How Germany could've won?

Moscow :there is no proof that the fall of Moscow would result in the collaps of the SU .
And,about the replacements :again :your figure is OUT OF THE QUESTION .The Germans attacked with 2.7 million men,followed (till october) by the strategical reserve (500000).That's all.To replace the losses,there were (till 31 december)500000 men available,who were leaving for the east in september .
At 31 december ,the Germans had lost 824000 men + 300000 due to sickness,etc
The result was that the some 150 divisions were short of 600000 men,=4000 men per division,and,as most losses were happening in the infantry,most infantry batallions were down 50 %.
The Soviets...they had 4.6 million men (+1.9 million).
The German tanks :starting with 17 PD (3500 tanks)+2 in september (2 + 5 PD) +replacements =a total of 900,which makes 4400,while they lost 2400 tanks,resulting in 19 PD with 2000 tanks (down 50 %),and the number of operational tanks was less than 1000.
The German chances to reach Moscow,and to capture Moscow were NIHIL.

 

They wouldn't dare rebel against the British? Nonsense. It may not have turned out well, but they did. Anglo-Iraqi War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

"It may not have turned well" that's a good one :it was nothing,the revolt had no popular support in Iraq.

 

Does any of them mentions Keegan's article :
Alternate North African Middle Eastern Front

 

I did not claim it to be significant, but it is counter to your claim that " they would not dare rebel against Britain."

 

Oktam,

As to your first question I cannot say without checking the search function, but it is likely here somewhere.

As to your second point, having reinforcements and getting them to where they are needed most are two different things. The German troops 15 miles outside of Moscow were at the end of a exceedingly long line of supply, that was inconsistant at the best of times. The Men and equipment were back in Germany and getting them to the sharp end was the first problem. The second problem was that for the divisions already there, operating at half strength or less, getting all the fuel, food and ammo they needed to continue the attack was taxing the limited supplies heavily. More men and equipment would only further overtaxed an already stretched supplyline. The third problem was not reaching Moscow, which is only half the fun, but getting 50-75 kms. beyond Moscow. They must encircle the city to cut off from effective support. As Germany would learn at Stalingrad, taking a city by frontal assault is a costly affair. In mid to late December this was just too much to acomplish. The time to move on Moscow was mid-August, not mid-November.

Which brings us to your 3rd point. The Arabs were not so much pro-German as they were anti-British and colonial. They had no wish to trade one overlord for another one as they did with the Ottoman Turks for the British Emipre in WWI. They were out to use the Reich as much as the Reich hoped to use them. Complicating the matter was that the Arab factions were as fractured then as they are now, with much political (and actual) fighting amongst themselves. A fact that Britain tried hard to exploit so as to prevent any general uprising from occuring.

As with Germany's problems before Moscow, getting there was only half the fun. First, German divisions of the period were being formed with German rifles, Polish machineguns, Austrian morters, Czech artillery and French motor transport. There simply were not enough German made equipment to fully equip all of its own formations, let alone an ally who had none of these things of thier own. All the Arabs could supply was bodies, not weapons of modern war. Second the Axis supply effort to keep the DAK fully supplied was cracking at the seems as it was, there simply was no more give in the supply pipeline to arm a significant number of Arab troops without a radical re-alocation of German resources to expand the supply net in the region. Germany might have been able to re-alocate the resources, but lacked the will to do so in the face of the Russian invasion. Lastly, America's effort to create effective combat formations from peoples of the same general region is instructive. With decades of practical expirence at raising local forces from scratch, and near unlimited resources, money and weapons and a decade of time to work with, the results in Iraq and Afganistan are a mixed bag at best. Germany facing tremendous pressure from Russia and the west could not hope to do better.

In short a German "Southern Strategy" works only in lieu of a Russian Campaign, as a means to force Britain to the peace table. Once the attack begins in Russia there simply not enough to go around and any hope of invading the USSR from the south, is simply beyond the means of Germany in any senario.

