How Germany could've won?

More practical than rail as we have established.
And deemed practical by the Germans who wanted to do it.
Did you know some thing no one in German high command knew?

So you think it is impossible for a German Corps to reach Gibraltar by road?

 

The strategic benefits are huge without the massive loses incurred in Barbarossa.

 

Proof ?

 

Answer is :yes

 

YES

 

Where all the entire General Staff of Germany mad then?

You realise the Germans have traveled further without a rail link don't you?

 

As the German occupied France arrived to the spanish border there was a main railway available.

How many men did Adolf Hitler need to take Gibraltar? How many tons per day?


Franco – Hitler meet in Hendaye.


<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CfBtGQceOEY" data-cke-saved-href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CfBtGQceOEY"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US">[video=youtube;CfBtGQceOEY]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CfBtGQceOEY[/video]




Irun – Hendaye. Google Maps


The wide of the spanish railroads were so similar to the Russian wide...


Bilbao – Madrid - Seville. Were / are main cities and interconected by train since 1860 ... and with Algeciras, a city in the border with Gibraltar ... since 1900 .

 

Read it to quick. But lets take a look at that situation:
From: Anglo-Iraqi War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Note that they had to negotiate with the Vichy government. Also note that the forces involved were German and Italian airforce. It's also in 41 almost a year after the Armistace Agreement was signed and France has been very throughly disarmed. Not to mention that little run in at Mers Al Kebir. Quite a bit different than June of 40 isn't it.

 

Mainland France already had this agreement in the shape of the article in the armistice.
Hence why Germans forces where moved back and forth across France from June 40 onwards.

 

Forces planned for the capture of Gibraltar January 1941.

Stab/1. Gebirgsdivision: Lanz Hubert, Gen. Maj. (RDA: 01.11.1940)
Ia: Degen Hans, Obstlt. i. G.
x Gebirgsjägerregiment 98: Picker Egbert, Obst.
x (vst.) Infanterieregiment (mot.) "Großdeutschland": Stockhausen v. Wilhelm, Obst.
x Kdr. d. Pion. XVIII. (Geb.) Armeekorps: Geiger Franz, Obst.
xx 3 Pionierbataillone
x Gebirgsartillerieregiment 79: Winkler Max, Obst.
xx 4 Abteilungen
x 1-2 Nebelwerferabteilungen

Strength: 460 Offiziere, 16.000 Mann. The troops were prepared near Besancon and Le Valdahon. Kaltenegger gives the following attack date: 10.01.1941, as well as a detailed plan for the operations. Air support should have come from Richthofen.

Source: Kaltenegger, Roland (1998): Die deutsche Gebirgstruppe 1935-1945, p. 179 ff.

(a) Gibraltar is to be captured and the Straits closed.
(b) The English are to be prevented from gaining a footing at any other point on the Iberian peninsula or in the Atlantic Islands.
The preparation and execution of this operation is planned as follows :
PHASE I
(a) Reconnaissance parties (officers in plain clothes) will draw up the necessary plans for action against Gibraltar and for the capture of airfields. With regard to cover and collaboration with the Spaniards they will conform with the security measures of the Chief, Armed Forces Intelligence Division [Ausland Abwehr].
(b) Special detachments of the Armed Forces Intelligence Division, in secret collaboration with the Spaniards, will undertake to secure the Gibraltar area against any attempts by the English to enlarge the area they control or to discover and interfere prematurely with our preparations.
(c) Formations detailed for the operation will be concentrated at a considerable distance from the Franco-Spanish frontier and without previous briefing of troops. Three weeks before troops are timed to cross the Spanish-French frontier (and after the conclusion of preparations for the occupation of the Atlantic Islands) a warning order will be issued.
In view of the low capacity of Spanish railways the Army will detail chiefly motorised formations for this operation, so that the railways are available for supplies.
PHASE II
(a) Units of the Air Force, summoned through observation in the Algeciras area, will set out from French bases and make a well-timed air attack on English naval forces in Gibraltar harbour. After the attack they will land in Spanish airports.
(b) Shortly after this attack units detailed for operations in Spain will cross or fly over the Franco-Spanish frontier.
PHASE III
(a) An attack will be made with German troops to seize Gibraltar.
(b) Forces will be made ready to invade Portugal should the English gain a footing there. Formations detailed for this purpose will enter Spain immediately behind the forces intended for Gibraltar.
PHASE IV
After the capture of the Rock, the Spaniards will be assisted to close the Straits ; if necessary, from Spanish Morocco also.
The strength of the formations destined for 'Undertaking Felix' will be as follows :
Army.
Formations detailed for Gibraltar must be strong enough to capture the Rock even without Spanish support.
A smaller force must also be available to support the Spaniards in the improbable event of an attempted English landing on another part of the coast.
Motorised forces will be employed in the main for a possible invasion of Portugal.
Air Force.
The forces detailed for the attack on Gibraltar harbour must be sufficient to ensure a resounding success.
Dive-bomber units, in particular, are to be transferred to Spain to engage naval targets and to support the attack on the Rock.
Army formations will be allotted sufficient anti-aircraft artillery to allow them to engage targets on the ground also.
Navy.
Submarines will be used to engage the English Gibraltar squadron, particularly when it leaves harbour, as is likely after the attack.
To support the Spaniards in closing the Straits, preparations are to be made, in conjunction with the Army, to bring over single coastal batteries.
Italian participation in the operation is not expected.
Adolf Hitler

 

The problem is that the strategic risks are also huge and very likely to more than off set any gains.

