Japan decides against Midway and invades Australia instead

DA,

A postscript,

Of the 60+ air-raids inflicted on the north of Australia, at least one was by a lone 'Betty' that managed to cart ONE bomb all the way to Katherine airfield.

That one bomb managed to kill one unfortunate civilian at the airfield.

Also, the bomber strip at Fenton AFB, near Pine creek, home base of the 380th BG USAAF (B-24s), was bombed about 3 times. The sole crater in the runway can still be made out by the different grade of gravel used in its repair.


John.

 

Devilsadvocate wrote:

Well this explains part of the problem. I make sure I have reliable sources, Wikipedia is notoriously unreliable. Most high schools and virtually all college level courses forbid it's use as a source. Doubt me? Here's a quote from it's founder.

Wikipedia is useful in one way. If you go to the sources they cite you can sometimes find a reliable source or two. Secondly, I never quoted something as fact unless it is confirmed by multiple reputable sources. I prefer .mil, .gov and .edu sites or PDF's of papers published by respectable sources (eg. papers by students in the Army's War College, published by the War College).
If you are going to use Wikipedia it would be a good idea to do further research. If you had looked into this further you would have realized that some of the information was not complete or incorrect.

Devilsadvocate responded:

How so? What did I state? That MOST were prewar fields not operational military fields. Now, from what my research showed there were 51 airfields in the Northern Territory. So you've named Daly Waters, Fenton, Batchelor and Manbullo. To that I'll add Millingimbi (a civilian field where the 59th operations Base unit was stationed), Livingstone, 9th Pursuit Sqdrn, 17 to 21 operational P-40's depending upon the date and Pell, and ancillary field to Batchelor used for aircraft salvage, repair and servicing. Daly Waters was a civilian airfield, requisitioned by the RAAF in March of '42. It became an operational military airfield in May of '42. Long airfield wasn't constructed until late 1943 by the Australia's 14th Airfield Construction Squadron. We now have 7 operational two of which aren't flying aircraft out of. One of the others Fenton (Brock's Creek) housed the AAF's 43d Material Squadron, not combat aircraft until later in the war when B-24's used it.
Now of the units you listed I've addressed the 9th Pursuit Sdrn, the 7th rated 25 P-40 aircraft but were most often lucky to have 12 to 16 operational. The 27th Bombardment Group existed in name only, most of it's personnel lost in the Phillipines and Java. What was left was rolled into the 3rd Bomb Group stationed at Charters Towers airfield in Queensland near Townville. The 27th Bombardment Group ceased to exist in May 1942, then was later reactivated in the U.S. The 530th Bomb Squadron wasn't activated until November 1942 so they couldn't have been in Australia at the time in question. 71st Bombardment Squadron is correct with 16 B-26's. 64th Bomb Squadron is legit with 12 B-17's. Finally the 59th Bombardment Squadron was stationed in the Caribbean during this time.

Devilsadvocate wrote:

Well let's take a look:
-First the 12th Division was a redisignation of the Northern Territory Force, it took place on 31 Dec 1942 (late for our time frame but I'm not going to nitpick). It reverted back to the designation of Northern Territory Force on 15 Jan 1943. (It wasn't around very long)
-The 13th Brigade was stationed around Perth and was "the only Army unit in place to protect Western Australia." Not likely to be moved to the Darwin area, more likely it would form a defensive line somewhere north of Perth in the event of a Japanese invasion.
-The 19th Brigade was actually part of the 6th Division formed in 1939 by the 16th, 17th and 18th Brigades. The 18th was chopped and sent to the UK so the 19th was formed to replace it as the divisions 3rd brigade. It was formed by reducing the other two brigades from four battalions each to three battalions. The 19th minus the 2/11th was defeated and captured on Crete by the Leibstandarte SS Adolph Hitler. (2/4th and 2/8th) The division was returning to Australia when the 16th and 17th were diverted to defend Ceylon. They remained there until July 1942. So the 19th Brigade you mention was in fact one depleted battalion. Big difference.
Well we still have the 23rd Brigade. The units component battalions were the 2/21st sent to defend Ambon NEI, the 2/22d defending Rabaul, the 2/40th defending Timor and the 2/14th Field Artillery regiment near Darwin. Oh, wait they were all captured by the advancing Japanesee except the 2/14th and the Darwin based Headquarters. Kinda shrinks the available defensive forces doesn't it We have a depleted infantry battalion the 2/11th, and artillery regiment the 2/14th and the 23rd Brigade Headquarters element.

You mention the 808th Engineer Aviation BN then later refer to it as being armed and equipped to fight as combat engineers. Well I hate to break the news to you but there is a big difference between an Aviation Engineer BN and a Combat Engineer BN. You're comparing apples and oranges. They were skilled in construction but would be next to useless as fighting troops.
You mention the two US fighter squadrons, well according to the official US Airforce History these two squadrons had less than 40 operational P-40 Kittyhawks at the time frame in question. Not a formidable defense. the RAAF 34th Squadron in the area had a total of 4 aircraft, 2 Arvo Ansons and 2 Tiger Moths (DH82 biplane). You can quote statistics all day but you need to look at the underlying facts beneath the statistics. I guess I spent too many years in the military gathering intell to look at something on the face without looking at the underlying data. Bad intell is dangerous and misleading and that's what you are providing.

