How Germany could've won?

Although long-range bombers were,theoretically,a good answer ,there still were objections
1)more long -range bombers would mean less Stuka's,Messerschmidts,etc
2)if not,it would mean less tanks,trucks,.....unless one would assume that the capacity of the German armaments industry could be increased,and,that's doubtfull
3)more long-range bombers will not automatically result in more sinking of merchant ships(if more bombers were searching for convoys,more could be destroyed by British aircraft)
4)and if it resulted in more sinking of merchant ships,one could argue that it would result in less sinking of merchant ships ....by Uboats
5)for 1939+1940,the LW did sink 360000 tonof merchant ships .Would an increase of the long-range bombers by 50 percent result in an increase of the sinkings by the LW by 50 percent (=from 360000 to 540000)?And,when was the critical point where Britain would be in danger ?

 

Some exemples :Ju 88:speed :between 400/640 km ,range:between 1790/2730 km,bombload :a maximum of 3000 kg
He 177:speed :415/490 km,range 5500 km,bombload:1000kg + missiles /guided bombs
He111:speed:365 km,range:1950 km,bombload:3250 kg
Do 17 Z/2:speed :350/477 km,range:116O/1519 km,bombload :100km
But,there were a lot of types with different speed,range,bombload .The speed also differed following the height and the bombload .

 

Germany could bomb anywhere in Britain with the same twin-engine aircraft that provided tactical support; they hit Scapa Flow from bases in Germany in 1939. The occupation of France just allowed greater payloads. Four-engine bombers could deliver more tonnage, but there would be fewer of them, the overall increased effect might not be that great.

If they wished to conduct daylight bombing, the key would be not the type or size of bomber but fighter escort. Extending the range of daylight attacks would presumably mean Me109s using belly tanks, not difficult in itself, but geography complicates the situation; they would be engaged, and forced to drop tanks, almost as soon as they left their French bases. Striking by day into say the industrial Midlands might require Fighter Command to be suppressed by attacks on its airfields.......

As both Britain and America discovered, a sustained bomber offensive was a massive industrial and logistical effort that took a long time to seriously damage the enemy's economy. Before and early in the war there were greatly exaggerrated expectations of rapid decisions achieved through air power. If Germany embarked on a bomber campaign in hopes of quickly defeating Britain - and then turning to Russia - they might be rudely suprised to find it dragging on and on.

Russia reminds us, Germany's main concern as a continental power was ground and tactical air forces. A massive investment in heavy bombers was not in the cards, but a reasonable number of long-range aircraft would have been useful for missions including maritime reconnaissance and attack in support of the U-boat campaign. They had several four-engine bomber/transport projects; they needed to select one or two of the most promising and bring them into service.

 

[FONT=&amp]Four engines bomber, Why?[/FONT]

[FONT=&amp]The basic idea is to focus the efforts of the LW to attack naval traffic, British merchants, beyond the protection of the RAF. That implies attacks in the North Atlantic beyond the range of the He 111. [/FONT]

[FONT=&amp]The JU 89 gives a maritime reconnaissance capability far superior and it was available before the war started. [/FONT]Anyway I must admit that the replacement of the fleet of He 111 and Ju Do 17 to 89 was not a real possibility.

[FONT=&amp]Germany never got completely disrupt traffic in the North Atlantic, so I assume that there were ships to sink enough to launch a combined attack of the LW and the U-boot.[/FONT]

[FONT=&amp]The goal is NOT get GB surrender with a terror bombing campain... but close her naval traffic. So we can add the efforts of all those bombers sent to demolish British cities ... so we have a significantly higher capacity.[/FONT]

