How we come to know what we know

I'd think there are some significant differences, but as far as comparisons go, that would be the most worthwhile. Sherman, PzIV, and early T34.
PzIV would seem to have the most adaptable chassis- but then again, the Germans had far more need for said adaptation than either the US or Russia.
I'd think the Sherman would win the mobility argument relatively soundly, and make a good case at reliability, as well.
PzIV would probably win in areas that stress technology and craftsmanship... but in context, who cares(d)?

Indeed, between the US, Germany, and Russia, manufacturing circumstances made a HUGE difference. US had only issues of applying manpower and resources to the task; Russia had the resources, but some obvious issues with having the Germans right on their doorstep. Even as the war progressed, Russia never had the security that the mainland US did. And putting German manufacturing into the picture... strained resources, under near constant attack, etc.

Amazing the Germans managed to manufacture any tanks at all during the last couple years of the war!

 

Arguably, M4A3E8 was a better tank than PzKw IV H and M36 a superior tank destroyer than StuG IV or JgdPz IV. I doubt the American Army would have more tanks on hand if their factories produced Pz IVs.

 

(just to maintain an interesting conversation)

Was a 24 ton PZIV more difficult to manufacture? Obviously shipping isn't an issue with a lighter vehicle, so I don't see where the issue might be with having adequate numbers on hand (if hypothetically speaking the US was building PZIV's).
The M36 may have an edge on the JgdPz IV, but on the JgdPz IV/70 ? The Nashorn (88mm)?
Was there a Sherman equivalent to the Brumbar?

There is also the dizzying number of specialized variants:

Mobelwagen- Sd. Kfz. 161/3,
Wirbelwind,
Ostwind
BergePanzer IV recovery vehicle
Panzerjagers/Sturmpanzers (Tank Destroyers and Assault Guns): Hornisse/Nashorn - Sd.Kfz. 164,
Hummel - Sd. Kfz. 165,
Jagdpanzer IV - Sd. Kfz. 162 / 162/1,
Sturmgeschutz IV - Sd. Kfz. 163 / 167,
Sturmpanzer IV Brummbar - Sd. Kfz. 166,
Prototypes/Projects: Geschutzwagen IV (Sd. Kfz. 165/1) - 105mm L/28 howitzer carrier,
Geschutzwagen IV (Sd. Kfz. 165/1) - 75mm Pak 39 L/48 gun carrier,
Geschutzwagen IV - 105mm L/28 howitzer carrier - (Rh) prototype,
Heuschrecke 10 / Gw IVb - 105mm L/28 - 3 prototypes built,
Panzerjager 105 - 105mm K18 L/52 gun - 2 prototypes built,
Panzerkampfwagen IV mit hydrostatischen Antrieb,
Ostwind II,
Zerstorer 45,
Kugelblitz,

 

I had read that Speer had wanted a lighter more agile 30 ton Panther. If built as opposed to the 45+ ton variant how much of a change would this mean? Sounds like something closer to the M-4.

 

Belasar,

Speer might have wanted a 30 ton Panther, but he was a day late and a dollar short. He was still Hitler's architect, IIRC Todt only died on February 8, 1942, when the contract for the VK 3002 body was given to Daimler-Benz and MAN on November 25, 1941. The VK 3002 was to have had a combat weight of 30 tons, it was upped to 32.5 tons and was finally to 36 tons on January 22, 1942. The VK 3002(DB) looked very similar to the T-34 and MAN's version was, well, mostly the Panther as built. Google "VK 3002", there are plenty of info and drawings on the net. For instance, the old "Mythic Panzers"/ now "WW2 Drawings" website has this drawing of the VK3002(DB).
VK.3002(Db)

However, till all was said, done, and built, the weight of the Panther had increased to near the 45 ton mark.

 

Speaking of that site.....

Apparently this is the direction they "should have" gone in 1942:
Panzerkampfwagen III/IV Einheitsfahrgestell

Panzer projects & prototypes.

