Germany reach the Urals

Atlantis captured a merchant ship with 6 British naval officers on board heading out from Australia. A shot was sent over to silence the radio & landed square on the shack, killing all 6 of the officers. The unfortunate effect was that the codes were left in the safe,( no one was alive to dump the contents of the safe overboard as is the usual custom ), along with all the British disposition info regarding SE asia, strengths, gun emplacements the works. Captain Rogge was astonished that the British would send such sensitive info on a cargo ship, yet that is exactly what happenned. & the merchant code is "extremely" important to the atlantic conflict.

http://www.nesa.org.uk/html/automedon-ultra.htm

This info was turned over to the Japanese who at 1st were very suspicious, they had the same question & thought it was fake information. They soon changed their minds & used the info to their advantage steamrolling the British out of Singapore based largely on Rogge's captured data. Rogge was given a Samurai Sword for his contribution, one of only a few that were bestowed on Germans during the war. So yes, Atlantis did in fact effect not only the Atlantic war, but very much the south Asia front as well.


P.S. I have never stated the Germans should have won for any obscene reason. Taking Baku via southern route is a logical & viable strategic avenue of travel for Germany in the war. & rail system was the main supply method used in Russia. Motorized transport important, very true. & surrounding Stalingrad vs going straight into it is yet another facet among many that could have changed the face of the Russian front.

If different strategy topics are tiring, why on earth post on them?

 

There is no doubt that possession of these documents profoundly affected Japanese war planning in January 1941, this intimate view of Churchill’s War Cabinet decisions and opinions enabled the Japanese to dismiss any serious fears that the British could make a worthwhile military intervention in the Far East, it also provided the Japanese with a clear picture of British knowledge of their armed forces (for example. that we were unaware that the Japanese Air Force possessed torpedo-carrying aircraft).

It is fair to argue, therefore, that the capture of the Chiefs-of-Staff report from the Automedon was the catalyst that sent the Japanese on the path to Pearl Harbour and precipitated the ruinous attack on America’s Pacific fleet.

After the fall of Singapore in 1941, Captain Rogge of the Atlantiswas presented with a Samurai sword by the Japanese Emperor in recognitionof his achievement, only two other Germans received such an award, Hermann Goering and Erwin Rommel, later, Admiral Kondo was to tell Wenneker on several occasions how valuable this particular document had been in planning the attacks on Pearl Harbour, the Philippines, and Singapore, on the 8th December 1941, thus opening the war between Imperial Japan and the USA.

I think this deserves a separate thread.

 

Couple other Ural thoughts. If I were in charge of Barbarossa, the 1st thing I would do is bomb Baku. Send BV 138's from Black sea, or condors, whatever & flatten the place. & keep doing it throughout campaign.

& when approaching Stalingrad, I'd bomb ships in the Caspian sea Then go after the Trans Siberian railroad. Condors might reach Manchuria & bomb all along the way. The terrain is not like the Russian Steppes, there would be many more bridges to take out. No switchbacks either like germans used in steppes, only one track, making damage easy. This would block lend lease materials to a large degree. & if southern route followed, Iran route also blocked.

& instead of going straight in to Stalingrad, I'd set up all along the Volga & sink anything that passed. Especially ships coming from Caspian bringing go go juice to the Russian armies.

Yes I know, hindsight is 20/20, but, that would have been better than what they did. War winning strategy?, no, as this is limited to east front discussion. & success well depends on how well executed.

http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/archives/961230.shtml

Due to various delays, including weather conditions, the first Lend-Lease aircraft wearing the red star did not cross from Nome into Siberia until October, 1942.

(Of these Vladivostok sailings, at least nine vessels were sunk by the "neutral" Japanese.)

 

Chromeboomerang, 3 posts in a row? What makes you so desperate?

Could be worse, in your Buchón thread it was 5 posts in a row before any reply.

 

What makes you arrive at such an odd conclusion that I am desperate??


Could be worse, in your Buchón thread it was 5 posts in a row before any reply."

And so what??

 

A few notes:

Railways are not the easiest thing to interdict. The US had massive problems maintaining a complete interdiction of the Northern Italian railway system in early 1944 during Operation Strangle.
The Germans had the same problem in the east where they did try to interdict rail lines before Kursk (largely, if not completely a failure), the Murmansk rail line using much more suitable bombers like the Do 217 where at most they managed to shut it down for a few days at a time periodically.
Bombing bridges during this period is even more difficult. Look at the Brenetfeld (sp) Viaduct. The RAF tried to destroy this critical rail line / bridge in Northern Germany for over a year periodically bombing with large aircraft raids. It finally took 617 Squadron using Grand Slam bombs (note the s there) to drop the aquaduct.
A handful of Fw 200, Bv 138, or other marginal bombardment aircraft are not going to make a whit's difference in the east. "Flattening oilfields" is not going to happen using a couple dozen bombers any more than flattening some large city by similar means; at least not with conventional explosive weapons.

On motor transport for the Germans, they were so short of trucks and other motor vehicles that at the onset of the 42 summer offensive (drive to Stalingrad) only those divisions of AGS that were spearheading the drive were equipped with anything approaching their establishment strength of trucks (about 80% level in this case). This was done by stripping all other divisions in the Army Group of virtually every motor vehicle they had.
AGC and AGN were in even worse shape with the best divisions at about 50% and the vast majority vehicle-less.
Panzer divisions in AGS were built up to 2 battalions each with a couple of units getting 3. Elsewhere panzer divisions were limited to just a single battalion of tanks due to the overall shortage of these vehicles.
If anything, capturing the Caucaus oil fields would do the Germans little or no good; they had no vehicles to use the oil!
Even horses were in short supply at the onset of this offensive. Artillery? Infantry divisions were limited to 3 guns per battery due to a shortage of pieces. The mobile assault divisions got 4 per battery.
If anything, the Germans started the Summer 42 offensive in a weakened and barely capable state declining from there and never recovering to even these levels.

