Germany signs peace with Britain

Given the principals probably not. On the other hand if Germany really wanted a peace treaty with the West if they offered to pull out of Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France (probably excepting Alsase and Lorraine) along with the return of all POWs I suspect Britain would have a hard time refusing and that looks a lot like a "peace of equals" to me. Even if there were some provisons limiting the military of the recently freed countries over the next few years.

 

Except there's no way that Hitler would ever have offered those. That's clear from the July speech "offer"; what he was seeking was a "freezing in place" - with Britain to have NO interests at all in Continental Europe and what the Germans did there I.E. no interests at all in the Greater Reich as it stood in July 1940. Which included said Norway, Denmark, Belgium, France...

There are hints of him portraying it as a "peace of equals" in that speech - or at least being politically savvy enough to offer the peace in terms that could be portrayed as such by the British government which accepted...but a peace that in effects says "yes we will leave all of Europe to the Naizs" after the loss of Norway, the loss of Belgium and France, and the humiliation of Dunkirk...is a British acceptance of that defeat. It's Hitler dictating the terms he will offer to Britain.

 

But just as Hitler can't offer that can Britain accept a peace with the low countries under control of Germany? Either one or both sides have to act way out of character who is to say which one?

 

Right then - we had lost. And we certainly had no army to go BACK to liberate the Low countries. It was only Churchill's determination, backed by the War Cabinet of the new National Government, that kept us in the war until the relative haven of the beginning of the winter of 1940


There were other factors in the situation; ones I've mentioned before. Hitler openly stated to members of his immediate circle that he was hanging around Belgium and the old WWI battlefields sightseeing with Max Amman in the last weeks of June and the first week of July 1940 because he was waiting for news vis the Swedes iof a change ogf government in London...that statement is mentioned in Fleming's book on Sealion.

It seems that there was SOMETHING going on in London in June 1940 after DYNAMO; Ralph Edwards, DNO at the Admiralty, was busy organising what amounts to a Coup along with a number of disgruntled RN officers, foremost among them the Bill Tennant who was the RN shore officer in Dunkirk, and who on his return to England dashed out a scathing pamphlet condemning Churchill's conduct of the war to date...the diea being to rget the King to replace Churchill with Lord Halifax, who would then conclude a peace with Hitler. According to his diaries, preserved openly on the Bodliean Library, Edwards and his conspirators met with Walter Monckton, who was to give them direct access to the Queen...

Whatever happened - the coup did not take place. But what's interesting is that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office officially telegraphed the British Embassy in Stockholm to await a change of government in London on or around the 28th of June...a telegramme that when the Swedes wanted to make public in the 1960s London was very put out about - but the Swedes published anyway...

And who was the head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as Foreign Secretary? Lord Halifax...!

Unlike most "conspiracy theories" this appears to be one with some major grounding in reality! If only in that it was accidently confirmed by Fleming several decades BEFORE all the other elements became clear.

And there's another wrinkle...

Not only had Halifax been told after the Cabinet vote in the middle of DYNAMO to carry out no more appraches to germany via the Swedes at the start of June...and he had disobeyed Churchill by the middle of the month when all the above began working up...

In the middle of AUGUST, Churchill was informed by the Americans that once again, expressly against his instructions, Halifax was asking Lord Lothian in the U.S. to ask the German ambassador in Washington what Germany would seek as "pay off" for a peace treaty...and Churchill had to once again order him to stop.

This time he acted directly against Halifax, albeit in a particularly "British" way; he demanded that he see the despatch sent to Lothian ordering him to desist...and he ordered that all future correspondance to Lord Lothian in Washington go through the Cabinet Office at No.10. Thus removing Halifax' ability to act covertly.

In effect, therefore.....three times Halifax negoitiated either via a third party or directly with the Nazis - and on two of those at least he either hoped to or would have NEEDED to be Prime Minister to be able to make or accept a formal peace offer

Lord Halifax is a nasty piece of work who's reputation has managed to survive parly unscathed out of the events of 1940; my personal opinion is that at the very least he was a nasty, traitorous little sh1t who was just one small, "very British coup" the wrong side of going down in history a worse traitor than any Vidkun Quisling or Benedict Arnold.

