Germans doomed to failure

I think we need to be careful here in the direction that this thread is heading. That is, the alternate history question presented lacks one of the basic elements of a good what if concept: plausibility. The US army of 1944 could never face the USSR army of 1941 and there is no use arguing one way or the other about it.

To get back to the original question, did the German army of 1941 have any possibility of defeating the Russian army of 1941? From my reading of this thread, there seems to be a general consensus that they did not. For those that claim it possible, I would suggest that such a victory for the Germans would simply result in a treaty where the USSR would cede some of their Eastern land, which they would eventually gain back during an inevitable conflict sometime in the coming years. I think that it has been clearly established that the German army was far too inept with respect to logistics, civil engineering, and resources to ever completely conquer the USSR.

 

Of course,there is a danger of going to an alternate directin,but the OP is interesting:would it be possible for a more motorized,logistically better equipped army to do what the Germans could not ?
I must say that I am doubting,because one is starting from an unproved assumption:that the Germans failed because there were less motorized and logistically badly equipped,IMHO,this assumption has its origin in the belief (in the US) that motorisation and logistics are the conditiones sine qua non to finish a war victoriously.
One could argue that the Germans failed because
1)the infrastructure in the east could not support the supply even for a non motorized army
2)its was a mission impossible :to arrive at the A-A line before the winter
3)of the resistance of the Russian army,that was sending 1 million man to the front by month.
But,let's imagine a 1944 US-Allied army in june 1941
There are problems:
If we keep the same manpower(2.7 million),we must change the toe-tail ratio :from 1.8-0.9 million,to 1.35-1.35 million
If we keep the same toe-tail ratio,we must change the manpower to 3.6 million (1.8 -1.8)
In both cases,we have a different army
An other point :if we follow the OP,we assume a German war economy,capable to produce all these things necessary for a motorized army,we assume a road and rail infrastructure capable to transport all these things,and,we assume that such a motorized army could operate in a country without a decent road-rail infrastructure .
I also could argue that this motorized US -allied army could not sustain its advance in september 1944,because of logistic problems ,thus the possibility to do it in eastern europe in 1941,..? is,IMHO,dubious .
I know that there is a wide spreaded belief in the US on the omnipotence of the technology,but ,I believe that nature is always stronger .

 

Personally I think you should use the 1944 Red Army in comparison if you are gonna use the 1944 US-Allied Army back in June 1941. Just my opinion.

 

What does that 2.7 Million stand for? looks like the German initial Barbarossa force but it's smaller than figures I've seen (around 3M Germans and 1M axis allies).
2.7M with a US stile toe to tail ratio it would give 1.35 combat troops so roughly 100 divisions (if you keep the historical ration of division/non divisional troops), IMO not enough to achieve the historical initial breakthrough, you need to get close to the historical 150+ division force to get enough combat troops for that and Germany probably didn't have that kind of manpower available even leaving aside the problem odf equipment.

 

No. It has it's origin in the considerable logistics problems suffered by the Germans during even the early parts of Barbarrossa. Clearly the German log system was inadequate. Now whether a much better one would have resulted in a win is an open question.

"Even" for a anon motorized army??? First the log system is more than motorization. But even there a standard 4 wheel drive truck can do a lot more in even some pretty rough cirumstances than a horse drawn wagon. However things like the speed of conversion or indeed how to convert the rail lines, construction of new rail lines, building new, repairing, improving roads and bridges were other areas where the Germans could have used some considerable improvement.

Didn't you just say something about unproven assumptions? Pot to Kettle ....

Why?

As mentioned above an army organized and equiped like the western allies could improve the infrastructure and indeed that would be a big part of the log plan.

In regards to this one should check the choke points. The big problems the allies had in Sept of 44 was due to the lack of port facilities and the unexpectedly rapid rate of advance.

Strawman.

 

The Germans came dangerously close in advancing technologies to having things in their production that could have rendered themselves strategically superior in some areas such as advanced aircraft designs, v-bombs, and nuclear development, but early on they shot themselves in the foot by destroying the innovative levels of their economy, by their attack on their own Jewish population, an important element of their economy, that was an essential element of their success. Early on, Hitler actually protected this element to maintain the economy but soon his hatred drove him to attack the Jews. Enslavement of this group did not replace what their economy needed and by that margin they fell short in design and especially production of the necessary war goods to succeed. Perhaps you could conjecture as to what could have happened if Einstein had chose to stay in Germany to do his studies and the other scientists like him that left Germany early on because of the character of the new government.

