Japan decides against Midway and invades Australia instead

The Japanese problem with supply and Guadalcanal was more related to U.S. interdiction of their supply lines than from a lack of basic logistical capabilities. I don't mean to be saying that the Japanese were anywhere close to having robust logistical assets. If you do look at the assets that were committed to attempting to supply Japanese forces on Guadalcanal. At the assets that were lost in that attempt. Then consider that the assets committed to supplying the Japanese in the New Guinea campaign, which I don't see as occuring, could be redirected to supporting a Northern Australia Campaign, they might pull it off. They would never enjoy the logistical excesses that the allies enjoyed but they wouldn't starve and would be able to undertake combat operations.

 

On the Darwin Railroad's, there existed a Rail line from Darwin to Pine Creek just south of Adelaide creek and north of Katherine, Pine Creek was at the time the Start of the Ghan Rail line which then ran straight through the middle of Australia and all the way down to Adelaide.

North Australia Railway - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Adelaide–Darwin railway - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

There also existed a four lane dirt highway especially built by the Army in ww2 to accommodate a large amount of Military traffic if Darwin needed to be defended.

 

Here is an aviator's map of the area south of Darwin showing the route of the Northern Australian Rail line in the vicinity of Katherine. I believe this is the one The 808th. Aviation Engineer Battalion boarded at Larrimah (Birdum) after traveling by truck from the Alice Springs rail head.



Military Airfields in Australia and the western Pacific area during World War 2

 

Yes, the Allied interdiction of Japanese supply routes to Guadalcanal did inflict severe losses on both the Japanese Navy and the merchant ships committed to the campaign. But the significant point here is that the Allies were able to interdict those Japanese supply routes with a single air base, vulnerable to both air and naval attack, and a handful of planes. At Guadalcanal, the Allies, like the Japanese, had to fight convoys through to keep their own forces supplied; such will not be the case at Darwin. The Allies can simply use the existing rail lines and trucks and draw supplies from the interior of the continent.

At Darwin, the Allies will have at least five large airbases already in operation, and these airbases will not be vulnerable to naval attack, nor will they be nearly as vulnerable to Japanese air attack, as was Henderson Field. Moreover, since the Japanese will have 2+ divisions, plus air units to support logistically at Darwin, it stands to reason that they will have to commit many more logistical units to supplying Darwin than were necessary at Guadalcanal.

Logically, since the Allies will be able to bring more forces to bear on the Japanese supply routes, and the Japanese will be forced to commit significantly more logistical assets to support their forces ashore at Darwin, than they did at Guadalcanal, it is reasonable to assume that the Japanese will suffer significantly more attrition in their light naval units and transports than they did at Guadalcanal. This is especially true because the Japanese were able to use barges for transport of troops and supplies in the Solomons, yet a glance at the map indicates that the Darwin area is surrounded by wide open seas, and distances that will preclude the use of barge transportation.

Furthermore, Darwin could unload only two sea-going ships at once, and that was before the Japanese bombing in February when the wharf and port facilities were either destroyed or badly damaged. Willmott, in "Empires in The Balance" reports that when the Japanese bombed Darwin in February, some ships had been there for two weeks waiting for an opportunity to unload, so it's reasonable to assume that the Japanese would have serious problems trying to push adequate supplies through the port. However, were I the Allied commander in defense of Darwin, I would simply close the entire port to shipping, by dropping aerial mines in the 3.5 mile wide channel that separates the port of Darwin from the sea.

Overall it's clear that the Japanese logistical problems would be worse than at Guadalcanal, would require greater assets to support their forces, and would open up the Japanese logistical effort to even greater attrition rates.