 

Armament for an aviation construction battalion (807 O & EM) included 603 M1 rifles, 156 M1 carbines, 27 .45 cal SMG, and 22 .30 machineguns, 4 60mm mortars and 1 M 16 AA Halftrack. I'd say they were armed to fight. They were also unique in having at least the potential to drive into combat on their rider lawnmowers as the unit had several tractor mounted ones!

 

To continue:

Devilsadvocate, you quote statistical facts that while on the surface are accurate, (and some that are just outright untrue) but they give an inaccurate picture. Facts need to be evaluated within the framework of the larger situation. I do not know whether you lack a knowledge of military principles or purposely are trying to obfuscate (to be evasive, unclear, or confusing). In an earlier post I made the point that:

The whole freakin' argument is a "red herring". What are the facts:
-The facts as I stated were correct, the period of greatest loss to US merchant shipping, during WWII were the months of January to June 1942.
Ships Lost
1941 (Dec) 82
1942 574
1943 376
1944 333
1945 181
Jan/Jun 1942-365 Jul/Dec 1942-209 Total 574
-The increase in gross tonnage in shipping, based upon your figures, of 160,453. out of 1, 444,000. tonnes launched is a mere 11% increase over what was available at the end of 1941. Since America entered the war in December 1941, do you really think this increase kept pace with the United States needs, now that it was committed to a global war?
-Another "red herring"

You include these production totals but not how they relate to these two countries losses.
-

The statement is irrelevant. It matters not if there was more shipping committed to the Pacific than to the Atlantic. This only makes sense due to the greater distances men and material needed to travel. What is relevant is how the amount of shipping allotted, balanced with that was required. Virtually all sources on the Pacific campaign make the point that it was insufficient for more than maintaining the status quo. What would be relevant would be your providing a source that stated that there was excess shipping in the Atlantic that could be redirected to the Pacific. You won't find it though because it is not true.
-You also fail to address one portion of my statement:

You were aware that the U-Boat campaign was so effective that it virtually closed many of the United States southern ports, weren't you? How was this alleviated. An inter-linked convoy system was instituted in the Gulf and along the US east coast. But only after King had to borrow escort vessels from the UK. This is why Donitz's success rate was falling so he did the logical thing and re-deployed to better hunting grounds, the North Atlantic, in July 1942.
-Devilsadvocate wrote:

An interesting point of view since the month of greatest loss of shipping for 1942 was in June. (83 ships) Losses didn't significantly drop off until August after Donitz's redeployment.

Devilsadvocate wrote:

I stated that one of the reasons the Marines were chosen is because they were amphibiously trained. You come back telling me about Army Divisions in Australia and New Caledonia. Units untrained in making an amphibious assault, one of the most complicated missions in warfare.
Well what part of amphibiously trained did you not understand? You might as well say that you could have chosen the 1st Infantry Division to make the Normandy Airborne drops instead of the 82d and 101st. You should always try and avoid using divisions for operations they are not trained and equipped for.

I understand the reason why you did this. You were trying to insinuate that the reason for their selection was political, as evidenced by these posts.

It is not a fact, I don't have access to Frank's book right at the moment, I borrowed it from my dad and read it many years ago. I do not remember him framing the debate in the manner you quote but if so it is an inaccurate depiction of the events. If he in fact did write of it as such, you might want to broaden your sources, because the exchange is mentioned in most of the histories, and all describe it differently from the way you are describing it.

-On 18 February, Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, wrote the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, saying that he considered it necessary to occupy certain islands in the South and Southwest Pacific. For this purpose it would be necessary to have Army troops for garrison, and King requested Marshall's approval.
-In reply, General Marshall wanted to know why King considered such a course necessary, and asked whether he had thought of using Marines for the garrison task. He asked to be told what King's complete plans were, and closed by saying:
In general, it would seem to appear that our effort in the Southwest Pacific must for several reasons be limited to the strategic defensive for air and group troops.

What were these "several reasons"? The most important was, to quote Griffith,

"Marshall recognized the need for limited action in the Pacific, but correctly foresaw that operations up the chain of jungle clad islands would inevitably draw resources from the European theater, to which joint strategy had given primacy. H. H. ("Hap") Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, agreed with Marshall that action in the Pacific must defensive in nature until the buildup for invasion of Europe (BOLERO) was well underway. The President had made it clear to the Chief of Staff (but apparently not to Admiral King) that he did not want BOLERO slowed down."

The defeat of the Japanese at Midway got both King and MacArthur looking at ways to exploit the changed situation. MacArthur requested the assignment of an amphibiously trained division and navy carrier air support (only two carriers were available in the pacific at this time) to attack Rabaul. Well since there were only two ampibiously trained divisions at this point in time it would be the 1st or 2nd MarDivs and the navy was hesitant to risk it's only two carriers in "the reef laden Solomon Sea". King favored a plan put forth by Nimitz to land the Marine 1st Raider Battalion on Tulagi, gut the base and withdraw. The Japanese threat posed to Australia's lifeline by an airfield on Guadalcanal changed the matter, the Joint Chiefs decided something had to be done, and the Guadalcanal operation was approved. Marshall wanted MacArthur placed in charge, King wanted it run by the navy. That's where the correspondance you gave comes in. King pointed out that since the forces involved, both naval and ground were Navy forces, the Navy not MacArthur should command. To emphasize his point King declared, Watchtower would be under naval command or no Watchtower. This ended the debate and the command lines were moved accordingly. When this exchange occurred, the Marines had already been pulled and sent to Auckland, NZ. For you to infer, as you did, that they were chosen for political reasons is decidedly incorrect. In fact the only support requested or offered was in air support and that was likely to have little practical effect.

from Marine Corps historical Monograph.

