Misconceptions about Dresden

I just run over it, and I can't agree that strategic bombing saved the Russian's ass. I mean, hands up: how many of us really go along and claim that a german victory against the USSR was of course possible after Stalingrad or Kursk?

reality check:

Dec. 1941: "Barbarossa" failed, German Army on retreat, suffering great losses in experienced menpower, huge losses on material and decisive losses in motorization. The experienced, trained Wehrmacht who overrun Poland, Norway, France and the Balkans was crippled badly.

Dec.42: sideshow operation "Blau" failed, Romanians crushed, one entire German Army encircled and awaiting destruction, menpower shortages, critical fuel and ammo shortages, AGN and AGC stripped off thier motorization. AGS on retreat from the emerging Caucasus-trap.

How much did the BC's bombing campaign (the U.S. AF wasn't even in a player to this time)partictipated to this result so far?

Cheers,

 

Andy :

I rephrase my statement. YES ! Dresden was part of the Thunderclap raids where Chemnitz and Leipzig also felt the furry of the Allied bomber formations.

E

 

The February 1945 raids had their genesis in the Thunderclap concept but were not in the strictest sense that actual operation.

''...(in) August 1944 Portal had laid before the Chiefs of Staff and idea for delivering a coup de grace to German morale by such a means. Portal had emphasized at the time that this catastrophic blow would be unlikely to achieve important results unless it was delivered at a finely chosen moment between the virtual defeat of Germany and and the otbreak of anarchy in that country, accompanied, perhaps by an underground movement. The idea was in fact conceived, not as a means of bringing about the defeat of Germany, but of inducing an organised surrender after that had occurred. Except on that basis, the Air Staff never showed any enthusiasm for the plan which came to be known as Thunderclap '. ( from The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945, vol iii ).

 

As for the talk of babies and double standards this is ,naturally, highly emotional.

The fact remains that the context was the need for the defeat of fascism.

'When one says the bombing war had always been directed at the civilian population. Which war is not ? What was the result in past wars ? When you killed enough soldiers you created enough misery amongst their families in the opposing nation until it decided to give in.

All major wars are against nations as a whole and are not boxing matches against selected individuals.' ( ACM Sir Arthur Harris, quoted in Tripp, ' The Eigth Passenger ' )

 

“They have sown the wind, now they are going to reap the whirlwind” Bomber Harris.

"They don't like it up 'em Captain Mainwearing" Corporal Jones.

Probably this site is already known, but if not it may be of interest to RAF enthusiasts.

http://www.edenbridgetown.com/at_war/index.shtml

No.9

 

Misconception 3
Casualties were likely around 135,000 people, possibly as high as 250,000.

Nazi authorities started counting the number of casualties. By the time the counting stopped, 18,375 bodies had been found, and the final figure was estimated at around 25,000 in a report from March 1945. The Dresden city council gave the number 40,000 shortly after the war, while a US study concluded that around 35,000 people had perished. A federal West German report detailing losses and damages during the war, dated 1958, puts the number at 60,000. The origins of the six-digit numbers seem to stem mainly from Nazi propaganda, both war-time and more recent, as well as (the not especially well-respected revisionist author) David Irving's book "The Destruction of Dresden" from 1962, where the widely quoted 135,000 number was arrived at. Irving, to his credit, later retracted this number after reading further war-time reports, revising it to the more likely 25,000 dead and 35,000 missing.

 

to put it simply thundercalp was an attempt to aid the soviet adavnce from the east, an i quote

"In order to appease the Russians, who had made advances against German positions in the east, Bomber Command was asked to conduct raids against three important centres of communication and supply. We would ask you to remember, at this point, those words, "important centres of communication and supply". The three raids were to be grouped together under the name "Operation Thunderclap"
http://www.hellzapoppin.demon.co.uk/harris1.htm

for an after the battle report in the paper read this:
http://www.guardiancentury.co.uk/1940-1949/Story/0%2C6051%2C127714%2C00.html
this shows you how at the time such raids were reported.

