Japan decides against Midway and invades Australia instead

Exactly what I said; Vandergrift was forced by lack of naval and air support to take defensive measures which would have been unnecessary if sufficient naval support had been forthcoming.

There were no Japanese remaining on those small islands; had Ghormeley been able to provide adequate naval support, almost the entire battalion could have been moved to Guadalcanal.

The Marines on Guadalcanal consistently outnumbered the Japanese, sometimes by a margin of two to one, until quite late in the campaign. They were defending on interior lines and had the advantage of plentiful artillery which could fire concentrations all around the perimeter The Japanese, until late in the campaign had no artillery to speak of and little if any heavy ammunition. They could not move freely through the jungle and could concentrate "superior numbers" only with great difficulty, and very often, not at all. The Japanese had absolutely no accurate intelligence of Marine dispositions or numbers throughout the campaign, while the Marines continued to receive not only sigint from Nimitz in Hawaii, but local intelligence through Coastwatcher Martin Clemens and his scouts. The Japanese were never adequately supplied with even the basic necessities, while the Marines at least had enough to eat and plentiful ammunition. The Japanese were trying to attack the Marines defensive positions, with no more than parity, they simply couldn't concentrate enough effectives in one place to give them the required three to one numerical superiority required of a successful offense.

Again, the biggest problem Vandergrift had wasn't lack of manpower, but inadequate air and naval support to stop the Japanese landing reinforcements and supplies.

True, but this had no practical affect on the outcome of the battle. The marines continued receiving resupply and reinforcement on a timely basis. The reason the battle went on for so long was that Vandergrift couldn't stop the Japanese Navy from running ships in to bombard Henderson Field and land more Japanese. For that, he needed better Naval support and better air support, not more men.

 

IIRC - Buin was built on muddy ground and this caused great difficulties.

 

Devil’s Advocate: You stated repeatedly during a discussion about moving IJA air units to Darwin for a land campaign in June 1942 that Japanese army pilots were not trained to fly over open water:

#58: “And the Japanese would be forced to use naval pilots as Japanese Army pilots were not trained to fly over open water.”

#72: “As for the Japanese pilots, IJAAF pilots were not trained to navigate
over open water and thus were not deployed where they would have to do so; Timor, for example”

#127: “Those in Timor could not be used by the IJA because Army pilots were not trained to navigate over open water.”

You posted as proof of your position a quote from an IJA air unit from 1943 that were sent to Rabaul with poor training. You neglected from your source (Fire in the Sky) the narrative where it was stated that by this time replacement pilots arriving at Rabaul were so green that their training time was only 100-200 hours. Obviously, this omitted fact might have had a bearing on why the IJA pilots at Rabaul weren’t “up to snuff” by 1942 standards.

“The airfield at Singora was soon in Japanese hands and before long, at
first light, KI27’s…began winging their way in from their Southern Indochina bases, via Phu Quoc; several came to grief when touching down on the rain sodden grass airfield.”

Bloody Shambles, 85.

Not only could these IJA fighters navigate to a forward field flying over
300 miles of “open water”, they did it in the dark.

 

USMCPrice – these prewar airfields – were they connected to the southeast (or Darwin) by rail, or were they dependent on the sea for logistics support?

The Guadalcanal offensive came near to disaster as it was, with Kido Butai
smashed at Midway, and four US fleet carriers in support. DA speculates
success in an invasion with an intact Kido Butai composed of eight fleet
carriers and the bulk of the US carriers at Perth. I just don’t see it as a valid hypothesis that King takes the risk.

I had a question on this. Assuming the scenario DA envisions and the
broadly historical deployment of the USMC on Guadalcanal. If the Japanese response is, after about 6 weeks preparation, a direct invasion over the beach with full support from Kido Butai and naval units, with other units already on the island to attack in coordination from the flank, how many division equivelents would you estimate that the IJA would have to commit to take Henderson Field in one assault?

 

In the dark? Are you now so desperate that you feel you have to enhance your citations?

I wonder, in your haste to prove the Japanese were supermen, do you even bother to read your own citations?

Your reference clearly states that the flight began, "at first light". That means dawn, which traditionally is the beginning of daylight. So, no the Japanee pilots didn't fly from Phu Quoc to Thailand in the dark.