 

Devilsadvocate wrote:

The Navy considered the Ranger too small to mount a sufficient anti-aircraft battery, lacked sufficient armor, lacked sufficient internal subdivision, had certain design features that made her inefficient concerning flight ops and was too slow to operate with the Pacific Fleet. I at first questioned the too slow part because she was only a quarter knot slower than Wasp. All sources that mention that she was kept in the Atlantic, because of deficiencies, do mention this as a reason. I guess it is the speed along with the other limitations. One is that she had only one catapult an unusual outrigger design of limited utility (during her late war refit all eight of her 5" guns were removed to allow for a full radar suite and a bow catapult to be added). She was so top heavy and dangerously unstable with her '42 AA fit that she had to have six of her 20mm mounts removed in Jan. '43. When Wasp was built she had the unusual asymetrical hull, bulged out to port to counter-balance her island and provide additional stability. Ranger had six deck edge funnels mounted aft (3 port/3 starbord). The hot exhaust gasses caused unusual turbulence over the after portion of her flight deck effecting her aircraft. Mention is also made of problems with her hanger deck setup. I could not find out what the specific issues were with the setup, other than they seemed to be exacerbated by the larger aircraft in service when war broke out.

Naval thinking prior to the Ranger being built was that the best way to use the Aircraft Carrier tonnage allowed by the Washington Naval Treaty was to build numerous small, lightly armed and armored carriers with sufficient speed to operate with the battleline. The number of flight decks and total available aircraft more important than a few larger, more capable ships. Practical experience accumulated and changed their perception, it was decided that larger more capable ships were needed for operations in the Pacific and the U.S. built the Yorktowns. They reverted to a smaller carrier with Wasp because it was all the tonnage left under the Washington Treaty terms, they did however use numerous, innovative design features to keep the weight down while incorporating many of the successful features of the Yorktowns. It aslo allowed her to mount a sufficient AA battery, an adequate amount of internal and torpedo subdivision, they were however unable to save sufficient weight to allow her to be armored. When the treaty lapsed in 1938 the Navy started design work on the carrier they really wanted (Essex class) and ordered an additional Yorktown (the Hornet) as an interim measure.

Wasp's stop at Norfolk was also to repair some unspecified damage, in addition to the overhaul/refit.



All information/data from official U.S. Navy websites and various U S Naval Institute Proceedings (in my collection going back to 1979) and Naval History Magazine (going back to 1987) articles.

 

And yet she conducted a raid on Trondheim in early '43 which placed her at great risk from the Luftwaffe. The Ranger also covered the Casablanca part of the Torch Landings furthermore for a quite a few years she served in the Pacific.

 

Yes, the Ranger did serve in the Pacific for about 4 years pre-war. It was this service during the Fleet exercises that the Navy decided she was inadequate for wartime service in the Pacific. She also went back to the Pacific in 1944. Arriving in San Diego on 25July and sailed for Hawaii on the 28th. She spent her wartime Pacific service as a night fighter training ship in Hawaii and on the West Coast, not as a combatant. The Langley also served in the Pacific, pre-war but for twelve years. She also took part in the Fleet exercises but you wouldn't consider her capable as a fleet carrier now would you?
Ranger underwent improvements prior to heading for the Pacific during the war. In addition to having all her 5" mounts removed, "Ranger then entered the Norfolk Navy Yard to have her flight deck strengthened and for installation of a new type catapult, radar, and associated gear that provided her with a capacity for night fighter interceptor training."
Before she entered the Yard the Navy discussed an extensive rebuild that would make her truly war capable. It was decided that this would take up yard space and materials better spent on more valuable ships.

The Torch landings, yes Ranger led the carrier task force, four escort carriers. No one has said she wasn't as capable as a CVE but that's not saying much. CVE's in the Pacific were only usefull for limited tasks.
"Ranger led the task force comprising herself and four Sangamon-class escort carriers that provided air superiority during the amphibious invasion of German dominated French Morocco which commenced the morning of 8 November 1942."

 

First, let me state that my father's first ship was the old Ranger; he flew SBD's off her flight deck on Neutrality Patrol for several months before being reassigned to the Pacific just in time for Pearl Harbor. I will base many of my comments on things he told me about this ship.