The deployment of magnetic mines does not begin in 1939[FONT=&amp] but “now”, [/FONT][FONT=&amp]in May 1940[/FONT][FONT=&amp], and [/FONT][FONT=&amp]better covered[/FONT][FONT=&amp], the effect [/FONT][FONT=&amp]is dramatic. Germany might have closed the Irish Sea and London at the same time.[/FONT]
[FONT=&amp]
Henschel 127, Why?[/FONT]
[FONT=&amp]The Ju 88 was the Type that suffered more losses, about 380. It was sent to fight relying on his speed and it was insufficient. I suspect that the Henschel 127 (with his crews) had survived to this kind of missions, even if the escort was forced to intercept the British fighters. We can send them to bomb merchants in Liverpool, daylight.[/FONT] [FONT=&amp]I have no data on its ability to dive bombing, it is possible it would have improved the Ju 88.[/FONT] [FONT=&amp]

The[/FONT][FONT=&amp] Me 109[/FONT][FONT=&amp]protecting[/FONT][FONT=&amp] the faster [/FONT][FONT=&amp]Henschel[/FONT][FONT=&amp] would [/FONT][FONT=&amp]have[/FONT][FONT=&amp]flown[/FONT][FONT=&amp] at normal [/FONT][FONT=&amp]cruising speed[/FONT][FONT=&amp], increasing [/FONT][FONT=&amp]the range.[/FONT][FONT=&amp]The [/FONT][FONT=&amp]Ju[/FONT][FONT=&amp]89,[/FONT][FONT=&amp]heavier [/FONT][FONT=&amp]and stronger than [/FONT][FONT=&amp]the[/FONT][FONT=&amp] He 111[/FONT][FONT=&amp] might[/FONT][FONT=&amp] have allowed [/FONT][FONT=&amp]to keep the [/FONT][FONT=&amp]Frei[/FONT][FONT=&amp] Jagd Me [/FONT][FONT=&amp]109[/FONT][FONT=&amp] missions[/FONT][FONT=&amp], lethal [/FONT][FONT=&amp]for the RAF[/FONT][FONT=&amp]... and its[/FONT][FONT=&amp] cruise speed.[/FONT]

[FONT=&amp]More ME-109 E-6[/FONT] [FONT=&amp]The 400 Me 109 E-6 "extra" represent 50% of the fighter force of the RAF at the start of BoB ... and 50% of the single engine fighter force of the LW in the North o France at that moment. It would have been possible to organize relay ... in Frei Jagd missions... as did the USAAF later.

[/FONT]In short, the idea is to accept from the outset the impossibility of successfully landing GB or defeat the enemy with a terror bombing campaign .

 

Many likely, and many more unlikely possibilities have been presented in this thread, and while i am no expert in the field, my own opinion on how the war could've been drastically altered without "miracles" would be :

The first alternative : Felix would be : Operation Felix actually happening. So much emphasis has been put on capturing Suez, as a potential stomach-wound (slowly bleeding, but potentially lethal) for the British Empire, yet capturing Gibraltar would achieve the very same results. This is not to say that RN would just let Germans keep Gibraltar, and bleed them out. Suez was certainly much safer from naval attacks, but by the time Felix would succeed (this is my assumption. Franco joining the war or not) it would be obvious that Sealion can not succeed.
Felix would be but a means to try and force UK out of the war.

Though if we follow this thought, it could've ended sooner, in 1940.
(2nd alternative : Dunkirk). Hitler had planned on using Dunkirk to achieve the same goal as - in my opinion - Felix would aim for : forcing UK to step out of the war.
400 000 martyrs from Durkirk were not something he wanted. Rather 400 000 starving soldiers, daily massacred by luftwaffe and with no way to escape were what he wanted. A trading-card. This is why Guderian was halted, and trapping of the channel began. Göring assured Hitler that Luftwaffe was strong enough to pull this off. They were not.
One could argue whether or not it was possible for Germans to wipe the defenses of Dunkirk with force, but it's not where i'm aiming at. Luftwaffe was too weak to stop Operation Dynamo. Were it not, and thousands of British soldiers were at the mercy of Nazi's, with Hitler wanting nothing more (or less) than he did 30th of August 1939, i don't see how Churchill could convince the nation to continue the war.
The speech he gave regarding Dunkirk was touching, and all that, but They all knew how much is at stake, should Dynamo not succeed. One can say that i basically agree with what has been said before : that Germans have put too much emphasis on tanks, and too little on airforce to do anything about RN or RAF. (Though even if Germans produced planes and planes only, i don't see Sealion happening)