Secondly, there are several small islands lying to seaward from Phu Quoc and also several small islands off the Thai and Malayan coast. Flying between these islands reduces the flight over "open water" to only about 170 nautical miles, which, at the cruising speed of a KI-27 is only about 45 minutes flight time. Even someone untrained in open water navigation should be able to hold a straight course for 45 minutes. and this was a one-time flight, so it's not something they are going to have to do every day to accomplish their combat missions.

Moreover, I did not rely on just a single quotation to prove that Japanese Army pilots were deficient in navigation training. I also quoted the following website; Japanese air operations over New Guinea during the Second World War. - Free Online Library which indicates the Japanese Army rejected an August, 1942, proposal to send Army air units to the aid of the IJN in the South Pacific because the "Army and Navy's doctrines, training, tactics, strategy and equipment." were different.

Furthermore, unlike the Navy pilots, Japanese Army pilots did not begin to suffer a degradation of training until the beginning of 1943, when they finally began engaging Allied pilots in New Guinea. Until that time they had mostly opposed poorly trained Chinese pilots flying inferior aircraft in mainland China. When the Japanese Navy began brining replacement pilots at Rabaul it first exchanged experienced Navy pilots with other locations around the theater, as my citation clearly states. Clearly, bot the Japanese Army and Japanese Navy were aware of the need for experienced, well trained pilots in the Solomons campaign, but the Navy was running out of that commodity and the Army pilots had never received the kind of training that would make them proficient at over water navigation.

I stand by my statements that that issue was a severe restraint on the use of Army pilots where open water navigation would e an issue, such as in air support from Timor of an Invasion of Darwin.

 

I guess your a disciple of Goebbels; repeat a lie enough and it becomes the "truth". Kido Butai NEVER operated eight fleet carriers. At most, There were six Japanese Fleet carriers in 1942; Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku. because of cumulative wear and tear, and the need to repair, and refit the carriers, at times, such as the Indian Ocean raid, there were fewer carriers comprising Kido Butai. If you have information to the contrary, either post it or quite lying about the numbers.

My speculation is that it would be possible for the Allies to invade Guadalcanal without carrier support, IF the planning for the invasion had been better. This would have been possible IF the Japanese carriers were tied up with the Darwin invasion for a month or so, which is quite likely.

 

Tough to do when four were sunk at Midway. In planning exercises for the second stage operation, Ugaki indicates that Junyo and Hiyo (the converted fleet carriers with a capacity of about 54 aircraft each) operated with Kido Butai. First Air Fleet staff felt confident they could handle nine carriers in Kido Butai,

“the First Air Fleet headquarters entertained the view that its strength could possibly be expanded to as many as about nine carriers, for it would be possible to command that number in the same area. Furthermore, in a war game held for the second stage operation, the same headquarters arranged to use as many as twelve carriers, even including ones of inferior speed and quality, in one group for an attack upon Hawaii. In a conference to study the war games I asked th same headquarters to study this problem further, pointing out that the concept was not considered adequate.”

12 carriers in one task force certainly was inadequate! Yamaguchi’s (much superior) suggestion was that the fleet carriers would be divided into three mutually supporting task forces - forshadowing the TF58.1, .2., .3., .4 thing.

That would be the conclusion of a lunatic.

You’re sure you just didn’t start off on invading Guadalcanal while forgetting that you’d been yapping about putting carriers into Perth, thousands and thousands of sea miles from Guadalcanal? Because if you did forget, its no biggie - no one else on the thread is going to hold a correction against you.

BTW - what Allied invasion of WW2 was made without air superiority?

 

The KI-27’s arrived over Singora at first light to cover the transports during landing. Obviously, if they only took off at dawn from Indochina, then they could arrive at Singora three hours later to find the transport force already sunk…unless the British were to be sporting enough to put their dawn attacks off for three hours?

We are talking about air ferry, not combat missions. No one said the IJA would be tasked with the support the initial landing. The IJA would get the job of supporting the Australian campaign. 450 miles from Timor to Darwin is too far for land based air; IJN carriers would cover for a day or two until IJA units ferried in - just as carriers had covered landings at Rabaul and Java.

