How we come to know what we know

T.A.,

Your points are valid, but as I wrote Germany needed to address more than one area to have any chance to succeed. I was listing a few areas where more tanks could have a positive impact. A 150 to 200 more tanks at the start of the '42 campaign might allow for more enemy pow's to be taken after Kharkov is another example.

More available tanks for 6th Army on the aproach to Stalingrad after Hitler splits off AGA to seize the caucasus's surely could not hurt. While I agree more tanks means more breakdowns, overall though there are still more runners than would be historicly.

 

My point was that their biggest problem by mid 1942 wasn't fighting power. That is, their top priority shouldn't have been panzers, but rather support troops, trucks, trains, and engineers. Without these their army couldn't fight efficently. It cost them their 1942 summer offensive in Russia. It defeated Rommel in North Africa. It proved to be one of the largest singular causes of the German's defeat for the entire war.

 

The last thing the Germans needed was more panzers the reason why they lost was because the Germans were getting a bigger pice them they could handle.

 

I don't know as much as I would like at this point but I'm trying to gain more knowledge. Of what I do know I can't agree more with the above. For example I have a paper written by the U.S. Army based on interviews about German tank maintenance during the war (#20-202, available through Merriam Press.) It points out that the Germans encountered one foul up after another in trying to maintain the panzers they had and the further they got from Germany the worse things got. Essentially the rule book was written for how to do things and then thrown away since improvisation was the name of the game.

R.L. Di Nardo writes a book, Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism where he discusses the mighty Wermacht's image versus the reality of a force almost completely dependent on horses (my words.) He discusses some of this in Germany's Panzer Arm in WWII (both Stackpole books.) He points out that not only does Germany have an inadequate number of trucks but that they are inadequate as trucks, not being true military grade vehicles but a mismash of civilian vehicles. It is his opinion that the German industry was never capable of the needs of the military and much of the wasteful playing around done by Hitler et al certainly did not help.

 

Agreed, the German army dies in the east but from factors on all fronts. Again, don't see the 500 to 600 making too much difference but what I think is an important toss around thought is how effective they would have been fighting with one standardized, easy to maintain, medium tank...like the Sherman. The reason I sing the praises of the Sherman is that the U.S. fielded it and the U.S. was capable of producing it in huge numbers, maintaining it, redisigning it and fielding the other units to fight with it. This is unique and worthy of the praise I give it.

 

Gentlemen,

After the last few posts I have certainly aquired some apreciation for how Custer felt at the Little Bighorn, there seem to be far too many hostiles around, and I wish to hell I knew where Reno and Benteen have got to!

Despite the tenor of recent posts I feel that, for the most part, we are in closer agreement than it first appears. I have not and do not make the claim that a more rational procurment system for German armor will in itself win the war in the east. Simply that a such a system would both increase the number of operational units, and ease the supply/maintenance of the same thereby improving the overall situation for Germany. More operational tanks may not have been Germany's most pressing need, but the despairity in numbers produced between Germany and her opponents belie the statment that more tanks were the last thing Germany needed

T.A.'s comments on transport and supply are valid, as I stated above, but also as I stated above, Germany needed to adress more than one issue to have any chance to succeed. A similer rational procurmemt system in truck production might produce a general purpose military grade truck like the US duece and half, thereby adressing the pressing need for transport of supplies and spare parts. Again improving Germany's overall position.

The same rational can be extended to Germany's shortage of construction personel. During 1941 Germany took over a millon Russian pow's, if Germany had not decided to starve them to death slowly, but selected a certain number of them, and treated them humanely and given them enough food to live on, they could have adressed the manpower issue in this manner. Not ideal, but certainly better than nothing. Again making another small improvement in the overall situation.

Make enough improvements and they begin to add up, sometimes being worth more collectively than the sum total would seem.

Unlike many on this forum, I am not a veteran, just a armchair historian. Veterans of active duty service do posess a wealth of knownedge about how things actually work in the military. Still from what I have read, in my comfy armchair, to win at war you must optimise your assets so that you can succeed at the lowest possible cost.