 

I'm not part of that general consensus I guess. I firmly believe that the Germans (Axis) had the necessary capability on hand in 1941 to defeat the Soviet Union, but that the plan for Operation Barbarossa was inadequate (obviously) but could have been improved to the point that it could have succeeded.

If they lost in 1941 I highly doubt this.

I think this is misled, clearly the German logistical and engineering support for Barbarossa was perfectly adequate as per the original operational construct. The issue of failure on these subjects is only broached once the original operational parameters are exceeded, and even at that point one has to take into account the sheer scale of operations before applying the broad stroke of ineptitude to what were up to that point highly effective services. Seems a shallow generalization to me, omitting severe changes in circumstance to focus on the end result and see a systemic failure as opposed to the true origin of the problem. The fact is the Wehrmacht excelled at rapid river crossings as demonstrated in France 1940 (Meuse, Rhine) and in Operation Barbarossa (Dnieper, Desna) just to name a few.
Crossing the Dnieper during the Kiev op.
The German Crossing of the Dnieper in the Kremenchug Area (Kiev Operation), WWII Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 7, September 10, 1942 (Lone Sentry)

Seems pretty efficient and rapid to me.

The Wehrmacht during Barbarossa encountered a significantly higher level of resistance than what was planned for and subsequently failed. So lets say for instance that the Allies faced similiar circumstances in Normandy 1944, would we blame their logistical support and engineering for that? Should we blame logistics and engineering for the failure of Market Garden then?

 

Initially(on 22 june)the German strength was
AGS :38 divisions + 1 brigade (LSSAH)
AGC :47 divisions +1 Mot IR (GD)
AGN:26 divisions
Finland :3 divisions + SS Kampfgruppe Nord
Total:114 divisions +the equivalent of 2 divisions =116
That should be 1.8 million in the divisions and 0.9 million other
There also were 6 security divisions which were not engaged at the front .
The strategic reserve was :28 divisions ;a guess :some 0.5 million,but a lot of these divisions were committed only weeks after 22 june,the 2 PD (5 + 15 ) only in september .
Thus my guess is :in june 2.7,in september :also 2.7 million :2.7 + the strategic reserve -0.5 million losses (KIA,WIA,MIA :some 0.4 million,wounded and sick :some 0.1 million)
With the manpower the Germans had,they could not have an American style army with a 1/1 ratio of fighting and non fighting forces
1)or they would increase the non fighting forces to 1.8 million,but,where would they get them ?
2) or they would diminish the fighting units from 1.8 to 0.9
3)they would diminish the fighting units to 1.35 and increase the non fighting to 1.35
About the German allies n june ,these were Finland,Rumania and Hungary ,it was impossible that these 3 could commit 1 million men .(the Italian Expeditionary Corps was engaged only much later),there was also from Slowakia 2 ID +1 brigade
I have for
Romania:4 divisions and 7 brigades (later other Romanian units were engaged,but,retired from the front in the autumn)
Finland :17 divisions + 2 brigades
Hugary: 3 brigades
In 1942,the Romanian,Hungarian and Italian contribution was increased,but,that's irrelevant for the june 1941 period .

 

I don't think it's all that clear at all. Certainly they were having problems in August that's a bit early for them to be called "perfectly adequate" in my book.

The resistence in the fall was higher than planed for. I'm not sure about that in the summer.

Indeed the logistics and planning for Market Garden is often sighted as one of the reasons for that failure. Having the armored support only able to advance along a single road along with the log support for most of the operation was problematic. In addition had a through logistics study been prerformed it would have been clear that a supperior objective was both available and more attainable.