 

But did he have enough support in Britain to carry it off? I can see him trying but while Britain alone lacked the strength to return to the continent it's also clear that Germany didn't have the navy to defeat Britain either. It would seem to me that the above would have been clear to many if not most Britains and especially those in power.

 

More than we choose to think nowadays. And again - it would depend on how it was spun by the new government; the conduct of the war was, with minor...as in soon-vanishing...highpoints like the sinking of the Graf Spee and the Altmark Incident, up to 10th May was pretty disastrous...

...and not only was a good deal of THAT all down to Churchil - Norway etc....

...HE presided over all the defeats and losses after 10th May!

Tennant's "book" was a potboiler but a minor bestseller There used to be a copy reproduced on the Internet, but it vanished years ago, although I did get to read bits of it. And the Conservative Party was still very much agsinst Winston; of all people it was CHAMBERLAIN who did the most to unite the party behind Churchill before he died at the end of the year!

Germany may not have had the navy to defeat the Royal Navy - but it didn't need to Just get across the Channel where the Navy couldn't have brought its capital ships to bear...

 

So where does his support come from? You aren't talking a military coup are you? I can't see that working. With Cnamberlain firmly against a treaty (perhaps the POD is him dieing somewhat earlier) I simply don't see the support to pull it off. The Germans also need to do more than get across the channel they need to be able to support a force in Britain for a significant period of time (weeks at least). The RN can pretty well prevent that even without capital ships and of course the navy can if necessary bring those capital ships to bear.

 

Germany lacked the specialized ships, heavy sea lift, amphibious doctrine and training, naval strength and airpower to pull off a successful invasion of Britain. They could not get sufficient forces ashore quickly enough, nor sufficient material to sustain a combat force as large as would be needed.

 

Doesn't make it impossible, Just highly improbable. Been many times through out history when forces so small that should have been crushed have been able to gain the upper hand be it through superior fighting ability, better tactics or simply making their force look bigger then what it actually was. So on paper an invasion wouldn't succeed, in reality, well we will never know because anything could have happened.

 

Ill be straight off the bat, Im basing my personal thoughts on the belief the the UK would be occupied.

LW - 700,000 personnel, Im honestly struggling with the LW needing a force any larger that what they had in 1939 which was 400,000 persons with 4,000 aircraft. Most would only be needed on the Eastern front as their would be no decent sized force able to endanger them from any where else with the only nations around Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Turkey, Bulgaria etc all being either allied with Germany, lacking sufficient size and military capability or so severly isolated that attacking would mean certain defeat.

Kriegsmarine - With naval plan Z the personnel strength had been planned to rise to over 200,000, The fact that Germany was still a good decade away from being able to complete such a plan if at all tells me that the force would be unlikely to grow to that 300,000 ever, Let alone the 200,000. Conquering the British and French and quiet possibly putting a sizable force at the bottom of the ocean could lead Hitler to directing resources away from the KM and more into Panzer production seeing as the Naval war would be non existent.

Home force - Why is a force of 1 million men not exaggerated when you take into account that in said scenario there is literally no threat around you? If France or Poland where still independent then yes a home force of 1 million would be suitable (maybe) but with all under Germany's control you wouldn't need a force any larger then what was in 1938 (600,000 men) and even then to me that is over the top.

Occupational capability - True no single nation could occupy that all alone, At least not indefinitely however they also had allies with them that also did the occupation so when using statistics you should also use their population sizes so as to not try and skew the figures, Oh and the SU had just above 160 million all up, Germany never intended to Conquer all of the USSR, Just up to the A-A line so really shouldn't use the SU figures as a whole but rather work out size of population in area of occupation/intended occupation. Even using worst case figures (320m people - Which would include all of SU) Germany and their allies in Europe would still be able to bring 165 million people onto the mix. 320m occupied by group numbering 165m, Difficult but not impossible.

 

The Germans saw the European part of the Soviet that was closer to Germany as more important. It had the SUs capitAl, Leningrad, Stalingrad, the Caucusus, etc. basically that was where most of the Soviet Unions I distrial strength was located.

 

And while we are talking about highly improbable events, we can mention that it is also possible that all your atoms suddenly fly apart, leaving nothing behind. I mean, anything could happen, right?