The Ranger had eight single 5"/25 AA mounts and 40 .50 Cal. MG's, this was comparable to the Wasp's eight single 5/38's, 4 quad 1.1's, and 24 .50 Cal. MG's. This AA battery could have been increased, once the Ranger was in the Pacific, by reducing the .50 Cal. mounts and replacing them with either quad 1.1's, or 20 MM mounts. Numerous Pacific Fleet vessels underwent a similar process early in the war, when it was realized that the .50 Cal. MG's were ineffective in the AA role. At 14,576 tons displacement, the Ranger certainly was not too small to mount a reasonably effective AA battery.

The Ranger had more armor than any escort carrier, including the Long Island, which subsequently served in the Pacific at Guadalcanal. In fact, the armor on the Wasp was slightly thicker, but less extensive, than that on the Ranger. Ranger did not lack sufficient armor to serve in the Pacific.

In summation, there was absolutely no reason Ranger couldn't have served as a CV in the Pacific; she carried more modern planes than many other Pacific CV's was almost as fast as some of the American CV's, and indeed faster, than some ships that served with the Pacific carrier fleet. While her passive protection was not as good as the Lexington -class ships, and some of the later carriers, it was certainly better than the Long Island which served in the Pacific combat zones, and easily much better than many of the Japanese carriers which served in the Pacific.

I have heard this excuse too, but Friedman says in his Naval Design History series, that Ranger was as proportionately well subdivided as the Lexington class carriers. and better subdivided than the Yorktown class, so where's the beef?

Like what? Ranger was capable of spotting and launching a deckload strike of aircraft as rapidly as any of the Yorktown-class carriers, and of recovering these strikes in a relatively short time frame. Her flight deck was actually slightly longer, 728 feet vs. 715 feet than Wasp's. Ranger also had the then standard three elevator arrangement for handling aircraft.

I question that too. The difference in speed between the Wasp and Ranger is insignificant. It seems the 27 knot South Dakota-class BB's were able to operate as carrier escorts in the Pacific; I seriously doubt the Ranger would have any trouble keeping up with the Wasp an d Yorktown-class ships.

Yeah, except these limitations were shared by many other ships that did operate successfully with the fleet in combat zones in the Pacific. I don't think the Ranger was kept in the Atlantic because of any inherent deficiencies.

This is incorrect. The Ranger had three catapults as built; one was removed sometime in the 1930's because it was found three catapults were not needed; my father's recollection was that, while he was aboard, aircraft were normally launched by flying them off, not by catapult.

Ranger's late war refit was to outfit her to become a night intercept training carrier; her flight deck was strengthened, her old catapults were replaced with newer models, and the latest air search radar (she previously carried CXAM-1 Radar) was installed. Her AA batteries were removed so that he flight deck could be widened, NOT because of top weight concerns. Since Ranger was destined, in 1944, to become a training carrier AA batteries would not be needed. Admiral King thought well enough of Ranger to propose a rebuild which would have involved lengthening her hull and installing new engines, but as this would have necessitated a long period in the yard, which in turn would have affected repairs to Essex-class carriers, the plan was canceled.

 

Another option for the US CV's is to fly thier planes off to the East Coast of Australia and have them self deploy to the front while the carriers go back for new planes. Takes them out of action for a while but if the main action is defending Australia their planes are there and their hulls are safe. The planes can get into action faster that way as well.

 

The Ranger was most definitely better than a CVE and served in combat in the Atlantic. There was no reason she couldn't serve in the Pacific as a CV. Although you have cited some of the reasons why the Ranger didn't serve in the Pacific, none of them are substantial, and some are completely untrue. I believe the USN kept her in the Atlantic as a political gesture to the RN and specifically choose the Ranger because she was, in the USN's eyes, the least effective of their modern CV's. Having said that, Ranger was an effective CV, certainly at least as effective as some of the Japanese CV's.

 

The USN would not transfer Ranger and Wasp to the Pacific because Japan invaded Darwin. Marshall doesn’t care about Darwin; it’s not even on the radar.

Yep, 380 is right. So call it 380 IJN to 240 USN (Saratoga, Enterprise, Hornet).

Because a rail connection would be the fastest way to facilitate the type of heavy logistics movements being suggested. It would take quite some research to try and estimate what might have been possible logistically in an Allied response along that line into town. Anyone want to flesh out the Allied OOB in mid-May 1942?