Any of the above could - assuming Hitler would pursue a ceasefire with UK - knock Britain, and therefore US, out of the war. This alone couldn't win the war, but would drastically change the course. Without Britain's involvement in WWII, USA would have no interest in waging war against Germany. An Anti-communist nation, and one that so "eagerly pursued peace with the overzealous Churchill". Could this be enough to stop L/L for USSR? No idea. But were if enough, would USSR have the strength to continue fighting as They did? No. (*1) Not to mention lack of planes over German cities, no naval blockade, and oil freely flowing from Mexico to be refined in Germany (Thanks to "Mr. Davis") would break many balls.

Then again, only a miracle stopped allies from launching Overlord in 1942. How would it end? Let's be honest : In a complete disaster, which could also knock West out of the war. By then it would be too late for the Germans, but also something worth noting.

But even smaller things could completely change history. Were Russians not informed, that Japan will not attack them, Moscow would have fallen. (ofcourse the city itself was meaningless, but what a stepping stone for propaganda and morale that would be) How many people cracked the Japanese Purple Code (i'm translating the name from Polish)? A few men and women. How big of an impact did their ground-breaking discovery have?
Aside from the already mentioned Moscow. (Not a war-winner for Germany, but certainly for Russia) : Kursk was also won thanks to the great preparations of the Russians, possible only thanks to intercepting missives. How many missives were intercepted? I don't have any document to look into right now, but during the course of war we are talking about thousands of messages. Then again, Stalin was warned about the incoming German offensive of 22.VI weeks before it happened, and he ignored them all. If he did not, would Germans even reach Kiev?

I could make this post ten times as long, as this is just the tip of the iceberg that i wanted to say, but i shouldn't cross the line with my first post.
Suffice to say the war could have been decided by either side at least a few times during the course, and only horrible mistakes on one side or the other, and luck, made it last so long.

(*1) This is not to take anything from USSR, as They were the ones who won the war. Battle for Britain, Blockades and Overlord were all fine and dandy (From UK-POV Overlord took place to not allow Stalin taking too much of Europe. Churchill initially planned on an attack on Balkans), but the war was won in the East. I'm just saying that without L/L USSR would be neck deep in manure.
(Please note that i would not want to live in a Nazi world, and 'tis were no "wishes" of mine)

Oi!

 

1)the possiblility for Felix to succeed has been questioned
2)the importance of a successful Felix has been debunked (it is in the Sacred Cows section) by Brndirt
3)about Dunkirk :there never were 400000 British soldiers at Dunkirk,"only" 198000
4)about the SU,Japan and Moscow :the possible,or not,intervention of Japan was irrelevant for the battle of Moscow :most of the Far East divisions (wrongly called the Siberian divisions) were already committed against the Germans ....in the summer,and,in october,they formed only 10 % of the Rusian strength before Moscow .

 

3* Ah yes : 198 British of 400 thousand total. Why bother pointing out a small oversight of mine, good sir? You know very well what i've meant. Edit : Not even an oversight, as i didn't point out how many British were there.
My knowledge sources absolutely disagree with 4* When the Soviet Parade took place in Moscow, only those "10%" mattered. I guess different sources can picture different situations, but forces guarding Moscow were on their knees when Stalin decided to "stay" in Moscow, only saved from being taken from the get-go by the "10%" and - of course - German supply lines. Then the Red Army offensive took place, but that is a different tale entirely.

I shall look into Felix discussion some more but the word "questioned" doesn't exactly discourage me too much. After all, we are all theorycrafting.