Let's face it. The reason the German's didn't attempt it, shows that they knew just how improbable it was. It would've been a massacre. Had Göring even accomplished what he claimed he could, it still would've been a bloodbath. With all the right conditions, Germany would still have a very difficult time keeping the forces deployed in supply.

 

No need to get like that, I did state that it was highly improbable so I honestly am stumped as to such a reply when I for the most part agreed it was unlikely however leaving room for the possibility of it occurring since I gather not one of us has the ability to see alternate realities. I did give a general example (no specific battle/war) of when forces that should have lost have won against what was thought of impossible odds, Not one of us can see into alternate realities so not one of us can say with out a doubt if it would or wouldn't have succeeded.

We can use what we know to make a 'likely' conclusion but it all comes down to it being a 'likely' conclusion rather then a 'definite' conclusion. Hell on paper when you look at the USSR forces amassed against the Axis forces at the start of Barbarossa it should have at the very least been a stalemate.

Battles won against the odds include but not limited to: Battle of Longewala 1971, Battle of Okehazama 1560, Battle of Tolvajarvi 1939 etc etc etc

Having the home field advantage or a longer less guaranteed supply line does not make certain victory or defeat. A few bad or good officers can turn a strength or weakness into a weakness or strength. Its not all black and white as we have learned many times through many battles that occurred in WWII, so when it comes to discussions within the WI section we need to refrain from making out something the be a certainty when we well and truly known that it may not be so.

 

So, back to the OP.

Let's assume
1) France has fallen
2) that there is some form of coup in June 1940, that has the following consequences:
2a) Lord Halifax is made PM
2b) Churchill is locked away in some form of house arrest
2c) King Edward VIII is restored to the English throne somehow.
2d) King George VI sent into exil with his family, in Canda.
2e) Italy presses unsuccessfully for territories in the Med.
3) Canada, Australia, and New Zealand declare a hesitant peace.

Civil unrest in Britain. Germany "lends" 12 divisions to the British to help "restore the peace".

Indian nationalist activities increase. The Indian infantry divisions (4th, 5th) withdrawn from the Suez.

IJA invades Indochina (June '40).

Italy, with sour grapes, makes a half-hearted attempt to invade Egypt in Sept '40. Without the inglorious defeat inflicted on Italy as was historically. Hitler is furious, however, as this causes the uneasy Britain to tip over to a civil war, against the authorities. Queen Wallis killed in a riot on Picadilly. King Edward VIII disappears from public view, rumours abound. The Italian invasion is barely stopped.

Oct '40; Still seeking victory, Italy invades Greece. Still unsuccessful.

Australia, New Zealand and Canada abscond from the British Commonwealth in Oct '40, citing King George VI as their "new" King and Emperor. The ANZCAN-Bloc is formed. The RN divides, with the majority declaring loyalty to King George VI, and sailing for Canada. A short period of confusion ensues as to which parts of the British Empire belong to the ANZCAN. The Scottish parliment attempts to join, but the effort is betrayed. In the end, the ANZCAN have the Suez, and Gibraltar, but in India, British control has disintegrated by the year's end, and soon there are several separate states established, as various leaders and ethnic groups start to fight each other. INdian troops leave Persia.

Hitler puts more troops in Britain, as the situation devolves further. He blames the US and ANZCAN for formenting the unrest. Spain joins the Axis pact for Gibraltar, and bits of the Med, putting them on a collision course with Italy in some distant future date.

Jan '41: Thailand, in co-operation with Japan, forces France to cede territories, in Indochina.

March '41 Stalin invades Persia. Quickly destroys the Shah's forces, but leaving the ANZCAN forces intact in Bandar Abbas, Abadan, and Bushehr, allowing them to withdraw. By May '41 Iranian Soviet is formed.

In Africa, native unrest increases.

June '41: Operation Barbarossa.
With no warning from the British, Finland participates more fully, aiding in the encirclement and destruction of Leningrad.
With troops and supplies disengaging from a rebellious Persia, and no lend-lease, the Red Army defence of Moscow is weakened and captured in Nov '41. Stalin, who Eastward fled in October is disposed, Beria is killed by someone, as the communists start to disintegrate, and a truce is sought.

Dec '41:
Japan attacks Malaya, and Burma.

Is Pearl Harbour even necessary?