 

The claim of Octam was that the Arab countries would join the Axis as co-belligerants ,that implies that there would be a general revolt against Britain(some Arab Spring),and,this is an illusion :
-during the "Iraq-British war"(war being an exageration,because there was no Iraq army),the people of Bagdad were not manifesting against Britain ,the British pro consul in Iraq (4.8 million people in 1947) was Nouri-As-Said,who would remain loyal to Britain,till the Germans were in Bagdad.
-when the Shah (a colonel,who proclaimed himself Shah) was fired by the British,the people of Iran was not manifesting by thousands ,demanding that Britain should leave
-in 1942,British tanks encircled the palace of Faroek,and the British ambassador demanded the removal of the Egyptian PM,and the appointment of a British candidate .No body was manifesting against this interference in the internal affairs of Egypt
At no moment during WWII,was the dominating position of Britain threatened .

 

Relevant excerpts from the Führer Directive No.32 (it's about actions after Barbarossa, but still):

For the sake of argument let's presume Barbarossa was successful. What about the invasion of the Middle East after it?

 

Impossible
1°Distance from the Ruhr to Tripoli :2000 km,from Tripoli to Kirkuk (Iraqi oil fields):2870 km (as the crow flies):no way that an Army Corps could march from Tripoli to Kirkuk,and,the Germans could not supply the advance of a bigger force.
2° And advance via Turkeyut of the question (even if Turkey agreed):Vienna-Istanbul :1200 km (no bridge over the Bosporus),Istanbul-Kirkud :1600 km,and the Turkish railways were almost inexistant nly 65 km of double-track in 1952.
3° From Transcaucasia through Iran :a dream
4° Revolt of the Arabs :also out of the question .
The point also is :OIL.Starting from Tripoli,or going via the Balkans,or going via the Caucasus ,the Germans would need a lot of oil,which they did not have,and,if they had,could not transport .
Last point :no tank or truck,starting in Tripoli would reach the Sinai(there is something as wear and tear),and water,spare parts,etc .

 

For the sceptical ones:a German division needed 350 ton a day ;assuming an advance of 20 km a day,that's 17 ton per km.
For 3000 km(Tripoli-Bagdad)=50000 ton,this could not be transported by the railways in Libya/Egypt,nor by the railways in Turkey.
Result :an invasion of the ME would be a mirage,a fallacy .

 

I agree and this is what I was suggesting. An alternative, not in addition to a Russian Invasion. Force Britain out of the war.

Agreed.

Agreed.

Now I didn't go past seizing Egypt and stopping at the Suez Canal, but this would be a great way to run Britain completely out of the Middle East. Send German agents and advisors to support tribal uprisings, exploit the factions. Promise them that once they throw off the British yoke they're free to rule themselves. Insurgencies are actually fairly easy to get going and extremely hard to combat.

Why not use the weapons captured from the British you'll capture in North Africa? An insurgency doesn't require a robust logistics chain. Let them ride horses and camels. Let them ambush British supply convoys and attack isolated British garrisons. When they take them they get more weapons and ammo. Attack from ambush and where they are weak. You can't protect everything and Britain really can't afford to expend additional men and material to keep them supplied and reinforced. If Germany takes Gibralter and closes off the Med. Britain will have to have shipping sail from Britain down the west coast of Africa, around Cape Agulhas, and up the east Coast of Africa to the Persian Gulf to supply themselves. Just think of all the commerce raiding they could do against that supply line.

This is what has been being advocated.

A very bad comparison. First. in the current wars you are trying to mold forces that have a national government as their primary allegience, when traditionally their allegience has been tribal and religious. Many of the troops in the current Afghan and Iraqi armies are very proficient as soldiers, it's focusing their allegience that's at issue. When the president of your country tells you to do one thing and your sheik or mullah tells you to do something else, you go with what you've always known. Or when in doubt you put your allegience with the strongest tribe, it's called survival. The US is a perfect example. In 1860 we split along state and local lines because there was more allegience to the state than to the nation and we had been a nation for 80 plus years! Secondly, the insurgency uses terror and murder in an attempt to prevent cooperation with the new Afghan and Iraqi governments. Britian won't stoop to these levels in attempting to hang on to power in the region during WWII. Example: An Iraqi woman takes her kids to the clinic even though Al-Queda in Iraq has warned them against doing so. Terrorist come in the middle of the night, boil her kids and makes her eat them, then tortures and kills her and all the rest of her family. Next day when it's known what happened nobody will go to the clinic. (This is a true story) If Germany were to arm local tribes, bribe the chiefs, give their people captured weapons and supply rudimentary training, provide intell, occasional air support (for large actions) and planning expertise, they could eat the Brits lunch on a regular basis.