 

At the outbreak of war Britain was importing around 55 million tonnes of goods (by sea ) each year ... (found in the internet) so IMHO Dönitz was little short when he said that the goal were the one million tons per month. I'm looking for the answer in this forum. Well, I could be miserable wrong: I found it in the net:

Many long - range planes means more maritime reconnaissance ... the U-boot not only had to attack the ships, they had TO FOUND them and after the convoy was introduced the U-boot just saw WATER most of the time, most of the patrols... The few four engined planes more, and a better coordination LW-Kriegsmarine, would have made a great difference... Until the rocket catapult or USA joined the war.

My best regards.

 

3) the effect of losing 200000 men is different of the effect of losing 400000 men
4) Well,your sources are wrong:in the following websites,the importance of the Siberian Divisions has been debunked as being a myth.
on this site in :significance of Siberian divisions :a myth ?
on "operation Barbarossa Siberian Divisions myth"
on the well informed Axis History Forum ,by a Russian poster
The fact is
1)14 Far East divisions (only 3 of them Siberian) were transferred to the West Front,and,only 3 were engaged in the defense of Moscow
2)there is no proof that these divisions were "better" than the other Soviet divisions
3)the forces guarding Moscow were not on their knees,it is the oppositen 23 november,general Wagner (theGerman QMG responsible for supplies) wrote :we are at the end of our human and material resources ,while on 1 december,there were 10% less Germans than on 22 june facing 50 % more Soviets than on 22 june n 22 june 2.7 million Germans and 2.7 million Soviets,on 1 december :2.5 million Germans against (at least) 4 million Soviets .Already in november,the German offensive capacities were exhausted .

 

Long time ago I read that historically the only way to deal with "Russia" was to repel her attack. As the Kaiser´s army did in WWI. Could Hitler have done the same ? ...If we accept that Stalin wanted to attack in ... 1942 !?

 

Long time ago I read that historically the only way to deal with "Russia" was to repel her attack. As the Kaiser´s army did in WWI.

Whoever wrote that does not appear to have been thinking much beyond August 1914, when the Germans defeated the initial Russian attack into East Prussia at the battle of Tannenberg. After that the Kaiser's army took the offensive; here's where the lines stood in 1917: File:Eastern Front As of 1917.jpg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia and the Germans had advanced further by the time they compelled the new Bolshevik government to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

The closest analogy to WWII is WWI. Despite technological advances, both German and Russian armies and their logistics in WWII remained primarily foot-, horse-, and rail-mobile; they even still used many of the same weapons. The Russian winter was no different. Germany in WWI totally defeated Russia despite having her main commitment on the western front the whole time.

 

The same perhaps, but different in a very important way. Both Germany and Russia fought as Imperial nations headed by a monach. It was considered bad form to comepletely topple your opponant, (cause it could happen to you as well). You traded a province or two at the end of a war, not the entire country. Russia came to terms because they had a more important war to fight between the Whites and the Reds. In WWII you had two totalitarian idologies fighting for dominance. No quarter asked, none given. And the Kaiser's army never got as deep into Russia as Hitler's did.

 

1)I agree with your point that mostly the U Boats were seeing water:in 1940,Britain lost 2.2 million ton (500 ships) due to UBoats =10 a week,and,if we assume that in 1940 30 UBoats were weekly patrolling,the effectiveness was not very big.
2)At the same time (1940),some 7500 ships (30 million tons) were arriving in British harbours =150 a week :for one ship that was destroyed,15 passed .
3)If we look at 1939,1940,1941,Britain lost 4.5 million ton by UBoats(=1000 ships),an average of 8 a week,at the same time,Britain and Canada were building some 2.5 million tons (a guess )and received at least 2.5 million tons from Holland,Greece,Norway,from captured German and Italian ships .And,during the same period,British imports were some 80million(=18000 ships).The conclusion is :the UBoats were back on 1 september 1939.
4)If,because of the long range aircraft,the U Boats could discover more convoys,that will not result automatically in more ships lost :to sink more merchant ships,more U Boats were needed ..
5)If more ships were lost,that would not automatically result in Britain having very big problems.In 1940,the ratio ( lost/not lost) was 1 to 15 .What would be the critical limit for Britain?(in 1941,the ratio was 1/11)

 

You fellows are talking about two different things. Donitz's 1,000,000 tons/month goal - never achieved - referred to tonnage of ships. At the start of the war, Britain's merchant marine totalled about 20m tons, and the goal of Donitz's "tonnage war" was to sink those ships faster than they could be replaced or augmented.