You might want to study up on priciples of warefare, I might recommend Von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.

First of all the Marines had troops stationed on the surroundin islands to prevent reoccupation by Japanese forces. The navy withdrew on 09 August after the Savo disaster, when the navy re-engaged later in the campaign they still lacked the ships to adequately prevent Japanese from running troops down the slot. The navy did not have the ships to do more, so Vandergriff had to make the necessary steps to prepare for these possibilities. When you state that sufficient naval strength was not forthcoming, you insinuate that it was withheld on purpose. That is not true and I take it as a personal affront to all the brave sailors that died during the naval battles during the campaign. They fought for all they were worth and the navy committed every available ship. The navy had no options but to sail away on 09 August because Fletcher lost his nerve and sailed off with the carriers and the surface force had been decimated the previous night in the Savo Island fight. They did re-gather strength and returned. In fact even in the November naval battles additional ships to defend the island were hard to come by. They hadn't yet been built, were being repaired or were not yet worked up to become fully operational. In fact here are some quotes describing the tactical situation:
--The Americans knew the enemy moves, thanks to their cryptographers. But Vice Adm. William F. Halsey, the aggressive commander of the Southwest Pacific Theater, had virtually no ships to hurl at Kondo. All his cruisers and destroyers had been used up in the Friday 13th battle. The carrier Enterprise was still only partially repaired after being damaged at the Battle of Santa Cruz, but her 78 planes could screen Guadalcanal by day. The problem would be a night surface action.
All that was left for Halsey’s use were two fast, new, battleships, USS South Dakota and USS Washington. Naval War College doctrine forbade the use of battleships in a tightly confined space such as Ironbottom Sound, just north of Guadalcanal, but Halsey knew that wars were won at sea, not in a textbook. He ordered the dreadnoughts committed.
--That night, all hell broke loose in Ironbottom Sound. Next morning, Halsey realized he was down to his last trump card, the two battleships, 300 miles south of Guadalcanal. At noon, Halsey told Lee that he was to head a new unit, Task Force 64, and warned him to be ready for a flank-speed run to Guadalcanal. At 7:15 p.m., Enterprise blinkered Washington the message: ‘To Commander TF 64: Proceed north with both battleships and your four destroyers at best speed.’
They were facing a larger Japanese force
--On Atago, Kondo would directly lead a bombardment unit with Atago, Takao and Kirishima, his heaviest ships. A screening unit of the light cruiser Nagara and six destroyers under Rear Adm. Satsuma Kimura would protect the big ships. A sweeping unit of Sendai and three destroyers would comb the Savo waters for enemy ships. Kondo’s plan was simple–blast through Guadalcanal and pummel the airfield. As soon as Ironbottom Sound was secure,
--All four of Lee’s destroyers were now out of the fight. He was down to his battleships. Lee swung in to attack, his ships racing by blazing hulks and shipwrecked crewmen floating in oily water.
--On South Dakota, crews were patching minor holes from 5-inch hits by Ayanami when at 11:33 the chief engineer tied down her circuit breakers, violating safety procedures. The system instantly went into series, and the big ship lost electrical power. Radar, fire control, turret motors, ammunition hoists, radios–everything went out, with her guns locked in train.
--Washington was now the only intact ship left in the force. In fact, at that moment Washington was the entire U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Sounds to me like the navy did all they could do, they had put all they had into the fight.
You further state that the Marines had plenty of supplies and ammunition. The fact is they were immediately placed on short rations because when the transports were forced to leave, there was only a 17 day supply of food, the majority captured Japanese rice and canned goods. They had 4 days worth of ammunition, no mines, a single roll of barbed wire, yes they were bountifully supplied.

I am tired of your mis-attributions, your misquoting what I post, your misdirection and what appears to be puposeful distortion of facts. I have better things to do than spend hours verifying what you post, I try and be accurate and expect the same from others. If you are expressing opinion that's fine, but don't monkey with the data to try to make your opinion fact.
So I have decided that our discussion is at an end. I will no longer waste my time, I have better things to do.

 

USMcPrice...
I don't want to get involved in the dispute between you and DA however it seems to me that Darwin isn't going to be able to be held by the Japanese while if they put a major effort there they won't be able to guard the Solomons adequately,i.e. Darwin will be the attrittional pit for the Japanese versus the historical New Guinea/Solomon's campaign. . In fact IMHO the Japanese won't even be able to even get Henderson Field even started . So again IMHO it won't take near as much to capture or hold Guadalcanal as it did historically.
The Darwin campaign here can be supported more or less overland,i.e. won't need all that much shipping which can then be used to effect in the Solomon's for the Allies.

 

USMCPrice,
IMHO if Australia is invaded ,ala this Darwin alt history, then more shipping will be made availliable to the Pacific. Also you quote above that the USS Washington at the time was the Pacific Fleet however IMHO if the Japanese were seriously invading Australia then more of the USN would be made availiable to the Pacific Fleet remember that at the time Washington was,as you say, the Pacific Fleet the USN also had the Torch landings going on. You probably wouldn't have those goings on if Australia was really seriously threatened ,in fact in March/April of 1942 the British were conducting the invasion of Madagascar with quite a sizeable fleet at that ,which was totally unnecessary IMHO.
One could look at what assets the USN had in another light that by taking away a couple of torpedo hits the USN could have had another BB & 2 CV's at Guadalcanal's final battles plus another modern fast BB if the Atlantic wasn't given such a preference.