 

It's emotional because most people feel that there is something wrong in indiscriminate killings of non-combatants during war, no matter the reasons. It somehow misses the basic Clausewitzian meaning and purpose of violence during war: Compel the opponent to fulfill one owns will. The foremost target of violence are the armed forces of the enemy, because this is the opponent’s most important tool of resistance. One needs to construct a pretty abstract argumentation to justify a deliberately, unproportional military campaign to eliminate not the enemy military, but the people who are ought to accept my own will. As almost all wars prior and after WW II had shown, elimination of the opponent armed forces was the key element for victory. This was also valid for the “total” wars of WW I and II.

After all, even back in 1922 a commission of jurists draw up a code of areal warfare. Article 22 said: "Areal bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of military character for injuring non-combatants is prohibited."

Context is urgent to understand the decision who led to the bombing and the targets of the bombing, but it is not explaining nor excusing the abandonment of the basic rule of proportionality in warfare. The Holocaust has a context, too, but it's still away from all proportionality. So was the SBC in the late stages of the war. The "human" position that a war should be conducted with utmost cruelty, with utmost violence, and with all possible (not: necessary) brutality and by all available technical and material means, in order to stop this war as soon as possible was never international moral standard of warfare, at least not among civilized people. And with the possibility of mutual nuclear overkill this dogma became even absurd in itself. and the question of proportionality (and, coming with it, morality) is of essential meaning.

Quite early the question arose whether defeating fascism by morally sinking to the level of the regime one pretends to fight still can be considered to be a "just" war, and efforts were taken to keep the semblance:

"[It is necessary to] satisfy the inquiries of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Moderator of the Church of Scotland and other significant religious leaders whose moral condemnation of the bombing offensive might disturb the morale of Bomber Command crews."

(Sec. of State for Air A. Sinclair in an Oct. 1943 letter to Sir Charles Portal, quoted in Webster & Frankland: Vol.III, p.116)


"[But] there is a great deal of evidence that makes some of us afraid that we are losing moral superiority to the Germans... Of course the Germans began it, but we do not take the devil as our example."

(Nov. 23, 1943 letter by Lord Salisbury to Sec. of State for Air A. Sinclair, quoted from Max Hastings: Bomber Command. p.194)


In June 1943 Sir Arthur Harris presented film footage of the bombing campaign against the populous industrial centers of the Ruhr. At the conclusion of the film, the British leader sat bolt upright and exclaimed: "Are we beasts? Are we taking this too far?"

(from Christopher C Harmon: "'Are we beasts?' Churchill and the moral question
of World War II 'area bombing")

Cheers,

 

Sorry that I am nasty here but for a purpose...

Isn´t it as well as good for the nazis in 1940

3) Arthur Harris, Bomber Command (1947)

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWarea.htm

On the night of March 28th-29th the first German city went up in flames. This was Lubeck, a rather distant target on the Baltic coast, but not difficult to identify because of its position on the River Trave, by no means so well defended as the Ruhr, and from the nature of its buildings easier than most cities to set on fire. It was a city of moderate size, of some importance as a port, and with some submarine building yards of moderate size not far from it. It was not a vital target, but it seemed to me better to destroy an industrial town of moderate importance that to fail to destroy a large industrial city. However, the main
object of the attack was to learn to what extent a first wave of aircraft could guide a second wave ta the aiming point by starting a conflagration : I ordered a half an hour interval between the two waves in order to allow the fires to get a good hold before the second wave arrived. In all, 234 aircraft were dispatched and
dropped 144 tons of incendiaries and 160 tons of high explosives. At least half of the town was destroyed, mainly by fire. It was conclusively proved that even the small force I had then could destroy the greater part of a town of secondary importance.

Clinical finishing...

Even if the Germans got what they "deserved" I am wondering did Harris ever really think about the crews he sent over Germany? Or was it Germany´s destruction over everything else?


http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/bombercommand/bomberharris.aspx

were as fully prepared as Harris to commit their crews to difficult targets, often with severe losses, in the hopes of proving the war-winning capability of strategic bombing.

It is interesting to note that the number of aircraft declined with each night, from 211 on March 8/9 to 187 on March 9/10 to 126 on March 10/11. Whatever other reasons may exist for this decline, damage from flak and night fighters would have taken its toll, and the number of available bombers would drop.