 

Shattered Sword’s comment that "Japanese" doctrine favoured large strikes even if requiring too much time arose from Kusaka’s personal operating habits. From Ugaki’s diary, 140-161, Kusaka’s account of his thinking :

Chief of Staff Kusaka remarked, “Since my appointment to the present post, training of the fleet has been based upon the principle that all strength be concentrated in one stroke after sufficient reconnaissance – and with success in all engagements. Therefore, I had no idea of changing this principle on the way.”

Kusaka’s personal habits were not Japanese doctrine. In fact, these viewpoints not only were not shared by others, but actually scared the hell out of some. Ugaki’s response to Kusaka's pre-Midway outline of his thinking:

In the conference assessing the Combined Fleet’s first stage operation held toward the end of last April…Kusaka stressed, citing sword theory, to the effect that a carrier borne air attack should be launched with a concentrated stroke after sufficient study and meticulous planning.

Upon hearing his remark, I felt considerable apprehension about it, because I thought, unlike land warfare, it is not easy to make sufficient studies beforehand or thoroughly to reconnoitre over a vast sea area, where forces can move anywhere….

Second Carrier Division Commander Yamaguchi had always been actively within the task force, and had been so unsatisfied with the thinking of its headquarters that he went so far as to recommend his own views more than once during the past operation. He told me three times that the First Air Fleet headquarters had never taken steps to expand its achievement in battle, grasping an opportunity to do so, or to cope with a change of circumstances.

I think his remarks generally hit the point, and as I agreed with him, I told him that he should continue recommending his views as much as possible in the future too. When asked who was leading the headquarters, he said, “The commander in chief doesn’t say a word, and both the chief of staff and the senior staff officer lack boldness, although I don’t know which one is more so.

Hearing this, at the time I worried deeply whether the First Air Fleet would be able to accomplish its mission in future sea operations in which every kind of change must be expected to happen..”

Yamaguchi’s opinion Ugaki finds on target. The problem is that First Air Fleet is rudderless from the top, leaving the staff officers running the ship. Previous operations had demonstrated Nagumo lacked the ability to make quick decisions or act decisively. Fuchida confirms this assessment of Nagumo:

“It was not long, however, before I noted that Nagumo had changed, and I began to feel dissatisfied with his apparent conservatism and passiveness. It might have been because he was now commanding an air arm, which was not his specialty…his once vigorious fighting spirit seemed to be gone, and with it his stature as an outstanding naval leader. Instead he seemed rather average, and I was suddenly aware of his increased age.

In directing operations he no longer seemed to taek the initiative, and when plans were being developed, he most often merely approved the recommendations of his staff. Commander Genda…once summed up the situation to me in these words:

“Whenever I draft a plan, it is approved almost without consideration. This might appear to make my job easier, but it doesn’t. On the contrary, it is disquieting to seem my own plans approved without any check from above, then issued as formal orders….If I were serving under a commander like Admiral Onishi or Admiral Yamaguchi, my plans would be thoroughly studied from every possible angle and returned to me with comments and opinions….”

The problem with the IJN in 1942 was the lack of doctrine. Everyone was running around with their own opinions and doing things their own way. Nagumo, whose was supposed to be on top of things, was not doing his job and not ensuring that when these opinions were counterproductive, they were corrected. Why he was not doing his job is because he was not competent to lead the carrier forces. And why the Imperial Navy would put an incompetent in charge of Kido Butai is the key to the issue, and goes back to what I mentioned before – that the Imperial Navy had a habit of promoting officers beyond their competence,

….This tendency to rely excessively on the staff was promoted by the fact that, under the Japanese Navy system, officers whose seniority put them in line for a fleet command were often given one for which their special qualifications did not suit them. The appointment of Nagumo, whose specialty was torpedo warfare, to command the First Air Fleet was an example. A commanders’ shortcomings in the special fields were supposed to be compensated for by the specialists on his staff. The result was that the influence of the staff officers naturally became very great. <though>…Nagumo, passive as he was, did not always leave everything to his subordinates…” (118)

The problem was not that the Imperial Navy lacked the insight to understand first strike tactics or other fundamental principles of carrier combat, but that the Imperial Navy allowed an individual who had no understanding of carrier warfare command their premiere striking force.

