How Germany could've won?

This problem is much more distinctive in countries with only patches of hardly fertile soil. We have just 24% of agricultural land and very high fraction of the land is forrest. Small estates and difficult terrain require lot of labor and costs are rather high. I guess that agriculture in Finland is even more difficult due to inadequate weather conditions.

 

its not well known but one reason Germany did not employ more women in the factories is that they were on the farms, 60% according to Tooze took over the farm jobs.

 

Quite so.

 

With hindsight, Germany could have won by:
1. advancing and destroying all factories in the USSR as quickly as possible
2. treating all civilians and POWs in civilized manner
3. avoiding any conflicts with the USA

Point 1: This is quite obvious: Patriotism supported with adequate veappons have saved the USSR - the main opponent of Nazis in the initial 2 years of the war.
Point 2: Already discussed.
Point 3: Declaration of war on the USA was unnecessary, perhaps the silliest decision in the entire history of warfare.

Even in this case the final victory would have been very difficult

 

They tried they failed and they would have failed as some of those factories were on the far side of the Urals.

This pretty much requires them not being Nazis in which case why are they in the war in the first place?

That's easy avoid war with Britain and France which means not invading Poland. Of course that means no war to win.

That's not at all clear. Indeed the US and Germany were going to be at war in any case within the year with near certainty. Letting the US pick the time would likely not have been to Germany's benefit. Still there likely was a better time for it.

 

Indeed, but the majority of plants were located in the western pat of the USSR.

But saving Britain and France wasn't sufficient reason to enter the war and send troops to fight other peoples war. I've read somewhere that the USA wouldn't enter the war in Europe without Hitler's declaration of war. I have to dig through my literature to support this with proper literature refference.

 

What percentage of the ones that were't taken was? Besides you said "all".

Actually it was. Read the Gallup Polls of the time (Opana has them on his hyper war link). The main reason the US population didn't support getting into the war earlier was the belief that Britain didn't really need our help to win. The US would have been in the war by the end of 42 with or without Hitler's declaration.

 

I've saluted your post because today you have corrected my wrong view on this important issue. Thanks.

 

actually the Germans did capture a significant part of Russia's factories and resources in the western half of the country and the Soviets still had enough left over in Siberia. There were enough plants in Siberia and the Soviets were able to expand production to vastly out produce the Germans.

 

Indeed, but many factories have been rellocated to the east before Nazis arrived at their original locations. This escape of industrial facilities and laborers has enabled the USSR to recover from the initial blow.

 

I guess Roosevelt was the man to make the plans on this for the near future or perhaps he could have stopped saving Europe in 1940already...


Mass murder or a stroke of genius that saved Britain? As closer ties with France are planned, the 'betrayal' they still can't forgive | Mail Online

The U.S. navy had 50 antique destroyers it didn't need. They would be the perfect boost to Britain. But when Churchill asked him for them, President Roosevelt said 'No'. In Washington, the smart money was betting on a rapid British defeat or capitulation. Men such as Joe Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador in London, thought that America should not waste resources on a lost cause.

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After the ops...

For the first time since the war began, Churchill was cheered from all sides of the house. According to Harold Nicolson, who was present: 'The House is first saddened by this odious attack, but is fortified by Winston's speech. The grand finale ends in an ovation, with Winston sitting there with tears pouring down his cheeks.'
In Europe there was outrage. The Vichy regime, which included Admiral Darlan, and the German government made much propaganda play of the British 'atrocity'. Posters showing drowning French sailors and proclaiming 'Remember Mers-el-Kebir' appeared all over France.
But Washington was delighted. One major strategic worry (the fate of the French fleet) was removed. And another one (Britain's will and ability to fight) was much reduced. Roosevelt's attitude to naval aid for Britain quickly changed and soon Churchill had a deal on his 50 destroyers, the first important sign of American support for Britain and a huge boost to British morale.
Historian Andrew Lambert believes that the attack had a profound impact. 'It impresses the hell out of the American political class. Churchill is showing the Americans that the British mean business.'

 

Thanks Kai for the inspiring reply.

Churchill – Roosevelt relations weren't so rosy. Somewhere I've read a comment that for the most it wasn't worth saving the drowned man - Churchill. But, suddenly, Churchill has got support from the least expected side: Hitler carried out into effect what Churchill was trying so hard for 18 months – for him Adolf dragged the USA into European war. That's a historic fact.

I do respect growing preparedness of the US citizens at that time to support Britain, but it is not Gallup to ask Americans about the declaration of war but the US president should have asked the Congress regarding that matter which he didn't and even never intended to do so. Quite the contrary; even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor America retained diplomatic relationships with the Nazi Germany, an ally of Japan. Therefore, statements that the US could have or would have declared the war on Nazi Germany or almost did so are absolutely irrelevant speculation.