 

I thought it was obvious that a western style army needed more supplies than a proportionally less motorized army as the German one of 1941.
The Germans had already big problems to supply their army by the primitive railway and road system in Eastern Europr:
ex:for june and july,they only could send 87 tanks to the front,in august :none .
ex:it took them 3 months to gather enough supplies for a limited offensive (Typhoon)
Conclusion:to supply a western style army would be much more difficult .
Quote"as mentioned above an army organized and equiped like the western allies could improve the infrastructure and indeed that would be a big plan of the log plan"
I expected something as this,it is proving my "strawman" :you belief that there was no limit on what could do US technology,is very patriotic,but is it wise ?
About Pot to Kettle:
the facts are the following :
on 22 june 1941,the SU operational forces (reserve included) were :3 million men
on 1 december 1941,these forces were : 4.6 million
from june 1941 till january 1942,these forces had 4.5 million losses (and this figure is probably underestimated).
The conclusion is that the SU was capable to send monthly 1 million men to the front .
That's my principal objection to those who are argueing that the Germans failed because of bad logistics ;logistics were of course important,but what was more important,was
a)the SU sending 1 million men(monthly) to the front ,and these reinforcements being bigger than the losses
b)Germany sending less than 200000 men (monthly) to the front:0.5 million of the reserve and also 0.5 million individual replacements,and,these reinforcements being smaller than the losses (.083 KIA,WIA,MIA and 390000 sick)

 

Broadly(!) speaking ,the argument of Stolpi is that at the end of august 1941,the Germans could launch an attack on Moscow (no supply problems),and could capture Moscow and that the fall of Moscow would result in the fall of the SU.
And that all was the fault of the stupid Hitler .But
1)The German archives are proving that there were bif supply problems which were diminishing the possibility of an attack on Moscow
2)There is no proof that such attack would result in the fall of Moscow
3) there also is no proof that the fall of Moscow would result in the fall of the SU
These are my principal objections against Stolpi.
I know that Stolpi and Glantz are no big friends .

 

Well, like I said above: "German logistical and engineering support for Barbarossa was perfectly adequate as per the original operational construct". That would be from the border on 22 June until 7 August when Smolensk was consolidated. AGS was having a tougher time than the other two AG's due to heavy resistance, not so much logistical issues up to that time. According to the pre-campaign estimates of enemy strength the Wehrmacht (specifically AGC) had destroyed the Red Army as per the plan within the assigned timeframe and had reached the designated operational phase line (Smolensk) where it was to pause 3 weeks before proceeding to Moscow against limited resistance. A planning staff can only prepare to support an operation with the parameters it is supplied with, there is no magic crystal ball. A degree of flexibility is contained within the plan, but to fault the German Quatermaster Service for not preparing for what happend during the latter stages of Barbarossa is incredibly shortsighted.
As I have been saying all along the logistical support plan for Barbarossa was perfectly adequate within the confines of the original operational plan put out by OKH. The logistical support plan proved inadequate for operation Barbarossa because the pre-campaign planning assumptions regarding enemy strength were incredibly low, thus the stockage level of just about everything for the operation was too low as where the emphasis and means to get it there.

Market Garden isn't the issue here but... It's a pretty clear case of a bad plan that assumed too much and ignored too much also. The log issues associated with MG are a byproduct of a bad plan and aren't the central issue.

 

I suspect it is pretty dependent on just what you are talking about. Working horses take porportioally more weight of fuel (all be it grain) than trucks if you measure by the ton/mile.

Indeed but it's been mentioned that a better equiped force can improve the road and railway infrastructure faster so it's not necessarily a net loss. Indeed even without improvement a truck can move more supplies faster and further than a horse drawn wagon on the same road net.

Conclusion reached in the absence of adequate facts or logic.

No it doesn't "prove" your strawman. It proves you are either unwilling or unable to comprehend what I'm writing.

You are still making assumptions concerning the "facts" you posted. It's not clear that if the Germans had been able to advance faster that they couldn't have reached the A-A line or that the Soviets could have made up for the losses or indeed even maintained the numbers they were moving to the front in the face of even more pressure from the Germans.

Comparing the ability of Germany and the USSR to send troops to the front ... Sounds like logistics to me.

 

Well let's take a look, according to wiki at: Operation Barbarossa - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I.e. the infantry divisions had fallen behind and needed time to catch up. So ~2 weeks into the campaign the log system is handcuffing the offensive.
That site and others mention Lenningrad and Moscow as being primary targets so sounds to me like they are part of the "original operational construct".

Aren't they? I'm certainly not convinced.

 

AFAIK the strategic reserve was comitted quite quicky, the late arrival of the two panzers was due to equipment losses in the Balcans that had to be made good but most of the other units were committed sooner.