 

This is Fuchida’s account of what he was thinking as Kusaka and Nagumo delayed:

“Unaware of these deliberations <delaying launch> I <Fuchida> felt relieved that our second attack wave had not yet been committed to Midway, at the same time regretting the hasty rearming of our torpedo bombers for a land attack. At least, I thought, the dive bombers from Hiryu and Soryu was ready to attack the enemy, and I expected that it would be ordered off the carriers momentarily. This expectation – and hope – waned as the recovery of the first attack wave got underway with no sign that the dive bombers had yet taken off. It gave way to dismayed surprise when I learned of Admiral Nagumo’s order issued at 0855, indicating that no attack would be launched until we had time to reorganize our forces…Looking back now on this critical moment, which ultimately was to decide the battle, I can easily realize what a difficult choice faced the Force Commander. Yet, even now, I find it hard to justify the decision he took.

172 Fuchida, The Battle that Doomed Japan.

 

Ugaki’s account of the discussions about flank attack at Midway:

When asked in the battle lesson studying division what the First Air Fleet was going to do in case an enemy air attack forestalled it in an engagement, or flanked it while it was engaged in an air raid upon an enemy land, the First Air Fleet chief of staff simply said that the fleet would operate so as not to let such an event take place.

…I asked them to deepen their attention by citing similar cases occurring in a war game prepared for this Midway operation – once in a Midway invasion operation and twice in a Hawaiian invasion operation.

In the operational briefing before the commencement of this operation, the First Air Fleet headquarters took this problem more seriously and presented a plan for arranging its attack upon Midway in two stages, the second wave being kept in readiness to meet an enemy sea-air force. This relieved me a little bit.

And,

“All in all, we can’t help concluding that the main cause for the defeat was that we had become conceited because of past success and lacked studies of the means and steps to be taken in case an enemy air force should appear on a flank while our force was launching an attack on one target – something which had worried me greatly and to which I invited their <First Air Fleet’s> attention repeatedly – and furthermore, failed to make a quick decision, still driven by a greedy motive of seeking ways and means even at the most crucial moment.”

In the end, Yamamoto imposed a doctrine by instructing Nagumo to maintain a reserve, which Nagumo promptly ignored and then lost the battle. This decision to use torpedo bombers in a land based strike was incompetent, since Nagumo and Kusaka knew from previous battles that Val and Zero aircraft would account for the vast majority of any number of enemy aircraft caught on the ground at Midway. At Wake, the patterns of air support by 2nd CAR DIV before the landing indicate that Yamaguchi never committed more than 1/2 his force to land battle during any day. Therefore, that Yamaguchi kept 1/2 of his aircraft (all of the same type) in reserve for naval battle.

For his part, Ugaki acknowledged that Combined Fleet's failure to provide additional support to Nagumo or to sweep the danger area with ships and aircraft represented a severe failing on his part.

 

Also tough to do when the Japanese never had more than six fleet carriers, even before Midway, in 1942.

I'm not disputing that the Japanese could "handle" 9 or12 carriers in a task force, but the point is moot; the Japanese just didn't have more than six fleet carriers at any time in 1942. Junyo and Hiyo were not "fleet" carriers, they were converted auxiliary carriers and were not up to the standards of fleet carriers. The IJN didn't use them as front line carriers and did not operate them with the regular fleet carriers, until after Midway, when they became desperate for anything sporting a flight deck. Here's what the Combined Fleet site has to say about these vessels;

"These two were originally building as ocean liners when they were taken over by the Navy and completed as carriers. Not particularly useful vessels because their machinery wasn't up to the grade; they never made better than 23 knots in wartime service. This meant that they really couldn't keep up with the big boys."


Hiyo-class Escort Carrier | Nihon Kaigun

That is your opinion.

I have already pointed out that the Marines on Guadalcanal enjoyed just 1.5 days of carrier air support out of the first 13 days on that island. Historically, the Japanese were not able to concentrate effective land-based air attacks against the Marines because the Japanese aircraft at Rabaul were too distant to have any significant effect. If the IJN carriers were tied up by a Darwin invasion for a month, any Allied invasion of Guadalcanal would face no more air opposition than it did historically. In any case, better Allied planing would have allowed the Marines to enjoy constant air cover from Allied land-based planes. So an invasion of Guadalcanal without any US carrier support would be well within the realm of possibility.

To answer you question, the Guadalcanal invasion was accomplished without air superiority; at best, Fletcher's carriers afforded only minimal air cover for the invasion fleet, and certainly didn't prevent Japanese air strikes from reaching the transports. Furthermore, Fletcher's carriers withdrew almost 24 hours before the transports withdrew. Allied air superiority over Guadalcanal was not finally achieved until late in the campaign.

