How Germany could've won?

One point that seems obvious but for some reason is never mentioned - in the last war, Germany had defeated Russia, despite having the majority of her forces committed in the west the whole time. Who would guess that Stalin's regime, which spent the 1930s starving its own people and purging its military leadership, would prove so much more resiliant than the Tsar's?

 

Well... Tsarist Russia had huge problems. Not least of which was the Collapse of the home front, the February Revolution in 1917, and the inability to adequately supply and maintain the armed forces already 1915. The German army did their bit to "purge" the Tsarist Army of loyalist officers. Ultimately, though, the German army didn't beat the Russian army (the Russians did ok militarily in 1916, but it was a malaise of spirit in the whole of Russia). The war did exacerbate the gulf between the haves and the have nots, in a social climate that was already brewing of discontent for years prior. The Karensky government tried to continue the war, but it was so unpopular, that doing so caused more riots and unrest, and vastly increased the popularity of the Bolsheviks. It was not until after the October Revolution, that Russia concluded an Armistice with the Central Powers in December 1917. Significantly, the remaining German troops that forced the terms of the armistice by marching unopposed into the Ukraine in March 1918, could perhaps have been put to better use in their Spring Offensive in 1918.

The first three five year plans (from 1928) of the USSR were devoted almost entirely to overcome these short comings; improved heavy industry, collectivised farming, improved communication infrastructure.

By 1941, the average Soviet citizen has seen a vast improvement in many aspects of life.

As so many non-Soviet citizens were involved in these preparations, designing, building, factories, power plants, subways, it shouldn't really have come as any surprise whatsoever.

 

The only way the allies could have prevented an occupation of eastern Europe by the Soviets would have been to abandon the war against Japan and start ww3 against the Soviets.
Im not sure why Hitler or any other Nazi leader would think that the British would ever consider a peace treaty with Germany after the occupation the Czechs, since no treaty was really valid according to the Nazi's.

 

Churchill did not order to plan an attack on the SU:

First,he asked the military if it was possible to launch an attack on the SU (the offensive variant),than,he asked the military what were the possibilities for Britain to resist,if the SU launched an attack (defensive variant) .And,in both cases,the abswer was negative,pessimistic.


There was nothing sinister on the whole story :the war with Germany was over,and the political leadership asked the military what they could do if a) the West attacked the SU , b ) the SU attacked the West .
Twice,the answer was : forget it .

 

There was also no reason for the West to oppose a Soviet domination of eastern Europe:Britain never was interested in the region .

 

No,the understanding was quite early coming,and,it was one of the reasons to attack the SU .Germany lost WWI,because this was a long war of attrition,thus,the longer WWII would last,.............

 

Nobody suggested it was "sinister": It was a fact; Churchill asked for a preliminary plan. The reason, the mistreatment of the Poles; what could the west do to enforce their political will upon the USSR (that is, free elections, as promised, by Stalin, for all Eastern Europeans, but primarily Poland). The answer was; It'd be bloody dangerous to try. Those are facts.

 

Yes, there was: Stalin promised that there would be free elections, and yet he was already in May subjugating Poles to harsh repression. This riled Churchill, who was quite the anti-communist. Especially, as Great Britain declared war, over the invasion of Poland. You can be as cynical as you please, but to claim there was "no interest" is incorrect. There were many Poles in British uniform still. More than 100,000 Poles in Iran (a distinctly British interest), Poles served in the RAF. Poles fought at Monte Casino. The common man was very much aware of the Polish situation. Those Poles in the west were not forced back to Poland, unlike many other citizens of places then "liberated" by the USSR.

 

The quote was regarding an "Attrition Air war against the Anglo Americans" and forseeing the event already in 1939-1942. There was no such thing, in 1939-1942. In fact, Hitler belittled the US, because of its puny armed forces at its disposal in 1941. Very few in Europe in 1940-41, could percieve that the USA would produce 100,000 aircraft in 1944 alone. Even fewer of them imagined that fleets of Bombers 1000 aircraft strong protected by long range fighters would fly to Berlin and back from bases in England in late 1944. In 1941, this was not possible, and so the magnitude was not forseen. Had it been forseen, then other steps would've been taken with regards to aircraft production and procurement.

Furthermore according to Nazi Germany, and the commonly believed myth, they lost WWI because of the stab in the back, not because of any "war of attrition".

