Japan decides against Midway and invades Australia instead

I thought that scout plane that over-flew TF16 only did it because it was launched late and sighted TF16 on a dog leg manuver which it conducted early because it was launched late to begin with ?

Now as far as invading Darwin my question is why? It's so isolated from the rest of Australia and it seems to me could be left isolated though harried like other bypassed island garrisons during the war.

 

I'm not sure how it would affect the odds but ...
Is there enough fresh water at Darwin to support 2+ Japanese divisions? Water supply would also be very critical for allied responses. On the other hand the greater motorization would aid them and the ability to strip transport from some divisions to supply others would certainly give them an edge in mobile operations.

 

lwd wrote:

I'm not sure but it is a very good question. I also wouldn't think it necessary to station 2+ divisions at Darwin. Darwin could be taken with a battalion and held with a regiment. An additional battalion would probably be required to man a string of LP/OP's south and southwest of the city. This would be enough to man the posts and allow for rotation of personnel back to the rear on a regular basis. You would also have the aircrews, their support/maint personel, and logistical/supply troops to operate the supply system. Strike aircraft would pose a huge obstacle to an allied advance from the south, being subjected continuous air attack on their movement north. If they did manage to approach Darwin in sufficient strength to pose a real threat to the defenses, they could reinforce from Timor.
I would guess that there is a substantial water supply because there was a civilian population there.

 

Well looking at the map at:
Google Maps
things don't look too good. There are obvioulsy waterways but how seasonal they are I don't know. I'm also not sure if the resevoir indicated on the map was there in 1941.
Looking at: Bombing of Darwin - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The civilian population at the time was ~2,000
Darwin, Northern Territory - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
indicates it's current population is ~120,000 but that doesn't mean it could have supported that many at the time.

*** edit for ***
From http://www.auinfo.com/darwin-climate.html it looks like Darwin gets about 72" of rain a year. However from June through September it gets less than an inch.

 

Absolutely, that was the question I asked early on; What objective is achieved by the Japanese? A "diversion" only becomes successful if it diverts attention from some other worthwhile objective. So what is that worthwhile objective for the Japanese? No one answered those questions.

Darwin, in mid-1942 wasn't important enough for the Allies to waste much time trying to evict a Japanese occupation force. Just surround them, by-pass them, and let them starve. They'd be useful as live targets for Allied units before going into active combat zones, otherwise nothing but a self-sustaining prison camp.

 

What if Darwin had been invaded and captured by the Japanese?

Ultimantely if this happened, it would mean that 1. the Japanese now hold a section of the Australian Coastline including a port and an airfield, almost eliminating the only ones in the area. 2. It would cause the Australians to retreat to more vital positions exposing them to the desert and attrition. 3. The need to station more men around the area of Darwin once the invasion was successful would be much higher then if they were to simply attempt to hold the single city and coast line.

By taking Darwin, you do achieve these things, but in terms of the rest of Australia and the most vital part the Eastern Coast, it is nothing of importance.

 

IMHO it's sort of a "super-Wake Island" or "super Midway if they had succeded" syndrome ,i.e. the logistical effort needed to supply it would outstrip it's worth. Now the political factor maybe the most important since Australian citizens & politicians ,indeed maybe even US politicians, may demand the Japanese be evicted.
However it seems to me that the Allies could just continue to conduct the Papuan & Guadalcanal Campaigns as historical but a big difference here would be the Japanese would have to address 3 campaigns here(Darwin,Guadalcanal & Papuan) alongst with the Darwin campaign here being seperated quite a bit from the other two, instead of the historical two(Papuan & Guadalcanal). The Japanese had enough trouble allocating resources for 2 campaigns much less 3. So where do they allocate resources? What would be the major naval base for the IJN if operating against Darwin? In the Guadalcanal Campaign the IJN sorited out of Truk for the most part(at least the carriers did) which had plenty of years to be built up into an IJN base. If Darwin is itself used how much lead time is needed to get it operational?

 

Your question has been answered you just chose not to listen.

You replied to my comment that you had to look at the situation from a specific time frame with:

Glenn239 started this thread off by asking:

You can't use the United States military capabilities from 1943 onwards, and Japan still has the carriers it, historically, lost at Midway.