The 30, 55, etc. million ton figures are for cargo arriving in Britain in the course of a year, which of course represents individual ships making multiple trips.

The tonnage of ships in existence and the tons of cargo they deliver are both important statistics, just keep track of which you're referring to in a given sentence or paragraph.

As it turned out the biggest reduction in tons of cargo delivered resulted not from sinkings at all but simply from having to operate ships in convoy, with all the inherent inefficiencies. Just putting the convoy system into effect reduced imports to Britain by about 1/3.

 

May I quote myself? Just up here

The idea of send the LW not to destroy houses and kill children but to sunk ships would have increased the Kill ratio ... Especially with more fighters (Me 109 E-6), faster bombers (Henschel 127) and crews trained for anti-ship duties. I read that a ship was unloaded in three days (IKE Crusade in Europe) in June 1940 it was a sitting duck.
IMHO, we could be sure is that it would have been a better way to deploy the LW than it historically was done.

And then is the idea of a more imaginative use of the magnetic mines. (And my desperate alusion to the Heino von Hamburg proposals).

What I don´t understand is the hysteria of March 1943 ... Post -war propaganda? Maybe a literary license of Mr. Churchill? An attempt to do more exciting the story of the methodical ASW work ?

The truth is that although some brilliant mind got to show that Hitler could win, would have to change so many things, hitting all the decisions ... only someone with the gift of clairvoyance could have done. Although Adolph Hitler believed to have that give , he was obviously wrong. And quoting my self again (as english is not my native lenguage I'm sure you will apolgize me)

 

I guess BOTH know that. ALL That. I remember a post by TA Gardner: he believes that the Germans had to use few submarines of 2000 tons to force the British to use convoys... for this reason. T.A. long ago not write. I hope it's nothing serious.

 

And that's assuming that the Germans were able to bag the entire British force at Dunkirk. It is extremely likely that even if the Germans make a concerted effort to do so that some of the British will escape and if the Germans put too much effort into it France will last longer and indeed may be able to establish a defencive line and prolong the ground war there for some considerable time. Not to mention the chance that the German effort there will be turned back.

 

The convincing would be done well before the speach. Indeed it was mostly done already look at the Gallup polls. If Germany doesn't declare war then sometime in 42 I suspect FDR would be able to use the built up pressure and an incident of some sort to petition Congress for a declaration of war and get it. That's if he needs it. If the Japanese attack as they did historically then the British and the US will be very close allies in the Pacific and sooner or later Hitler will get tired of the spillover into the Atlantic.

 

Not having read through the whole thread... hoping I am not repeating anyone with this:

1. Hitler made terribly poor use of photo reconnaissance and espionage in general.
Better photo reconnaissance and trust in his sources could have resulted in devastation to the invasion fleets into North Africa, Italy and Normandy.

2. If Hitler had been replaced by, or fully utilized a council of his generals... things would have turned out much differently.
His generals at the outset of the war were just outstanding.
The tactics and strategies which they suggested throughout the war, if heeded, would most likely have won the war for them.
Sound tactics would have crushed the Russian block before they could recover.
With that secured, the middle east would have been of no consequence to them. Britain could be left to rot on its own.

 

Sorry,but you are telling us an old theory that has been debunked :Hitler was no military ignoramus,and his generals would not have done better ?
Btw:the Germans had not the means to destroy the invasion fleets in NA,Sicily,Normandy .