The most important reason to attack the USSR, was mutual distrust. Sooner or later War with the USSR was going to happen, and it would be better now rather than later, as the Soviets were increasing their capacity and capabilities faster than Germany. Hitler saw Stalin's trade agreements as a way for the Soviets to buy time, which, in all honesty, it was.

As the USSR was seen as a rotten house ready for collapse, USA was not in the war yet , and Britain alone couldn't really do diddly squat in continental Europe, there was very little to do with any thinking about a "war of attrition" at all. Hitler was an opportunist, not a long term strategist.

 

The Germans were aware of the growing American industry, specially the aero one. For this the idea of invade the USSR was to grab resources to fight the Anglo-Americans.

 

The OKW was aware of the positive points of the WM, but also of the negative ones and that the Eastern Front should not be an attrition one. So, like with France, it was a gamble.

 

Churchill was not that naive to believe the promises of Stalin. He knew that Poland was at the mercy of Stalin,and,that there was nothing he could do about .Besides,the importance of "unthinkable" is much exaggerated:in may,Churchill was the leader of a care-taker government :elections were planned for july;he also was the PM of a ruined country,that was at the mercy of the US.What Churchill was thinking was irrelevant : the decision for a war would be taken at Washington ,not at Whitehall .

And,about Poland : the big clash after the war was not about Poland(every one had put of Poland),it was about CZ : the new coup of Prague of 1948.

 

1)Such steps were taken with regards to aircraft production and procurement : the LW still got priority:the LW strength would be quadrupled:the war against the West was for Hitler the decisive one,not the war against the East .

2)You are falling for the usual trap ,which is :looking at what the Nazis were saying,not at what they were doing :the war in the east was planned as a short war,because,Hitler knew that Germany had not the means to win a war of attrition .

In the autumn of 1940,it was obvious that the WM was not capable to defeat the UK in a short war,even a long war would be questionable ,meanwhile,the US would intervene,and this would mean that Germany could forget it .

It was also obvious that the WM was not capable to defeat the SU in a long war:the only thing it could do,was to defeat the SU in a short campaign,and hoping that this would force Britain to give up,resulting in the end of the war with the west .

Publicly,the Nazis were deriding the US(they only could make razors),but in reality,they were taken precautions.

 

"I don't see much future for the Americans ... it's a decayed country. And they have their racial problem, and the problem of social inequalities ... my feelings against Americanism are feelings of hatred and deep repugnance ... everything about the behaviour of American society reveals that it's half Judaised, and the other half negrified. How can one expect a State like that to hold together?"
- Statement in conversation, 7 January 1942. (not a propaganda broadcast)

And consider that when the European war began in earnest on September 1, 1939, with the German invasion of Poland, the U.S. Army ranked seventeenth among armies of the world in size and combat power, just behind Romania. It numbered 190,000 soldiers.

The idea, that the USA would mobilize as quickly as it did, and achieve the standards it did while doing so, was incomprehensible. Just as No one in the west foresaw the Soviet Union mobilizing ca 500,000 men a month, for the duration of the war, in July 1941.

The East was planned as a short war, because there was a belief, that a longer war was not necessary. It was believed, that it was only necessary to destroy the Soviet army as it stood in the field. No one "wants" to fight a longer war. "Wars of Attrition" benefit no one. Wars are a means to a political end, not an end in and of themselves. Fundamentally, the Germans were not "outnumbered" on the Eastern front yet. They just couldn't deal with the continued Soviet rate of mobilization.

The German army basically achieved its goal of destroying the Soviet army of June 1941. But by the time it did so, the Soviets had mobilized almost as many again, which is where the fundamental miscalculation was. Basically, the same misunderstanding as with regards to the speed of US mobilization and production.

It was not forseen by German leadership, that the USA would have such a vast airforce already in 1944, in 1941. If it had been, then there was little point in declaring war against USA. Because by this time, it was clear that the war in the Russia, was not going to be short. This is also reflected in the goals for the campaign in 1942; There was no single goal for "knocking the USSR out of the War" in Case Blue. It was an attempt to secure more POL resources desperately needed by the Wehrmacht. That summer, they were abandoning heavy vehicles in their advance from lack of Oil.

At least the Japanese understood what they were getting themselves involved with. But they too, underestimated the determination of the western democracies.