Rostock was home to a Heinkel factory, and could therefore be described as a legitimate target. But it is worth noting that of the 161 aircraft dispatched on April 23/24, only 18 were sent against Heinkel: the rest were directed to bomb the city itself. Heinkel went untouched. On April 24/25, 34 of 125 planes targeted Heinkel, which again escaped unscathed. Not until the third night, when again 18 (of 128) aircraft were given the assignment, was the Heinkel factory hit. Of 414 sorties on these first three nights, only 70 ­ 17 per cent ­ were attacking a precise military target. Fewer than 25 percent of the 70 actually hit Heinkel. For the fourth and final night (April 26/27), official records are fuzzy:[6] the number of aircraft sent was just over 100, divided roughly equally between town and factory. Both elements of this final raid claimed success.

Eye for an eye??

After Rostock, the Germans began using the word Terrorangriff (terror raid) to describe such attacks.

What did the destruction of Lübeck and Rostock prove? To German high command, it demonstrated that the British were dedicated to destroying their cultural heritage: both towns held a high place in the architectural and cultural history of Germany. Their response was to launch the so-called 'Baedeker Raids' against England.[7] To British high command, the raids on Lübeck and Rostock ­ relatively small in scale, against relatively small targets ­ were a testing ground. They demonstrated that precision bombing could be accomplished by night (the Heinkel factory), and that incendiaries could indeed generate massive fires (the razing of the hearts of both towns). More, they indicated that Bomber Command was prepared to implement area bombing with only the slightest pretext of strategic importance. Two months after taking command, 'Bomber' Harris was demonstrating that he would attack the enemy in home or factory without hesitation. Or remorse.

[ 26. February 2003, 06:39 AM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

 

let's continue the paragraph you posted: "...the name "Operation Thunderclap" (Berlin was also included in Operation Thunderclap, but the attacks on this city were left to the Mosquitoes of the Light Night Striking Force), and had the backing of Churchill - indeed he actively encouraged them and took a direct hand in the planning of them. Churchill later tried to distance himself from these plans, and denials from various Air Ministry departments and senior officers flew around like the flak on a bad night over the Ruhr. The three cities detailed in these plans were Leipzig, Chemnitz, - and Dresden."unquote

First, let's have a look at a memo defining Operation "Thunderclap", written half a year before the Feb. 1945 Yalta Conference in which the Soviets (allegedly) asked for massive strikes on Berlin and Leipzig (not Dresden, AFAIK):

Operation 'THUNDERCLAP' (Attack on German Civilian Morale)
Introduction (...)
7. The following principles are put forward as essential to the achievement of the maximum moral effect upon a civilian population:
- (i) The attack must be delivered in such density that it imposes as nearly as possible a 100% risk of death to the individual in the area to which it is applied.
- (ii) ... the total weight of the attack must be such as to produce an effect amounting to a national disaster.
- (iii) The target chosen should be one involving the maximum associations, both traditional and personal, for the whole population.
- (iv) The area selected should embrace the highest density of population.
- (v) Attacks of this nature are likely to have maximum effect when the population has become convinced that its Government is powerless to prevent a repetition.(...)

15. Total devastation ... would, moreover, offer incontrovertible proof of a modern bomber force; it would convince our Russian allies .... of the effectiveness of Anglo-American air power.”

So it is clear that THUNDERCLAP was targeting the "moral" of the whole population with a "100% risk of death to the individual in the area" applied. A further, but not primary purpose was to "convince" the Russians "of the effectiveness of Anglo-American air power", and not to "appease" them. As for terminus "Communication and Supply", it is interesting that in a January 31, 1945 letter Air Marshal Bottomley identified "Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden" as being "next in order of priority" (after oil industry) where "heavy attack will cause great confusion in civilian evacuation from the east and hamper movement of reinforcements from other fronts.". This was eight days after Air Commodore Sidney O. Bufton, Director of Bomber Operations and Chairman of the Combined Strategic Targeting Committee suggested to Bottomley the launching of "Thunderclap", but still weeks before the Yalta Conference.