 

Thanks for the links. If put into production it would seem a very close parallel to the M-4, an existing chassis with a improved turret. Considering the production problems of the Panther it seemes likely they could easily surpass the 6,000 Panthers built. Does anyone know why it was not adopted? The turret looks a little large for the chassis.

 

If you look closely at the Panzerkampfwagen III/IV Einheitsfahrgestell, it appears to have the Pz.IV turret. I know it has the same 75mm KwK 40 L/48 main gun of the late model Ausf. G's, and Ausf. H and J. Also the upper glacis is sloped, the Pz.III/IV's were vertical, the upper hull sides also appear sloped where the III's and IV's were vertical.

Panzerkampfwagen III/IV Einheitsfahrgestell
Specifications
Panzerkampfwagen III/IV Einheitsfahrgestell
Specifications​

 

Agreed, pity the Germans didn't think of it until 1944.

Probably for the same reason the Germans dropped their first attempt at combining the Pz III & IV in 1941; larger, heavier, more powerful Soviet tanks.

 

The Germans really needed to go the route the US did with the M3 - M5 light and M4 and T 23 medium. That is not reinvent the wheel but rather simply improve on what you already have to the maximum extent possible.

In the case of both the Pz III and IV they could have restructured the hull to give it fully sloped armor, installed a new turret that could take an effective gun, beefed up the suspension, and that sort of thing rather than build a whole new tank. The US did it. The Russians did it. The British eventually got around to doing it too.
This makes far more sense than developing a totally new vehicle like they acutally did.

 

Very good points Mr. Gardner. It makes a lot of sense. Any insight into why they didn't pursue this path?

 

I though the Germans took the Pz IV as far as it could go. They tried fitting the Panther "schmalturm" with the 75mm/L70 gun, but found this had overburdened the chassis. But that was without a modified hull or suspension. Then again, with all the extra weight wouldn't the "new" Pz IV need a better transmission, steering gear, and a more powerful engine? If so, haven't we just basically described the "Panther."

 

No, they didn't come close with it or the Pz III.

I've been fiddling with the Pz IV for another board. While what appears below is a work in progress it gives you some idea what I mean. The design shown would have been all welded with the upper part of the hull still removable by unbolting like it was on the original design. This would allow for repair and maintenance.
The weight would be about 28 to 30 tons (eg, the same to about 2 tons more) compared to the original vehicle. The suspension would have recieved one more leaf per bogie truck and the trucks spaced from the hull about 4 cm further out using spacers. The idler and drive sprocket would be done likewise. An 8 cm wider track would be fitted. The turret would allow for a 75/L55 gun installed (say a cut down version of the Panther gun or a hotter version of the L48).

 

It would seem we have Hitler's/Germany's pride to thank for the pursuit of the best tank possible as opposed to simply an effective tank. A rather interesting parallel to this thread I think.

I have read that Germany produced about 9,000 Pz IV's of all variants and about 6,000 Panther's of all variants. Discounting all Pz IV's built before 1942, does a production run of 15,000 to 18,000 Pz III/IV or Pz IVt.a.gardner seem reasonable. If so how much of an effect 1942-45 for Germany?

 

This has far more to do with the way the German military procured equipment. Their system had a number of "technical" departments within the various branches that actually made up specifications, oversaw development and, decided on procurement. These branches were staffed by what were usually combat arm officers from the appropriate branch and technical portion of each service.
Thus, the Luftwaffe had experianced combat pilots as their technical branch officers, the Heer had panzer or infantry officers in theirs, etc,. The problem here is that few of these officers had any background whatsoever in engineering and procurement. Those positions within these branches were filled by subordinate civilian or military personnel. The final decisions on most equipment developed lay with the senior and untrained combat officers overseeing the department.
There was no equivalent civilian side agency or board to the military one either. Thus, industry was simply given specifications and told to develop equipment.

