In perfect Hindsight: Build Japan's Carrier Force beginning 1933

As usual, some good points from @T.A.Gardner and @RLeonard, but repeating what someone did historically doesn't necessarily answer a hypothetical. No one should suggest that Japan's pilot/aircrew training or aircraft production programs as they existed could support four or six or eight more carriers. If they had decided in 1933 to build more carriers, presumably they would have increased training and production to support them. Is there reason to think they could not accomplish this?

As noted, their philosophy was to provide just the aircraft and aircrew needed for the ships they planned to build. They would likely still have had a lack of replacements, inability to rotate air groups or airmen, and possibly inferior or incomplete air groups for their lesser carriers.

 

That pertained to the 5" main armament on fleet destroyers starting with the later Fubuki class ships. The 5"/40 caliber Type 89 used for AA armament on capital ships, heavy cruisers, and carriers had all-angle loading, fixed ammunition, and rates of train and elevation roughly comparable to our 5"/38.

The Type 94 dual-purpose director was evaluated by the USN after the war as roughly comparable to our Mark 37, though of course it lacked radar. The Japanese also had trouble producing sufficient Type 94s; the Akizuki class anti-aircraft destroyers were supposed to have two, but only the first few ships did, and they had their after Type 94 removed for reinstallation in other ships. The Matsu class escort destroyers, with a 5"/40 main battery, had to make do with a much less capable director, the Type 3.