That's a good point - with a bit of careful propaganda and without any of their stupid 'racial supremacy' ideas, the Germans could have got themselves a host of new recruits, and eradicated 90% of the partisan problem. If only they had been nice to the Ukranians etc they conquered, they would have had a much easier time of it in the USSR...
I swear I'm going to write this down. You crack me up Ricky. :lol: Do you think nice people would actually go for supremacy in Europe?
You are both right, bad people usually don't do nice things to people. But on the other hand, Stalin was so deeply hated by the Ukranians that if the Germans displayed any kind of descency at all (Nazis and descency, yeah right), they would have easily won the Ukranians' support.
This is probably so. In any case the Germans could have mobilized huge numbers of Baltic peoples for their cause when the Russians seemed to start winning; had they been nice. The problem is, you can't really be nice to people and at the same time want to remove them from their country to make room for Germans or simply to exterminate them. Trying to get support from Slavic peoples, and also from the huge amount of Jews living in the Ukraine, simply can't be mated with the German ideological ideals. They were horrible to the Ukranians and Baltic peoples alike because it was their aim to remove them. Like you said, they weren't nice people and they didn't have nice ideas.
Indeed. And the strange part is that Hitler was actually *admired* by many people outside of Germany before the war. And there are those today in this country who actually have the unmitigated gall to not only admire him, but to compare him to George Washington! :angry:
Ok, so we are agreed that had the Germans thought with their heads, not their racial ideology, they would have had a far easier time in the USSR. So, how could they manage to enlist the slavs and still get rid of them? The obvious thing to do is to use them, tolerate them, even be nice to them, until the war is ended. Then eradicate them. Think about it - you get a large pool of person-power. They grow good crops in the Ukraine. Their men can go to Germany to be factory workers. They could even build the new settlements planned for the German volk (under the pretence that they are for the Ukranians). They could even join the army. Yes, I know, it would be dangerous to arm & train people you are finally gonna kill off, but... 1) stick them where the fightling is fiercest. They will be happy, as they get revenge on the Soviets, the Germans are happy because no Germans die, but lots of Russians and Ukranians die. 2) when the war is over, or nearly over, you tell the Ukranian troops (either when they demob, or just as a normal thing) that they are to have a de-lousing shower, or similar. You herd them into a large room, lock the door, and turn on the gas taps. Hey, maybe I should become an evil dictator! (to point it out, no I do not share any of the ideological views of the Nazi Party, nor do I condone any action like that I have described. This is a purely intellectual exercise in alternative history.)
You've summed it up nicely, I think. This would indeed have been the best solution for the Germans to have employed.
Actually, the Allies learned a great deal of very important lessons on combined arms and supported amphibious assaults at Dieppe that saved many a life on the beaches of Italy and France. It's a shame it had to go at the price of several thousand Canadian lives, but this could be considered "cheap" compared to the stakes of such operations as Overlord.
It is also a shame that the part the Canadians played at Dieppe was so thoroughly minimised by British accounts. :angry: :cry: However, not really a big mistake, more a steep learning curve. That was the whole reason for the raid, at any rate (this is still debated, though). canadiansuperpatriot, can you give reasons why you think it was the biggest mistake?
a tactical level I think the failure by the Germans at St Nazaire to realise that the British Destroyer HMS Campbeltown was full of explosives was a bit of a mistake. Twenty four depth charges are not a nice thing to be close proximity to when they go off. Pity for the Germans that were was a whole pile of Germans examining Campbeltown when this happened. :roll:
Let me try to start for Canadiansuperpatriot: Not all that many lessons were learned, or learned correctly. The Pre-invasion bombardment at Normandy was too short and too light, especially when compared to what the Allies could have brought to bear. Surprise took precedence over preparation. Landings took place in front of prpeared positons (Omaha), surely this lesson should have been learned from Dieppe. Although I greatly admire the originality and igenious nature of the DD tanks, they weren't really necessary. The Churchills actually landed successfully and even in the chaos some got off the beaches. It took 6-7 weeks after D-Day to (re)learn how to use airpower in direct support (thanks "bomber barons" and war-winning independant air forces). Dieppe clearly showed this was essential. Objectives were unrealistc in both cases (example: Caen on D-Day). A big lesson learned incorrectly was getting off the beaches. Because Dieppe stalled on the main beaches (the flanks were actually relatively successful), the Allies put huge efforts into getting onto the beach, at the expense of conducting a campaign beyond the beaches. This is a start, I'm sure Canadiansuperpatriot can do a better job.