Look at the situation from a contemporary point of view, Australia was scared. Seizing Darwin as a forward base threatens the eastern coast of Australia and possibly Port Moresby from the rear. In July 1942 Japan landed troops at Buna and tried to attack Moresby across the Owen Stanley mountains. Australia had only 2 militia brigades to oppose them. The terrain, environment and extremely hard fighting by the Australians stopped the Japanese close to Moresby. An attack from the seaward side and Moresby falls. MacArthur himself said that "whoever controls Moresby controls New Guinea," New Guinea is also a campaign that started in 1942 and was still being fought in 1945. Japan committed huge resources into the campaign that could be redirected into the proposed Australia/Moresby Campaign.
When the allies discovered the Japanese building an airfield on Guadalcanal in the Solomons they were so fearful of the threat to Australia's lifeline, they undertook an invasion for which they were underequipped, ill prepared and lacked the resources to sustain, in a proper manner. The unit they pulled for the invasion was the 1st Marine Division, it was on the east coast, assigned to the Torch Landings and training the Army Divisions in amphibious warfare. It was short one of it's three regiments, the 7th Marines off guarding British Samoa. They were brought up to strength using the only remaining regiment of the 2d Marine Division, the 2d Marines. (The other two regiments were the 6th Marines guarding Iceland against a potential German attack and 8th Marines guarding American Samoa against the Japanese). Where are all these divisions that are going to guard Australia or retake it?
Also, to fully appreciate the situation in the Pacific you have to take the global view of what was going on in the war. For instance the 9th Australian Division played a key role in halting the Axis advance in North Africa at 1st El Alamein. What would have happened there if Japan was on Australian soil? Would they have been pulled and shipped to the Pacific? Because of the Japanese threat the Australian 6th and 7th Divisions were shipped back in early 1942, and the 8th was stationed in Singapore. The 8th was lost in the Singapore surrender, most of the 7th at Java and NEI, and two Brigades of the 6th were retained in Ceylon until August of 1942. This really cuts down on the available veteran troops.
What did Australia have to counter this? Eight partially trained and equipped divisions, 373 aircraft, most of which were obsolete trainers, three cruisers and two destroyers. The Australians did undertake a major expansion of it's armed forces in early 1942, but by the time of our scenario they could hardly be considered a match for the battle tested and hardened Japanese.
The Battle of the Atlantic. January to June of 1942 was a crucial period for the United States in their battle with Germany's submarine force. Contrary to Deviladvocate's assertion, the United States didn't have the huge logistical capability it enjoyed in 1943. Little merchant shipping could be spared from the Atlantic or Britain would starve. Escort vessels were needed to protect the convoys, there were not enough to guard a concerted Japanese assault on Australia's lifeline.

One thing I will agree with Devilsadvocate on is the importance of a first strike in carrier warfare. I do not agree that adherence to this doctrine was the reason for the U.S. victory at Midway but that discussion is best left for another thread. What is important is that Japanese aircraft had a range advantage over the Americans. Operating in the Coral Sea, with search aircraft located on the Australian mainland and at Moresby there was a good chance they could spot first, strike first. The Japanese navy sought all through the war to fight a decisive, naval surface battle with the U.S. This would be much more likely to occur if the U.S. was trying to come to the aid of Australia. Historically, the Solomons campaign saw a huge number of surface battles. The Japanese demonstrated a marked superiority in this type action, the Americans normally stopped the Japanese forays but at an enormous cost, including the worst naval defeat in U.S. history at Savo Island. The Americans saving grace was that they were operating near their base and had local air superiority, they were able to pick off a number of damaged Japanese naval units, with air strikes on their 600 mile return trip up the slot. In an Australian scenario it would be the Americans that would be trying to take the fight to the Japanese, near their bases, without local air superiority. Damaged allied naval units would be picked off as they limped back to Brisbane or points south.
Japan would have the initiative they would be making the allies react to their moves not vice versa.
The New Guinea campaign would probably not occur, if Japan controlled Moresby. The U.S. would try to isolate Moresby and bomb it from Australia. Allied attrition would be enormous because of the loss of aircraft from battle damage, wounded pilots and mechanical failure on the return trip across the Coral Sea.
The Solomons campaign would not have been likely to occur, since the initial reason for the Guadalcanal landing was to prevent Japanese airpower from threatening Australia's lifeline. Japan being the weaker power logistically and economically would benefit more from the consolidation of two AO's into one.
The Japanese would also benefit more from the aspect of submarine warfare. While the Americans had superior doctrine they had defective torpedos. The Japanese had fewer less capable boats but had the best/most powerful torpedos in the world at this time. The Japanese could base their boats in Moresby, Darwin and Rabaul with a much reduced range to the hunting areas leading into Australia. Their efforts could also be somewhat concentrated instead of spread across the entire Pacific making them somewhat more effective.
Lastly, the Japanese controlling part of Australia would be like the Germans controlling part of England. It removes or severely restricts it's use as a base. Australia was as important to the Pacific offensives as England was to Normandy and the war in Western Europe.
All this said it will not change the result of the war. America's economic might will allow it to prevail eventually. However, historically, America was very war weary in early 1945, if Japan can drag the war out an extra year, there is a good chance for a negotiated settlement.