The obvious priority of targeting "morale" (i.e. killing civilians) compared over military and industrial targets becomes obvious in the argumentation of Air Commodore Bufton to Harris in favor of Operation "Thunderclap": "If we assume that the day-time population of the area attacked is 300,000, we may expect 220,000 casualties. 50% of these, or 110,000, may expect to be killed (...) Such an attack, resulting in so many deaths, cannot help but have a shattering effect on political and civilian morale all over Germany." (Geoffrey Regan, The Guinness Book of Air Force Blunders, Enfield 1996, pg 127)

Cheers,

[ 26. February 2003, 08:10 AM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

Things about the bombings I am wondering if they were true:

Operation Millennium
May 30/31 1942

Churchill was so excited about the plan that he said he would defend it again any subsequent criticism even if losses reached 10% (100 bombers).

-------------------

http://www.valourandhorror.com/BC/Issues/Bomb_1.htm

The airmen called Berlin "The Holy City": it was the most I heavily defended target in Germany, over 2,000 direct air miles from the British bases, at the limit of the Lancaster's reach. To get there, the planes had to fly even farther, detouring r hundreds of miles to avoid German anti&endash;aircraft defences.

To save weight and thus increase the fuel and bomb-loads, Air Vice Marshall Harris wanted to strip back the defences of the planes, remove some of the protective armour and reduce the gunners" ammunition.


Officially, the word was that airmen had an excellent chance of survival if the plane were shot down. They would simply jump through the escape hatch, pull the rip cord on their parachutes and float down to earth.

The facts suggested otherwise: 50 percent of crew shot down in an American bomber escaped; from the older types of British night bombers such as the Halifax and the Stirling, 25 percent escaped; from the Lancaster, 15 percent.

At the time of the Berlin raids, Bomber Command was rapidly phasing out the old bombers and converting the squadrons to Lancasters, which had escape hatches only 22 inches wide-2 inches narrower than in the Halifax. According to statistician Dyson, "The missing 2 inches probably cost the lives of several thousand boys."

After much lobbying, led by Mike O'Loughlin, a colleague of Freeman Dyson, Bomber Command agreed to enlarge the hatch but the new design would not become standard until the very end of the war.

By spring 1944 Harris had lost 953 bombers in 34 raids
...???
-----------

On March 29 target was Nuremberg.

We looked at the target and, 'Oh my God!' Nuremberg-and in moonlight. Moonlight! We'd go to France and that's no problem; but to go into Germany in moonlight?"

Behind the scenes, one of Harris' advisors tried to talk him out of the mission, objecting that the clear, moonlit night would expose the bombers to terrible danger. A late weather report showed that the only cloud on the whole route hung over the target. Everyone expected the mission to be scrubbed. It wasn't. (???)

The return flight to Nuremberg took eight hours. The crews could see the white vapour trails of the other aircraft in the stream.

"I was sitting at my tail gun and suddenly I saw the first Lancaster explode in a big, red, fiery ball," recalls Moffat. "It's the gunner's job to point out where aircraft go down. We started reporting the planes going down in flames, 'Aircraft going down in flames with no parachutes off the port.' This went on for 20 minutes. Twenty&endash;one aircraft going down in 20 minutes. 'Aircraft going down in flames, no parachutes.' Finally the pilot said, 'That's enough, no more; don't give any more."'

Virtually the entire Herman night&endash;fighter force of planes was deployed against the stream of approaching British and Canadian bombers. With the new German technology, 59 planes were shot down en route to Nuremberg. The crews knew what hit them.

In one night, the raid on Nuremberg destroyed 108 planes. More airmen died-545-than in the entire Battle of Britain.

--


Nuremberg 1944

This would normally have been the moon stand-down period for the Main Force, but a raid to the distant target of Nuremberg was planned on the basis of an early forecast that there would be protective high cloud on the outward route, when the moon would be up, but that the target area would be clear for ground-marked bombing. A Meteorological Flight Mosquito carried out a reconnaissance and reported that the protective cloud was unlikely to be present and that there could be cloud over the target, but the raid was not cancelled.