Finally, let's analyze the most important question of the Gallup poll:

"Should U.S. declare war on Germany and send our army and navy to Europe.”

1. In the spring and summer of 1940, no more than 5 percent gave confirmative answer. (Berinsky)

2. Support for a declaration of war edged up over the next year, reaching 29 percent in June 1941. (Berinsky)

3. Come December 1941, the public mood shifted dramatically. While Japan’s action and Germany’s declaration of war may have guaranteed U.S. involvement in the War, the public quickly rallied behind the American war effort. (Berinsky).

All this, however, doesn't diminish significance of the US participation in the Alliance. Their decision came at the most appropriate moment; when their country was subject to an immediate treat. Roosevelt, as a leader of a great nation acted prudently.

 

No. It's not a fact. It's your opinion and hardly a well founded one.

But FDR is only going to ask for a declartion of war when he believes he will get it and get it with a strong majority. In that regard the opinions of the poeple are critical. The US also maintianed diplomatic realtions with Finland throughout the war. In the period right after the attack on PH there was some considerable confusion. Hitler simplified things by declaring war at the time. It is clear however that the US was headed to war with Germany and almost assuredly some time in 42. Indeed the "shoot on sight" order was in essence a declaration of war all be it a limited one. So no it is not irrelevant speculation.

Is it really the most important? I hardly think so.

The shift however is noticable in November and December piror to the PH attack. For a parallel look back at WWI. How much support was there for US intervention in that war 6 months or a year prior to the US entry? Consider also that FDR's military advisors were telling him the US really wouldn't be ready for war until mid 42 and not ready to go on the offensive until the end of that year. Indeed some almost begged him to keep us out of the war for at least the first quarter of 42.

 

Nazi Germany did not employ German women in the factory floors, because it was a philosophical choice. German women were not meant to labour in factories. BDM did not teach young girls that they would do their duty to the fatherland by taking manufacturing jobs. They were to look after hearth and home, nurse and nurture.

 

Stalin and the rest of Communist Russia did not live the entire 1930's with their heads stuck down a dark hole. A lot of preparation, and indeed the creation of factories, heavy industry, and movement of labourers had started prior to the start of the Great Patriotic War. There was a great fear of the effects of strategic bombing on Russian industry, so steps had already been taken to locate industries beyond the Urals, well away from bombers, and this was initiated already in the early to mid 1930's. The need to improve Heavy Industry was outlined already in the 5-year plan of 1928. The second 5-year plan (1932-1937) improved communications, (mostly railways), and continued to improve heavy industry production, primarily through new sites, located well east of Germany (near the Urals).

During Operation Barbarossa, what could the Germans do? Advance Eastward faster? Believe me, they were advancing as fast as they could. You can't sneak up on a factory with a panzer division... The panzers have to physically drive there, and that takes time. Panzers don't drive on autobahns at top speed towards their destination. Railways always go right into industrial centers. So the factory keeps on producing until the enemy is 50 kms away: being near a city, it may take a week to advance those 50 kms. How much material can 1000 workers dismantle and load onto trains in a week? The Germans rapid advance probably prevented the Russians from dismantling some window frames and doors. Soviet anti-defeatist attitude by some commisars may have allowed the Nazis to capture more nails than were strictly necessary.

What allowed the Soviet Union to recover from "the initial blow" was its ability to keep mobilizing vast amounts of manpower: on average 500,000 each month, for the duration of the war. Nazi Germany vastly underestimated the capacity of the Soviet Union to mobilize, initially believing that destroying the standing army of ca 3.5 million would render the Soviets basically defenceless, allowing strategic freedom. This never happened. The Germans did what they set out to do: in the first six weeks, the russians lost 1.5 million (killed wounded, captured). It didn't help. Because the Soviets had mobilized 1.4 million between the start of the invasion and the end of July.

 

It was not jus "women must stay home", Nazi ideology contributed a lot to Germany's defeat, probably just as much as the lack of a real grand strategy due to having amateurs at the top.
Just to make some obvous examples:
- Quite a large number of key figures in the Us A-bomb programme were jews, had they stayed in Europe of even contibuted to the German effort .....
- Without the racist policies they would have had a much better change at causing a political collapse of the USSR (the only realistic way to defeat it) and delaying /preventing US intervention.
- A lot of Nezi leaders had huge personal agendas that hampered the war effort, Goering was possibly the worst but not the only one.

On the other hand without Hitler the rearmement programmes that transformed the German armed forces from a non entitity to hugely effectivve war machine in just six years would probably not happen.

And I'm not convinced that with all out effort by Germany would not have eventualy won the battle of the Atlantic or at least made any sort of offensive operation from the UK not viable. Historically they didn't even come close but it was a sideshow as far as production priorities went.
Also if the bulk of the LW stays in western Europe the bombing campaign will take yers to develop and is far from sure to win, the Germans are at a big production disadvantage but they are trading single engined fighters agaist four engined boimber with full crews.

