes a large patch and also you can choose to play in 2 modes, as a U-boat commander, OR as American sub skipper.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-list..._1?ie=UTF8&s=videogames&qid=1255800671&sr=8-1

 

I realize what you are suggesting is "what if" Hitler had built more U-boats, but they cannot just "build" them out of thin air. The initial funding, plans, steel production, construction, and crewing also must be accounted for. Hitler might have been "better served" by focusing on U-boats, but that is unlikely to have occured as "living space" in the east was always his plan. Not control of Great Britain, he vainly hoped the British would just "accept" his domination of the Continent, and allow him his land empire if he allowed them to keep their sea-empire.

Before Hitler turned his attention east toward the USSR, which is 1939 through mid-1941 as the time-frame, the Kriegsmarine of Nazi Germany had 57 U-boats in existance. I am not absolutely certain, but I believe this counts the existing Type II boats (A through D models), since they were small coastal and training boats only. That said, 8 boats of those larger types were lost in 1939, 24 in 1940, and 9 more lost before June of 1941. Some were replaced of course in that time line, but by mid-June the U-boat strength remained pretty small.

6 of the 10 existing type VIIA (Atlantic boats) had been sunk well before June,1941. There were 24 type VIIB boats build, and they were an improvement in range, but by mid-1941 twelve of them had also been sunk or "lost at sea". There were a grand total of 538 type VIIC boats eventually commissioned during the war years, but only a few had been built by late 1940 and mid 1941 since the very first was only commissioned by Nov. 1940. 5 of the 8 type IX (A) boats built had been sunk by early 1941, and of the 14 IX(B) improved version boats built, 6 had been sunk or "lost at sea" by early 1941. The IX(C) class only showed up in Jan. of 1941, so they really can’t be counted in my estimation of U-boat strength. There were eventually 54 of them produced but not before the time period we are speaking of; before June, 1941.

Most of the other classes of U-boats built, by that time, were NOT terribly threatening types. So no matter their numbers, they could NOT have influenced the Channel or even open sea usage in any significant fashion in the early stages of the Second World War (pre-Barbarrosa). This is why I stand by the "less than 30 combat ready, sea-worthy" U-boats existed before Operation Barbarrosa, and at the time being considered. I can recommend Richard Worth's (username "Tiornu" here) Fleets of World War II

The 57 boat figure at the start of the war includes the Type II 'ducks'. U1-24 were Type IIs and there were more being built, with about six additional Type IIs entering the September 1, 1939 fleet. Although largely used as training and 'first command' boats, they did serve operationally; however 11 or 13 were lost in combat in the first two years of the war. I think they could just about cross the North Sea, so they might have been able to operate in the Channel from advanced bases in the Low Countries. Still, they were far less capable than 'normal' U-boats and couldn’t have aided in any blockade of Great Britain.

As I mentioned at the start, I realize the question was what if they built "hundreds" of U-boats before this time-frame. The problem with the larger U-boats of seaworthy type, is the length of time it takes to build each one, and the time it takes to train crews for same. I have never seen a less than 11 month construction time between "laid down", and "launched". And then there is almost without fail another month before the boat is "Commissioned" after it sea-trials. So that means a full year from concept to fruition. Submariners are a special breed of sailor, and you cannot just "plug sailors" into submarines. They not only have to be volunteers, they have to be a certain size (height/weight), and have no phobias.

This increase in U-boats would have to have been planned for in, or before 1938 or so in order to have the numbers of boats and crews being bandied about here. Even when the war began in earnest in 1939, the Kreigsmarine had only made plans to train another 50+ crews by the end of 1940, and they missed that goal. And this "more U-boats" also ignores the fact that Hitler was convinced that the pragmatic British would accept his terms after the fall of France, and he wouldn’t have to take the "battle" to them

 

What you say is true but in hind-sight, its easy to say Hitler goofed again on this deal. Hitler tried very hard NOT to provoke the USA into coming into the war for as long as this could possibly be achieved, and this was a huge factor in Hitler's strategic planning.

Hitler made the most basic strategic and tactical mistake of all, leaving one active enemy in his rear while attacking another! Hitler seemed to think that the U-boats already in use, plus the luftwaffe, would keep the active enemy in his rear (Britain) at bay while he merrily sent 138 divisions to attack Russia. Meanwhile British strategic bombing had already begun, but again Hitler gambled that Goering's boasting about the luftwaffe was all true (despite the German failure during Battle of Britain) and could keep the British bombers from doing serious damage, until he had attacked and conquered Soviet Russia by the end of 1941. THEN he could turn his attention back to neutralizing/marginalizing/attacking and invading Britain. All this in retrospect sounds totally insane, and any butter bar lieutenant of any army who wrote a tactical order like this in training, would probably be sent back to the enlisted ranks! Nevertheless that's what Hitler did, his failure to neutralize Britain was one of the major factors that caused Germany to lose the war.

(Interestingly grand Admiral Erich Raeder seemed to have been one of the most brilliant of Hitler's planners, in early 1941 he argued strongly against attacking Russia, pointing out all the reasons against doing it- which were all in time proven true - and outlined a grand strategy for striking in the Mediteranean instead. There was much to gain by Raeder's proposed strategy, including Egypt, the suez canal and middle eastern oil - and his plan would have used far less resources and had a higher likelihood of success. Yet Hitler ignored Raeder, and chose to invade Russia instead.

 

Egypt and the mid-east oil was of no real worth, the oil Hitler went after was a proven producer. The Suez would only be an ego blow to the prestige for GB, they were already shipping around the Cape when the war finally got going. Loosing the Med would be an embarassment to the UK, but of no real value to the Axis. No raw materials, food, fiber, nor wealth. A cash drain in the mega "money pit" style.