82 bombers were lost on the outward route and near the target. The action was much reduced on the return flight, when most of the German fighters had to land, but 95 bombers were lost in all - 64 Lancasters and 31 Halifaxes, 11.9 per cent of the force dispatched. It was the biggest Bomber Command loss of the war.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary/mar44.html

Any idea which number of lost planes is the truth or closer to it at Nuremberg? The latter?

 

http://www.ospreypublishing.com/content4.php/cid=66

About the author:
Jon Lake is one of Britain’s leading journalists and historians, and secretary of the Freelance Aviation Journalists Association.


While politicians maintained the pretence that Bomber Command was attacking military and industrial targets Harris was more honest, seeing no shame in attacking the German people and having no problem with describing the aim of his attacks on Berlin as being ‘to cause the heart of the German nation to stop beating’. When pressed to use a higher proportion of incendiaries, he argued the case for high explosive, saying:

I do not agree with this policy. The moral effect of HE is vast. People can escape from fires, and the casualties on a solely fire raising raid would be as nothing. What we want to do in addition to the horrors of fire is to bring the masonry crashing down on top of the Boche, to kill Boche and to terrify Boche.

-------

Following the 1945 attack against Dresden, Harris summed up his attitude to the value of German civilian life by paraphrasing Bismarck:

I do not believe that the whole of the remaining cities of Germany are worth the bones of one British Grenadier.

--------

Maybe he could have done a bit more for his bomber crews??


Perhaps even more surprisingly, Harris was a scathing critic of the Halifax. He placed no value whatever on the multi-role versatility of the Halifax, and never bothered to re-evaluate the aircraft once he had formed his impression of the initial, Merlin-engined version. Certainly, he gave no impression of realising that the aircraft suffered a lower loss rate than the Lancaster during early Pathfinder operations (even in its Merlin-engined form), nor that in its later radial-engined form, during the latter part of the war, it enjoyed a considerably lower loss rate than the Lancaster (0.56 per cent compared to 0.74 per cent). The fact that 29 per cent of Halifax crews who were shot down survived the experience, compared to only 11 per cent of Lancaster aircrew would have been of little interest to Harris, to whom live aircrew languishing in enemy POW camps were of little interest.

What did matter to Harris was the tonnage of bombs dropped on the Reich.In its lifetime, the average Lancaster would drop 154 tons of bombs, while the average Halifax would drop only 100 tons.

---------

 

First, V-Weapons were designed as retaliation weapons for the Allied bombing campaign. In simple terms, no bombing, no V-weapons.

Secondly is is arguable if putting very considerable efforts into a campaign with the goal of indirectly shortening the opponents material basis (and aereal firebombing of a city is a very indirect way of killing off the enemy army) was really worth the investment.

It took almost three years of continious input of money, technics, material, trained menpower until the bombing campaign showed sustained effects on Germany. However, 'Straight legs' marching all the way into Berlin were the decisive "war-winner", not strategic bombing which wasn't there in sufficient force when it was needed and wasn't needed any more when it was there. I guess those grunts forcing Herrn Hitler into suicide by knocking on his doors would have preferred a couple more trucks, good tanks, APC's, Arty, Close air support, a save trans-atlantic passage or enough ammo etc. to "convince" the average Wehrmacht soldier to raise his hands or, if not, to make it at least more easy to kill him.

Building up a several million-worth strategic airfleet over YEARS, whose only ability was to drop bombs somewhere into urban areas, hoping to kill a worker or destroying a factory here and there was not really of help to end the war as soon as possible.

Cheers,

[ 26. February 2003, 08:56 AM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

Kai :

Will the true numbers ever be told about Nürnburg ?

There have been at least two books written about the great air battle and a web-site dedicated to just this raid, but it is no longer on the waves.

German night fighter claims are at 109. I'll return with hopefully a more realistic figure from the RAF's perspective unless someone beats me to it. In any case it was intense and bombers were falling out of the sky at an unreal rate. Scarecrow flak was seen numerous times(schräg waffen)....

E

 

No bombing, no V-weapons ??