 

OOPs hit post twice. Disregard.

 

It’s not my thread. I just happen to think that invading Darwin was an excellent option for the Japanese under certain circumstances, given their logistical weakness in other theatres, and need to divert Allied attention from the Solomons.

To trigger a diversionary campaign that sucks in Allied resources indisproportionate numbers to the Japanese forces committed, and conserves Japanese aerial and naval strength for the hopeless test that will begin in 1944. Australia is the only point of contact in the entire Pacific Ocean basin where Japan can fight a major land campaign against the Allies. If either Guadalcanal or Moresby is in Allied hands, Darwin is not a good option; the Japanese will only extend the area of conflict with the Allies and thereby weaken themselves faster. If the Solomons is secured, then a diversion in Australia just might keep the Allies occupied for a while.

Right, but when the Japanese invaded in the Aleutians they were occupying nothing of importance. The US still reacted strongly.

If the Japanese take Darwin, the Australians will go ape ****. MacArthur will stand to the pulpit and suck all the resources down for his glorious crusade. A chance for Faromir of Gondor to show his quality, you see. The Japanese will lose in spectacular fashion. But it will take a year and plenty of US troops. Meanwhile, on Guadalcanal, the Japanese will be tending their rose gardens and reading about the war.

A successful diversion in Australia might prolong the war by about 4 months, assuming that it succeeds in preserving the IJN and its aviation strength.

 

Man, can this site screw up the fonts.Truk – the USN isn’t dumb enough to switch their primary base from Hawaii to Perth. That’s crazy town. If they do, then the IJN is practically given the keys to the car in the South Pacific.

 

Ok, clarified. When you said that it was absurd to suppose the IJA
had 2 divisions lying around, what you apparently meant was that the
IJA didn’t want to invade Australia. Got it; when you say your
favorite colour is red, you actually mean blue under some circumstances.
In this A-H, the IJA is willing to go into Australia.

Darwin’s geographical location ruled out any major USN effort there. The USN simply
did not and would not commit fleet carriers to that area. This is why the US Army recieved
that command. The US Army was in command in theaters where the Navy would not
operate as a major partner. Luzon (1941), China, Australia.

This is a great example of a destructive argument (ie, one that is intentionally made
to be argumentative). Now, instead of answering the point about IJA/IJN
interservice rivalry and delineation of theaters, we are going to debate the logistic
details of transferring IJA planes to Darwin? Pass.

 

No US carrier or carrier group in 1942 went close to a full-strength Japanese major base. Prince of Wales and Repulse did. How'd that work out?

Don't get me wrong here. If the USN is dumb enough to fight at Darwin, then that is a powerful argument for the Japanese to invade Darwin. I just don't think Nimitz graduated from the Cuckoo Bananas Military Academy.

Sure. About 8 unescorted Betty bombers broke through Lexington’s CAP and nearly clocked the carrier. Oops. Lucky they weren't carrying torpedoes.

Remember that Spruance didn’t want to chase the shattered Japanese forces into range of tiny IJN air units on Wake, because he was afraid of them getting lucky? Well, times that tiny Wake force by 10, and that’s what’s waiting on Timor.

 

Are you seriously implying that any carrier commander in WW2 would instead wait around, or radio the enemy to invite them to attack first? Good God man. What else on Earth would anyone do but attack? The question is what happens when other circumstances interfere with the desire to hit first with the most.

Spruance had two key decisions to make on the 4th, and in each case he went against the quick attack and opted for the delayed option.

Sure, why let common sense stand in the way of a good rant? Buddy, if that cloud ain't there, Nagumo fires a 4-carrier strike at TF16/17 by 0700.

You again are playing fast and lose between “Nagumo” and “Japanese”, despite the conversation we had yesterday. Remember? When you claimed you meant only Nagumo's command and not the Japanese in general. Hara did not commit a “full strength” strike on May 7th when seeking to get in the first strike with a small force at dusk. Yamaguchi did not signal Nagumo looking for permission to launch at 0830 because he wanted to wait till later.