 

while the capture of Baku might not have been immediately useful to the axis it would have seriouly hurt the soviets. Without the caucus oil the soviets would soon run short of feul for their economy.

 

According to Harrison, Soviet oil production for Baku was 22,000 tons of 32,000 tons total in '41, and 11,500 tons of 19,500 tons total in '45.

The big question is why did the production of Baku decrease by nearly 50% by 1945 since it was never bombed by the Germans. Is this a result of a failure to repair or replace essential equipment in the oil fields as well as a failure to drill new wells when existing ones ran dry? Or perhaps something as simple as a labor shortage?

 

"The US had massive problems maintaining a complete interdiction of the Northern Italian railway system in early 1944"

Hmmm, this is at odds with what is known about the German rail guns in northern Italy. They could only operate in the rail tunnels cause rest of rail system bombed out.


"On motor transport for the Germans, they were so short of trucks and other motor vehicles that at the onset of the 42 summer offensive (drive to Stalingrad)"

Yet they reached the Caspian sea & planted a flag atop Mt Elbrus regardless.

 

"Flattening oilfields" is not going to happen using a couple dozen bombers any more than flattening some large city by similar means; at least not with conventional explosive weapons.


Um, not. Flattening a city is not at all comparable to hitting the key elements of oil production, namely the refineries, the storage facilities & so on. A few bombers would do horrendous damage if done with accuracy. Imagine the oil fires! extensive further damage would happen after the bombing resultant from fire damage.

One only need look at the damage inflicted on Germany's synthetic fuel plants to see how easy it was done.


http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/germanhorse/

The old-type German infantry division had approximately 5,300 horses, 1,100 horse-drawn vehicles, 950 motor vehicles, and 430 motorcycles. In 1943, due to the great difficulties in supply and upkeep of motor vehicles in the wide stretches of the Eastern Front, the allotment to divisions in that theater was reduced to approximately 400 motor vehicles and 400 motorcycles, and the number of horses was increased to some 6,300. The 1944-type divisions had about 4,600 horses, 1,400 horse-drawn vehicles, 600 motor vehicles, and 150 motorcycles.

http://www.tamiyausa.com/product/item.php?product-id=35052

These "Kubelwagens" were used as light gun tractors, staff cars, radio cars, command cars, artillery survey vehicles, and signal line layers, as well as serving as personnel carriers for motorized units.

Dunno how many of these were made, but it was very common at all fronts/ Also wonder about Dutch & French captured vehicles & how they might've been used in east front.

Here we go. 51.000 made.
http://www.tamiya.com/english/monthly/006_porsche/index.htm

the Volkswagen never quite reached the people, but instead was used as the base for a military vehicle known as the Kubelwagen. Including all remodeled versions, a total of 51,000 Kubelwagens were produced for military purposes. Strong, durable and reliable, it was the trusted mode of transport for the German army.

 

Well, let's see; citing modelling web sites hardly makes a strong argument (eg., tamiya).
There were actually 52,018 Kfz 1 (aka Volkswagen 82) cars produced. These vehicles were far less capable than the US produced 1/4 ton truck (eg "jeep"). But, that aside they are not some panacia to German motorization problems.
Shifting to Department of the Army Pamplet 20-261a The German Campaign in Russia - Planning and Operations (1940 - 1942) we find that almost half 21 of 41 divisions in AGS are "allied" (eg Hungarian, Italian, Romanian etc) and that of the German divisons the majority had 60 percent or less of their organic motorization. There was also just a single rail line east of Stalino to supply units advancing towards Stalingrad, or about 1/3rd the necessary rail requirement.
As for oil field destruction, one can look to the Polesti raid(s) where hundreds of American heavy bombers carrying several times the load of the suggested German aircraft failed to make a significant dent in production. Not only that, but in the case of Polesti, the US had far better intelligence and planning than any German raid during the war anywhere had. Briefings included motion pictures of the sites to be bombed showing approach routes, targets, and other pertinent information in a 3D setting. Crews practiced for weeks prior to the raid on low level bombing of targets. The Germans never were so thorough on a raid or bombing mission. It is absolutely absurd to think that somehow they (the Germans) could manage what the Allies could not with a mere fraction of the aircraft and some marginal amount of planning.
Basically, this thread is becoming a waste of effort to bother with.

 

it has stretched long enough....i say we close...

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Well, let's see; citing modelling web sites hardly makes a strong argument (eg., tamiya).
There were actually 52,018 Kfz 1 (aka Volkswagen 82) cars produced.

Whoopeedoo, off by a thousand. Gimme a break.

"American heavy bombers carrying several times the load of the suggested German aircraft failed to make a significant dent in production."


http://bestairlines.net.au/online_ww2_videos_89t.html

By the
end of the Ploesti air campaign in the fall of 1944, 90% of Romania's
oil production was knocked at a cost of 270 bombers and 49 fighters and
their crews.

As usual, Gardner is 900 miles off the mark.

 

I agree..we should close this one.