 

QUOTE=Glenn239;447843]The KI-27’s arrived over Singora at first light to cover the transports during landing. Obviously, if they only took off at dawn from Indochina, then they could arrive at Singora three hours later to find the transport force already sunk…unless the British were to be sporting enough to put their dawn attacks off for three hours? [/QUOTE]

Hmm....your quotation indicates some missing verbiage between "at first light Ki-27's", and "began winging their way in". My recollection is that the aircraft ferried over from Phu Quoc left that island at dawn, at least that's what I recall from my reading. What words are missing from your quotation? I assume they don't change the meaning or context of the quotation? And as I recall, the British (actually Australian pilots) made no air attacks on the Japanese transports at Singora, only the ones at Khota Bahru

“The airfield at Singora was soon in Japanese hands and before long, at
first light, KI27’s…began winging their way in from their Southern Indochina bases, via Phu Quoc; several came to grief when touching down on the rain sodden grass airfield.”

No, YOU are talking about air ferry; I am talking about IJA pilots flying from Timor on a regular basis performing combat missions. and that is because, any Japanese air bases at Darwin would be subject to immediate and heavy air attack by Allied aircraft. It would be extremely difficult for the IJA to establish effective air bases at Darwin under such attack. Therefore, if the IJA intends to provide any air cover over Darwin, it will have to be done from Timor.

Alternatively, if the Japanese Navy is to provide air cover for the Darwin Invasion, it will have to commit it's carries for an extended period off the Port of Darwin. That is something Kido Butai never proved capable of. Moreover, if Kiido Butai is committed to providing air cover for the Darwin landing, it will be vulnerable to air attack launched from US carriers, which will have a more or less free hand, since the Army pilots on Timor will not be able to launch effective anti-shipping strikes. This was exactly what happened at Midway.

From where then? We already know the air bases in the vicinity of Darwin will be under Allied air attack. If Kido Butai departs after a "day or two", the bases at Darwin will be uncovered, and the IJA will again be forced to retire to Timor, from which you have just admitted that it would not be possible to provide effective air cover. At Rabaul and Java, there was no effective Allied air power to oppose the Japanese land-based air; There will be a Darwin. The IJA given the restraints on it's operations will not be able to sustain it's support from air bases under heavy air attack.

 

Well, that nails it right there. Thanks for the reference.

If, as Ugaki says, the fleet had based it's training on the principle of concentrating it's strength in one fully coordinated strike, then that was, by definition, the Japanese carrier doctrine. You train the way you intend to fight. That is the very definition of military doctrine.

I don't care if other commanders disagreed with it, or wouldn't comply with it if it was up to them; Nagumo, obviously, did agree with the doctrine when he made his decision at Midway. Kusaka's personal habits were, of course, not Japanese doctrine, but the way the fleet trained WAS doctrine; if that happens to coincide with the way Kusaka felt it best to fight, that's irrelevant.

 

Well, this certainly proves that Fuchida disagreed with Nagumo. But then, I have never disputed that.

 

Yamamoto did not "impose a doctrine", he issued verbal orders to Nagumo to take a specific course of action. A doctrine would be something written down in a manual, a principle of action as a basis for training, or some practice that is generally agreed by a majority of officer to be the correct action to take in a specific set of conditions. Yamamoto's verbal order was none of those, but simply something he thought it wise for Nagumo to do at Midway. The fact that Yamaguchi disagreed with Japanese carrier doctrine, at least insofar as waiting to launch full strength, fully coordinated air strikes, proves only that it was doctrine with which he, as the ultimate commander on the scene, was quite free to ignore.

Good on Ugaki! Too many senior officers during WW II blamed their errors on subordinates.

 

Oh, but there was, whether the Japanese wrote it down or not, that was the way the fleet trained, therefore it was doctrine. You fight the way you train

Nope, the decision Nagumo made at Midway reflected the way the Japanese carriers trained. Yamamoto laid down no doctrine to Nagumo, but issued verbal orders to perform a specific action. Nagumo, according to you, ignored Yamamoto's orders, and he did so, obviously because he felt a full strength, fully coordinated strike was the better choice.

