Initial USA Battles.....

To echo Terry, Ike was very nearly the indispensable man for the Allies in NW Europe.

Eisenhower had the near complete trust of everyone he needed to. Roosevelt and Marshall in the US, Churchill in Great Britain. Even De Gaulle probably found it more palatable to be told no from a American than he would from say a English supreme commander. Also I suspect that in so far as he might be willing to admit it, Stalin would prefer Ike over any of his likely counterparts as Ike had no ambitions past the agreed demarcation line. Taken to the lower levels, Ike's personable style tended to endear the trust of the common soldier/.sailor/airman the way others might not. Patton's and Montgomery's style were definitely acquired tastes. No small thing when allies must fight side to side and charges of making one nations soldiers take too heavy a burden a distinct possibility.

All I have read indicates that Ike's SHAEF staff was intensely loyal to him. Normally this is pretty much a given except in a very poor commander, but for SHAEF this was a must. In no theater of war for the Allies was there a more integrated command structure, simply because it must be. It had to accomplish the most difficult task in military operations, land a force on a well defended coast and then breakout in to the interior. Air, Sea and Ground forces had to act as one, and whomever commanded must have deputies from the other Allied nation.

All the other likely candidates came with decided baggage. Marshall was taciturn and remote, as well as someone FDR did not want to lose. MacArthur would have to mentally transition from the Pacific to Europe, yes he served there in the Great war, but that was a very different war. Worse his freeze out from a publicity standpoint of Anzac forces would be a disaster in NW Europe. It would be asking too much of Bradley. As Terry notes Tedder does not seem to have much grasp of ground operations. Alexander was considered decent, but not suited for the Big Chair so to speak. Then there is Montgomery, for some he reached his pinnacle as a Army Group commander, some wags (American and Allied) think perhaps a little too far past that point. He could get along with some American's like US 9th Army's Simpson, but not very well with others, including his own Canadian 1st Army commander.

There are, I think, 5 critical decisions made by Eisenhower that illustrate that he was both the best suited for the job of Supreme Commander, and worthy of that position.

1) Go-No Go order for June 6th, 1944. Arguably the most important decision he made during his tenure. His staff were divided and a mistake meant a longer war was inevitable , likely his termination as Supreme commander and at least a possibly negotiated end to the war that did not include Unconditional Surrender. We now know he made the right decision, but it was far from clear when he said "OK. Let's Go".

2) Resurrection of Patton. Marshall was ready to rotate him home after the slapping incidents and Bradley had misgivings since he had previously served under Patton, but Ike sensed he had a diamond in the rough, that through careful polishing, would sparkle if given the chance. Most historians agree that Patton in command of the US 3rd Army was the right man for the right situation and wielding the right instrument. He would have struggled in a higher command, floundered in a Pacific command and been a colossal waste with no command at all.

3) Splitting commands during the Ardennes attack. Dividing 12th Army Group infuriated Bradley, nor did it sit well with most senior officers of the US 1st Army. I am not sure Bradley ever fully forgave Ike for this and Bradley was correct to be concerned about the return of half his Army Group (It took weeks to fully regain 9th Army). Just the same, giving the northern shoulder of the Bulge to Montgomery was the correct choice. Bradley could not effectively command both shoulders and at the time the split was made it was unclear if American troops alone could seal the breach. As it turned out they could, but the possibility was there and Montgomery's presence insured that there would be no delay to the deployment of Commonwealth troops without Monty shouldering the blame. Eisenhower acted to prevent a worst case scenario. that it didn't come to pass does not invalidate the correctness of the decision.

4) Deftly handling Monty's Putsch. Montgomery's attempt to supplant Eisenhower just after the Bulge was both ill timed and tactless. In this he seriously underestimated the steel in Ike's backbone. Eisenhower could have used this to force Montgomery's removal (sideways promotion most likely) or to publically embarrass him (the American press would have gone nuts), but he allowed him a face saving way to resolve the issue, working through Monty's chief of staff. As with Patton and De Gaulle he found a middle ground allowing him to get the most out of a troublesome subordinate or ally.

5) Keeping the strategic focus in entering Germany. You would be hard pressed to find a Allied ground commander in NW Europe who didn't see themselves marching into Berlin. Many of those Generals, in hindsight, say their motivations were post war, cold war inspired, but the truth was their primary interest was the glory of capturing Hitler's capitol. Too much was on the line, and Eisenhower's job was victory in Europe, nothing more. A lot of vets lived to go home that never would have had he listened to these firebrands.

Eisenhower is damned with the faint praise of being more diplomat than general, but his position called for a Soldier-Diplomat, if not at least a Diplomatic Soldier.

 

That's an outstanding and succinct estimate of Ike's strength and moreover (and just as importantly), his restraint, by Belasar! He was indeed the right man in the right place at the right time.

 

belesar -
I have often pondered June 6.
Think about the mistakes/uncertainties in your own life.....then compare them to June 5 and June 6
Eisenhower got lucky.
Meteorology was in its infancy in 1944...those guys easily could have been wrong, and D-Day could have failed...been a disaster...or attempted, squelched, and then landed at another date to much stiffer resistance, etc etc etc.
I do not mean Ike was lucky, as in a coin toss....just that all the stars aligned for him...stars that could have just as well faded.
He decided to go for all the right reasons, but he must have sat up all night, worrying.
I can understand why he wrote "that" note, accepting blame for the D-Day fiasco.....fortunately The World never read it.....not til much later.