Then it’s a non-starter to suppose that level of aerial commitment to Darwin. MacArthur's mission is to safeguard Australia's main population centers.

The Japanese never again raided the Coral Sea only because Kido Butai was smashed at Midway. The Japanese also never raided Hawaii or the Indian Ocean again, also because of Midway!

 

That's a valid start and the effort is appreciated.

Supplying Guadalcanal doesn’t say much about the logistics of operating an 8-carrier Kido Butai force from Truk against places like Noumea, Samoa, etc., during the second half of 1942. A planning figure might be 3 sorties by Kido Butai between July 1942 and November 1942 with 10,000 steaming miles per sortie – 30,000 in total. This should allow Nagumo ample opportunity to prowl the waters from Samoa to Australia. The composition of this force might be something around 8 CV, 4 BC, 4 CA, 3 CL and 18 DD.

Assuming that the Kido Butai spends 60% of its time at 14kt, 20% at 18kt and 20% at 24kt, then the oil consumption for that unit is:

14kt: about 3,500 tons per day * 18 days = 63,000 tons.
18kt: about 5,500 tons per day * 5 days = 27,500 tons
24kt: about 14,500 tons per day * 5 days = 72,500 tons.

Total requirement is 163,000 tons per sortie * 3 sorties. Call it 500,000 tons required over 5 months. Initial capacity of the specified force is about 90,000 tons. Assuming they are around 66% per full when arriving in July at Truk, then the tankers have to supply 440,000 tons in five months. If each tanker can bring 10,000 tons to Truk once every six weeks, then the tanker train is about 13 units.

The scenario calls for 2 divisions to land. It doesn’t specify whether these are triangular or square, and does not specify other support units engaged. Assuming 45,000 men with more mobility than the norm for the Japanese, plus 250 aircraft, and 25 lbs per man per day for supply (i.e., very high for IJA units). Let’s assume 5,000 men per month as replacements/reinforcements. That’s about 400,000 tons for the initial invasion force (about 60 transports), then maybe 60,000 tons per month supply/replacements.

Those are examples of logistics projections. What are yours?

 

That's probably what would happen. While in the Atlantic, the Ranger delivered upwards of 75 land-based fighters (P-38's) at a time on ferry missions to North Africa and beyond. Assuming both the Long Island and Ranger were available, the USN could deliver large numbers of land-based fighters, possibly via the Gulf of Carpentaria, directly to the front line air fields south of Darwin. Not all the US carriers would be taken out of action this way, but one or two US carriers making regular ferry runs would probably be necessary, anyway. Of course, the Japanese can do the same thing, if they have the planes. But the Japanese aircraft production wasn't keeping up with losses in mid-1942, so they have to strip other units for replacement aircraft.

 

I think you are on the correct track, here.

I did some quick research and found that Japan's total production of oil in the 4th Quarter of 1942 was 1,194,000 tons, almost the entire lot coming from the NEI. Keep that figure in mind.

Then I did some number crunching of my own based on Glenn239's scenario of a formation of IJN ships "roaming" around the Coral Sea and outlying Allied bases. I found that, based on the actual oil consumption figures for the six CV's, and the two converted auxiliary carriers Glenn is so fond of, plus four battleships, four heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and 18 destroyers, on three sorties of 10,000 miles each, approximately 1,043,356 tons of fuel oil would be consumed.

In other words, just these three operations, involving these 37 ships, over a period of three months, would consume on the order of 87% of all the oil produced by Japan in the last three months of 1942. Could Japan support that? I don't think so, and I don't think any sane person would propose it. Obviously, Japan can't support a major, 2+ division landing at Darwin, and also have it's carriers cruising the Coral Sea at the same time, either from the perspective of numbers of ships required, or from the perspective of oil consumption.

 

Marshall has very little to say about it. King would push for the transfer and the Brits and Australians are also screaming for it. Roosevelt the politician, wants to keep the Brits happy so they will go along with the US "second front" policy as soon as possible. It's no contest, the transfer happens.