 

1)About the Germans using the Lawrence of Arabia trick:it is very doubtfull that this could work :Iraq(4.7 million )and Jordany (0.5 million) could easily be pacified by the British,SA had no reason to revolt,and Syria + Libanon were French colonies .When the Germans were at Alamein,the ME was cal,why should it change,IF the Germans were at the canal ?
2)I should not give much importance on the results of Lawrence of Arabia in WWI.The Ottoman Empite was defeated by Allenby,not by a revolt by Arab tribes
3)In WWI,the Germans sent agents to Pakistan to cause a revolt against the British,without result
4) Give the tribes captured British weapons,is assuming that the British would be defeated,and,they were not .

 

I think we are closer on this point than may appear. I actually faver a 'Southern Strategy' for long term survival of the Third Reich. I was responding to the perceived thought that an aproach on the USSR could be fostered by the rising up of Arab armies to fight along side Germany. You are correct to point out we have had success in creating effective insurgents, but less so as conventional combat forces, but we also had none of the drawbacks that Germany did in 1941. If Germany had focused its limited resources on a limited campaign it could fight indefinitatel, (especially if they avoided provoking the US) they could over time wear down British desire to continue the war and come away with at least half a loaf, rather than famine.

 

I didn't have Lawrence in mind when I made my suggestion but, dozens upon dozens of successful insurgencies around the world would suggest you are wrong.

I need some of what you're smokin'.

It would be quite easy to incite simply by taking advantage of real or perceived injustices/inequities, religious differences, seperatist/independance movements, or leaders desire for power.

Of course, that's one of the premises of the scenario. Why would the Germans need to stir up trouble in the greater Middle East if they hadn't seized Egypt and destroyed British military power in north Africa?

 

Cool!

Yeah, I agree that's a no go. But to use the Arabs to wear down the Brits is a viable strategy. One of the Soviet Unions greatest weakness' during the cold war, was that a very large proportion of their army's conscripts were from the 'stans and didn't even speak the same language of their Russian officers. Language and cultural issues led to poor training and morale, inability to execute anything but rudimentary military operations and lack of tactical coordination. I think the language and cultural barriers would make the employment of Arabs as supplemental troops in the Wermacht a net loss and make the overall force weaker not stronger.

I think avoiding the Battle of Britain would have preserved the Luftwaffe's strength and experience, in men and aircraft. It would have disallowed the perception of "Britain stands alone", heroic Britain keeping the Nazi wolf from the door. Re-focusing on the Med. the German military would have the strength to secure the med and conquer North Africa. The loss of Egypt and the loss/destruction of Gibralter would have hurt Britain militarily, economically, in morale, and prestige due to the perceived loss of empire. Uprisings against British authorities in the greater Middle East would further erode British prestige and empire, while siphoning off military and material assets. If it doesn't appear that the home islands are being threatened by Germany, and that the fighting is taking place in British colonial possessions it will be really hard for Roosevelt to garner public support for greater involvement. If Germany can keep America out of the war in Europe through diplomacy, propoganda and peace overtures, she can pretty much keep whatever she's seized up to that point.

 

Jordany and Iraq were artificial entities(created 20 years before for the sons of Faisal) with a tiny population,consisting of a lot of hostile tribes,Kurds(1 million),Sjiites,Sunnites,etc.None of them could be a danger for Britain (even if they were revolting).With a few British troops,and the Arab legion ,the whole region could be pacified without much trouble .
There also is the objection that the start point is unproved :that Britain could conquer Egypt,it did not,why would it do it in the ATL?No Battle of britain will also result in a stronger RAF in the ME,you only will have a Battle of the Middle East .And,about the ground troops:logistics will prevent a stronger ground force than in the OTL,and,IMHO,the result will be the same as in the OTL,why would the Italians fight better than they did ?