This is sounding more and more like some of that crap in Shattered Sword. Read Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral. Best 3-page summary of Nagumo's command decisions made at Midway that I've ever read. Perfectly balanced. Breathtaking.

Everyone agrees with that statement. The problem is that DA refuses to admit Nagumo’s tactical circumstances made it impossible for him to get in the first blow. Nagumo cannot be ignoring a first strike doctrine when Nagumo had no chance to get in the first strike.

 

A couple of questions Glenn.. HoweverFirst off why would that give the keys to the car to Kido Butai in the South Pacific? Another surprise raid on Oahu? An invasion of Oahu?
1. This still doesn't answer my question of how Japan allocates it's resources between Guadalcanal,Papua ,and Darwin if the Allies start counter-attacking in say Papua & Guadalcanal. Darwin is in an isolated part of Australia which can be bypassed furthermore even if alot of importance is attached to it by the Allies that is countered by far more resources being re-allocated by them from the ETO. Yes I know if Midway doesn't happen Kido Butai still has 6 CV's instead of two but that two things....for one Kido Butai with 6 CV's is far more of a logistical drain then Kido Butai with just 2 CV's...two..it also means the US hasn't lost Yorktown or Lexington either butn here Japan is the one trying to conduct 3 campaigns versus the two historical ones that it couldn't handle.

2. How is Kido Butai going to stage out of Truk to support Darwin? If it is at Truk it's out of position to help Darwin . If it's at say someplace closer to Darwin it's out of place to help either at Guadalcanal or Papua. The USN meanwhile can probably stage out of Noumea,Espirito Santo,Auckland,or from Eastern Australia to assist either of the three campaigns..

 

USMCprice,
I don't agree with your analogy about occupying Darwin is like occupying part of the UK. For one Australia is much,much larger far less densely populated and most of all far harder to overrun especially from Darwin. I admit the political is a little dicier but the general strategic isue here is why Darwin? IMHO a campaign there ties the IJN down to the Indian Ocean side of things because I just don't see Kido Butai being able to cover this campaign alongst with the two that happened historically,Papua & Guadalcanal simply because of lack of a proper base The Allies always seemed far more concerned about Australia's access eastward rather then westward.. I am assuming that the latter two campaigns(Guadalcanal & Papua) are still going forward as far as the Japanese are concerned right?

Just how good was Kido Butai at "hitting and staying" like in covering an invasion verus the "hit & run" like they did historically at Pearl Harbor, Ceylon, and Darwin? Did Kido Butai ever participate in covering an invasion other then Wake Island? Did Kido Butai have a doctrine/expierence in covering a IJA landing ?

 

goodness i'm getting tired of this first strike as if it was completely alien to the thoughts of both sides on june 4, 1942. why are people ignoring real events that day that prevented the japanese from destroying the three US carriers?

 

and just what are those? You know guys a lot of what enabled the US to prevail at Midway was superior intell,i.e. if the USN knew historically about the Midway operation then they'll probably know about this Darwin operation in this sceanario and take proper countermeasures like strengthening Australia.

Somebody brought up about the politica/strategicl in regards to say more Australian troops being withdrawn from Egypt and what effect that it might have in the ETO but that is one option of the Allies especially if they know ahead of time which they probably would ,i.e. bring a division or two of Australians home. The Axis certainly weren't going nowhere further in Egypt because of their logistics there but that is a completely different topic for another thread.

The main topic here should be how does the IJN get the USN into the "decisive battle" which was even more of a doctrine for the IJN then any "getting first strike in" or " most,largest whatever co-ordinated air strike" ? Nimitz seen a chance to ambush the Japanese at Midway just as much as the Japanese hoped to lure the USN into a decisive battle and I just don't see Nimitz risking his assets for Darwin unless he sees a good chance for dividends. If Nimitz doesn't fall for it then Darwin just becomes a backwater which US subs operating from Western Australia can make a very expensive backwater. The IJA also thought that it would take at least 12 divisions to take Australia.

 

You are correct. T.A. Gardner started the thread. I was incorrect when I attributed it to you. The quote was actually T.A. Gardner's and the time frame was, as I said, spelled out in the original post as "late May early June". I stand by the rest of the statement but apologize for incorrectly putting the words in your mouth.

I agree that's why I stated,

 

Wouldn't Darwin also be a bad choice of the Japanese since not only is it vulnerable to attack from the continent itself but from both the Pacific & Indian Ocean sides both?