Yes, I agree the difference was not doctrine; the Japanese carrier officers had trained for Coral Sea, just as they did for Midway, so their doctrine was the same at both places. And I've already said that different commanders under different conditions, might be likely to make different decisions regarding whether to comply with doctrine or ignore it.

I don't understand why you are having so much trouble understanding what doctrine is; after all, I've explained it to you, and even posted dictionary definitions. Yet you still keep confusing doctrine with orders. Doctrine is the way a unit trains to fight, orders are specific instructions to perform a specific act. The IJN had no training in how to deal with flank attacks, that is why Yamamoto felt it necessary to issue orders regarding a flank attack. Nothing you have said changes the fact that Nagumo's decision at Midway to wait to launch his strike was in compliance with IJN carrier doctrine. I've posted an authority that confirms that.

Well, no, it doesn't prove that at all.

Fuchida's quotation says nothing at all about IJN doctrine; it merely relates that Fuchida was dismayed at Nagumo's decision to wait to launch his strike and that he (Fuchida) felt it was the wrong decision under the circumstances. All it really indicates is that Fuchida understood that complying with doctrine isn't always the correct choice; sometimes, commanders have to be prepared to use their own intelligence and experience when making battlefield decisions. Fuchida understood that "one size doesn't fit all conditions", that Nagumo, who was not particularly sharp as a carrier commander, was likely to follow doctrine even when that wasn't the right answer.

 

Sarcasm doesn't really become you Glenn.

I'm merely said that Nimitz getting increased command responsibility is no more unlikely than Mac getting a bigger command. It's not my "theory", just a possibility.

Uhm...you do realize that, in the example you gave, the Japanese failed to succeed in both invasions? They were only able to successfully carry out one invasion.

Commitments can change, and in the context of this scenario, are more than likely to do just that. In any event, the Japanese in Mid-1942 were far more over-extended than was the US. if the US temporarily suspends the "Europe First" policy, which is highly likely, it would have no trouble in supporting it's carriers any where in the vicinity of Australia.

Yes, I'm aware of that. However, since I made no such assertion, I do not feel bound to supply any such quotation. Since you seem to feel strongly about the issue, why don't you post whatever you have indicating they would be able to carry out ferry missions?

My assertion was that, since the Darwin air bases that the Japanese would be able to use, would be under heavy Allied air attack, they would have a very difficult time providing air cover from them. And that means they would most likely have to rely on either carriers or the Timor base for effective air cover.

 

A number of issues regarding the Darwin area, it’s physical attributes, and the general conditions of the Allied defenses in June/July, 1942, have been raised without satisfactory answers being posted in response.

Probably the most significant misconception about Darwin is that it is on the edge of a great empty desert; it is not. At least not in the way Americans think of deserts such as the Mojave or the Arizona desert. The area around Darwin is semi-arid grassland with large numbers of trees and scrub-type undergrowth. There is a definite Wet Season from about October through March and a dry season which runs from April/May, through September. Darwin receives an average annual rainfall of 67 “. This is comparable to the average annual rainfall of Mobile, AL. There are a number of rivers draining into the sea near Darwin, but swimming is not advised as they are infested with saltwater crocodiles. The excellent beaches around Darwin are also frequently visited by these animals which sometimes attain a length in excess of 15 feet. Another danger is a type of jellyfish called a “sea wasp” whose sting is usually fatal. These jelly fish are usually found offshore, but sometimes gather in great numbers off the beaches and can kill even when washed up on the sand.

Sometime in 1942, the Allies began a dam across a freshwater river near Darwin, to provide freshwater for the huge numbers of military personnel arriving in the area. I can find no source referencing a completion date, but it was completed before the end of the war. Before that, fresh water was apparently obtained from wells and local rivers.

There were, in and around, Darwin about 19,000 troops under an Australian Major-General Herring. I can’t find many details on this force, but it appears the units were the 13th, 19th. And 23rd. brigades of the 12th Australian Division, reinforced presumably, by Australian militia troops, as three brigades wouldn’t number that many men. In mid-1942, there were also at least four battalions of USA field artillery armed with 105 MM howitzers, in or very near, Darwin. These units were landed from the famous Pensacola Convoy in February, 1942. There was also a USA Coastal Artillery battalion (AA) armed with 48 .50 caliber machines guns in Darwin (later moved to Batchelor air Field) There were four operational air fields within 200 miles of Darwin in the spring of 1942 with at least two US fighter squadrons and three US bombardment squadrons. This doesn’t include the British, Australian and Dutch squadrons stationed in, and near, Darwin. Finally, there were at least three 6” Australian coastal batteries sited to defend the port. In the NT, the Australians also organized a system of coast watchers and interior patrols to warn of Japanese intrusions, these units were nicknamed, the “Nackeroos”. No, I don’t know why

No, Darwin wasn’t going to be taken by a “battalion”, nor held with a “regiment”.