 

Not absolutely sure if Göring tells the whole truth here but anyway very different view to Hitler on the US possibilities in production figures, I trust.

http://www.historynet.com/lost-prison-interview-with-hermann-goring-the-reichsmarschalls-revelations.htm

Hechler: What was the German estimate of American war potential? Did Germany hope to complete its European campaigns before the United States would be strong enough to intervene?
Göring: As a break neared and it seemed that the matter had to be decided by war, I told Hitler, I consider it a duty to prevent America going to war with us. I believed the economic and technical potential of the United States to be unusually great, particularly the air force. Although at the time not too many new inventions had been developed to the extent we might have anticipated, and airplane production was significant but not outstandingly large. I always answered Hitler that it would be comparatively easy to convert factories to war production. In particular, the mighty automobile industry could be resorted to. Hitler was of the opinion that America would not intervene because of its unpleasant experiences in World War I.

 

Part of Hitlers miscalculation was that Japan would be able to occupy America far more then it did. Hitler declared on the US because he thought his U-boats could interdict the supplies that were otherwise flowing to Britain freely.

 

I agree that some may have seen the potential problem, but none anticipated the speed at which it developed.

In a dictatorship, there really is only one voice that needs to be heard, only one opinion that matters, and only one person to convince. Ribbentrop, too, feared another adversary would not exactly aid the German war effort. Yet we know what happened.

Somehow Göring failed to convince Hitler. Göring, who suggested that the LW by itself destroy what was left of Allied armies in the Low Countries (May 1940). Göring, whom told Hitler that the LW would secure Air superiority over the channel and Great Britain (Aug 1940). Göring, whom assured Hitler that the LW could adequately resupply the surrounded 6th army by air. This Göring, is the man, who had the insight, that automobile factories could be converted? That must be why he did so very little about it then. I must say I'm not 100% convinced of the man's veracity. Maybe he mumbled something at a dinner party while in a moment of temporary lucidity between morpheine doses and cocktails. I doubt he made a very passionate case. Göring knew nothing about airplane production, or strategy.

This of course, at a time when the armaments were still competing peace time goods, and factories were running on single shifts, when the Ministry of Economic Affairs, had declared in November 1941 that conditions did not permit an increase in armament production. Prior to the death of Fritz Todt (Feb '42), and Albert Speer being named Minister of Armaments.

Because if "it was known" ie common knowledge, and accepted wisdom, that there was going to be overwhelming air superiority problems in Central Europe for Germany just a few years down the line, and yet they had done next to nothing to change or improve their production capabilities (the glide towards war with America didn't happen over night, and yet there were demob plans drawn up in Sept '41), then wouldn't you say that they were rather lax and complacent well beyond the point of sheer incompetence?

So pray tell, what exactly did these German men with all this foresight as to USA's vast aircraft production potential, and USA's increasingly obvious stance, do in 1941?

That's right. Next to Nothing. There is a complete lack of a long term plan to deal with anything. Since 1938. Just rampant opportunism. Which is apparent in June 1940. There is no solid plan for what to do when England doesn't seek an armistice. Just vague ideas (well, we could always kick the Soviets in the shin for LoLs, that'll show the English we mean business), when it was obvious that Hitler wasn't really interested in a war with the Western powers.

If you know in Sept 1940
1) you are facing an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the UK, and you don't have the means to successfully invade for at least several years.
2) that an increasingly hostile USA, is aiding the UK and may sink Uboats in the Atlantic.
3) that you want to invade the Soviet Union next year.
4) that the USA will probably produce 100,000 aircraft in 12 months after 3 years from DoW

It might just be a good idea to actually, you know, fully mobilize and start producing more than an additional 150 more aircraft a month, because aircraft can be utilized on all fronts (Eastern, Western, African, Atlantic, and Home)

And then again, in Dec 1941, facing the same realities, the same inaction.

Total German WW2 aircraft production
Year
1939 --- 1940 ---1941 --- 1942 --- 1943 --- 1944 ---1945 --- Total
1,928 - 7,829 - 9,422 - 12,822 - 20,599 - 35,076 - 7,052 - 94,622


In other words, no, the Germans did not forsee the vast superiority in production. In hindsight, they all blame Hitler, even Göring. They did nothing to mitigate the disaster which they all claim to have seen heading toward them prior to the DoW.