 

Refering to my post 181 on this thread, if you merge my ideas with USMCPrice's, a viable option seems to open up for middleast/north africa. If Germany does not even threaten a UK invasion, forego's the BoB, draws up a generous peace with France/Belguim/Holland and holds off a Operation Barbarosa, then a fair bit of manuvering room opens up for the Reich.

A Germany that can now spend on infrastructue in Italy and North Africa what it did on U-boat pens and 'Atlantic Wall' in France would would be a force multiplier for both German and Italian troops. The addition of aircraft lost over Britain, but now saved, could tip the air war into axis favorfor a year or two. Thexpansion of Ports, roads, and rain nets in the region would allow a better supply for troops deployed, and possibly as much as a doubling of axis troops available for North Africa. A Germany not gearing up for a Russian invasion could live with an overall smaller army, allowing more quality equipment to be diverted to her allies, this too would make the Italians better.

A Hitler and OKW fully focused on this only active theate of war would cut though the muddle that existed by his indifference historicly. Italian trops would be reagated to line of communication and port guards, a role they were better suited to rather than front line combat troops. This would go far to 'hide' the flaws of the Italian army until they could be fixed (maybe). With only a dozen or so divisions actively fighting, Greman production and manpower leavees could easily keep up with the loss rate and steadily improve existing formations with new, better equipment.

The improved supply net would make it easier to supply small arms to Arab insurgents in 'Jordany and Iraq'. Turkey won't join the axis, but she might be induced to allow small arms and ammunition to be shipped through her borders as well. Turkey did have a vested interest in seeing the British mandates destabilized also. If not Turkey, perhaps our Russian friends (we are still buddies you know) might be willing to allow us to sent weapons into Iran and south as well.

Yes England would retain its empire, but every brigade deployed on keeping the natives in their place is one less to push the German-Italian army out of Egypt.

 

The return to the 1914 borders is most likely.

Another possibility: with Japan's assistance, German supports India's independence next to the affairs in the Middle East.

 

There are a lot of flaws in your argumentation,due to the fact that you are representing Germany's position in the summer of 1940 as roseate,while it was in reality very bad.
1)time was running against Germany,thus "the aircraft saved by no BoB,could tip the air war in to Axis favor for a year of two":Germany had NO year of two .In 1942,Britain would be stronger,and Germany weaker
2)Hitler was convinced (and,IMHO,he was right ) that a war with the US was ineluctable and was nearing (if there was no BoB,Roosevelt would not change his policy)
3) Even if Germany did capture the ME in 1942(1941 being impossible,and the chances for 1942 being insignifiant-Rommel failed in 1941 and 1942),this would not be decisive,because without the ME,Britain would continue the war:there was nothing in the ME that Britain needed,and,there was nothing in the ME that Germany could use:as already has been mentioned,Britain's oil did come from the US/Latin America,while there was no way that this oil could be transported to Germany,which did not need more oil .
4) The SU:it was very uncertain that the "entente cordiale" with the SU would last,whatever,Germany was not strong enough to start the conquest of the ME,and at the same time,waging a naval war against Britain (unless you assume that Germany would keep its UBoats indoors) ,a defensive air war against Britain and the US(the defense of the Reich would claim a lot of resources),defending the occupied countries (unless you assume that Hitler would "give away" his conquests),AND at the same time protect the east border of the Reich and the oil fields of Romania (unless you think that Hitler trusted Stalin,Hitler was measuring his corn by Stalin's bushel,Hitler's POV was that there was no benefit for Stalin if the war between Germany and Britain was finished,thus Stalin would do all his possible to let the war continue )
If (not when) Germany captured the ME in 1942,and Britain continued the war(Britain would be stronger),while the US was stronger(the US mobilization started in 1940) and while the SU was stronger (the Red Army would be stronger in june 1942 than in june 1941),the result would be that Germany had lost 2 years(years it never could recover)and Germany would have lost the war .
The war with Britain had to be ended,before the US could intervene,and,as the capture of the ME would not result in the end of the war with Britain,.......a commitment in the ME only would be a waste of means and of time

 

A return to the 1914 border would exclude a generous peace with France .
"Another possibility":that's assuming Japan's assistance,and,this was very unlikely,and why should Germany support India's independance :Hitler was a great admiror of the rule of the Raj.