 

ickysdad wrote:

My problem with DA was that it appeared to me he didn't want to debate the issues and I spend more time correcting how he twisted what I posted and less time discussing the topic. I hate that because by spending time rebutting the mis-statements we didn't get to discuss the really valid points he had. I also didn't reply to some of the other posters that had good points or questions. You in fact were one of the posters I specifically regretted not replying to. Enough on that, I don't want to get sidetracked again, I'll now shut my mouth.

Historically, the Solomons came about because the airfield on Guadalcanal posed a potential threat against Australia's supply lines. Secondarily, King, was looking for a way to capitalize on the Japanese defeat at Midway by going over to the offensive. He wanted to get at the Japanese and this (Solomons) and New Guinea where the areas we could strike back given our limited capabilities at the time. We'd regain the initiative and instead of defending at the place and time Japan decided, they'd be reacting to us.. One of the basic principles of warfare is the side holding the initiative has the advantage and to some degree can dictate their opponents actions. The current doctrine of maneuver warfare has this as one of it's key principles. Speed of action, concentration of force, and maintenance of momentum are the keys. You get inside the enemys OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, and act) and he is basically always trying to react to your moves and their command and response become virtually paralyzed. They observe, attempt to orient, try to decide but before they can act they're faced with a whole new tactical situation. So, that is why I think the Solomons would not even be the scene of a major campaign. In '43 Marine Raider battalions and small Army unit's could land and occupy these islands with little resistance, as occured, historically on many islands in the Solomons chain, after Guadalcanal up until they reached the top of the chain at Bougainville. The United States limited resources (remember we're talking May/June '42, by 1943 the US had the men, material and ships to engage in multiple AO's) would be focused on holding and counter-attacking the Japanese in Australia. I would be interested in your thoughts as to why the Solomons might still need to be fought.

No argument here. Japan will be worn down, and Japan will lose. I just think that the attrition would be slowed. From Japan's point of view, draw out the war and there is a chance for a negotiated settlement. For one the attrition due to illness, suffered when fighting in the jungle was enormous. Fighting in Australia would greatly reduce these losses. Pilots lost over water in the Solomons were just lost. Going down over or near your own lines while fighting in Australia would mean that many pilots and aircrew would live to return to duty in new aircraft. I also never got into it in depth but in my initial posts I stated Darwin would be the first step in a larger campaign, I'm not basing my thoughts on the defense of a small enclave around Darwin. If interested we can elaborate on how the campaign might run. I can post what I'd do. You and others can point out weaknesses in the plan or point out more more effective deployment of the Japanese forces.

We're in full agreement. I don't think it would be necessary and even if it was their assets would be tied up in Australia.

We agree again. Like I said earlier it could be taken with little or no combat by a Raider Battalion, but would we even want to take it?

It only makes sense that it would be supported by overland means. However, much of the allied shipping, freed up, would still be required to meet the expanded need for war making materials and men in Australia. I'd think most naval units would be retained around Australia to counter Japanese naval units. I don't think there would be excess military ships to cover the transport/cargo ships for offensive operations until mid-1943.

 

ickysdad wrote:

You are correct no doubt. Politically, little else could be done. That's where the interesting part comes in. Would Australia and New Zealand recall all their forces from the UK? If so how would it effect the UK's fighting ability? How would this redistribution of resources effect the global scheme of things? Would Germany prevail in North Africa? Would the delay in U.S. forces engaging in the European theater and the U.S.'s reduced ability to send war materials to the U.K. and Russia effect the outcome in those theaters?

Historically, most U.S. Navy major combat vessels were committed to the Pacific. There were relatively very few vessels committed almost exclusively to the European/North African theater. Of these most were older less capable ships. The majority of allied naval power in the European theater was provided by the British. Until the wartime shipbuilding program ships started joining the fleet in numbers (late '43 early '44) I don't think more than a few additional warships could have been spared. APA's, AKA's, and merchant shipping now that's a different story.

I agree.

 

First off I'd like to apologize for my part in causing your thread to devolve away from it's original intent. I am sincerely sorry, the idea for the thread was very good and I hate I had a part in detracting from it.

Now in response to your point. All units that have a potential to see ground combat are armed and equipped to defend themselves. However, units such as the 808th have very rudimentary training in ground combat. A Combat Engineer unit has extensive training in infantry combat skills and is designed to operate in conjunction with the infantry. They have additional training in demolitions, building of fortifications and light bridgebuilding. The Japanese infantry of the period were quite proficient and had dealt defeats to all real infantry formations they'd come up against. I've served with troops from all over the world and the Aussies are some of the hardest I've come across. They have a long tradition of being stout, hard fighting troops and the Japanese had defeated them in every encounter up to the time frame in question. That should tell us something about the quality of Japanese Army formations.
If the 808th were to be thrown into battle as ground troops, they would in all likelyhood be destroyed quite quickly, with little harm to their opponents.