 

Now I am in the realm of second hand knowledge, but it had been put forth by others that the Pz. IV was not designed for ease of production. It was harder to manufacture in man-hour terms than the Panther. The Panther suffered from low QC and some bad design short cuts (final drive), but it was faster to make in comparison to the Pz. IV.

Considering the firepower of the 90mm, and the advantage of having a turret, I would rate M36 somewhat above JgdPz IV variants, as a tank-killer. The Sherman tank did have an assault gun variant armed with a 105mm howitzer. Its effectiveness compared to Brummbär? A toss up. I would prefer a general-purpose assault gun you can find in any battalion that runs reliably than a specialist heavily armored SPG that's rare and hard to find, but Brummbär did have its advantages.

 

The second generation German PzJr were a definite improvement in terms of protection and survivability compared to their first generation ones like the Marder. But, what they gained in protection they lost in visibility and crew efficency. Most of the second generation vehicles like the Hetzer and Jgpz IV lacked alot of smaller refinements that made them less than fully successful. There was a general lack of vision devices, a lack of secondary armament, and the crew compartment was often not optimally laid out.
What this resulted in was a vehicle suited to defensive ambushes but really incapable of fighting a mobile armored battle either offensively or defensively.
Vehicles like the Brummbär were more an attempt to build a very specialist vehicle for narrow tactical needs. In the case of the Brummbär and Sturmtiger they were intended primarily for urban assault and infantry support in those conditions. However, they never were used in that role.
The Brummbär saw service in just four seperate abteilung as corps / army troops and functioned most of the time as self-propelled artillery. Use in that role pretty much defeated their design purpose. There was no need for heavy armor or even a fully enclosed vehicle for an artillery piece.

On the other hand, the biggest failing of the US tank destroyers was insufficent foresight in their design to have them mount the biggest gun they could. With hindsight one could argue that the initial M 10 should have had the 90mm on it and follow on vehicles should have mounted even larger guns. This is one mistake the Germans didn't make on their PanzerJäger.
Had this been the case for the US the tank destroyer would have likely been seen as far more successful as it would have been capable of dealing with even the heaviest German armor on a reasonable basis.

 

I'm with you as I am not a veteran either, though I am the proud son and nephew of WWII vets. Agreed, making the best of your assets is key which would bring me back to the Sherman (notice how I just keep bringing that old warhorse back to discussion.)

 

I'm interested in your comments on the tank destroyer as you seem to offer that it is less than successful. I've read Yiede's book on the tank destroyer units and I got very little impression from it that the TD's felt they were less than effective. I remember a spot in the book where he mentions that the TD's crews felt, after fighting in Italy, that they could handle the cats.

I don't wonder if the idea that TD's did not work because of the field commanders that were using them in lieu of tanks. I notice that the notion of a lightly armored vehicle with a high velocity, tank killing gun, is alive and doing well presently, often with wheels instead of tracks.

 

The US version of this has much more to do with speed of deployment and cost effectiveness of weapon systems than it does with its ability to do what a tank can. Ideally commanders usually want the heavies, but in reality its better to have options in case you cant get the tanks where you'd like them. We can deploy Stryker units in a few days, takes weeks/months for tank units.

 

There appears to be a tone here suggesting that the Germans made a comedy of errors in their design, production and fielding of their armored and mechanized/motorized forces. I would like to point out that they did just as well or well enough in production to effectively match any single power facing them:
Military production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In specific regard to military trucks, to say that their trucks were of poor quality or insufficient design is just plain bad information. The only period that this could possibly apply to would be Barbarossa when thousands of civilian types and older captured foreign types were employed to support the operation. Beyond (and during) that period the Wehrmacht employed some very robust designs along with more purpose built vehicles (RSO, Mautier smong others) and some ingenious and flexible designs.

There were thousands of Opel Blitz, Ford 3 tons and several smaller firms turning out very capable and robust trucks for the Wehrmacht (such as):
Engines of the Wehrmacht - "Magirus A3000", 3-ton, 4x4, Cargo Truck

Something else that is glossed over is the hundred of thousands of horses and that no they weren't trucks, but..... They were effective transport. They aren't as fast obviously, but they can haul a load from A to B and can be relied upon if time permits. This is something to keep in context, not every military supply operation has to be done as fast as possible. Some operations are routine and can be performed by simple horse and wagon without loss of efficiency.