By 1942, it was too late. They fell into the trap of believing their own propaganda, and then lied about it afterwards once they saw the vast armadas arrayed against them in June '44.

 

The Wages of destruction, 451:


The floodgates in Luftwaffe planning finally opened in the summer of 1941 with the completion of the army's Barbarossa programme and the long-awaited decision to shift priority to the air war. In June 1941 the Air Ministry proposed a doubling of output to 20,000 aircraft per year over the following three years.
72
To implement this expansion, Göring'sstaff came to an agreement with Fritz Todt to carry out the reallocation of resources from the army to the Luftwaffe in a 'consensual fashion'.Todt himself was to oversee the identification of spare capacity and to ensure continuity of employment for army contractors.
73
Days after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Luftwaffe revealed the full urgency and ambition of its new plans. At a meeting with representatives of the OKW, State Secretary Milch announced that, as of 1 May 1941, German intelligence believed that combined British and American output had exceeded that of Germany and Italy. The United States alone was turning out 2,800 high-performance aero-engines per month. On current trends, Anglo-American output would be twice that of the Axis by the end of 1942. 'There is not a minute to lose...', Milch declared. By the summer
of
1942 Germany needed to increase its production of aircraft by 150 percent, to roughly 3,000 planes per month.
74
The precise target set by Milch was new, but not the basic thrust of his comments. As we have seen,the expansion in productive capacity had already begun in the autumn of 1940. Milch's new target of 3,000 aircraft per month, however, required a further scaling up. Since earlier in the year Krauch had been envisioned a medium-term increase in the production of air fuel from 1 to 1.5 million tons. Now he raised his target to no less than 3 million tons. Given the cost of the hydrogenation process, it was unrealistic to assume that this could be produced from German coal. Hydrogenation was simply too expensive. Krauch's promise therefore hinged on the assump-tion that the Wehrmacht would conquer the Caucasus in the next few months and that Germany by 1942 would be importing Russian oil at the rate of at least one million tons per annum.
75
Here was the perverselogic of Barbarossa in a nutshell. The conquest of the oilfields of theCaucasus, 2,000 kilometres deep in the Soviet Union, was not treated as the awesome military-industrial undertaking that it was. It was inserted as a precondition into another gargantuan industrial plan designed to allow the Luftwaffe to fight an air war, not against the Soviet Union, but against the looming air fleet of Britain and the United States.

 

For those interested in further reading on how the Luftwaffe doggedly planned for defeat already 1940, and how the leadership of the 3rd Reich failed to learn many important lessons, amongst others properly organising aircraft production, I suggest:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/index.html#index

I quote:

"One can argue with justification that the Germans lost World War II in the late summer of 1940 and that their future defeats on the ground and in the air sprang from their unwillingness at that time to identify and to face the real strategic situation. In the euphoria of victory over France, the political and military leadership refused to acknowledge that it had won only the first round of a long struggle. Even defeat in the Battle of Britain failed to shake a remarkable mood of optimism. Hence, the force structure and organization with which the Wehrmacht embarked on "Barbarossa" was in no fashion suitable to the demands of a continental war. Conversely, the British and Americans drew certain lessons from the Battle of Britain that determined the course of the air war three years later. Overestimating the Luftwaffe's actual size, Anglo-American planners organized their nation's economic effort for an enormous increase in aircraft production.

What is almost incomprehensible is the fact that the Germans paid so little attention to the attrition that had occurred in France and over Britain. Not until the Wehrmacht was deep in the Soviet Union did Göring finally authorize Milch to bring order to the aircraft industry. By that time, it was too late. British production programs had a two-year head start, while the American programs were at least a year ahead. If that handicap were not enough, Milch faced a constant, uphill battle to persuade the general staff to accept as a necessity the production increases that he proposed. That failure to gear German aircraft production to a worst case analysis of what Anglo-American industry might turn out cost the Luftwaffe the air war in 1943 and 1944. One cannot stress enough that administrative, strategic, and productive decisions in the 1940 to 1941 time frame insured the permanent inferiority of Germany's air effort throughout the remainder of the war. The basis of those decisions lay in an overestimation of the Reich's strength and a contemptuous arrogance that dismissed the Russians as subhumans and the Americans as capable of building only radios and refrigerators. Disdainful of their enemies and proud of their victories, the Germans were sure that their technological expertise and military competence could master any threat."