 

USMCPrice...
A few points...
1. Remember historically we "dual drives" ala Papuan Campaign & the Solomon's. In this scenario we'd have maybe the Solomon's ,the Papuan and the Darwin Campaigns.

2. Instead of the USAAF & US Army being basically in charge of the Papua/New Guinea Campaign they'd be handling the Darwin side of things here so IMHO no big change in the logistical requirements as per historical for the US. The Australians would probably still be conducting a limited presence,defensive if nothing else, in the Port Morseby/Papuan side of things. That still leaves the USN capable of conducting a Solomon's Campaign as per historical .I think a Solomon's campaign still makes sense here since Rabaul is still a threat to Australia. I mean if the USN lands on & occupies a un-occupied Guadalcanal/Tulagi then builds an airbase there it has a serious practical value in protecting the US-Australian supply line . Tulagi meanwhile would provide a very good seaplane base which would extend the range of USN recon assets which again helps protect the US SW Pacific supply lines. Even if Darwin is the main campaign would it not make some sense for a limited campaign in the Solomons just to protect the flank of US supply lines running to Australia? .

3. In this Darwin Campaign the allied effort/resources would be bolstered by the simple fact that the British Far Eastern fleet could/would be more of an assistance then they could ever hope to be as per the historical Solomon's.

4. What I was getting at about more USN assets is that early in '42 the Washington was reinforcing the British Home Fleet(probably unnecessary),the Wasp was reinforcing Malta(more on this later). The North Carolina came to the Pacific in about June could have came much sooner. Now what I also contend is that the USN would probably be more concentrated in the Coral Sea/Solomons area in this scenario since Darwin wouldn't need as much naval assistance as did the Solomon's Campaign Historically furthermore if Coral Sea & Midway didn't happen then while the IJN still has 6 fleet CV's the USN hasn't lost Lexington & Yorktown either. The IJN would probably still be occupied mostly with Darwin so there will probably be less sub threats to the USN in the Solomons area so a less probable chance of Wasp being lost or Saratoga & North Carolina getting torpedoed. So we could maybe see a SW Pacific Fleet of 3 modern BB's & 5-6 CV's. then late in the campaign you could add Indiana & Massachusetts.

5. I really don't see much need to bring back too many troops from the Mid-East/North Africa even if they did the 8th Army could just play defence since Rommel had basically outran his logistics which were hopeless at El Alamien . As far as supplying Malta well even if that island fell remember that Rommel has outran his logistics train so it's importance at this time isn't as much and then one must take into consideration Malta's worth versus what it costs to resupply it. The Pedastal Convoy suffered heavy losses in August of '42 in re-supplying Malta. IMHO better to actually loose Malta then the perception of loosing Australia . Imagine all those Spitfires ran into Malta by Wasp instead going to Australia (Darwin???) and Wasp herself being in the Pacific helping Nimitz. If Auchlinek/Montgomery just play defence imagine just one extra Australian division in the Darwin area or even the divisions diverted to Singapore in early '42 just in time to surrender to the Yamashita being in Australia instead.

I in summation am just saying I see no reason the US/Australia/UK couldn't run both a Darwin Campaign & Solomons Campaign at the same time since here the Darwin Campaign would take place of the historical New Guinea Campaign with the US Army being in charge there with the USN conducting the Solomons Campaign .The difference being the US Army is better off logistically then historical and could maybe even get some help from British Far Eastern Forces. The USN is better off then historical because the IJN has to run between two campaigns to provide assistance whereas historically they dealt with only one ,the Solomons with the IJA handling the New Guinea/Papuan side of things.

 

Well, you claim that my facts are accurate but some are untrue. Could you point out which are which and tell us why you think some are untrue? If you know certain assertions to be untrue, you should be able to correct that data and present the correct facts and cite the sources for your information. That seems simple enough.

As for those facts which I am presenting which seem to be providing an "inaccurate picture", please point these out and explain why you think the "picture is inaccurate".

Well, I didn't raise the argument, you did by saying the US didn't have the shipping to spare for a major defense of Australia in 1942, due to German U-boat depredation in the Atlantic. I merely pointed out that even though the Germans were sinking US ships, that construction of new ships was more than keeping up with the loss rate, and presented figures to support that argument. These figures were cited from a well documented book by an acknowledged expert in the field. I regret that you think the argument is a "red herring", but it seems to me that you shouldn't have raised the issue if you feel that way. It really appears to me, that you raised the issue thinking it was a good argument in favor of your point of view, but on finding out otherwise, you now wish to downplay it.

It would be nice if you could cite your sources, please.

Your facts are interesting (if accurate), but hardly relevant as presented. Simply claiming that 574 ships were lost in 1942 without giving particulars is, in itself, obfuscating. Who did the ships belong to? When were they lost (the A-H scenario is set in May/June, 1942)? How many new ships were constructed during the period of loss? And by how much did the United States "needs" increase during the period we are discussing?

You accuse me of presenting inaccurate, incomplete, "obfuscating" facts, but then you do exactly what you are claiming that I am doing. Well, at least I am citing sources for my "facts".

Oh, but I did point out that the total of new ship construction "exceeded" the losses of the countries mentioned. That is the relevant way, in terms of the issue we are debating, that the production totals related to the countries cited.

Yes, it is true that more ships were needed in the Pacific than the Atlantic because of the longer distances, but the point to be made is that throughout 1942, the additional shipping was made available by the US despite the needs of the Europe First policy and specifically the major North African operation going forward.