 

I think I will approach this subject from different perspective in strategy terms. Could Germany win the war ? First of all , define winning : Is it survival of Third Reich as a state with all of its conquests in Eurasia intact and rise as empire state a superpower from Urals to Atlantic ?

I dislike playing "what if ?" But my answer is a definitive "No". As long as Adolf Hitler , his Darwinian outlook and extreme Nazi ideology on every subject and issue (military , politics , international relations , diplomacy , economics , geopolitics etc ) he was supposed to be expert existed and ruled as state policy of Reich , German war effort was doomed from start. They did not even use their all advantages or resources efficiently. Their main victories at the beginning of war was due to their better military preparation and efficiency in short term quick victorious campaigns against their neighbours who were at disadvantage in one way or another and much less prepared. But political and military leadership of Third Reich lacked a proper and sound strategy for a long term total war from start because they avoided or did not contemplate that possibility even at the beginning. In military terms German Armed Forces performed very admirably. But what good would it be if you waste your scant resources against your opponents who had much larger reserves and afford to lose it , afford to wait and consume time and learn from past mistakes ? WWII was a Total War and Germany realized that too late and even after that they couldn't get a "total war footing". Just being military efficient does not mean you succeed in Total War concept.

In that regard both Nazi leadership and German High Command (OKW , OKH) were at fault for thinking in WWI or even worse 19th Century militray strategical terms. Just a few victorious battles and deep thrusts to deep enemy rear into its fatherland and it would be over just like that ! they assumed. This concept might have worked in Napoleonic era ( which influanced Prussian military strategic thinking more than it should have ) but they also worked mainly against Germany's peripheral neighbors in Europe. German strategy never throught beyond that (like flexibilty of naval power and geostrategy or main landmass or population base of Russia) 1871 Franco-Prussia War or 1914 Tannanberg Campaign shaped their outlook in narrow strategic terms. Soviet Russia in 1941 was not Tsarist Russia of 19th Century especially Nazi war of total annihilation/enslavement against Slavs considered and France with its population dwindled and divided in society/politics was not a USA or UK which were isolated by seas or oceans and learned to use them to their advantage. For example both Hitler and OKW assumed main military and political objectives of Operation Barbarossa would be achieved before the end of 1941. They just thought for a six months long of a campaign and made logistical preparations for that not beyond. If this is not an example of baseless ideology and underestimating enemy due racism and clinging past examples I don't know what it is.

As Andrew Roberts said only way Hitler could have won the war was not starting it in first place BUT from his perspective he had to start it because he was a Nazi and a Darwinian and victorious romantic war should have been concluded in his lifetime.

 

The Nazis could never win. And without the fascists, the Germans would not have started the war.

The Nazis very philosophy doomed them from the start. The persecution of "undesireables", the inhumanity of the KZs, the use of slave labour, the repression of local populances, fascination with V-weapons (the development and deployment of which cost more than the Manhattan project, and the V2 killed more people involved in production than enemies), proves that their brutal regime would do nothing but crumble, falter, and fail.

Nazi philosophy did not allow them to do otherwise. They labelled certain sciences as "Jewish" and not worthy of further investigation. Without the racist policies, and vision of a master race destined to rule Eastern Europe, they are no longer Nazis, and not likely to start the war.

They couldn't force the issue across the channel. They tried but failed to defeat the RAF. They couldn't afford to give Dönitz his 300 uboat fleet to effect a stranglehold on the UK. Neither could the Kriegsmarine be built up to challenge the RN openly. They needed that steel for their army. They couldn't ignore the growing colossus to their east, because the Soviets would have invaded sooner or later. So the KM played third fiddle to the Army and LW. They couldn't justify keeping large numbers of aircraft in the west, early in the war, when the efficiency of the bombing raids is quite low.

The bombing campaign took years to develop as it was! Long lasting disruption of German industry due to the bombing was rare, until very late in the war (1945, when it was obvious to all the war was lost regardless), and then only really on Oil production, which was always a scarce resource.

 

I don't think I've seen one yet. One of the problems is that the Nazi German economy was such a wreck and the people involved didn't seem to know how to fix it. I'm not convinced that they would have survived into the 50's even if they had managed to terminate the war successfully in 41 (Peace with Britain and the USSR falling apart into various successor states).

 

Why would Germany need to stop the war in Europe fast? After victory in France 1940 start making your leadership stronger in Europe, not pushing for other wars but stabilize your position. The US would take years to declare war, if Hitler had not done that in Dec 1941. And if Stalin and Hitler would not attack each other, who would kick the nazis to Berlin?