No, your research is wrong.

Not only were several of the airfields around Darwin fully operational in May/June, 1942, but most of them were also home to operational air units. On top of that, there were two US Army Engineer units (The 808th. Engineer Aviation Battalion, and the 43rd. Engineer Regiment) in the area from February and March, 1942, busily engaged in improving the local air fields, and transportation infrastructure in the area. The 808th. Arrived in Australia on February 1, 1942, and by February 20th, were at Katherine with some of their heavy equipment. The 43rd. arrived in Australia late in February, but quickly followed the 808th. to the Darwin area and performed much of the same kind of work. Both units were, of course, armed and prepared to fight as combat engineers.

The airfields and other installations in the NT were normally supplied from Darwin, but there were also transportation links from the interior. The 808th. Moved with it’s equipment from South Australia by train to Alice Springs, and from there used trucks to transport their bulldozers and other equipment to Larrimah, where they boarded another train which ran all the way to Darwin. This railroad was decrepit, and in loading one of their D-8 bulldozers aboard a flat car, the engineers destroyed the flat car. But the line could carry supplies such as food, water, ammunition, and spare parts. The roads also, were not in the greatest shape, most being only graded and graveled, but the 808th. And later the 43rd., along with Australian military and civilian engineers, were rapidly improving them. Australia had a counterpart to the US Civilian Conservation Corps, called not surprisingly, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and a large part of this organization had been working on transportation infrastructure in the NT since early 1940.

So, in summary, a Japanese invasion of Darwin would not have been the cake walk most of the posters seem to have envisioned. Neither Australia nor the US units in Australia were completely ready to repel an invasion, but there were sufficient ground, air, naval, and support units already in place in May/June, 1942, to seriously contest a Japanese invasion and prevent the Japanese from consolidating any position in the Darwin area. The US would rapidly reinforce the Allied units, particularly with aircraft, armor, and artillery, to the point where they would have enough strength to crush the Japanese incursion.

Most of my information can be confirmed at this link.

Peter Dunn

 

DA,


"The roads also, were not in the greatest shape, most being only graded and graveled, but the 808th. And later the 43rd., along with Australian military and civilian engineers, were rapidly improving them. Australia had a counterpart to the US Civilian Conservation Corps, called not surprisingly, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and a large part of this organization had been working on transportation infrastructure in the NT since early 1940."





My wife's father, a carpenter, was knocked back by the Australian Army due to medical problems, but he was determined to serve nevertheless. He joined the Allied Works Council in 1940 I think and was attached to a part of that organisation called the 'Civil Construction Corps'. Its function was the construction/expansion of bases all up and down the Stuart 'Highway' from Alice Springs to Darwin.

By mid 1942 there must have been a dozen or more airfields within walking distance of the highway. Some were sealed strips and others nothing more than graded gravel fighter strips. At least 2 of those gravel fighter strips are still visible parallel to the highway in the southern suburbs of Darwin. Those fighter strips have been through 60+ "wets" and are still quite usable.

In addition a graded strip plus tents etc could be made 'functional' within days, and any of 1000 spots within range of Darwin, much of that area being quite flat and hard baked earth.

If Darwin had been taken, supply could have been possible via the Stuart Highway from "the Alice" or alternatively via Townsville, Mt Isa, Tennant Creek, all of which had functional airfields. I am fairly certain that the railway from Townsville to Mt Isa was operational in 1942.

As an aside, the original gravel Stuart Highway, its failed sealed replacement, and the SECOND upgrading with the concrete side strip are still visible near many parts of the Stuart Highway today.

Further, your description of the Darwin area is accurate to about the Daly Waters area, but from then on it is the classic arid 'outback'. At that point you have left the Roper River behind, and all the watercourses are dry until the wet returns.

John.