In your dreams! it's 474 US carrier aircraft to 379 Japanese aircraft in early June, 1942.

It's already been done, but you refuse to accept it. Yeah, rail would be the fastest, but not the only, way to provide logistical support for the Allied troops around Darwin

Yes, Mac is committed to protecting Australian's population and industrial centers; so what did he do about it? Historically, he committed almost every plane in Australia to fight the Japanese in New Guinea. But that was historically, in this Darwin invasion scenario, the Japanese won't be in New Guinea, but in Darwin, and that is where Mac will commit almost every plane in Australia to fight them. C'mon Glenn, even you can see that would not only be his best option, but in reality, his only option.

And because of a lack of oil, and being fatally over-extended in New Guinea. Midway didn't help, but the Japanese weren't going any further than the Solomons whether Midway happened or not.

 

I noticed that the Ranger conducting a raid on Trondheim in 1943 in the rough North Sea & very exposed to the Luftwaffe isn't being challenged. It seems to me if she can handle the North Sea with the concurrent risk from the Luftwaffe then she can if nothing else carry a very large number of F4F's to protect the other USN CV's just like the Independence CVL's were designed to do.

 

Yes, Ranger's maximum aircraft capacity was 86 aircraft; she could carry, and operate, large numbers of fighters and act as a CAP CV if that was required, or a aircraft ferry for short range land-based fighter, or simply as another CV. The idea that Ranger was not an effective CV is nonsense.

 

I think this is actually a very good idea and makes a lot of sense. Holds the Japanese without risking the ships until sufficient strength for a counterattack can be gathered.

 

Devilsadvocate wrote:

And I admire you father for his wartime service. The US Navy in WWII was the worlds best and demonstrated time and again they had huge brass ones.

Deviladvocate continued:

Well, here's a short synopsis of what the Navy says. I will not waste my time by going back and reposting everything I've already posted.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060-- U.S. NAVY SHIP TYPES -- FLEET AIRCRAFT CARRIERS --

Ranger, Yorktown & Wasp class aircraft carriers, (CV 4-8). (Fiscal Years 1930, 1934, 1936 & 1939)

After beginning construction of the small fleet aircraft carrier Ranger (CV-4), the Navy revisited the issue of carrier design, as restricted by treaty. Ranger was clearly a very marginal ship, relatively slow, wholly unprotected against gunfire and torpedo attack, and with an unsatisfactory ability to operate aircraft in rough weather. A new design, displacing 36 percent more than Ranger's, was prepared that addressed all these issues. Two of these larger ships, Yorktown (CV-5) and Enterprise (CV-6), were ordered in Fiscal Year 1934, with construction beginning shortly before Ranger entered service. Completed in 1937 and 1938, these two carriers were satisfactory in most ways, and a slightly-modified third ship, Hornet (CV-8), was built under the Fiscal Year 1939 building program, after treaty restrictions had been effectively set aside by the outbreak of the European war. The Yorktown design also provided a basis for the Essex class, whose construction began in 1940 and continued through World War II.
In the mid-1930s, with treaty restrictions still very much in force, only enough carrier tonnage remained for another Ranger-sized ship. This became Wasp (CV-7), built under the Fiscal Year 1936 program. Though her design was an improvement over Ranger, Wasp suffered from the earlier carrier's inherent problems, most notably modest speed and no torpedo protection. Strictly a result of the limitations imposed by international agreement, she was the Navy's last serious attempt to build a small fleet carrier from the "keel-up", though an even smaller design, the Independence class, with greatly reduced aircraft capacity, was generated as a result of the World War II emergency.
Second World War combat experience confirmed pre-war expectations for these ship designs. Wasp's absence of anti-torpedo side protection doomed her to a blazing demise in September 1942, when a Japanese submarine's torpedo easily penetrated to her aviation fuel supplies.

Everything I posted was official US Navy information. Now, if I have to choose which source to go with, Devilsadvocate or the US Navy, I'm sorry but the Navy wins. You can argue the points until you're blue in the face it's not going to change. We'll just have to agree to disagree on this one.