 

Oh indeed. I have a feeling though, that the battles involved have to involve some chance to succeed. Either the leader of the smaller force is exceptionally clever / astute (Alexander), the leader of the larger force exceptionally stupid / stubborn / ill-informed, that political (non-military) aspects came into play, or there is a quantum shift in equipment.

Somehow, with the possible exception of political forces coming into play, I don't see these things as happening in Operation Sea Lion. Indeed, the question seems to hang around, that it was the hope that a political situation would appear and render the need to invade moot, that seemed to preoccupy Hitler's thoughts. But by the time it was apparent it was not going to happen, and the need to actually physically force the issue to ensure a peace with Britain, the moment of political vacillation had passed. IOW, the only moment it could possibly have succeeded, based on the most political opportune moment, was those days in June. Any later, and Britain had congealed.

There is a similar moment in Operation Barbarossa, during Oct '41 (IRC) when Stalin is filled with self-doubt, and considering fleeing Moscow. The reserves of STAVKA are extremely low, and everywhere there is panic. Then OKH halts the offensive. There are valid reasons, of course for halting then. And valid reasons for why other battles (Kiev, etc) were fought on "the way" to Moscow. But given that the only way to defeat the USSR was politically, not militarily, you have to sometimes wonder about "what if..."

The window of opportunity is much, much smaller to force a political conclusion with Britain. And the chances of an Invasion succeeding without a political conclusion are basically nil. As close to nil as you can get, basically. It was such a long shot, not even HItler, gambler extraordinary even attempted it.

Look at it this way; it was so difficult, it was easier to prepare for, and invade the Soviet Union, and defeat them, than invade a Britain without a base for political post-invasion support. That's how difficult it was.

 

During the 6-8 weeks in question....the Fall of France to the end of July 1940.....the "treaty window" so to speak - the UK was actually horribly vulnerable. We would have been vulnerable to a rapidly-mounted, makeshift Kenneth Macksey-style "bouncing of the Channel" right then, for our defences were equally makeshift and basically still weighted in the wrong direction i.e. the EAST Coast. We would certainly have been vulnerable to a fast "raid" ....1-3 divisions big....aimed directly at London, the sort of "invasion" that Gen. Kirke was concerned about as OC Home Defence until Ironside was given the position.

We didn't know that the KM wasn't just hiding in the Baltic but was actually licking its wounds in half a dozen drydocks on Germany's Baltic coast, we didn't know how attrited the LW's lifting capacity was, nor how few gliders were available etc. - we were expecting a HUGE invasion from above within days. A sizeable raid would have panicked the nation...and certainly Parliament - right then. And the Norway Debate at the start of May showed how a House of Commons debate...even though WON....could rapidly bring down a government and change government policy.

As far as I can see, the plan was to present the King...through the Queen...with "proof" that the armed services were unwilling to support Churchill's premiership. And presenting him with the Director of Naval Operations at the former First Lord of the Admiralty's own back office, along with the Royal Navy's hero of Dunkirk, and IIRC Ernie Spooner of the Renown, would be a very convincing case that the REAL defenders of this island nation, the NAVY, had no confidence in Churchill and his government's war policy.

And if you have no confidence in the ability of the government to prosecute a war....what is the obvious alternative to war? And who was the most high-ranking UK politician openly supporting the idea of a negotiated settlement with Hitler?

A "coup" is what it would have been - but in a very "british" sense; no surrounding the Palace or Westminster with tanks LOL - but instead a peaceful and not-wholly extra-constitutional change of government. After all - ALL that would have been happening was a change in leadership within the Conservative Party, correcting the decision of 9th May...

Chamberlain, being the veteran Conservative politician that he was, would just as equally have worked to unite the party, and thus the government, behind Halifax as he did Churchill; that's what Chamberlain believed in - party unity.

Adm. Forbes refused to bring Home Fleet further south than Great Yarmouth on the East Coast; trying to operate capital ships in the shifting sandbars and shallows of the Channel narrows would have been disastrous - why do most POST-invasion scenarios have the RN departing for Canada? Because they couldn't have been used against an invader!