 

Effective transport? I'm afraid I would have to disagree with this. Trucks were being used in WWI, for a major power to rely so heavily on horses 20+ years later is not "effective transport" by my estimation. Missles, jet fighters, infra-red night vision apparatus and horses? One bullet can take out a horse. Of course they don't require fuel and can be eaten when they've been shot, so they have some advantage, but they sure don't get through the mud too well.

I think the sophistication of the German military is often miscalculated. In the study of the war we see the Germans as having employed what came to be called blitzkrieg and variations on it and we credit them with technological superiority instead of simply seeing the tactical superiority.

 

Do you want intelligent conversation where we can move on from the obvious and mundane? (no offense, lets just assume that people who put out more in depth details have had WWII 101) You point out the obvious, then so will I -kind of no sht Sherlock, thanks for the update : ) . Germany had just so much industrial base just like the individual Allies, no amount of tweaking is going to be able to keep up with a coalition. Does this not constitute the obvious and goes without saying? (all in good humor)

In Tanks? Care to compare the "exchange rate" of German tanks vs. Soviet? I would say its quite apparent that the Germans could have won that war of attrition if it were one on one based on that alone.

Trucks? The Soviet production I believe is pumped up by Lend Lease vehicles that were assembled in the USSR. The local GAZ and other trucks weren't nearly as sturdy (2nd rate).

Point being, regardless of flaws the Germans designed, produced and fielded numbers of tanks on par with comparable industrial nations and managed to destroy many thousands more during the course of the war that they themselves lost. Must have done something right.

Fair enough. For such a multi-flawed approach they managed some very effective operations. There were more than a few things that they managed to do correctly.
At no point do I look at the mistakes that were made in German engineering/design as opposed to successes and find reason to believe that the was war ultimately lost as a result of them. The country's industry turned out a host of effective weapon systems as fast as it could and was ultimately overwhelmed by a vast industrial coalition.

No German industry could not supply the numbers needed, nor could the oil industry fuel them, nor could the Personnel system provide enough skilled mechanics, etc. The only country with that kind of capability was the US (probably).
This doesn't mean that they didn't have a very large fleet of durable and capable military trucks (Ford, Opel/GM, Henschel, Steyr, etc).

Yes, effective transport. What is your understanding of the logistical supply system at the field level? Strategic logistics was the role of the DR, not horses. Consider these distances...
Home country-Wehrmacht depot to forward theatre railhead depot in Army group rear (all rail).
Forward theatre railhead depot in Army group rear to Army/Corps rear area depot (all rail).
Corps area depot to division supply depot(s). (maybe 10-20 km?)
Division depot(s) to Regimental or Brigade or even Battalion (10-15km?).

The "undermechanization" of the Wehrmacht is overstated. Only 10% of the Heer was motorized. Okay, lets look at that for what it is. Do fortress divisions need to be fully motorized? The Replacement Army in Germany (around 40% of Heer personnel strength) ?
Static security divisions in Russia? Cavalry?
Those formations account for quite a bit more than half of Heer personnel strength and can function pretty much just as well with horsedrawn logistics. In reality the fuel saved far outweighs any benefit derived by additional motorization.
btw-Horses are more effective in the mud than trucks.

The Heer could have used more motorization on its fighting edge (ie. motorized Infantry) and in its field logistical services that backed those up, but I think were only talking about adding about 5% more motorization to the Heer as a whole. That would be a substantial undertaking and likely unsupportable (fuel), but at least we can toss out the misleading 90% of the Heer was horsedrawn as some sort of measuring stick for effectiveness.

Often on cable TV perhaps, not so much in academia.

 

?

I haven't seen anything on cable about WWII in the last 10 years.