 

So you actually believe they are worse strategic risks taking Gibraltar than attacking the USSR?

 

So you like proposeing straw men?

 

No im asking a question in reply to your statement "The problem is that the strategic risks are also huge and very likely to more than off set any gains." in reference to Barbarossa v Felix.

 

I wasn't comparing Barbarossa to Felix though. Just because one strategy is bad it doesn't mean anther isn't also bad. Frankly I beleive Germany would have been better off attempting neither.

 

And doing what exactly?
Waiting for Britain and the USSR to get stronger or the USA to enter the war?

 

Perhaps you could list all the British battleships, battlecruisers & heavy cruisers sunk by German or Italian air attacks during the war?
(Oh, yeah there were none)

They had limited ground involvement in Syria, and didn't have use of Tunisia until after Torch, when the Vichy government was dissolved and France occupied

Which were nowhere near capable of forcing an attack on a heavily defended rock.

Compare the 1941 assaults against Tobruk or Sevastopol to see how easy it is to crash through a heavily fortified position

Again, how effective was airpower against British capital ships during the war?

And how did the attempted amphibious invasion of Crete fare?

Shipping was never "quite adequate" to supply the forces for victory in Egypt, as has been pointed out, otherwise they would have succeeded

Yes, just as Dunkirk has no chance hold out against a Luftwaffe attack, Tobruk could not hold out against the mighty Rommel, and the British Desert Force has no chance to hold out in the Fall of 1940 against the Italian juggernaught that's 5 times bigger than the British

No, like the HMS Renown bombarding Genoa in the Spring of 1941, how long did it take for the Axis air power to send her to the bottom for this foolhardy attack?

There were 4 Axis Armoured divisions in Egypt in 1942: 15[SUP]th[/SUP], 21[SUP]st[/SUP], Ariete & Littorio. How well were they supplied?

Because they were forced into a drastic reduction of operations in early 1941.

There is an excellent article here, at Regia Marina:
Oil Fuel Shortage

Having burned through most of it's 2 million ton reserve in 1940 with limited operations in the Med, and very little being replaced the Regia Marina was in a crisis by Feb of 1941, even when the Axis were still getting oil from the soviets.

Now consider the vastly more costly operation (in terms of fuel) if the Italian RM ventures into the Atlantic, and they run out of oil much more quickly

Uh, wrong. The Italian navy already is short of fuel as mentioned, and the Axis have a very small force of tankers to supply extended operations

 

If option A is very bad and option B is also very bad then one should look for option C. Finding a way to settle with the British would be a good option C.

 

I missed this:

Which is litterally true but when we dig a bit deeper we find:
Italian Army Elite Units & Special Forces 1940-43 - P. Crociani, P P Battistelli - Google Books
Which states that the two battalions formed a regiment whose strength was ~350 officers and men (a normal Itallian battalion had ~900). That's in April of 39 at which point one Battalion was disbanded but another one (mostly Italian instead of Lybian) but that was in July of 1940 and the second one was not really trained at that point.

 

Bafa, You know what the Germans should have done after France rather then going to Gibraltar or going along with Barbarossa? Improved infrastructure, the war Industry and build defences in depth.

Specifically on the NA theatre build double track running from Tripoli right up to Derna or possibly Tobruk depending on the field situation. That would help to alleviate some of the Supply issues thought that does not mean to say I am proposing to prepare to tack all of Egypt, That is a long term goal that we can not accurately judge what the ground situation might look like.

Actually build the Atlantic wall, With the manpower they would have had spare the construction of the wall would pick up in pass exponentially (ie: I work in a panel shop fixing and painting cars, Have noticed from experience that 1 guy can do one job, 2 guys can do 3 jobs but 3 guys can do 5 jobs and so on, The more men the more proficient it becomes increasing productivity.)

Build defensive lines along the Axis-Soviet border, The entire length and in depth, Very deep in depth to the point that any Soviet attack would lose its steam before they got close to a break through, This 'could' (not will!) leave the Russians in a poor position while allowing the Axis to field and launch a large counter attack that at first would have the early successes or Barbarossa in capturing and destroying vast amounts of men and material, Though personally from what I have learnt unless other front's where solved first I wouldn't go all the way, Just far enough to retake lost ground and rebuild the defences again while also tearing up the infrastructure in the USSR territory as you fall back to the defensive lines.

The problem Bafa is Germany set them selves up to fight 2 super powers with a 3rd soon to join, Going on the offensive on all 3 with out prior precautions taken was the most stupid thing I have ever seen. Better to sit back behind built up defences and allow those 3 to whittle down there own forces while yours remain intact to an extent. Hold out long enough and the British and Americans get out of the war due to public views and deteriating economic situations leaving Germany just Russia which they may then be able to handle (may, Not will be able!)