Lessons in relation to D Day go back at least as far as WW1. At Gallipoli troops got ashore well enough be failed to take advantage and pile forward. WW1 also showed that huge preparatory bombardments offered no guarantees. A light bombardment that made everyone duck could do just as well. Dieppe indicated that ordinary gun tanks could not be relied on to get onto or off the beach hence the funnies. Big strategic bombers designed to hit cities often didn't fare well in tactical support and there were some nasty cases of bombs falling on their own side. Problem is no two invasions are the same. One might offer pointers but that is all.
Ebar, The bombardments on D-Day were too light and short to effetively force heads down, although the British had about an hour longer and had less difficult landings. Coincidence? You decide. The US landings at Omaha were finally successful in large part thanks to aimed fire from destroyers (these DDs were a big help). I said the DDs weren't required, not that none of the funnies were required. The mine clearing and AVRE mortar and Crocodile flame type vehicles (to take out fortifications) may have been quite useful. The Churchills were landed at Dieppe and some got off the beaches. Problems with the shingle were not solved by DDs. In the air cooperation area, I was thinking more of the thousands of fighter-bombers and medium bombers than the heavies. As you correctly point out the heavies were not suitable for direct ground support
IMHO biggest mistake in WW2: by Germany not to capture Leningrad and Moscow. Moscow was 1) the supreme rail- and motorway crossroads in SU. 2)Lots of factories would no more produce goods for Red Army; 3)also morale would have been greatly shattered. Capturing Leningrad would have opened lots of seaports for use and the supply routes wouldn't have been in the middle of"partisanic" areas. 2) and 3) also go for Leningrad's case.
But are Moscow and Leningrad mistakes? They tried, they just didn't succeed. Most of the heavy bombs dropped on Normandy were too far inland and thus enabled the bulk of the German beach defenses to remain intact. For those who thought heavy bombardment will wipe out defenses, look no further than Okinawa or Iwo Jima, those Islands were pounded for days by 16-inch shells and by 1,000 lbs bombs from corsairs, and yet the most of the Japanese defenses survived. The idea of the DD tank was sound, have they made it ashore in Omaha beach, they could have helped taken out some of the murderes bunkers and machine gun nests. Dieppe was a good learning experience. Funny nobody mentioned Dunkirk? Hitler could have wiped out the French and British EF if he didn't listen to Gorehing.
Moscow was tried but didn't succeed. Leningrad was besieged for 900 days without assault; Hitler wanted to destroy the city rather than take it. This was a huge mistake indeed, as the morale of the defenders was unbroken and huge amounts of Army Group North were engaged permanently in the fight.
Smolensk fell in German hands in 16. July. In mid-August the Army Group Centre was ready for a final thrust into Moscow. 21. August Hitler sent a message to his generals: The most important goal, which has to be achieved before winter is not Moscow but Krim... Guderian tried to bend Hitler, but with no effect. Finally, Hitler ordered an attack towards Moscow to begin 19. November. All this time Russians just kept reinforcing Moscow. Because Army Group Center's troops where used elsewhere, they were weakened. They had to attack in mud and then in freezing weather. If Germans had attacked in August, Moscow would most likely have been captured.
The beaches the British were attacking and Omaha are very different. The Americans attacking Omaha were basically attacking the toughest nut. The lack of armoured support left them badly exposed. The destroyers were basically trying to do the job that the DD should have been doing. Note the DD's supporting Omaha were launched further out that elsewhere, orders had been sent to launch closer but that didn't get through for some reason.
Omaha beach was a thin strip of beach covered by extensive bunker systems. The other beaches were "easy" compared to thank, not even considering the fact that Omaha was the only beach assaulted virtually without tank support and the fact that not one of the untis assigned to assault Omaha beach landed where it should be (except 2nd Rangers).