The RN's anti-invasion preparations took a while to tighten down, as did the building of the coastal Emergency Batteries etc. Bascially - the UK was wide open through July 1940...and there was a significant low point in the RN's preparations in mid-July, when LW operations forced them to withdraw one of their anti-invasion destroyer flotillas from Dover...right in the middle of what we LATER came to know was the planned invasion area...to Portsmouth.

By AUGUST the opportunity for a peace treay was gone - Hitler had been rebuffed, and quite rudely too; Halifax was a diminished force because of the Lothian/Washington fiasco; something had happened so that the planned coup around the 28th of June hadn't gone forward...and British anti-invasion preparatiosn were firming up daily. But in JULY, the prospect for national survival had looked very different...

 

But would this have been sufficient? I would think the Army and the RAF would also have been consulted. Would they concur or offer a counter position?

But could such a government survive long enough to establish such a treaty? Or would there be enough resistance in Parliment for a No Confidence vote?

My impression is that by that point Chamberlain saw Hitler and the Nazis as a danger to Britain that had to be removed. Supporting a peace treaty with them could be viewed as suicide for the Conservative Party and I suspect that would have been his view. As such I simply don't see him supporting it.

Didn't they conduct a number of artillery raids on the French cost during the war? Wouldn't such raids against the logistics ports cause considerable confusion if not destruction.

But the German capability of supporting an invasion was also very weak just then. They would have had what something less than 100 cargo ships to start with and likely lost many in the first day or two. Likewise the air assault on Holland proved just how disasterous those could be. It should and I think was clear that Germany had essentially no chance of invading in June or July. The quick shipment of arms from the US couldn't have hurt either.

 

Yes.

One of the oddities of 1940 was that the Conservatives actually had a parliamentary majority, they didn't NEED a coalition; what the National Government did was do away with a HUGE part of the debating on government actions that trying to conduct a war against the background of normal parliamentary procedure and debate meant. The Norway Debate being a perfect example!

I'm not actually sure they would have been consulted; after all, "Senior Service" an' all that And more than a few equerries around the King would have been ex-Army anyway. I'll have to check but I think Walter Monckton was.

The idea would have been to filter access to the King for the short time that his decisionmaking would have required.

But remember the terms of the "offer" that Hitler did make Dividing up spheres of influence as Hitler proposed would have removed Nazi Germany as a threat to Great Britain - at least on the surface.

There were very few naval bombarments carried out - and not by capital ships. There was one small bombardment during August/September 1940, but only cruisers IIRC.

The problem was the risk/cost vs. the damage done....which was NOT great at all...

...and the RN also knew this from WWI and a couple of fleet bombardments of ports etc. on the occupied coast of the Low Countries, in an attempt to prevent or reduce uboat sorties. So unsuccessful that Roger Keyes came up with the idea of blocking their sortie'ing by the Zeebrugge blockship raid.

WE know that now - but it wasn't so clear in late June 1940. And the flooded airfields of Holland in early May 1940 were not the summer-hardened airfields of Southern England 2-3 months later.

Take a look at Fleming; there have been many works since, but he is still the best for recording the sheer panic of those weeks immediately after the Armistice....the period of any prospective peace treaty And David Newbold's thesis on the Defence of the United Kingdom also reveals just how militarily weak the UK was for those 6-8 weeks.

The U.S. arms were very welcome - but again, they started arriving through July, not in the four weeks immediately following the Armistice. It's that very narrow time frame we're talking about.

 

But that is entirely the point. You are arguing from a British perspective.

The Germans, knew what they had, and they still worried about what the UK had waiting for them on the other side of the channel. They couldn't afford the extreme risk and gamble, of throwing a few men in some 100 cargo ships and immediately trying to force the issue, in July. It was just too risky. Especially as the RAF and RN were still not defeated. It was one enormous gamble too far.

 

Need to take into account though that this WI specifically deals with a British peace deal, I'm certain we can all agree that the UK would not have surrendered under any circumstance unless Germany had troops on the ground in the UK. Ill concede that any invasion after July 1940 had a snow balls chance in hell at succeeding but based off the parameters of this WI I'm going to go with the view that some one some where managed to get support for a quick dash across the Channel, Unlikely yes but is a WI and could very well possibly have been seen by some as a make or break situation knowing that the KM just wasn't strong enough and seeing the failure of the LW at Dunkirk could have given them the chance to keep the pressure on the British while they still had the momentum.