Well, once again that's not what the Navy sources say:


NavSource Online: Aircraft Carrier Photo Archive







Ranger Class Aircraft CarrierOrdered Laid down Launched Commissioned Decommissioned Stricken 1 Nov 193026 Sep 193125 Feb 19334 Jun 193418 Oct 194629 Oct 1946Builder: Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., Newport News, Va.

• Named to commemorate five US warships which had previously borne the name. "Ranger" means "one who wanders; military scout." Secretary of the Navy Charles F. Adams assigned the name on December 10, 1930.
• CV-4 was the first US warship designed and built from the keel up as an aircraft carrier.
• Sponsored by Mrs. Lou Henry Hoover, wife of Herbert Hoover, the outgoing President of the United States. Mrs. Hoover, who smashed a bottle of Prohibition-era grape juice on the bow of the ship, thus became the first First Lady to christen an aircraft carrier.
• Commissioned on Monday, June 4, 1934.
• Decommissioned on Friday, October 18, 1946.
• Fate: Sold for scrap to Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., Chester, Pa., January 28, 1947.

Specifications

(As built, 1934)
Displacement: 14,576 tons standard; 17,577 tons full load
Dimensions (wl): 730' x 80' x 22' 4.875" (full load) / 222.5 x 24.4 x 6.8 (full load) meters
Dimensions (max.): 769' x 109.5' / 234.4 x 33.4 meters
Armor: 2" (sides and bulkheads)-1" (top) over steering gear
Power plant: 6 boilers (??? psi); steam turbines; 2 shafts; 53,500 shp
Speed: 29.25 knots
Endurance (design): 10,000 nautical miles @ 15 knots
Armament: 8 single 5"/25 gun mounts; 40 .50-cal machine guns
Aircraft: 86
Aviation facilities: 3 elevators; no catapult
Crew: 2,148 (ship's company + air wing) (1941 figure)

note: The highlight and underline of the no catapult is mine. I think this should lay to rest your assertion that "the Ranger had three catapults as built". The information I provided is correct per official US Navy sources. Ranger did have an unusual outrigger type catapult installed. She did receive receive a normal bow catapult when she underwent her late war refit prior to transferring to the Pacific, as I have already stated.

Devilsadvocate wrote:

And this would make perfect sense based on her only having the outrigger catapult, which is consistently described as "of limited utility".

Devilsadvocate wrote:

Once again this is not what the official sources state and I have to go with the professional Naval Officers and Historians of the Navy.

 

No, I wouldn't expect you to post that garbage again either. And I do realize that you are merely quoting things that you have read; I am not charging you with errors, but asserting that your information makes no sense in view of information we know to be true relating to other carriers which did serve successfully in the pacific.

You are aware of the fact "official" sources can be wrong? The sources you claim to be official are basically simply drawn for other documents which sometimes repeat "official" but erroneous statements. As far as the number of catapults, my father's log book states that on two separate occasions his aircraft was launched from the Ranger "by catapult" due to the aircraft being heavily loaded and the maximum wind over the deck not being enough to allow a rolling take-off. I hardly think he made that up in order to get his plane in the air. Furthermore, catapults were seldom used in the Pacific carriers, planes almost universally being launched by flying them off the deck.

As to the matter of the Ranger's "deficiencies", I need only point out that the Wasp, which shared most of Ranger's "deficiencies", WAS transferred, and DID serve in the Pacific. Moreover, carriers, even less suitable than Ranger, i.e. Long Island, DID routinely, and successfully serve in the Pacific. So all of the excuses for not transferring the Ranger to the Pacific are patently false.

In any event, nothing in the "official" sources you have posted actually disqualifies the Ranger from Pacific service. The CVL's and escort carriers which served routinely and successfully in combat zones in the Pacific were no more powerful and were actually less well protected than the Ranger, so those arguments you put forward are very suspect.

I continue to stand by my assertion that the Ranger could have been transferred to the Pacific and stood as much chance of serving successfully as a CV as any other carrier in the USN. I know I will never convince you, but that's not my intention.