 

Point being, your opinion comes across as the Germans went through the war with bad designs, bad industrial planning, deeply flawed tanks, weak maintenance/logistics, etc. Yet they managed to field an army as powerful as any single belligerant they faced and likely could have bested any single one of them if it were one on one. So in your opinion the failure to defeat the whole coalition means that they are inferior (in every way) to everyone else? For a country of its size and location I would say that the Wehrmacht performed admirably in a purely military sense (and I am no "fanboy").
Its well stated around the net that the Sherman tanl losses in France had alot to do with the Allies attacking and the Germans had the advantage in defense (plenty of truth there). So what does it say about the deeply flawed German tanks that at Kursk when they were the attacker that they lost 1 tank for every 3-4 that the Soviet defenders did? The most dense defenses of the war to that point and the strongest PAK fronts in the entire war, yet the loss ratio favored the attacker. I think you overstate German mistakes and miscues and minimize successful innovations.
I think if you were to take the four main belligerants in Europe out of the context of the war and compare all four side by side as individuals to include what degree of difficulty they faced, you might see that the Germans weren't the fumbling fools your argument(s) appear to try and make them out to be. They weren't supermen or genuises, but they weren't amateurs or stupid either (as your arguments seem to suggest).
The Soviets lost some 96,000 tanks/SP guns during the war, if one does the math vs. what the Germans had in the East the loss/production ratio favors the Germans. The Germans did as good a job as anyone else in designing, fielding and maintaining tanks in the context of industrial warfare, they were simply overwhelmed by an impossible task. To make their efforts to handle an impossible task out to be severly flawed and seem somehow short sighted or stupid is to miss many of the very respectable innovations that they produced. Their position was made unwinnable by political decisions, what the industrial/military leadership accomplished is what makes this war so interesting to study.

So the Allies set Canada up to be a giant truck factory, so what?

Please interject then. What is "well suited for wartime production"? Is that definition exactly how the US did business? Or is everything defined by: "but at the end of the war Germany was in ruins and they had lost"? The end justifys the means, therefore if you lose everything you did was inferior, stupid, not well thought out, etc.
This seems to be the impetus behind your argument and your logic.

Wrap your mind around the idea that depending on the tactical/operational situation that efficiency of a mode of supply can be of little importance. To further that, in the context of limited fuel supplies the use of horses in areas where their use is very practical is actually the optimal solution. The Germans didn't have enough strategic fuel capacity for a larger truck fleet anyway.

As a professional field grade logistician.....I couldn't tell you

So everyone should have motorized transport in case the war comes to them? At what cost? What do you give up to try and achieve this when your strategic assets are limited?

I prefer a truck, which has nothing to do with after we get to the battlefield (assuming we'll be there more than two days). After we get there I don't care if my supplies from the railhead/truck convoy rear area depot arrive by Carrier Pigeon, as long as they get there.
FYI about military logistics, its all done in echelon fashion in a series of loops (aka the supply chain, it has many links and some can be quite long). For the Germans the longest loop is done by rail, once supplies are unloaded in theatre the next loop can be completed by rail, motor and horse depending on distance, climate conditions and tactical situation. The horse played both a prominent role and a useful role on the Eastern Front.

Here is a diagram (hopefully) that might lend more light to logistical functions, locations, etc.

 

n/t

 

I would not call German War production a 'comedy of errors' but it was highly wastefull of available reasources. Which is ironic considering one of Hitler's reasons for war was the aquisition of vitally needed reasources.

Looking at the military production data noted above it shows that Germany and Italy were outproduced over 3 to 1 in tanks, 5 to 1 in artillery, and 9 to 1 in trucks by the allies. This dispairity in assets would seem to support the proposition that Germany had a paramount need to optimize its war production.

I can respect Germany's ability to improvise, but that impovisation came as a result of serious flaws in Germany's way of producing the weapons and war materials. The use of nearly 3 millon horses by the whermacht was not done due the superiority of the horse over the truck, but due to Germany's inability to meet its need for more modern supply transport.

 

Black6-It would seem you want to misrepresent what I say or you don't understand it. Either way I don't see the point of continuing our discussion.

 

I understand your position clearly, its too simple not to. You wish to destroy the "myth" of German invincibility and super tanks while promoting the Sherman (and most things American).
Personally I find your opinion over the top, flag waving to an extent and lacking a balanced perspective.

You said:

(Qualifying your opponent?)

(Qualifying your opponent?)

(False Dichotomy).

So anyone who disagrees with your opinion is uninformed, but your open to "good information"? Is "good information" the equivalent to anything that supports your opinion? It certainly appears so.