Rather than claiming that "virtually all sources" make some claim, it would be nice to cite some of those sources; I seriously doubt they all claim the US was able only to "maintain the status quo". Because the "status quo" was not maintained in the Pacific in 1942; numerous military units were shipped to the Pacific in 1942 to reinforce and secure the sea routes between Hawaii and Australia, and to secure Australia itself. These units represented a massive increase over those units which were available at the beginning of 1942.

No, I wasn't aware that any US ports were "virtually" closed by the German U-boat campaign in 1942. Which ports were closed and for how long? Can you cite sources for this information? Of course, Donitz redeployed his U-boats to the North Atlantic, because he could recognize failure, even his own, when he saw it. But how is any of that relevant to the scenario in question? If the question is about escort vessels being available to guard the US sea routes to Australia, shouldn't the pertinent question be; just how many escorts, and what types, were needed to accomplish this task? Shouldn't we be asking ourselves how many US transport ships were sunk by the Japanese in the Pacific in the first half of 1942? Since that seems to be an argument in your favor, I'll let you present those facts.

I was referring , of course, to the North Atlantic convoy routes where the losses for June were much lower than they had been for many months. This occurred because, Donitz was still making a major effort to sink ships off the US East Coast. My point was, of course, that the German U-boats couldn't be everywhere; if they were busy sinking ships off the US East Coast, losses in other areas would fall, albeit possibly not on a one to one ratio.

Yes, I wondered about that. I figured you were just trying to imply that there were no troop units already in the South Pacific. Since the scenario does not really require Allied ground units with amphibious training, it seems illogical to drag in the First marine Division because they had been amphibiously trained. That is why I cited the two US Army divisions already in Australia; the scenario, after all, is about a Japanese invasion of Australia and what units would be immediately available to defend against it, not amphibiously trained Marines in Iceland or on the East Coast of the US.

Thanks for the advice, I'll keep it in mind if I ever have to plan an amphibious invasion.

Well, I do have Frank's "Guadalcanal" right here on my desk, and he clearly intends to convey the impression that King was determined to launch the Guadalcanal offensive, or something very much like it, with, or without the Army's approval. And, part of the reason King was planning on using the First Marine Division was that he didn't need to ask for Marshall's OK.

Well, you are only presenting part of the picture (something you accuse me of doing). In fact there were several factors that led to the US committing more troops and planes to the South and Southwest Pacific;

"Not only were Rear Admiral Turner and Admiral King pressuring the Army during February 1942 for more positive action in the Pacific, but they were also pressuring Admiral Nimitz, and through him, subordinate Naval commanders in the Pacific. On 12 February 1942, CINCPAC was told:

' My 062352 [February] is to be interpreted as requiring a strong and comprehensive offensive to be launched soon against exposed enemy naval forces and the positions he is now establishing in the Bismarcks and Solomons.'

And again on 15 February:

'...Current operations of the Pacific Fleet, because of existing threat, should be directed toward preventing further advance of enemy land airplane base development in the direction of Suva and Noumea. . '

On 26 February CINCPAC was informed:

'... our current tasks are not merely protective, but also offensive where practicable. . . .'

The British also were in agreement with United States naval opinion, and began to put political pressure on President Roosevelt and military pressure at the Combined Chiefs' level to give increasing protection to Australia and New Zealand, and to step up American naval action in the Pacific. Both of these were to be done at the expense of American Army action in the European Theater of Operations.

On 4 March 1942, Prime Minister Churchill advised President Roosevelt:

'....I think we must agree to recognize that GYMNAST [the varying forms of intervention in French North Africa by Britain from the east and by the United States across the Atlantic] is out of the question for several months.'

This despatch gave the Navy Planners a talking point, since the GYMNAST Operation had a tentative date of 25 May 1942, and was responsible for overriding Army troop commitments to the European Theater.

On 5 March, Mr. Churchill advised the President:

'. . . it should be possible to prevent oversea invasion of India unless the greater part of the Japanese Fleet is brought across from your side of the theater, and this again I hope the action and growing strength of the United States Navy will prevent.'

The word "action" was needling in effect, whatever its intent. And again in the same message:

'.....Japan is spreading itself over a very large number of vulnerable points and trying to tie them together by air and sea. Once several good outfits are prepared, any one of which can attack a Japanese-held base or island and heat the life out of the garrison, all their islands will become hostages to fortune. Even in this year, 1942, some severe examples might be made, causing great perturbation and drawing further upon Japanese resources to strengthen other points.'

This despatch seconded the Naval Planners' desire for a more positive policy towards the Pacific War. The President replied on 8 March 1942:

'We have been in constant conference since receipt of your message of March 4.....'

The President pointed out, among other things, that using ships in the Pacific rather than in the Atlantic meant that 'GYMNAST cannot be undertaken,' and that

' American contribution to an air offensive against Germany in 1942 would be somewhat curtailed and any American contribution to land operations on the Continent of Europe in 1942 will be materially reduced.'

Moreover, he accepted the Prime Minister's urging for more action in the Pacific, and lower priority for Army troops for Europe. Essentially, this was a common sense decision to give higher immediate priority to defensive operations in the Pacific necessary to hold vital positions and to defend essential lines of communication, than to the initiation of early, but inadequately prepared, offensive operations in Africa. With the troops made available by this change in overall strategic policy, the Army members of the Joint Planners were happy to agree that the Army should provide the garrisons for Efate in the New Hebrides and for Tongatabu in the Tonga Islands.