The team of scientists working on military rockets, financed by the German Army, and directed by Werner von Braun started work in earnest in 1932 . Peenemunde was established as a test facility commanded by Reichswehr Captain Walter Dornberger in 1936 .

But then, maybe they were hoping to fly to the moon or use their rockets as giant fireworks in victory parades.....

'The Nazis entered this war under the rather childish delusion that they were going to bomb everybody else..and no-one was going to bomb them' ( Harris, 1942 ).

Revenge cuts both ways in war - always has, always will.

 

Been reading on Nuremberg and Goering but the indictments are quite "open"..?!

Indictments

Count One: Conspiracy to Wage Aggressive War
This count helped address the crimes committed before the war began, showing a plan to commit crimes during the war.

Count Two: Waging Aggressive War, or "Crimes Against Peace"
Including “the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances.”

Count Three: War Crimes
These were the more “traditional” violations of the law of war including treatment of prisoners of war, slave labor, and use of outlaws weapons.

Count Four: Crimes Against Humanity
This count involved the actions in concentration camps and other death rampages.


Found this on another article saying no German was accused of the civilian bombings -not even Goering-in Nuremberg trials? Anyone know if this is true? I tried but did not find info on this.

 

Now we have Harris metaphorically drinking Lancaster crews' blood with relish as he refuses to let them have the lovely Halifax...

Please !

The early Halifaxes, rushed into production, suffered serious design faults, particularly with the rudders.

Granted, these faults were eradicated and the MkIII introduced in 1943 was a well-performing aircraft. But not as well-performing as the Lancaster.

The Lancaster was : -

- easier and quicker to build
- easier and quicker to repair and service
- could carry a greater bomb load, higher and further for the same number of engines and one more crewmember

Twice as many Lancasters were built as Halifaxes - they flew a lot more sorties and certainly flew all the very deep-penetration raids. These were of course the riskiest and probably account for the higher loss rate. As for Pathfinder use, the Halifax was phased out as the increasingly complex and heavy PFF Marker loads were more suited to the enormously flexible Lancaster bomb-bay.

Despite the myth, Harris was not an all-powerful, omnipotent figure exercising diabolical will in all directions, and certainly not with the Ministry of Aircraft Production who had many reasons for concentrating on Lancaster production.

And yes, the Halifax was undoubtedly easier to escape from although this did not become overly clear until well after the war when survival rates could be more prcisely computed. Sad to say, wars ( especially WWII ) were not waged with servicemen's convenience and survival as the highest consideration.

 

Kai for losses on March raid to Nürnberg:

RAF 545 killed
English civilians by a Halifax crash 1
Belgium civilains at Ostend 36
Belgian resistance in secret ops in a Halifax 2
Workers from occupied countries in Nürnberg and Köln were a total of 20

German Luftwaffe crews/ 11 killed
Falk units 8
Nürnberg and surrounding villages 69
Schweinfurt and suroounding villages 2
Oberhausen from Oboe Mossie bomb 23
Köln from Mossie spoof raid 14
Kassel from Mossie spoof raid 2

in the RAF, claims 3 Bf 109's and 2 Fw 190's all from JG 300 were claimed as being shot down. 2 109's made claims from III./JG 301 and from JG 302. Actual German single engine losses were 3 Bf 109's from 9./JG 301, 7./JG 302 and 8./JG 302 due to air combat with the bombers.

Here is another RAF statistic on this raid for RAF bombers lost.....

Crashed on take-off 1
Shot down by nf 79+
shot down by flak 13, though I think it was less than this.....
hit by both flak and fighters 2
collision 2
Shot down by another bomber 1
Crashed on or crash-landed in England 9
Written off after battle damage 1

pretty grim stats I would say

E

 

Martin :

for comparison reasons only......were there any missions flown by Lancasters for mining(gardening duties) ? I am not aware that they flew on low-flying sorties or am I wrong about this ? have understood the lighter bombers and Hali's were used for these missions along German coast and into the straits of Denmark/Norway.

E

 

Thanx for the info Erich,Martin!



Nuremberg in the end 1945



Actually Moscow and July 1941 German bombing, but a "rare" pic

http://asylums.hihome.com/gallery-bourke-white.htm