Where the major problem lay was in what I would say was a national characteristic of Germans: They sought and demanded engineering and technical perfection along with very advanced features on their equipment.
Aircraft had to have very high top speeds often at the expense of other flight features. Complex defensive systems like remote controlled turrets were asked for. In ground vehicles suspensions that worked very well but were horribly complex, hard and expensive ot manufacture, and maintenance nightmares were regularly used. Soft skin vehicles often had independent unequal A-arm suspensions. These worked great but were delicate and difficult to manufacture compared to simple leaf spring ones. Interleaved and overlapped track systems. Lubricated pin roller bearing tracks on most half tracks was simply engineering overkill especially in wartime.

 

Still, the Heer could have decided to go with the Pz III/IV sticking with the known design much the same way that the Luftwaffe did with the Me109. It would appear that they easily could have produced 15-18000 of those tanks in the time period of 1942-45 considering the cost savings from not building much larger tanks. Overall I doubt it would have had any real strategic effect though.

 

My numbers for German production posted above are a bit low. According to Wikipedia just shy of 7,400 Pz IV F2-J's were built between 1942-45. A further 3,900 Pz IV Assult gun/Tank Destroyer variants were built during the same period. Plus 6,500 Panthers of all types for the same time frame. My math puts that just shy of 18,000 units they did build. Building to a single standard type, Pz III/IV or Pz IVtaGardner, plus the relative ease of construction compared to the Panther, a figure of 22,000 to 25,000 does not seem too unrealistic.

Germany probably still loses the war, but consider if Citadelle had gone off on time, maybe Germany gets 6 month to a year more time?

 

Those numbers are not too bad for Germany, but as you say she definitely still loses the war. One weapon of any kind can not turn a war (I think Clauswitz said something like that...maybe) and the allies are still controlling the air in the west, bombing the heck out of Germany and in the east Germany is facing numbers they can not come close to countering, even with a good number of a good medium.

By a good "standard" type I'm guessing you are aware of the disaster Germany put itself in with regard to maintaining so many different models of the tanks she fielded. Not only was Germany's maintenance situation a disaster because of shortage of parts but also because of the tremendous difficulty in getting the right parts to the units that needed them.

Another point to remember is that by late '44/early'45 the crews of the tanks Germany had were badly trained or saw limited training because of supply shortages. Germany will be losing battles to the allies based on this alone, regardless of numbers.

 

JBark,

Agreed no single thing (save having a A-Bomb in '41) will avert defeat for Germany. I personally love exploring the 'what if's' but it is pretty easy to take apart any single idea by simply saying if Germany does 'A' then the Allies/Soviets do 'B'. Germany needed to address more than one issue to win. I have always thought that Germany could survive the war if not win it, but the more variables you add the harder it becomes.

Back to this point, if Germany could field 500 to 600 more operational tanks during the period mid-1942 to mid 1943, when things were still fluid for the Reich, perhaps they can buy some breathing room for Hitler's Germany. With enough panzers to equip 3 to 4 divisions perhaps the 6th Army encircles Stalingrad rather than try to take it frontally. Or perhaps there is enough armor to punch thru to Paulus after the Soviet offensive. Or the summer '43 Kursk offensive launches on time rather waiting for Panthers/Tigers.

It was in the east where the German army truely died. A 10% to 15% increase in operational tanks in that theater gives the Reich a few more options and a bit more time.

 

But, this would not solve AGS's problems by any stretch. The severe shortage of trucks in the Wehrmacht was crippling AGS long before the Soviets launched their counteroffensive. The lack of railway engineers and construction troops were a massive hamper on opening roads and railroads to bring supplies forward. At Stalingrad the Germans were operating nearly 300 miles from the nearest rail head at Stalino. Their engineers couldn't even make the unimproved dirt roads that their supply lines were operating over sufficently better to keep them open in any inclement weather.
The Luftwaffe became more a transport service long before the Russians attacked flying in critical supplies on almost the scale of the later air lift once 6th Army was surrounded. To do this they had to curtail most offensive operations in support of the ground troops.
What happens with more tanks is simply that more break down, cannot be quickly repaired, and in the end the panzer divisions end up with just the same handful of runners limping along while the maintenance services are chock full of broken tanks that cannot be repaired quickly due to lack of parts and materials.