On the very day, 5 March 1942, when the British Prime Minister was urging the United States Navy to "action" in the Pacific, Admiral King was advising the President by written memorandum that only when Samoa, Fiji and New Caledonia had been "made reasonably secure," and the requisite "naval forces, air units, and amphibious troops" were available, could the United States "drive northwestward from New Hebrides into the Solomons."44 Since the United States Army garrison had not yet arrived at New Caledonia, and the others (Tonga, New Hebrides, and Fiji) were a month away from even embarking in the United States, and the Marines were only in modest strength in American Samoa, it was obvious that nothing was going to happen soon to start the drive northward into the Solomons. Rear Admiral Turner was in full agreement with a stand-fast policy for the present, advising Admiral King on 26 March 1942 that if an attempt was made at that time to establish bases in the Solomons, 'the ventures would be failures.'

But Efate was the camel's nose under the edges of the Army tent in getting to the Solomons and no one knew it better than Admiral King and his Chief Alligator and Head Planner, Richmond Kelly Turner."


HyperWar: The Amphibians Came to Conquer [Chapter 7]

So, even in the February/March time frame booth King and The British were urging Roosevelt to take stronger actions in the Pacific and Roosevelt, with the proviso that to take such action would cause repercussions in the European buildup, was willing to go along with the sending more forces to the Pacific.

Your assertion is incorrect; the lengthy quotation I just posted clearly shows that King was contemplating offensive action in the Solomons as early as March, 1942, and had the support of the British ad at least the acquiescence of Roosevelt. The "politics" part comes in because of the resistance of the Army and Army Air Force to any offensive actions in the Pacific. The First Marine Division was obviously chosen primarily because it was amphibiously trained, but King was pointing out to Marshall that Mac's withholding cooperation wasn't going to stop the US Navy from initiating offensive action by itself, if need be.

After Guadalcanal was captured, the Japanese made no effort to recapture Tulagi or Gavutu-Tanambogo because they were small, had no strategic, or tactical value and could not support air fields. So, no the Japanese have no interest in re-occupying worthless real estate. The Japanese realized that the only real objective in the Guadalcanal area was Henderson Field, and since they didn't have enough troops to re-take it, they weren't going to mess around with totally worthless secondary objectives.

That's an arguable assertion. I think it is more accurate to say that Ghormely wasn't willing to risk the ships he did have to properly support the Marines on Guadalcanal. When Halsey took over the command, US Navy ships suddenly appeared, and gave markedly more support to the Marines

You may choose to take it any way you want; the fact remains that when Ghormeley was in command he refused to risk his ships to give more support to he Marines. When Halsy commanded, more naval support immediately became available to the Marines.

I suppose you are aware that Admiral Fletcher was part of the US Navy, and was, in fact in overall command of the naval forces supposedly supporting the Guadalcanal invasion? If he "lost his nerve", as you claim, then was that why the US Navy didn't provide more active support?

It's odd then, that Halsey did finally manage to find two battleships and four destroyers, which according to you, "hadn't been built yet." These ships defeated and turned back the Japanese efforts to shell Guadalcanal into submission.

Yes, under Halsey the Marines finally got some support, had Admiral Ghormeley been less defeatist and more pro-active in providing naval support, the campaign woyld have been over by November.

They had all they needed. The Japanese didn't mount any kind of counter operation until August 19, and it was a pathetic attempt by less than 1,000 IJA troops. The Marines virtually annihilated these troops without much of a problem. According to Frank, it took the Marines on Guadalcanal "four days of concentrated labor" to move their supplies of the beach and into dispersal dumps. "At the same time the Marines inventoried their captured Japanese supplies and equipment, which included almost every conceivable item needed by a military force: arms ammunition, food, clothing transportation, tools, and building materials Japanese food commanded particular interest among the hungry Marines -- tins of fruit, milk, seaweed, a tasty beef in soy sauce, crabmeat bountiful rice, and even candy."

The Marines did go on a two meals per day schedule, but no one starved, no one ran out of ammo, and no one died because of lack of medical supplies. The supply situation was tight for some items, but it was adequate, and never threatened the Marine hold on the island.

Hmm....you say you are tired of my mis-quoting of your posts, my "misdirection", and my "purposeful distortion of facts", yet you haven't been able, or willing, to cite any examples of these alleged transgressions. I suspect you are merely growing weary of having all your so-called data proven incorrect and are trying to establish some justification to withdraw gracefully from the debate. It's all right with me, if you choose to do so; I don't think much of your opinions anyway and don't believe you had much to offer to the debate.

 

I am late to this thread, and probably not as well read on the subject as others, but I think that anything after Pearl Harbor would have eventually gone against the Japanese. Our industrial might and resolve after the "Day of Infamy" would have inevitably tipped the scales.

The only chance Japan might have had, IMHO, would have been to just attack Indonesia and maybe the Phillippines, and perhaps American war resolve would not have been so solid.

Just my 2 cents...