The Italian CSIR was a well supported 3 division force amounting to a little above 60.000 men and did take part in the 1941 campaign though not in the frontier battles. We have around 200.000 Finn troops and most of the Rumanian Army was committed at some point in 1941 though part of it was pulled back after the fall of Odessa, the Rumanianian Army was 650.000 strong in 1941 (and grew to 1.2M in 1944 despite the Stalingrad losses) so a rough figure of 1M axis allies is not that far off.

BTW GD in 1941 was still a regiment, as was the Lehr (900) "brigade" of AGC, LSAH and Nord were closer to divisions.

But I agree with your guess that German ground forces in the USSR in 1941 were probably not above the 3M mark during the 1941 campaign. I think your 2.7 does not include LW forces which would go a long way in explaining the much higher figures I've seen, the only significant "ground combat" elements of the LW in 1941 were the heavy AA regiments, important units as they had most of the 88s, but not very significant personnell wise.

The "stops" to the panzers, though they were officially attributed to letting the foot infantry catch up, were also due to the need to rest and refit after intensive combat, full motorization would not do away with that.

 

IMO Gentlemen, "will" has great importance on the battlefield. The Red Army Soldiers "will" and determination to resist and defend "Mother Russia" was greater than the German soldiers will to occupy, exterminate and enslave. The Russian soldiers love for his country was far greater than the German soldiers love for Hitlers racial policy and Bolshevik propaganda. It is for this reason alone why the conquerors of Western Europe who have never seen defeat on land and benefiting from advantages such as air superiority, mobility, leadership, equipment and surprise were met with resistance from a "rag tag' group of guys which inflicted more casualties on the German war machine than anyone else eventually leading to the German defeat at Moscow.

Had the German soldiers fighting in Russia encountered the same kind of resistance which they had encountered in Western Europe, the war in the East would have been over within the German time table.

The biggest problem which the Germans encountered in Soviet Russia, was an adversary who defied their core belief of a sub-human which they thought they were facing. An adversary who fought in and under any condition; regardless of weather, food, ammunition, leadership or shelter. Never before had the Germans witnessed soldiers charging their tanks with nothing but grenades in their hands or so stubbornly resisting when completely surrounded. The biggest problem that the Germans encountered in Soviet Russia was the Red Army soldier; logistics were more of an inconvenience which with out the resistance would not have been an issue.

IMO, The Germans were doomed to failure because they under estimated their adversary and the adversary's will to resist and defend at all cost.

 

Good points!!!! I can imagine that if France had the same fire in 1940 as they did in 1914 the Germans would have had a much rougher time in May of 1940.

 

Well,on the risk of going off topic,that's underestimating the scale of fighting and the losses of 1940:in may-june 1940 ,the Germans lost almost 150000 men (a weekly average of 25000;in the second phase,the losses were ,proportionally the double),and,for june -september 1941,the German losses were 400000 men (weekly an average of 40000)

 

I have to disagree on the second point (which is essential)"The highly mechanized-motorized US army would be far better suited to win a quick campaign than Hitlers 1941 army ":because,this is depending on the assumption that this highly mechanized-motorized US army would be capable ,in 10 weeks,to transform-ameliorate,the existing road-railway infrastructure,so that this road-railway infrastructure could sustain a MUCH MORE demanding highly mechanized-motorized US army.
And,for this,there is no proof,only a (blind ?) belief in the omnipotence of the US technology .

 

About the commitment of the Axis allies,on AHF,I have seen the most experienced member on these things claiming that Barbarossa started without any Axis allies,because the Fins and Romanians joined a few days later ;if you would reply that this is some splitting of hairs,well,IMHO,you would not be totally wrong .
But,"the Russian front" is giving the following on the engagement of the Axis allies(Finland not included):
july:+ 3 Rumanian divisions and 2 Slov.
august :+ 8 Rum and 3 It.
september:subtract :the 2 Slov
october:+ 2 Rum
december:+ 1 Slov.Subtract :all Rumanian units from the front and send back to Rumania
About the commitment of the OKH reserve,the same source is giving the following:
june :add:2 ID
july:add:21 divisions
aug:add :2
sep:add :1
oct:1 ID + 2 PD
nov:2
This source is giving a stronger OKH reserve
About the role of the LW:
most LW personnel is not included in the 2.7 million,as were not the RAF and USAAF in june 1944.
Some LW (A-A) units were accompanying the advancing army units,but,their strength was limited .