 

John,

I wasn't aware of that solo attack on Katherine, but on 22 March, 1942, nine Betty bombers attacked Katherine Field, killing one Aboriginal man named "Roger". The attack caused little damage to the air field but nearly resulted in a horrible tragedy when a bomb narrowly missed the Gallon license store. The Japanese must have been really poorly trained because in bombing Katherine, they just missed the nearby Manbulloo air field with two bombs. The recon plane associated with this raid was shot down by P-40 fighters of the 49th. Pursuit Group which had been alerted by the RAAF radar station at Dripstone Cliffs.

Katherine was supposedly the southernmost air field in the NT to be attacked by the Japanese.

 

LOL! For mowing the grass on grass airfields, I presume?

 

John,

Thanks for the additional information.

The picture I get of the Darwin area south as far as Daly waters and east to Mount Isa is that the local infrastructure had been improved to facilitate the defense of the NT, and particularly Darwin. It's clear to me that anyone who thinks Darwin could have easily been invaded just isn't aware of the true situation.

I've spent quite a bit of time looking at the area with Google Maps and can still see some of the air fields, roads, and old RR right of ways you mention, they appear to be amazingly preserved. My wife, who was an Australian citizen when I met her, had worked in the NT as a RAN Public Health Nurse for a couple of years and told me about travel conditions in he area and about the differences in climate and topography. She has flown in and out of many of the communities that I was studying.

It's interesting that your wife's father was employed in working in this area on the roads, camps, and airfields that we are discussing. The site Civilian War Effort in Australia during WW2 I cited for much of my information has some interesting pages on the CCC and other Australian civilian volunteers plus some pictures of CCC workers during the period.

 

All US Army (and for that matter SeeBee) troops underwent basic infantry training and were also trained in the use of their heavier weapons (like machineguns) just as the infantry were. Many engineers were selected on the basis of pre-existing skills where such skills were necessary.
None of them were equipped for heavy combat or offensive operations. Instead, they were expected to defend their positions around their work area on whatever construction they were engaged in. This includes combat engineer units.
Unlike the Germans who had Pionere and Construction engineers the US had just engineers. German pioneers or assault engineers were demolition and special weapons troops for assaults using things like explosives, flamethrowers and, other specialized equipment. On the defense they were used to lay mines, build obstacles that sort of thing. In the US Army the closest equivalent are pioneer platoons in infantry battalions. These troops were intended to build and remove obstacles, plant and clear mines, that sort of thing. The troops in this platoon were often "volunteers" from the various rifle companies and given extra training on clearing mines etc.
German construction troops were usually lower grade soldiers equipped primarily with hand tools for general or specialized construction tasks and not trained or equipped as combatants. They would have had just rifles and the occasional machinegun.

It is a difference in orgainzational philosophy. The Germans saw combat engineers as assault troops who could do occasional construction tasks while for them construction troops were dregs with shovels doing laborous work somewhere in the rear. The US saw engineers as highly skilled and well equipped construction troops who could adequitely defend themselves.

 

Exactly. They usually had a couple of full sized tractor mounted (like roadside crews use today) ones for the purpose.

 

Frank says pretty much what you (USMCPrice) said in post #184. The selection of USMC 1st Division for the landing was because it was amphibiously trained.

No real need to do that. Your are thinking of a mobile campaign analogous perhaps to that in Malaya. A reasonable prediction will be a period of perhaps 3 months where IJA columns are advancing, followed by a period of 6-9 months where they are pushed back and then defeated. The campaign ends perhaps in the fall of 1943 with the evacuation of the survivors and the recapture of Darwin by MacArthur. IJA losses of around 100,000 KIA and WIA, plus maybe 1,000 aircraft. Allied losses in the campaign of perhaps 25,000 KIA and WIA and 500 aircraft. In the Solomons, at the point that Darwin is falling, the Japanese still own Port Moresby and Guadalcanal, but an Allied counterattack is pending.

Close enough?

 

No, it was not. Frank says,

“The stunning triumph at Midway propelled American planners at all levels into a flurry of schemes to exploit the victory.” (32)

Indicates Guadalcanal was not in the cards save for the fact of Midway altering the carrier balance of power. Fire in the Sky says,

“Had the Allies been required to fight a major battle against a solid land air base just to begin a long campaign, the strong advocates of alternative strategies would have probably won the day. At minimum, the Japanese seizure of Moresby would have slowed an Allied offensive in New Guinea by months.” (43)

Note that Bergerud is observing from the vantage point of Midway, not from one where Japan has eight fleet carriers running around by August 1942. (Yes, Hiyo and Junyo are fleet carriers).

The notion that the USMC will invade Guadalcanal without Midway is a red herring; as there is no chance this would have occurred. An enclave there could not be defended or supported, as Kido Butai would sweep past Guadalcanal to smash the shipping and bases by which it was to be supported in a repetition of the Indian Ocean Raid. Nimitz would not risk the wholesale destruction of his carrier fleet in an attempt to prevent this from occurring, by way of being forced into a setpiece battle against the Combined Fleet. Ergo, there would be no invasion of the Solomons in the first place.

Both sides were stretched to the limit in the South Pacific in May 1942 when Coral Sea occurred. At Darwin in June 1942, the Allies had next to nothing in the way of naval forces, while the Japanese were practically on top of their forward fleet anchorage at Staring Bay. Not until August (two months after this invasion of Darwin) does ‘Operation Shoestring’ commence at Guadalcanal, thousands of miles closer to Pearl than the sea route to Darwin. There was no chance that the USN could have or would have constructed a base at Perth to dispute a Darwin invasion by June 1942.